

The Form and the Structure

HOW TO WIN THE PEACE. By Carl J. Hambro. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co. 1943. 384 pp. \$3.

Reviewed by PETER F. DRUCKER

OF the statesmen from the small countries who worked so hard to make the League of Nations a success, and who so often showed better judgment, greater ability, and greater honesty than the diplomats and foreign ministers of the Great Powers, none worked harder than Carl J. Hambro of Norway. Dr. Benes was the chief diplomatist of Geneva; the Swedes Nansen and Branting were the great humanitarians who toiled unceasingly to combat suffering and cruelty; Ireland furnished a bevy of distinguished international administrators; and the Dutch sent economists and were forever busy combatting the economic nationalism of the Great Powers.

But, though far less well-known to the newspapermen and to the public, Mr. Hambro was perhaps the most useful man in the Geneva of the late twenties and early thirties when the League time and again seemed ready to become what its founders had expected it to be: a real international organization of peace. He was the Parliamentarian of Geneva, the man who could always find a procedural formula to do things, who could get the unwilling representatives of the Great Powers to make the minor concessions needed to keep the show going, who could heal diplomatic breaches, gloss over indiscretions, reconcile personal clashes, and find a way out of impossible situations. He represented a type otherwise unknown in Geneva—or, for that matter, in the Europe of the Long Armistice. He never indulged in the moral cynicism which passed for conservatism in the foreign offices of the Great Powers—and of a good many small powers as well. Yet, he was worlds apart from the well-meaning visionaries. He was—and is—a shrewd judge of power-politics who, nevertheless, believes in basic values; and he is an idealist—in the best sense of the word—who is not above horse-trading in the interest of his ideals. If the maintenance of the League of Nations had been a problem of political tactics, patience, and parliamentary skill, Mr. Hambro would have maintained it.

This present book shows, unfortunately, very little of the man whom everybody in Geneva respected and not a few loved. His great parliamentary skill has led the author to concentrate on questions of parliamentary procedure, technique, and machinery. Mr. Hambro undoubtedly has

a definite concept of the basis of peace. He believes in world-federation, he is convinced that the League of Nations must be the starting-point for all peace-planning, and he sees the main problem as one of neutralizing the Great Powers. But he does not argue any of his points. And while the reader will applaud his insistence that the small countries not be bullied by the Great Powers, he will hardly be satisfied with Mr. Hambro's proposal to solve the problem by means of parliamentary technique; it is fruitless to attempt the reconciliation of the conflicting claims of national sovereignty and of an international order by tinkering with the voting rules or with the seating arrangements of a council whose decision no Great Power is willing to accept. And altogether the best part of Mr. Hambro's concrete suggestions are in the field of procedural details, whereas, as he himself points out often enough, it is fundamentals which we need today.

The reader will probably in this, as in so many post-war plans, enjoy the negative and critical parts more than the positive and constructive ones. He will find a great deal that is important and worthwhile in Mr. Hambro's criticism of the policy of Great Britain



Carl J. Hambro would neutralize the Great Powers.

and of the United States, in his serious and strong attack against the school which regards economics as the most important part of peace-making, and in his remarks on the limits of peace-planning. And altogether it might well be said that this is a book in which the *obiter dicta* are often more important and more profound than the thesis itself.

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An Anticipatory Rebuttal

DEMOCRATIC IDEALS AND REALITY. By Halford J. Mackinder. Foreword by Major G. F. Eliot. Introduction by Professor E. M. Earle. New York: Henry Holt & Co. 1942. 219 pp. \$2.50.

Reviewed by JACQUES BARZUN

THIS is a reprint of a book on modern political geography first published in 1919 and thoroughly neglected between that time and this. As so often happens when the public is behindhand in its thinking, recognition had to come to the author from abroad, on the rebound. It came, indeed, not merely from a foreigner but from a declared enemy, the notorious General Karl Haushofer, elaborator of the supposed science of Geopolitics.

It is not that Sir Halford Mackinder was an obscure or unqualified writer twenty-three years ago, nor that Haushofer has simply copied him. The British writer was a well-known geographer, who pleaded, not for world conquest, but for a recognition of continental configuration in the political settlements of the last war. It was he who originated the terms

Heartland and World Island and showed the relation between the military command of East Europe and that of the whole world. He was one of the few observers of that era to see how nearly Germany had succeeded in the First World War; and being concerned—as his title shows—with democratic ideals, he urged a political reorganization of Europe into three, not two, state-systems, working within a general League of Nations. The details of his proposal are still worth pondering. They are the anticipatory rebuttal to Haushofer who was to turn him inside out by denying his major premise of European peace. At times the British geographer is confused in his exposition, but it is his syntax, and not his thoughts, that thwarts him and the reader. Still the book is short, the words simple, and the main propositions perfectly intelligible. As Professor Earle says in his lucid and helpful introduction, "although this book can be read and reread with profit by specialists it is by no means for them alone."

