

The World. *While we've been looking the other way, the war has been quietly slipping back into history. Although not yet ready for the historians, it's now entering the biography and memoir stage. General Patton's "War As I Knew It," Ambassador Winant's "A Letter from Grosvenor Square," and "Admiral Halsey's Story" will be published this fall. Shirer's "End of a Berlin Diary" and General de Guingand's "Operation Victory," reviewed below, are both by men worth listening to. De Guingand's book—he was Chief of Staff to General Montgomery—may be read along with Alan Moorehead's recent "Montgomery," and as a possible balance wheel to Ralph Ingersoll's controversial "Top Secret," published last year. . . . If you're feeling a bit guilty about going along with the present "build-up-Germany" trend so soon after the end of the war, read Shirer, who follows the stylistic pattern of his phenomenally successful "Berlin Diary" of 1941.*

Second Warning

END OF A BERLIN DIARY. By William L. Shirer. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1947. 369 pp. \$3.50.

Reviewed by EDGAR ANSEL MOWRER

AS RADIO commentator and author, Bill Shirer has been primarily important to the American people for one gift and one vital conviction.

The gift—possessed to the same degree by no other reporter except Ernie Pyle—is an ability to share experiences and impressions with ordinary people and thereby mold belief.

The conviction is the full horror of the contemporary German betrayal of civilization and the danger of a German triumph at any time.

Gift, conviction, and timeliness combined to make the publication of "Berlin Diary" an American event. Coming at a time when most Americans were hoping to avoid trouble, this book rendered an immense service.

Shirer's second book, "End of a Berlin Diary," may—if it is well read—render the equal service of preventing us from listening to the siren voices of those who would have us rebuild Germany either as the "key to European recovery" (which it is not) or as a "bulwark against bolshevism."

This new book consists of three parts, "Beginning of the Peace," "End of a Berlin Diary," and "Postscript."

The first is a fairly normal diary of a broadcaster's life in the United States and abroad during the last year of the war. It reveals Shirer as an orthodox American liberal. As such he believed:

That the United Nations is much superior to the former League of Nations (disproved by experience);

That the Yalta Agreements were the foundation for a better peace than in 1919;

That the Rockies are more impressive than the Alps and the Himalayas;

That the American delegation at San Francisco was woefully weak (and how!);

That it was a horrible blunder to admit Argentina to the new world organization;

That the United States should have remained in the position of mediator between Great Britain and Russia;

That the important choice facing our times is "progress" or "reaction" (rather than freedom or servitude).

The "Postscript," written in the spring of 1947, seems to me one of

those unfortunate afterthoughts rendered necessary in a world where publishers push writers to hurry and then themselves dawdle along in bringing out their works.

"End of a Berlin Diary" is different. It is an impassioned plea to Americans not to forget in peacetime the salutary truths that we learned at such cost during the war. Written as the diary of a man who had writhed under the Nazis and returned to the beaten Fatherland, it is terribly convincing.

There is something frightening in the drift of the U.S.A. away from its wartime allies and toward reliance upon a restored Germany and a rehabilitated Japan as twin pillars of American security overseas. I leave Russia out of this because in that case the process of alienation did not start in the United States. As late as 1946 the American Government was still making concessions to Moscow and the vast majority of Americans wanted quite sincerely to continue cooperation with Russia into the peace.

But the United States authorities have been hardly more successful in maintaining the wartime partnership with Great Britain and with the liberated countries of Western Europe. Already we are planning such rosy

THE AUTHOR: William L. Shirer, back in his Beekman Place duplex from a summer at Lake Placid, has blacked out his October calendar in apprehension of a month's daily book reviewing for the *New York Herald Tribune*. "It will be good discipline," says Mr. Shirer, who has been coasting the past several months after a major operation. He'll lecture for two weeks in November; then off to his Litchfield, Conn., farm and a play he wants to complete by Christmas. Besides "Berlin Diary," he has written a previous play and novel about India. The latter "fortunately" was not published. He's convinced that "novels are the only thing if you are going to tell the story of our times," and plans to devote himself to fiction if he can manage to retire for the next five or six years. The past twenty-odd have been anything but retiring. After graduation from Coe College, Cedar Rapids, Ia., in 1925 (he's Chicago-born), he took a cattle boat to Europe, where, minus a honeymoon sabbatical on the Catalan coast and some time in Afghanistan and India, he worked through 1945 as foreign correspondent and European Bureau chief for the *Chicago Tribune*, UNS Berlin chief, and CBS Continental representative. He was broadcasting the Austrian *Anschluss* while his wife, a Viennese painter, was giving birth to their first of two daughters. He covered the War Crimes trials, San Francisco Conference, and UN meetings, then won the 1946 George Foster Peabody Award for "outstanding interpretation of the news" for the Columbia Broadcasting System. CBS discontinued his broadcast last April—possibly because of Wall Street and allied pressure, he believes. "My own deep feeling," he says, "is that what happened to me is only part of the general picture of intolerance in America." He's quiet, unpretentious, loves skiing, the theatre, ballet, symphonic and chamber music, plays the accordion and piano. A quarter of his fan mail praises him "for the wrong reasons." The Soviet Union? "Everyone in America should be forced to read Sir Bernard Pares's 'History of Russia!'"



futures for occupied Germany and Japan that disgruntled Britons are savagely remarking that perhaps to keep America's friendship they should have declared war upon and been occupied by us. In that case, they hint sourly, a General MacArthur or a General Clay would have seen to it that they were adequately looked after, their industries rebuilt, their sins forgiven.

