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Marlborough at the Peak of His Career

MARLBOROUGH, HIS LIFE AND TIMES. By the Right Honorable Winston Churchill. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1935. Vols. III and IV. \$3 each.

Reviewed by ARTHUR LYON CROSS

IN the first two volumes of his brilliant biography Mr. Churchill covered the first fifty-two years of Marlborough's life. The eldest surviving son of a scholarly country gentleman, whose modest property was practically wiped out in consequence of the Civil War, John Churchill, charming, gifted, and ambitious, had to tread a rough and tortuous road on his way to power and fame. The author, in his valiant efforts to cleanse the memory of his illustrious ancestor from the stains left by the aspersions of some of the preceding historians and biographers, dealt with much contentious matter and many dubious episodes in the first instalment of his extensive work.

Although William of Orange had come, before his death, to recognize that Churchill—now Earl of Marlborough and lieutenant-general—would be indispensable in the prosecution of his vast design, it was under Anne that his unique opportunity came. Shortly after her accession he was made captain-general of the forces and master-general of the ordinance, and within a twelvemonth—in spite of Sarah's reluctance—Duke. The two volumes under review cover only three years, 1702-1705, but three momentous and troubled years, marked by the "glorious victory" of Blenheim and another achievement, also fraught with consequences, the capture of Gibraltar.

In dealing with these stirring events Mr. Churchill has risen to great heights. He has made an exhaustive examination of manuscript and printed materials, he has grasped firmly the complicated lines of politics and diplomacy in Great Britain and abroad and woven them skilfully with the military and naval operations into a narrative that is crystal clear. Archdeacon Coxe, who published his monumental work more than a century ago, was apparently given the run of the Blenheim papers but he overlooked some and omitted others. Later they were withheld from investigators: even Mr. George Macaulay Trevelyan was unable to make use of them. Mr. Churchill devotes most of his preface of over a dozen pages to the variety of (Continued on page 547)

Mantle for Bones


By LENORE G. MARSHALL

NOW the soft laconic snow
Fills the hollow where it lies,
Covers root and mould and rot
Chilly in a pure disguise.

Root and mould and slug and rot
By a feather buried deep,
Who would dread eternity
Lost beneath a jewelled sleep?

When the crystal witchery
Brittly cracks and draws away,
See, implacable the earth
Marches on its old decay.

Where's a mantle for these bones?
Call back snow or summon shine—
Turn your head and dare not look—
Hasten, leaf and flower and vine.



JO MIELZINER'S STAGE DESIGN FOR "PANIC" (Photo by Juley)

Social Moralists and Science

BY JOHN CHAMBERLAIN

SOME weeks ago I taxed the late William Graham Sumner, the founder of American sociology, with having made certain root assumptions which conditioned and necessarily dictated the nature of his political economy. Whereupon that formidable and lusty fighter, Albert Galloway Keller, sprang to the defense of his intellectual master. Sumner, he said, never "assumed" anything. The word, in Keller's opinion, smacked of "metaphysics"; it was blood-brother to the futile word "posited." It is true, he said, that Sumner's essays* on contemporary issues of the 1880s, the 1890s, and the early 1900s abound in conclusions that have an *ex cathedra* ring; but fighting speech must have this ring. In reality, however, all of Sumner's conclusions "rest on the hard, inductive process of fact-gathering extended over a period of many years."

Before I pursue this quarrel with Sumner's disciple, literary executor, and successor at Yale University, let me limit my ground. This essay will have next to nothing to say about Sumner as a sociologist (he called himself a sociologist). I am an intermittent reader of the "Folkways," and sufficiently versed in them to know that the many startling sociological discoveries attributed to Vilfredo Pareto may be found in Sumner in less systematic (and some might say less pretentious) form. But I have not had the benefit of the advanced courses in "Sumnerology," and have no right to opinions about the scientific validity of his sociological conclusions.

But political economy is another matter. When one speaks of an "assumption" in political economy, one is not referring to anything "metaphysical," unless the desires of men are metaphysical, which, I suppose, in the last analysis they are. The "assumption" behind Sumner's champion-

ship of Free Trade is that "cheapness is desirable." Linked with this "assumption" is another: that it is "unfair to tax some men for the immediate benefit of others." (I say "immediate," because I believe, with Sumner, that protection is of no ultimate value to anybody. In other words, I, too, assume that "cheapness is desirable.")

However, if the case for protectionism is correctly stated, without verbal smoke-screen, it is as intellectually respectable as the case for Free Trade. As Lawrence Dennis has said, the assumption of the protectionists is that "security is desirable." Not security for John Jones, the factory hand, nor for Bill Smith, the farmer, who stand to lose when the trade and credit cycles are aggravated by the economic monkey-wrenches of the protectionists. But security for the industrial and financial *élite* who derive revenue from the internal banking system of a country, and who may need guns and ammunition and ships of war to protect their spheres of economic interest, wherever they may happen to be.

