


of this century, great political leaders, such as Hughes, Root, Stimson, and Theodore Roosevelt fought hard to obtain passage of the direct primary law. Their purpose was to transfer the selection of candidates from the bosses to the people. Yet, although the law was passed, the situation remains largely unchanged. Mr. Moscow points out that while this law has given the people the right and the power to select candidates, they do not in fact select them because of apathy among the people themselves. The number of enrolled voters who vote in a primary election seldom exceeds twenty-five per cent of those entitled to vote, and in most cases is about ten per cent. The machines get their people to the polls while the non-machine voters stay away, and thus the machines retain their power. The existence of the primary, however, makes it possible for the non-machine voters to express themselves when the issue is sufficiently dramatic to arouse them, and to this extent it has improved our political life.

In addition to being generally educational, Mr. Moscow's book provides timely background for such contemporary matters as the split in Tammany

Hall, Mr. Marcantonio's relationship to the Republican, Democratic, and Communist parties (he has or has had some relation to them all, as well as to his own American Labor Party), and Mr. Dewey's rise to power in the Republican Party and the State. A somewhat over-lengthy discussion of Dewey's public relations and press conference techniques, not entirely complimentary, can be excused on the ground of personal privilege of the author. The powerful attack on public-opinion polls contained in the final chapter is less easy to justify and seems, to this reviewer at least, to have been dragged in by its coattails. It would take more than one or two diversions such as these, however, to spoil what is otherwise a most useful and interesting book.

It is a truism that the success of democratic government depends upon an informed and responsible electorate. If every voter would read this penetrating volume, that success would be more definitely assured.

*Oren Root, Jr., a lawyer who has been active in Republican affairs in New York State, was chairman of the Associated Willkie Clubs of America in 1940.*



the busy executive to determine the focus of his attention in the same volume with a lengthy and philosophical article proposing and justifying sweeping reforms in the teaching of law, or a detailed analysis of the attitude of three clerks in a welfare office toward its clients, not far removed from a study of the relationship of the insecurity of lower middle classes to the rise of Hitlerism.

Through this baffling potpourri there can be detected the suggestions of a pattern. Lasswell is using science to clarify democratic morals and to find the techniques of relating them to reality. Impatient with the ambiguities of political literature, he means to make democratic philosophy observable. "Operational principles in representative and specific contexts" as democratic processes cannot be assured by simple acquiescence in the idea that freedom to talk will result in decisions consistent with the preservation of the democratic system." Legal education, for example, will never become an effective instrument of public policy while it exaggerates the relative importance of the appellate court in methods of social control. The influence of policy makers, the principles of values on a low level of abstraction (civil liberties, employment, social security, etc.), skill training—these are the true dynamics of society which must be scrutinized. Persons, institutions, occasions, policies and practices, doctrines, myths, and legends are the stuff of interpersonal relations.

It is its awareness of this principle that gives this book its value and interest. That and the psychological insights it uses.

## Clarifying Democratic Morals

**THE ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOR.** By Harold D. Lasswell. New York: Oxford University Press. 1948. 314 pp. \$4.

Reviewed by WILLIAM S. LYNCH

AT the beginning of this volume an editorial note asserts that its specialized discussion of concepts, terms, and methods are not academic. In fact, some of them semantically and conceptually are simply redolent of the seminar and of the professional journals in which they first appeared. The editor also, while admitting the "net is cast wide," suggests that the book has unity. The same could be said of the "Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences" to which this one bears no small resemblance.

It used to be that learned men collected their scattered papers and published them as miscellanies. Today's avid scholars shuffle them a little more, revise them a little less, and give the arrangement a title. Since there must be a limit somewhere to a man's specialties, and since most knowledge can be labelled on some level, however generic, it cannot be too difficult to find a place and a name. So if you are looking for a specific, this isn't it, even though the papers are ar-

ranged under three categories which imply concrete treatment: "How to Integrate Science, Morals, and Politics," "How to Analyze Politics," and "How to Observe and Record Politics."

As a collection of articles by a political scientist who represents in his work and in his influence the transformation which is taking place in political science, this is something else. Impatient with the older notion that their field is not much more than an appendage of political history, men like Lasswell have been turning to psychology and sociology, to the radio, and to practical administration, to discover not only how political institutions came about, but why they did and how their evolution can be directed.

