

**The World.** *It is no accident that publishers' lists are bulging with books on the Russian problem like Norborg's "Operation Moscow," reviewed below. Whether these books are for or against is perhaps less important than the contribution they make to the existing body of accurate information—and we realize that the word "accurate" will be immediately challenged by the semanticists. We know so little of Russia, indeed, so little of the world—now thrust into our laps by the accident of war—that the crying need is for information. The Council on Foreign Relations has performed a real service in bringing out "The United States in World Affairs," a book which might well be required background reading for more controversial books such as "Operation Moscow." "Exact knowledge of what has happened and what is happening," writes Lindsay Rogers in reviewing this book below, "must precede the suggestion of any solutions that have a chance of working." We heartily agree.*

## World Headache

**OPERATION MOSCOW.** By Christopher Norborg. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. 1947. 319 pp. \$3.50.

Reviewed by LOUIS FISCHER

**D**URING the wartime honeymoon, books on Russia multiplied even when they were not fruitful, yet comrades and camp followers did not complain, for most of the product, like the official propaganda, was patriotically uncritical of a gallant ally.

Two years of "peaceful" living with the Soviets, however, have burned up the blinkers and the authors, and changed the attitudes of the governments, as well. Communists and fellow-travelers thereupon suddenly discovered that the market was glutted. "Too many books on Russia," they cry. They mean, too many books on Russia are anti-Stalin.

The books, whether sober or passionate, usually agree on the facts. Soviet Russia is aggressive, imperialistic, uncooperative, obstructionist; the documentation is in everyday's newspaper. Where the books vary is in explaining the world headache which is Russia, and in prescribing the cure.

Russia is America's and the world's biggest problem. Why? Dr. Christopher Norborg, Norwegian-born American, ex-clergyman, associate professor of philosophy at the University of Minnesota, chief of an OSS section during the war, and later head of the North European division of UNRRA, attacks the Russian question with the weapon of psychoanalysis. He finds that the "supercapitalist Stalinist class system" is led by men with a "prima donna mentality" and "fanatic self-admiration." Soviet distrust of the West has a "psychotic character." The Soviet peoples, he states, are normal, healthy, and friendly, but "the other Russia," the "imperial Stalinist oligarchy of the Politburo," is isolating its subjects from the West by the



—Justus in The Minneapolis Star.  
Pied Piper.

iron curtain of Pan-Slav nationalism, the secret police, and a Russia-did-everything-first-and-best psychology.

The Politburo, Dr. Norborg maintains, is self-righteous and protests its perfectionism at international conferences because of a deep sense of guilt over what it has been doing at home. The Soviet aristocracy exploits the people; millions of serf laborers toil for less than is necessary to sustain life. The Soviet sinner then charges the outside world with endless sins.

Stalin and his lieutenants got that way, according to Christopher Norborg, as a result of Czarist persecution. Not only were they frequently arrested and exiled to Siberia, but the monarchy filled their ranks with spies, so that few were trusted. These and other circumstances "incapacitated the Soviet leaders for the normal give-and-take of human friendship." They "unlearned every natural trait of human confidence." Hence the all-powerful, ubiquitous secret police to operate at home; hence strong-arm and iron-heel diplomacy abroad.

Dr. Norborg proceeds, from this point, to a summary of the steps

which Moscow has taken in recent years in accordance with "a global blueprint for Marxist world conquest." The story is impressive even if some opinions might be rejected. To achieve its ends Moscow, the author says, employs "duality and duplicity, deception and pressure, sweetness and bitterness, protests of friendship and attacks of indignation . . ." Stalin tactics are "nihilistic," "amoral," and "unconventional." Most foreigners are too decent to believe that any government could be so depraved.

What to do?

Dr. Norborg offers Operation Moscow to cope with Soviet imperialism and Communism. It consists, chiefly, in organizing international police outside the United Nations; outside the UN because the Russians have not permitted a UN police force. Quoting from the San Francisco Charter, the author contends that regional defense and security measures are specifically permitted. If the Russians ever accept international control of atomic energy, or grant civil rights to their own people and their East-European colonials, such measures would become superfluous. But it is late and time is running out, Dr. Norborg affirms, and, since Russia has to be checked, the free nations (he excludes Franco Spain and Salazar Portugal) should proceed at once with their own defensive organization.

For the rest, we must turn to God and church worship. "This is the night of modern nihilism" and man needs the light of religion to guide him through the gloom. Church attendance in Europe is down to ten per cent of the population, and in America, too, religious services are not as popular as they should be. However, "The fact that the Christian church has all but lost its power may give it a divine opportunity, once again, to regain the savor of that salt, which is essential to mankind."