Sumner wrote a textbook on the financial history of the United States. He knew as much about money and credit as any other man of his time, so far as I am able to judge. But, in that pungent pamphlet, "Protectionism: The—Ism Which Teaches That Waste Makes Wealth," reprinted in its entirety in Volume II of the Essays, Sumner is guilty of a method of economic abstraction that seems to me indefensible. By talking for more than a hundred pages of *trade on a barter basis* (and any trade on this basis must be "free" if one is to get a maximum satisfaction of wants from the material which he has to trade), Sumner manages to forget pretty completely the conditions under which modern trade functions. He forgets the processes of borrowing and lending. He forgets that men differ (i.e., that some prefer "cheapness," while others prefer "security"). He forgets the monetary aspects of

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Drama of the Crisis

PANIC. A Play in Verse. By Archibald MacLeish. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. 1935. \$2.

Reviewed by BEN RAY REDMAN

THIS play was written for stage production, and only upon a stage may it be seen and heard and judged in its completed form. The reader of the text must imagine for himself the theatrical contributions of light and sound effects, of shifting tableaux and vocal orchestration; but he at least enjoys the advantage, if his imagination is lively, of being able to supply these things in perfection, instead of possibly having to make shift with inadequate acting or faulty direction. And the reviewer of the text, even while he seeks to picture the ideal production, is not really concerned with how "Panic" may play, but only with how it reads. What has the author to say, and how has he said it?

What he has to say is to provide an interpretation of what is happening to a world which feels itself slipping from an established order towards it knows not what. And he has said what he has to say in poetry, not merely in verse;—in poetry that reduces the complexity of real life to symbols that are at once a simplification and an artistic intensification of reality. McGafferty, protagonist of the drama, is no flesh-and-blood banker and industrialist: he is the quintessence of great banking and big business, he incarnates a whole social philosophy and system of values, he embodies an era in the history of mankind. The minor bankers, who surround him, are little more than an articulate ballet, moving and speaking in the almost mechanical routine of their kind. The mob of unemployed, which invades McGafferty's office, is a poor thing as mobs go; but, speaking through the mouth of the Blind Man, it is a mighty portent and prophecy. Ione, McGafferty's mistress, is Woman. To her love is enough, man and woman in each other's arms, whatever worlds may crash. And the words spoken by the voices that rise from the street—the anonymous voices, young and old, speaking in fear, in prayer, in anguish, in hate, and in bewilderment—are not so much individual utterances as fragmentary snatches of a mighty chorus, eddying

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Social Moralists and Science

(Continued from first page)

the situation. And he forgets the uncomfortable phenomenon of *man as nationalist*. Sumner, in brief, was for *Free Trade*, but he neglected to determine the nature of the conditions necessary for the preservation and maintenance of the unimpeded exchange of goods.

I have never talked with a classical Free Trader who had a realistic definition of the State. The classical Free Trader's final lack of intellectual sharpness, his final argumentative impotence, invariably goes back to an unwillingness to study the State. Sumner, of course, knew a lot about the rise and composition of the State throughout recorded history. But when he came to function as a moralist in the politico-economic battles of the 1880s and 1890s, he was guilty of ambivalent definition. When it suited him to assume that the State is an impartial economic "arbiter," a judge of fairness that is "above the battle," he did so. When it suited him to assume that the State is a collection of fallible and certainly not disinterested people, he did this. Thus he played both ends against the middle.

The State, says Laski, is a "function of that group or groups which are in a position to make the most effective demands upon it." "In a well-ordered State," says Sumner in "Protectionism," "it is the function of government to repress every selfish interest which arises and endeavors to encroach upon the rights of others. The State thus maintains justice." Every term in Sumner's sentences betrays a lack of realism that is appalling in a man whose life-work was to study the behavior of men in society. What is a "well-ordered" State? Marxists and Jeffersonians disagree. If the State is a "function

power-groups will define what is and what is not selfish. The dominant power-groups will also confuse "right" with "prescriptive right." Sumner was not a Rousseau-ist, but his definition of the State and its duties is a hodge-podge of Rousseau-istic terms. "Right," "justice," "order," are all words that mean nothing save in so far as they are pumped full of content by men with philosophies, i.e., by men who make value-assumptions. If different men make different value-assumptions, they will, as a human corollary, quarrel over what the State is to do. And they will, by ballot or bullet, try to seize and hold the fulcrum of the State in order to clear the way for their own differing conceptions of "right," of "justice," and of "order." The very fact that men split into different political parties proves the elementary truth of this. Sumner, however, overlooked this truth.

