

written things — why should I not avow it?—such as “Badegast” and indeed much in “Glasperlenspiel,” especially the great introduction, which I read and feel “as though ’twere part of me.”

I also love Hesse the man, his cheerfully thoughtful, roguishly kind ways, the beautiful, deep look of his, alas, ailing eyes, whose blue illuminates the sharp-cut face of an old Swabian peasant. It was only fourteen years ago that I first came to know him intimately when, suffering from the first shock of losing my country, my house, and my hearth, I was often with him in his beautiful house and garden in the Ticino. How I envied him in those days!—not alone for his security in a free country, but most of all for the degree of hard-won spiritual freedom by which he surpassed me, for his philosophical detachment from all German politics. There was nothing more comforting, more healing in those confused days than his conversation.

For a decade and more I have been urging that his work be crowned with the Swedish world prize for literature. It would not have come too soon in his sixtieth year, and the choice of a naturalized Swiss citizen would have been a witty way out at a time when Hitler (on account of Ossietzky) had forbidden the acceptance of the prize to all Germans forevermore. But there is much appropriateness in the honor now, too, when the seventy-year-old author has himself crowned his already rich work with something sublime, his great novel of education. His stirring novel “Demian,” written in his vigorous middle years, is a small volume; but it is often books of small size that exert the greatest dynamic power—take for example “Werther” to which, in regard to its effectiveness in Germany, “Demian” bears a distant resemblance.

Toward the end of the book (the time is 1914) Demian says to his friend Sinclair:

There will be war. . . . But you will see, Sinclair, that this is just the beginning. Perhaps it will become a great war, a very great war. But even that is just the beginning. The new is beginning and for those who cling to the old the new will be horrible. What will you do?

The right answer would be: “Assist the new without sacrificing the old.” The best servitors of the new—Hesse is an example—may be those who know and love the old and carry it over into the new.

The foregoing article is the introduction to Hermann Hesse's book “Demian,” which Henry Holt will publish January 15.

JANUARY 3, 1948

Ideas. *A close union of the American states seemed as visionary to most Americans of 1789 as a true world government seems to many today. One realizes this with a jolt in looking over Carl Van Doren's forthcoming study of the Constitution, “The Great Rehearsal.” The obstacles to world government today are infinitely greater, yet time may bring its fulfillment. On the subject, Friedwald's book (reviewed below), though published abroad last year, is still timely, and we recommend Cord Meyer, Jr.'s “Peace or Anarchy,” reviewed in SRL Nov. 1 by Louis Fischer, with a rebuttal by Mr. Meyer.*

Instead of Rejoicing . . .

MAN'S LAST CHOICE. By E. M. Friedwald. New York: The Viking Press. 1947. 128 pp. \$2.

Reviewed by ROBERT M. MACIVER

“**L**ORD, what fools these mortals be!” So might the man from Mars reflect, now that a heroic invention makes meaningless the wars that have ravaged the earth. Do they join in universal thanksgiving when war's historical role is ended, when no longer can any government use it as an instrument of policy, when no longer can any war chief who is not completely insane resort to it in the hope of gaining his ends? Instead, they treat this climactic invention as a new complication of their many worries! They still build vast armies and navies, wasting their resources, when the only goal of that activity is obliteration. Instead of rejoicing, they are filled with new fears, when this epoch-making thing not only offers the end of war but also promises, for a time not far away, the widened prosperity of all mankind.


The reader of the book before us may well be stimulated to indulge in such reflections as we have attributed to the man from Mars. It is a book of great lucidity and wise simplicity. In four pithy chapters, packed with significance, the author sets before us neat and telling summations of urgent realities we are slow or even loath

to comprehend. Even on the few points where we might differ with him—as when he characterizes medieval war as not an instrument of political power but only a “trial by battle limited by the rulings of the Church,” or when he makes the rise of nationalism a revulsion from the “encroaching individualism” of Napoleon—the difference is only one of emphasis.

Mr. Friedwald, before going to England to join the “Free France” movement in 1940, was a French journalist. He has something to say, and he knows how to say it.

In the main the book is a conspectus of the relation of science to political power throughout the modern era—the era that was modern before 1945. Until the end of the eighteenth century science was for the most part “a by-product of military research.” Only with the industrial revolution did science devote itself predominantly to civilian uses. The connection between industrial power and political power was for a considerable time unrecognized. It was in Germany that the importance of science to government was first grasped, and in consequence science received there a status and an endowment that helped to make German science the foremost in the world and the most fertile industrially.


The author takes the list of Nobel prize-winners as the best available criterion of the scientific achievements of the various countries. Over the whole period, from 1901 to 1946, the Germans are first with thirty-eight prize men, Britain second with twenty-five, and the United States third with twenty-two. The Dutch, Austrians, Swedes, Danes, and Swiss stand high on a per capita basis. Russia is nowhere—a total of two in physiology and medicine (awarded in the czarist days) and not one in physics or chemistry. Germany's advantage has been dominantly in chemistry,



but Germany lost much ground during the Nazi regime. The United States has taken a large leap forward and is well ahead for the period since 1933, with Britain taking second place. France has not, by this standard, been eminent in science, a fact the author attributes largely to the niggardliness of the French state in its attitude toward scientific research. The effect of totalitarianism on the scientific spirit is impressively suggested by the record. "Soviet science has not yet produced a single Nobel prize-winner."