Jacques Barzun is the author of *"Darwin, Marx, and Wagner,"* and *"Of Human Freedom."* He is Professor of History at Columbia University.

Controlling Germany After the War

CAN WE WIN THE PEACE? By Paul
Einzig. London: Macmillan & Co.,
Ltd. 1942. 148 pp. \$2.

Reviewed by CHESTER W. WRIGHT


THIS book has been written to oppose the groups in England which the author calls the "appeasers" and advocates of a peace that he believes will be too lenient toward Germany. Its main thesis is that Germany must not only be completely demilitarized but that her economic life must be so limited and controlled that there can be no possibility of her quickly rearming as in 1933-39. While this thesis was advanced in an earlier book, the author here seeks to state in more detail just how he believes such a program can be carried out without at the same time appreciably lowering the standard of living of the German people, the fear of which it is realized would be the chief objection to the plan among most "appeasers." The necessity for such a program rests on the assertion that the present generation in Germany, especially in Prussia, is incurably militaristic and would seize on the first possibility of rearming and starting a new war. It is claimed that this program is not contrary to any specific provisions of the Atlantic Charter, but the author insists that if the Germans persist in carrying on the war to the bitter end the Charter statement should be withdrawn and his program should be ruthlessly carried out regardless of the effect upon German living conditions.

The program for Germany's economic disarmament presented here is drastic and widespread; only the main points can be noted. First of all, Germany must be deprived of her machine tool industries, for they were the

chief economic factor making possible the rapid rearmament after 1933. Her arms industries must be completely dismantled along with all the synthetic raw material and oil refining industries. Her available supplies of oil, metals, rubber, fertilizer, and textiles must be kept down to the current requirements for civilian use. Hitler's New Order for the economic organization of the Continent, which is designed to make Germany the workhouse for the area and the rest of the countries her satellite suppliers of food and raw materials, dependent upon her for manufactures, must be completely reversed. The rest of the Continent should be made economically independent of Germany and Germany's foreign trade should be largely shifted to overseas regions; though it must be recognized that she may have to be allotted markets—but no colonies—sufficient to dispose of enough goods to pay for her imports. Finally, even with military and economic disarmament, "it would not be possible to safeguard peace unless the Reich is dismembered into its constituent elements." This last suggestion, it is candidly admitted, will probably be the most unpopular in the book; it is certainly the one most weakly defended.

As regards reparation payments, it is stated we should avoid such economically impossible claims as were made after the last war, frankly facing the fact that any adequate repayment cannot be obtained; but insist on requiring whatever can be recovered in the form of war materials, machinery, merchant shipping, and property seized in occupied countries.

It cannot be said that the author has clearly established what he set out to prove: that is, that the economic disarmament program advocated could be carried through without any appreciable decrease in the German standard of living. The economic results of any such sweeping program as he proposes involve infinitely more complex calculations than are even suggested in this volume. Also, there is everywhere present a tendency to ignore or to minimize points which do not support the author's thesis. No consideration is given to the time element required for such radical changes and to the effects, economic and political, of the economic disorganization inevitable during this period. Probably nobody could work out all the consequences involved with any pretense to accuracy, but certainly a far more exhaustive analysis of all that this program implies should be attempted before the author's thesis can be given support. Most economists, if called upon to give an off-hand deci-



sion, would, I believe, deny the likelihood that the thesis could be justified.

To say this obviously does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that such a program should not be adopted. The economic consequences are not the only, nor even the ultimate, considerations which must govern the final decision. It is clear that the author would ignore economic considerations altogether if necessary to prevent Germany starting another war. The various causes of war, among which the economic cannot be ignored, receive practically no attention. Certainly economic suffering and disorder were factors in the rise of the autarchies which culminated in the present conflict. Certainly—anent the proposal for dismembering the Reich—the splitting up of the Austro-Hungarian empire into a group of little, economically impotent countries providing easy prey for powerful neighbors hastened, even if it did not cause, the outbreak of the present war. The assertion that some of these countries "were highly satisfied with the new arrangement" may be correct, but it certainly does not prove that economic losses for the people were not involved or that they would not be involved in a breakup of Germany.

While it must be noted that the problem discussed in this book constitutes but a very small fraction of the large group of problems that will have to be faced in any program to win the peace, it is one of the issues about which controversy is likely to be very acute. Thus, the sooner its various aspects are explored and placed before the public the better the prospect for a wise decision.

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