I may seem to be wandering from the subject, which is Sumner as a Free Trade economist. Yet the subject of Free Trade has a very intimate connection with the State. If the State is a "function of that group or groups which are in a position to make the most effective demands upon it," then it will be used, inevitably, to advance the cause of Free Trade or of Protection in so far as the power-groups deem it to their advantage so to use it. And a power group will not think in abstract, long-run terms, such as the eventual "greatest good for the greatest number." In the long run, says John Maynard Keynes, we're all dead; and what is good for "humanity" may be bad for a man's immediate position.

What I am getting at is that there is in each national unit an *élite* (to use the Paretan term, which, incidentally, may be found in the "Folkways") that is interested in maintaining its power, i.e., its prescriptive rights (based on control of the police and the military) to what Harold Lasswell calls "income, deference, and safety." If Free Trade seems to offer

the most effective road to maintenance of power, then Free Trade will be used, not as an end (the end is the maintenance of power), but as a means. If Protection seems to be the effective means, then it will be used.

England is the classical home of Free Trade. But England (meaning the English governing class that rose to power with the industrial revolution) did not institute Free Trade because Adam Smith had approved it; Adam Smith was thrust into prominence and made the father of Manchester political economy because Free Trade promised income, deference, and safety to the Manchester cotton goods enterprisers. It was to the immediate interests of landowners and yeomen to prevent the rise of Free Trade. In the long run, Free Trade meant a higher standard of living for the British Isles. But it meant that men whose organisms had become conditioned to the raising of corn had to die or make themselves over painfully when Free Trade made British agriculture unprofitable. If the yeomen had been able to control the fulcrum of the State, they would most certainly have prevented the rise of the Manchester school, which ended their income, made



WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER

them objects of contempt, and tossed them to the wolves of chance.

Free Trade must be "international." It must, in other words, be carried on in terms of a stable monetary medium. The terms of contracts must be enforced by a police power with a single aim. In brief, Free Trade cannot brook a rival *élite* with an aim that is not "cheapness," but "security." But the whole history of the nineteenth century is the history of the objection of rival *élites* in control of the fulcrums of rival States to England's "internationalism." The rival *élites* may or may not have wanted cheapness, but they did not want it to be controlled by London, through the English gold pound, or by the English police power, through the British navy and army. Control from London would necessarily entail a diminishing of local satisfactions comprised under the headings of "deference" and "safety," whatever it might mean in terms of increased income all around.

I submit that a political economy that has no room for basic human desires such as those for deference and safety is a feeble political economy. And the fact that it is feeble is being demonstrated by the political action of the heirs of the Manchester economists and industrialists. These heirs have recently been calling for protective tariffs. It may be for the good of the world that cotton manufacturing should pass from Lancashire to Japan, China, and India. It may be that the standard of living in Great Britain would eventually rise because of the free-functioning on a world scale of a "natural" division of labor. But the immediate income, and the immediate titles to deference, and the immediate safety, of the present ruling class (i.e., the groups able to make the most effective demands upon the British parliament), are endangered

by the rise of other cotton manufacturing areas. This being so, it is Quixotic to expect the Manchester cotton manufacturer to sit still and let events take their natural course. His organism has been conditioned to a certain way of life. And, like any animal, he will fight to preserve his way of life. A science of political economy will recognize this.

An *élite's* titles to wealth depend on the soundness of the financial institutions of the national unit which is controlled by the *élite* in question. A shaky currency will, in turn, mean shaky stocks and bonds, capricious land valuation, uncertain insurance policies. If, under Free Trade, a national unit is experiencing a drain of the gold that stabilizes its currency, the *élite* will, most certainly, take steps to stop the drain, lest it lose its titles to wealth. One of the ways to stop the drain is the way of the protective tariff. An adverse balance of trade simply means that a nation is trading some of its gold for goods, instead of goods for goods. Free trade of gold for goods might, under certain conditions, mean the collapse of a banking system, which would entail a loss of the whole triad of income, deference, and safety for an *élite*. The protective tariff, by adding a cost to the foreign manufacturer, makes it improbable that an importer will foot the bill in gold for a more costly article. It makes it probable that he will buy at home, for less, thus stopping the drain of gold from one national unit into another.

Sumner would deny the relevance of all this by saying that "compensation" inevitably sets in to stop the trend of events that results in an adverse monetary position. A nation that is buying more than it is selling may, by way of compensation, borrow the difference back. But, in the end, the carrying charges of the debt, if the money is not used to produce goods with which to right the balance of trade, which may or may not be the case. Individuals, in any event, will bring whatever pressure they can to bear on the fulcrum of the State. Individuals will not wait for "compensatory" economics to work if the run promises to be too long. Once more: in the long run we're all dead.)

