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# The World.

*The newspaper scareheads and the radio alarms of the past few weeks have started thoughtful Americans studying, as they never studied before, the enigma that is the USSR. Although Russia encompasses one-tenth of the population of the earth and its history spans three centuries, the number of informed and judicious volumes about it available in English is scandalously small. The book publishers are, of course, hastening to correct the situation. This week they have added two basic titles. For background, in "Russia and the Russians," Edward Crankshaw, British journalist and historian, offers a concise appraisal of the Russian "national character." To illuminate the urgent questions of the moment, in "The Price of Power" THE NEW YORK TIMES's able analyst, Hanson Baldwin, compares the economic and military potentials of the USSR and the USA.*

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## Analysis of Global Warfare

**THE PRICE OF POWER.** By Hanson W. Baldwin. New York: Harper & Bros. 1948. 361 pp. \$3.75.

Reviewed by

BRIG. GEN. DONALD ARMSTRONG

**A**GAINST the frequently absurd and even dangerous hypotheses of self-appointed military experts, Mr. Baldwin's sober and thoughtful analysis of global warfare comes as a much needed antidote. The atomic bomb has confused the issue. It has engendered ridiculous theories and dangerous concepts, as perilous to this nation's security as the bomb itself in the hands of an enemy. If ever there was need for clear thinking about war and peace, it is now. We cannot afford the luxury of delusions. Our decisions in foreign and military policy must be based on sound premises. Mr. Baldwin's concentration for many months on the problems of modern warfare and his years of study have resulted in expert and objective deductions that will help to refute the fallacious conclusions of the wishful thinkers.

Mr. Baldwin had many helpers in writing this book. The Council on Foreign Relations organized a study group on "National Power and Foreign Policy." The goal of this group, which consisted of distinguished experts on foreign affairs, professors, economists, Army and Navy officers, and businessmen, was realistic. They determined to investigate "the meaning of the technological and political revolution to the strategic position of the United States and to determine, if possible, the consequential effects upon our military and foreign policy."

Mr. Baldwin is spokesman for the group, although he accepts full responsibility for the contents of the book. He is convinced that there is

no likelihood that war will be abolished in our time. Accordingly, we must be familiar with the fundamentals of warfare. He points out that "defense" can only mean defeat and "is completely incompatible with modern reality." Because of the marked superiority of the offense over defense, the only true defense is the threat of retaliation in kind. But Mr. Baldwin knows that that is not enough to defeat an aggressor. As General Marshall pointed out in his final report, to win a war the enemy's ground force must be defeated and we must move into the enemy's territory from which he launches his attacks. This principle is repeatedly emphasized.

While excessive military weakness can invite attack, excessive military strength can precipitate war. "There is a happy mean in armaments as in politics" Mr. Baldwin questions the assumption that the United States will be the first area to be attacked in any future war, and he points out that "a

large-scale invasion of the continental United States is highly improbable; and today, even impossible."


One of the most notable lessons of World War II was the evidence, with some admitted exaggeration, that "the big factories of America won the war." Our industrial strength is, therefore, of paramount importance in our military power. Maximum military efficiency, however, requires that not only our industrial resources but all phases of national life must be directed toward military strength and effectiveness. Although our industrial facilities, quantity and quality of population, raw materials, power and transportation combine to make our economic position the strongest in the world, we run the risk of confusing potential with actual power. In our economic position we have a number of weaknesses that Mr. Baldwin carefully analyzes. Our people must understand the problems of economic mobilization "for it holds the key to future victory and it can affect more basically than any other security measure the lives and liberties of all of us." We must learn to develop our economic potential with the greatest speed, for here time is of the essence.

The political situation is, of course, dominated by the fact of the "bipolar" world of today. Russia and the United States are rivals because of political, economic, and ideological differences.

But a frank acknowledgment of conflict does not necessarily mean [writes Mr. Baldwin] that a shooting war with Russia is inevitable or even probable; certainly it does not portend its imminence. . . . We can hope, therefore, if we follow the right policies, to postpone or avert shooting war with Russia and to ease considerably the present strain and friction, but we can never hope, given the Russian Czarist traditions overlarded with Communist ambitions, to achieve really friendly, easy give-and-take relationships, so long as totalitarian Communism faces democratic capitalism.

Excellent chapters on economic mobilization, intelligence, research and development, dispersion and decentralization of industries and cities show to what degree the entire life of the nation is involved in the price of power. The book answers wisely and effectively the question of the type and amount of military strength we need. The discussion of the atomic bomb, long-range missiles, new model submarines, new gases, and the threat of biological warfare shows how greatly altered are the strategic problems facing this country.

Mr. Baldwin's estimate of the psychological and spiritual values of our people is not reassuring. It is important to note well these pages of his



book, for man and not the machine, in spite of the importance of industry in war, is still the artisan of victory. Morale has always been of greater significance than material things and the atomic age only increases the importance we must attach to leadership and moral courage. To these we must add a knowledge of the subjects so adequately analyzed in this book. We must realize our power, but we must comprehend the new responsibilities that that power inevitably brings.