Mr. Shirer puts his feeling about the liberated countries in the form of a bitter entry in his diary:

What stumps me, though, is that the Allies don't seem to give a damn about the liberated people, who are also cold and hungry, after having been deliberately starved (and frozen) by the German government for years. Shouldn't we help them first?

Like almost all Americans who really know Germany well, on his return visit Shirer discovered that:

The Germans are unrepentant and still Nazi at heart.

Beaten and bombed Germany could—if permitted—in five years become industrially stronger than in 1939.

Its present capacity of twenty-five million tons of steel annually is five times what it needs for peaceful use.

In 1945 Germany still had four million tons of machine tools on hand and a vast undamaged plant for producing more.

At the time he wrote, Shirer was still blissfully unaware of the Soviet desire to rebuild a strong, unified Germany as an ally of Russia. Thus he foolishly condemned the "so-called Truman Doctrine as an ill conceived and hastily concocted plan that aimed to stem Russian expansion and spread of communism by shelling out American dollars, American arms, and American 'personnel' in support of democracy everywhere." Apparently at the time he felt that a country like ours that did not leap to the defense of democracy when it was attacked by Hitler in 1939 could not possibly be sincere in defending it in 1947. Let us hope that he has now recovered from his "liberal" illusion.

But whatever he thinks of Soviet "democracy," one must agree that no disagreement with Russia would justify victorious America in rebuilding an unregenerate and still Nazi Germany to the point where, alone or as the tool of another power, it could launch a third assault upon civilization. The important thing today is that the Marshall Plan for the restoration of non-Soviet-controlled Europe shall succeed and that within it, German reconstruction be allotted a very minor part.

Politics aside, "End of a Berlin Diary" makes valuable contributions in two other fields. Shirer publishes

captured German documents of the highest interest. He proves how early in Adolf Hitler's loathsome career, the Fuehrer decided on war; how his henchmen went along with him in aggression and wholesale murder almost to the last; how his death is almost sure; how Russia helped double-cross mankind in 1939; how in April 1941 Hitler promised Matsuoka to attack the United States without delay in case Japan got involved in a conflict with us, etc., etc.

Unforgettable too are some of the many German scenes Shirer describes so vividly. At the opening of the Nuremberg trial, he writes:

"This, then, is the climax! This is the moment you have been waiting for all these black despairing years."

As one who also waited thirteen years for the spectacle of those evil men before the Allied judges, I wish "End of a Berlin Diary" long legs.

Where Credit Is Due

OPERATION VICTORY. By Major General Sir Francis de Guingand. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1947. 488 pp. \$3.75.

Reviewed by FORREST C. POGUE

THIS book is noteworthy among recent war studies in giving credit to others for the work they did in winning the war. In the desert fighting, for example, the author points to the excellent work of General Auchinleck and his subordinates and comments, "It is the way of life that so little is heard of Eighth Army's successful offensive against Rommel before [italics are the author's] Montgomery took over command." On the matter of Salerno, he gives a balanced account of British aid to Fifth Army, saying "Some would like to think—I did at the time—that we helped, if not saved, the situation at Salerno. But now I doubt whether we influenced matters to any great extent. General Clark had everything under control before [italics are the author's] Eighth Army arrived."

This is not to say that the book is all "sweetness and light." General Guingand lashes out at the mixture of diplomacy and lack of military power in Greece which brought chaos and disaster, charging that the promises of support used by the British to sell the plan were little short of dishonest. Nor does he spare his chief. While no stronger statement has been published of the fighting qualities of Montgomery at El Alamein, in Tunis, and in Italy, and no better defense has been made of the Field Marshal's actions at Caen, than that of

"Operation Victory," yet the book strikes heavily at the legend that if the Field Marshal had been given his head in September 1944 he would have ended the war before Christmas. On this question General Guingand declares, "I have always held the contrary view, and in the event, I am more than ever convinced I was right."

Champions of Viscount Montgomery will be pleased at the list of his strong points presented—willingness to accept responsibility, clarity of mind, ability to assess a man's true worth, dogged persistence, fairness in treatment of individuals, physical bravery. De Guingand speaks of Montgomery's supreme confidence in himself, noting his intolerance of contrary opinions which "has sometimes served him ill." In assessing the ability of his former chief as a field commander, the writer concludes that few men were his equal in a "big set-piece battle," but concedes that there was sometimes a lack of boldness in a fluid situation which resulted from the Field Marshal's dwindling manpower resources and his desire never to let his troops suffer a major defeat.

"Operation Victory" is sometimes weak because in his desire to be loyal to his chief and to be fair to both sides, General Guingand does not always speak with complete candor. Its strong point is not so much in the excellent eye-witness accounts of the war from 1939-45 when the General served as military assistant to Hore-Belisha, one of the joint planners for the Greek campaign, director of military intelligence for Auchinleck, and chief of staff of Eighth Army and 21st Army Group, but rather in the picture it gives of a soldier who, although frequently ill, contributed mightily to the planning of victory, managed main headquarters of 21st Army Group while his chief was forward with his armies, bearded Montgomery in his caravan in the interest of Allied unity, sought to understand both sides of an argument, and sold many of the plans of his chief to Americans and Britishers who had been angered by the "Master."

General Eisenhower's task of handling divergent personalities whose tempers were heated by sensational newspaper accounts and the flame of battle was made much simpler because General Guingand shared with the Supreme Commander—"a lovable, big-minded, and scrupulously honest soldier"—the conviction that the war was an Allied effort, instead of a national contest. In adopting the same breadth of view in his book, General Guingand has continued to contribute to Allied understanding.