The fact that Free Trade demands a stable monetary medium (provided before the war by a bill of exchange drawn on London) if contracts are to be validated, and the fact that it demands the police power necessary to enforce the terms of contracts, work together to make Free Traders into Imperialists. It is no accident that Britain, great Free Trade nation, is the greatest of Imperialist nations. Selling finished goods at the ends of the earth, and often lending the wherewithal to pay for these goods, demands both a stable medium of exchange and the police power or financial pressure necessary to keep it stable. But Sumner, the Man of Trust, was an anti-Imperialist. His essay on "The Conquest of the United States by Spain" is probably the most impassioned anti-imperialist document in existence. Sumner's political economy, here, splits into unreconciled halves.

And it splits again on the question of land, which is the source of all wealth used in trade. One of Sumner's essays leaves one with the distinct impression that he regarded the monopoly of land and natural resources by the powerful to be an inevitable thing. If everyone could get at the land—at the source of all wealth—there would be no question that Free Trade would be practicable. For, given access to the land, no one would lack for trading material. Henry George, a Free Trader, completed his system by evolving the political economy of the Single Tax in "Progress and Poverty." But Sumner regarded Henry George as a trifle off his head, a man with good fighting prose style but little else. And so, while Sumner argued for a "free" market on the one hand, he argued on the other for the "inevitability" of the monopolization of nat-

ural resources. As a social scientist, he may be right in observing that monopoly in land will always exist. But other social scientists may just as plausibly aver that the monopoly fostered by the protective tariff will always exist. If one fact of human desire and might is true, another similar fact may also be true. The moralist and the scientist were at war in Sumner.

In answering those who argue that "security" demands a diversification of industries, Sumner argued that a one-product nation, if that product were cheap enough to excite the desire of everyone, could have all the steel, coal, and finished goods that it wanted. Such a nation would have no need of a steel industry, said Sumner, for it could get more steel for its one product than it could if it diversified its industry to include the making of steel. Why, in the face of the inflow of steel, should this nation try to become "secure" by making steel more costly to itself?

The answer is obvious: blockades can cut off the supply of outside steel. Nations whose *élites* make a fetish of "security" know this very well. Japan may be importing scrap iron at a fast pace at the moment, but it is not doing it in the interests of cheapness. It is doing it because it cannot foster "infant" steel industries at home by protection. It simply lacks the requisite natural resources. If it had them, it would foster them, cheapness or no cheapness. And, in terms of security for the Japanese *élite* (not the Japanese people as a whole), it would be quite right to do so.

Now let me jump back to Sumner's able defender, Keller. Recently I urged many of the foregoing points upon him. "What you are saying," he replied, "is what Lowell said: 'Truth forever on the scaffold, wrong forever on the throne.' But that doesn't invalidate Sumner's position." Well, Keller is trying to assemble enough material upon which to build, inductively, a science of political economy.

But what is the scaffold and why "wrong" is forever on the throne? If this happens, then there must be certain laws governing the eternal crucifixion of the truths of free trade economy when they come into contact with the facts of nation-clusters and of the borrowing and lending processes of finance capitalism. Sumner flinched from a formulation of these laws because he was a moralist, not a scientist, when confronted with the behavior of human beings as animals interested in income, deference, and safety and in employing the State as a means of attaining this triad. His inability to give us a science of economic behavior derived from his vague analysis of the nature of the State. Franz Oppenheimer knew better; Harold Laski knows better. "... international order," says Laski, "must fit the categories of a unified economic world, and this has completely outgrown the limitations which the sovereign State, as a political category, puts upon it. An international order, to be effective, must control things like currency, tariffs, labor standards, migration, access to raw materials, the penetration of backward areas, and so forth. . . ."

This means that to get along in orderly fashion without a World State men must be inhumanly like-minded in their desires, or it means that some one Imperialist State must impose its will on the others, or it means Lenin and international communism. Or it means that we will get along without international order, which seems likely at the moment. But if we are to get along without international order, be sure the Free Traders will not find the world of the future to their liking. It will remain a world of tariffs, of currency wars, of real wars, of imperialist jockeying for position. It will remain a world of various *élites* (such as the Thyssen-Krupp *élite* of Germany) who differ from each other by variation in root assumptions. It will remain a world in which some nations fight for "cheapness," and in which some nations fight for "security." And true social scientists will study this world as it is, not as they would like it to be. They will leave the "oughts" to the moralists.

* The author of this essay has tried to demonstrate this in "Farewell to Reform" (John Day).