Eventually these men may find the integration of the social studies they are seeking. Meantime their efforts, as typified here, will lead them to explore in places that seem at first most diverse. Gifted with curiosity, they bring together levels of thought and logical order in a manner that seems incongruous but for which the word empirical serves as a nice justification. Imagine, for instance, a paper devoted to a scheme of card joltings for

**The War.** *"The friendships which we buy with a price," wrote Machiavelli, "and do not gain by greatness and nobility of character, though they be fairly earned are not made good, but fail us when we have occasion to use them." Political warfare as practised by us should be, during peacetime, the winning of friendships abroad, and during war the maintaining of them. We have fought our wars, however, in such innocence of spirit that political expediency has taken the place of settled policy, and strength of arms has stood for strength of purpose. Yet, as early as 1922, a popular book by Walter Lippmann emphasized the importance of public opinion, and in 1940 Edmond Taylor's "The Strategy of Terror" warned of the powers latent in political warfare. Carroll's "Persuade or Perish" (see below) brings the story up to date.*

## American Delusion

**PERSUADE OR PERISH.** By Wallace Carroll. Boston: The Houghton Mifflin Co. 1948. 450 pp. \$4.

Reviewed by HERBERT AGAR.

**T**HREE years after the war the Paris edition of the *Herald Tribune* asks in a ballade: "But when do the pipings of peace begin?" It is an interesting question. Anyone who wonders why we are still waiting (anxiously and unrewarded) for those pipings, will find one answer in "Persuade or Perish," a wise and profound discussion of the relation between politics and war. The book is also a discussion of OWI—of America's information to her friends and political warfare against her enemies. The two activities cannot be separated, for if the United States had kept her friends reassured, confident that she meant the fine words she used, she might have done a swifter job of discouraging her enemies. To whatever extent she let her friends think worse of her, to the same extent she gave heart and hope to the foe.

"Persuade or perish": Mr. Carroll blames the failure to persuade on the American delusion that the war was a purely military operation—something which could be "won," and there was an end of it. In fact, like all wars, it was a political operation, a method for imposing and maintaining policy; but too often, where the Americans commanded, policy was put aside until the military phase ended, with the result that faith in our declared aims received a setback from which it has not recovered. With each sacrifice of policy to the immediate needs of battle, the notion that the war was "about" something became more outmoded. And the deep respect which America at first inspired became outmoded also.

Wallace Carroll's beautifully lucid



Wallace Carroll: "... the honest patriots whispered their misgivings."

book is a series of illustrations of these sad facts, beginning with the first use of American arms in the Western theatre: the North African campaign. "A notable military victory and a crushing political defeat," Mr. Carroll calls it. "The confidence of the great coalition in American leadership and American motives had been shaken," he adds, and few Americans who were in touch with European opinion at the time, either through the underground or through the governments-in-exile and their armed forces, will dispute the statement. For those who watched the unnecessary decline of our prestige in Western Europe the

very names "Darlan" and "Peyrou-ton" turn the blood cold six years later. As Mr. Carroll shows, the trouble was not so much that American policy was wrong as that it was incomprehensible and silent. "Bewildered by American actions," he says, "and worried by the American failure to explain, the honest patriots of the allied countries whispered their misgivings to each other . . . Over the uncharted routes across the Channel fear spread to the Underground, and back from the Underground came the fears of hunted and harassed men. Here was the devil's own tempest and nothing to tame it!" Needless to say, the last people to be told what was happening were the people whose job it was to explain American policy abroad.

It is fair to add that suspicion of the United States was never widespread in England—although, as Mr. Carroll says, "the British, who had fought a good many successful wars, were always amazed by the American obsession with the military side of war . . . For the British, an army was an instrument of policy, and policy never became a mere instrument of the army." Yet on the whole the English trusted our motives, however strange our deeds; it was only among the extreme liberals (in the American not the English sense) that they whispered against us. Extreme liberals are a discontented tribe everywhere.

On the Continent, however, and among the exiles, the distrust was dangerous, needless, and heartbreaking. If we still listen vainly for the pipings of peace, it is partly because of our failure to persuade Western Europe while the task was easy. "Public opinion," says Mr. Carroll, "is a reality that must be faced just as squarely as any other." It is a reality we chose to neglect. We thought winning the war was like winning a world's series; then everyone would go home, and everyone would remember who was champion.

Herbert Agar, journalist, author, and editor, was from 1943 to 1946 special assistant to the American Ambassador at London and director of the British Division of the Office of War Information.

## Footnote

By Ben Ray Redman

**A**ND those who kill themselves for love  
Are not so dead as those who live,  
Demanding what they cannot take,  
Parading what they cannot give.