There is room for argument in some of Mr. Baldwin's assumptions and conclusions. There is little possible debate on the accuracy and authenticity of his facts. He has given us an essential aid in solving the most important and basic problem facing our country today. We may loathe the facts of international life, we may all agree that war is the most reprehensible activity of human beings, but we should know these facts and we should realize the nature of modern and future war. In many respects Mr. Baldwin's book is most unpalatable, as the truth often is, and a most depressing commentary on humanity. And yet one of the needs of today is precisely that we face these facts unflinchingly and that each one of us, like the dictator in ancient Rome, determine a course of action that will "see that no harm comes to the republic" through our neglect or ignorance. At all events, we no longer have any excuse for ignorance with Mr. Baldwin's exceedingly valuable and timely survey.

FRASER YOUNG'S  
LITERARY CRYPT No. 250

*A cryptogram is writing in cipher. Every letter is part of a code that remains constant throughout the puzzle. Answer No. 250 will be found in the next issue.*

HVEY TQMTIEHOGWOQGC

YBQNYWTY QH BYMK

HOMVWU, GH PRYW KVI

AQWN G OMVIO QW ORY

EQCZ.—ORVMYGI

Answer Literary Crypt No. 249

Poverty is no disgrace to a man, but it is confoundedly inconvenient.

SYDNEY SMITH.

## Introduction to USSR

*RUSSIA AND THE RUSSIANS. By Edward Crankshaw. New York: The Viking Press. 1948. 223 pp. \$3.*

Reviewed by ROBERT LEE WOLFE

MR. CRANKSHAW, a British journalist and historian, who had wartime service in Moscow, has not only read widely about the Russian past but has dispassionately observed the Russian present. He has written a brilliant essay, with the double purpose of introducing the Russians to Western (particularly British) readers, and of sketching out the lines of a policy, which, he feels, the West might well follow in an effort to avoid catastrophe.

The bulk of the book is an attempt to describe and analyze the Russian national character, for the author assumes that there is such a thing. He poetically describes the vast Russian plain and writes sensitively and perceptively of the historic effect of its distances and its hardships upon its inhabitants. Despite its emotionalism, almost mysticism, this section of the book is sincerely and movingly written, and, in general, rings true.

In a chapter on "The Price of Victory" we are effectively reminded both of the depth of Russian suffering during the war and of the stoicism with which they met it. The survivors, we are told, want peace, but believe firmly in their system and in their destiny. The country is in effect run by the younger generation, the vast majority of course not Party members but none the less deeply patriotic for all that, which the author compares to the Catholic Church, with the Communists as its Jesuit vanguard. Although Mr. Crankshaw deplors the "destruction of individual minds" in the regime's drive for uniformity, he finds hope in the fact that the Soviet autocracy rules over a different sort of society from that over which the Tsars presided. Instead of a population composed eighty percent of illiterate peasants, fifty percent are now manual, clerical, professional, and intellectual workers, and the peasants are far more literate than they were. Crankshaw predicts that, in reading the classical attacks on autocracy written by the great Russian intellectuals of the past, the members of the new society, particularly the workers, will eventually question their own system. He even feels that Stalin hopes they may do so, and that the stringency of the regime may yet be modified. To this reviewer this speculation seems altogether too sanguine; it fails to take into account the dreadful efficiency of



twentieth-century despotism. Stalin operates more effectively than Nicholas I ever could.

As in all efforts to generalize about a whole nation, the danger lies in oversimplification, of which Mr. Crankshaw has certainly been guilty. He repeatedly maintains, for example, that Russians are totally without hypocrisy. Those of us who remember the Soviet pledges to allow all anti-fascist parties full political freedom in Poland and the Balkans, and who have grown accustomed to the new meanings of "freedom-loving," "democratic," "monarchofascist," "imperialist," and the like when used by Moscow would certainly challenge this. Sometimes his generalizing leads him to write what seems perilously close to nonsense, thus: "... if we read the stories of Chekhov we see what happens to Russians when they lack the framework of a common belief or orthodoxy. They go to pieces." If so, what becomes of the author's own hope for the gradual modification of the regime? But the tremendous richness and diversity and rebelliousness of Russian literary achievement during the dark days of the nineteenth century ought to be enough to refute this particular sweeping generalization. At other times Mr. Crankshaw's taste for paradox leads him to draw questionable distinctions. Thus he differentiates sharply between the MVD, latest form of the Russian secret police, and the Gestapo: "The one has come into being by mutual consent between the rulers and the ruled, as a means whereby the multifarious and fearful independence of the ruled may be curbed. The other has come into being as the instrument whereby a race of cynical self-seekers have been dragged into some kind of public service." The more one knows about the operations of police states and about Russian and German history, the less valid this distinction is likely to seem, and the