For some time to come this difference in scientific ability must be given considerable weight in any calculations of political power. At this moment there is only *one* world power, for the United States alone possesses the atomic bomb. But this final weapon carries with it its own nemesis. In the not distant future the differences of power between the countries of the world will be greatly reduced, may even cease to count in any realistic calculation. There is no question that, apart from a world authority, the bomb, in a yet more devastating form, will be in time available to any country that devotes itself to the business. It will be by far the cheapest, measured by its "productivity," of all the weapons of war. It is a "saturation weapon," so absolute that

THE AUTHOR: SRL nominates Eugène-Marie Friedwald, whose "Man's Last Choice" is marked by the absence of a single perpendicular pronoun, as the person most unlikely to write an autobiography. Even a transatlantic cable from his American publishers, the Viking Press, pleading for data, failed to beguile Mr. Friedwald into revealing anything fleshier than "Eugène-Marie Friedwald studied at the University of Toulouse and received his degree of Engineering in Chemistry and *Licencié ès Sciences* in 1931. He turned from scientific research to writing on international affairs fourteen years ago as a result of having followed lectures on political science at the *Collège de France*. Mr. Friedwald left France in July 1940 on the last boat to England, where he worked for the Political Intelligence Department the remainder of the war. He is married to an Englishwoman and lives in London." SRL asked for more information. His agent replied: "Friedwald knows more about oil and its influence on war than any other living writer. Was research worker in France. Now writing book on Russia and world power." R. G.



size of population, wealth of resources, and even expanse of territory will not suffice to give any country any degree of security. Consideration of "geopolitics," meaningful up to our time, must now be discarded. Furthermore, even a "victorious" state could not hope to enjoy its "victory." The author quotes the speculation of Dr. Irving Langmuir to the effect that an atomic war might render our planet "permanently uninhabitable."

Those who pride themselves on being realists about war and political power prove to be the worst victims of illusion. Science increases political power, is in our days a precondition of political power, but science has already, for the past thirty years, made war "a senseless thing without an object," completely useless as an instrument of policy. At the same time science has confuted nationalism, even though in this period the creed of nationalism has received a devotion never equaled before.

What then is the conclusion? Mr. Friedwald addresses himself here solely to the problem of atomic control. The main difficulty that blocks its solution is not a technological, but a political one. Given the requisite authority with the requisite power, including the power of inspection, atomic warfare can be prevented and atomic energy applied, without unfair discrimination between countries, to beneficent uses. The Baruch proposal presented a reasonable program for the accomplishment of this end. Russia's intransigence has barred its acceptance. The most satisfactory way of breaking the deadlock would be a change of attitude on the part of Russia, so that she would be willing "to merge a small part of her sovereignty" for the greater good of all. Failing this, the next best thing is that the five-sixths of the world lying outside the Russian zone should set up its own authority, leaving the door open to the Soviet Union.

It is a conclusion narrower than the argument that leads up to it, and to this extent disappointing. The control of atomic energy is certainly an urgent issue, and some scheme more or less resembling the Baruch plan is imperative. But this issue cannot be dissociated from others, and it cannot be effectively settled by itself alone.

No authority to control atomic energy will serve so long as there is not also an international authority to prevent war itself. The destructive potentialities of science are not limited to atomic warfare. War, as Mr. Friedwald points out, has become in every sense unlimited. Moreover, even if the Baruch or some similar program were accepted, it would be effective only during peace. The outbreak of war would put an end to all that, and within a year or so after the outbreak belligerents would probably be producing atomic bombs—unless they found other genocidal weapons.

Throughout history calculations of military power have been a series of visions that nearly always in the end deceived, even if at first their promise seemed to be fulfilled. In the past such calculations tempted dominant, aggressive men, who launched great conflicts to win their ends. Today they can tempt only fools. *The ends cannot be won.*

Contract vs. Coercion

A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS. By Arthur Nussbaum. New York: The Macmillan Co. 1947. 361 pp. \$4.50.

Reviewed by ASHER BRYNES

ONE of the unrecognized achievements of the twentieth century is a simplification of the terms in which we must think about peace if we are ever to deal effectively with the problem of war. Men are now roughly divided between those who would rely on world government, or police power, for the enforcement of peace; and those who would rely on the rule of law ("open agreements openly arrived at," in Wilsonian phrase) to accomplish the same end. Actually the issue is between contract and coercion: it is that simple.

According to the Communist conception of Russia one world means one government, maintaining peace by administrative order. That basic idea was sharply defined by F. A. Voigt a few months ago:

All nations in the world are prospective members of the Soviet
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