Dr. Norborg has a keen eye and he knows what is wrong with the planet. But I am afraid he does not place enough emphasis on the evils in the non-Soviet world. Stalin, like Hitler, has fed on our own weak-

### SOLUTION OF LAST WEEK'S DOUBLE-CROSTIC (No. 700)

EDGAR ALLAN POE:  
PREFACE TO POEMS\*

You are aware of the great barrier in the path of an American writer. . . . Our fops glance from binding to title-page, where the mystic characters which spell London, Paris, or Genoa, are precisely so many letters of recommendation.

\* 1831; Poe revised this thought later, so this expression may not be exact today.

nesses—and they are not merely military. They are economic, social, and political, as well as moral. The only way to prevent a war with Russia is to remove those weaknesses. Stalin would be powerless against a healthy, clean, internationally-unified, really-democratic democratic world.

## Policy and Strategem

**THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS.** By John C. Campbell. New York: Harper & Bros. 1947. 585 pp. \$5.

Reviewed by LINDSAY ROGERS

**T**HE ENGLISH historian F. W. Maitland once said that some pedestrian labors might be justified on the ground that they would at least save the eyes and the time of the great man if and when he came along. Annual surveys are likely to give point to this description, but Mr. Campbell and his associates have accomplished the difficult task of writing a readable and interesting account of American foreign policy from the end of the war in Europe to the spring of 1947. With their volume the Council on Foreign Relations resumes the series which it began in 1931 and continued through 1940. It will deal with the war period separately and later.

History teaches no clearer lesson than that of the facile dissolution of alliances which are not sustained by a powerful, evident solidarity of interests. . . . The cement of a bloody war conducted in alliance is notoriously weak for binding nations.

In his introduction, Mr. John Foster Dulles does not quote what the English economist J. A. Hobson said a good many years ago, but he suggests that those who are surprised by the tensions and hostility between former allies have forgotten their history, even such recent history as the aftermath of the war of 1914-1918. Now ideological differences deepen the rift, but Mr. Dulles sees no reason for despair. He thinks it possible to find "internationally a way of life whereby differences of belief and practice may exist without those differences leading to violence." He is not very specific on how this can be done but exact knowledge of what has happened and what is happening must precede the suggestion of any solutions that have a chance of working. "Theory divorced from fact," he remarks, "is dangerous, and there persists an excessive hangover of war illusion."

Mr. Campbell's volume sets out the

recent facts which must be studied if a workable way of life is to be found. He has succeeded in not being overwhelmed by a detail that is enormous. After two general chapters which outline the world position of the United States, its wartime decisions and commitments, the problem of strategic bases, and the creation of the United Nations organization, he turns to a meticulous account of the problems faced in the search for the peace treaties in Europe and the behavior and stratagems of those who have done the searching. There is an able summary of the different proposals for dealing with Germany, the conflicting policies that came out of Washington, the clashing of views of the Four Powers, and the tangled disputes over reparations.

These problems so preoccupied policymakers in Washington that they allowed our relations with Latin America to deteriorate. Mr. Campbell discusses these (and the political ferments in different countries) under a heading which discloses a point of view: "Threats to the Good Neighbor Policy." An appraisal of American responsibilities in the Far East, with a comprehensive discussion of the situation in Korea and the civil war in China, concludes the parts of the survey which deal, geographically, so to speak, with American foreign policy.

On our participation in the several international agencies that have been set up—perhaps the proliferation has been too great—there is a full record: UNNRA; the reasons for our aban-

donment of international relief; the Food and Agriculture Organization; proposals for the reconstruction of foreign trade; the bank and the fund; the projected trade organization, and UNESCO. The survey ends with a summary of the "accomplishments" of the United Nations and an analysis of the issues on which Russia and her satellites have clashed with the states of the Western world—the control of the atomic bomb, disarmament, the treatment of displaced persons, the work of the Economic and Social Council, and so on.

Surveys sponsored by institutions cannot praise or blame as an independently written book may. Mr. Campbell, nevertheless, has kept his account from being colorless, and on the more important matters does not conceal his opinions from the reader. He accomplished this quite legitimately by adroit adaptations of well-tried devices: "It was soon clear that this thesis could not be maintained"; "in many quarters criticism was prompt and severe." He has a few excellent pages on the organization of the State Department for the "making of foreign policy" which it is to be hoped Secretary Marshall's reforms have made less inadequate.

But the task confronting the policy proposers is tremendous. One indication of its size is Mr. Campbell's "selected" bibliography which runs to forty closely printed pages. The chronology of events takes fifty pages, and an index of ten pages makes easily discoverable the detail with which the book is packed.

