

The World. In Sir Norman Angell's latest book he blames much of the present impasse on the nationalisms of the West. Obviously, national-oriented thinking cannot be overcome until the Western peoples, who have always prided themselves on the rational approach, learn enough about the roots and growth of nationalism to do something about it. To understand its meaning one must dig back into the early history of Western culture, and even farther back into the beginnings of man, when primitive groups fought to control the river valleys, then spilled around the world in great migrations like those described in Gladwin's "Men Out of Asia." Both the Near East and the Far East at present are laboratories of the crude growth of Western-type nationalisms, and can be studied with profit in such books as Groseclose's "Introduction to Iran," reviewed below, Robert Payne's "Revolt of Asia," and "History of the Islamic Peoples," by Carl Brockelmann.

There Is Still Time

THE STEEP PLACES. By Norman Angell. New York: Harper & Bros. 1948. 247 pp. \$3.

Reviewed by JOHN A. KROUT

THE MORAL obligation to be reasonable! So might Sir Norman Angell have set down an explanatory subtitle for his even-tempered but incisive discourse on the barriers which shut us out from the peace we crave. In a world where many are already looking toward one of two alternatives—either the restriction of liberty under a totalitarian dictatorship or the collapse of Western civilization in atomic war—he stands firm in his conviction that for peoples, as well as for governments, there is still a chance to make the decisions which will guide mankind along a middle way. At a time when doctrinal passions and nationalistic desires are dividing us into fanatical groups, he believes, indeed he insists, that a temper of reasonableness can save us from the repetition of errors of public policy which made it impossible to avert the Second World War.

For almost forty years, ever since he wrote "The Great Illusion," Norman Angell has been seeking out the causes of war and the methods of maintaining a democratic society without resort to it. A certain clinical expertness in cutting through the false assumptions by which we live has given distinction to all his work. What he says, however heavy with controversial content, is never said in that emotional mood so typical of the zealot and so obstructive of lucid thought. Rarely has a clearer vision been revealed in such compelling prose.

The book before us is, in the main,

profoundly disturbing. Its analysis of the human factor is the determination of public policy—local, national, and international—casts a long shadow over the years immediately ahead. How few the resources, and how difficult to use, that lie ready to hand for the correction of mankind's blunders! How long it takes to persuade men to forsake old errors! How easy it is for moral passion to give en-

durance to immoral causes! How willing men are—even the better educated among them—to defy facts which do not conform to the patterns of their prejudices! All this the author admits, not only in general terms, but with a wealth of sharply defined incident drawn from the sorry record of human failure since the outbreak of World War I. Yet he warns that cynical despair or "panic pessimism" concerning the possible improvement of public policies "can be as fatal as complacent optimism." There is still time, not to attain any theoretical perfection in "the application of reason to society" but to get close enough to that goal, so that we may become secure from such madness as atomic warfare.

The crux of the matter is not solely the problem of establishing adequate atomic control (important as that is). It is rather the need for a clearer definition of what we want above all else from the society in which we live; it is rather the necessity of finding that common ground on which all the democracies can stand in their effort to convince Russia that reasonable cooperation may yet preserve peace and insure social welfare. Let the author state the case:

If we in the West are to adopt a policy of indefinite retreat before Russian power, we must face now

THE AUTHOR: When Ralph Norman Angell was seventeen he "got tired of the University of Geneva" and sailed off to America's Far West. He became a farm hand, "graduated to cowpunching," prospecting, and homesteading. Later, he says, "I walked into the *San Francisco Chronicle* and asked for a job, and they gave me one as a reporter. It was the same with the *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*." In Paris, he reported the Dreyfus case for American newspapers, was editor of *Galigani's Messenger* from 1899-1903, then spent two years with the *Eclair*. The next decade he was general manager of the *Paris Daily Mail*, which he established for Lord Northcliffe, London newspaper tycoon. While *Foreign Affairs* editor (1928-31) he invented "The Money Game" to vivify fundamentals of currency and credit, and wrote "The Story of Money." The game looks something like "Monopoly," with playing cards, paper money, etc. "Bridge," he says crisply, "would be absolutely unteachable if we taught it the way we teach economics." Mr. Angell has never played cards frivolously. But he is emphatic that "we need new tools of education," and saddened that some teachers "were snuffy" about his contribution. It is used in private schools here and abroad. Other books by him include "The Great Illusion," "For What Do We Fight?," "Preface to Peace," "America's Dilemma," and "Let the People Know." He was Labor MP from 1928-31, has been on the Council of the Royal Institute of International Affairs since 1938, "can't imagine" why he was knighted in 1931, although his Nobel Prize for peace two years later is less speculative. He divides his year between New York and a cherished island off the Essex Coast, where he raises chickens and writes in a farmhouse tower. He also broadcasts, lectures, and lays bricks, is about five feet tall, seventy-three, and still walks as if he were wearing high-heeled, cowboy boots. R. G.



just what that involves and not see it through rose-colored spectacles. Otherwise there will happen what happened before the Second World War: we acquiesce in the advance of a hostile system because we insist it is not so bad. Then when it is on top of us, we conclude that it is very bad indeed and decide to resist. But by that time the policy of aggression has attained a momentum too great to stop. The aggressor might have been deterred if he had realized earlier that he would be certain to meet the resistance he did finally meet.

This would follow the lines of policy which produced World War II; and it would be certain to bring the world once more into military conflict. The failure of peace would come less from a refusal to face the realities of international politics, or even the dangers of communism, than from a reluctance to admit that our chief desire is not world peace, but national security and economic prosperity. Here is a fact of "disturbing significance," for it may mean that the fissures of nationalism, dividing the Western nations, constitute a standing invitation to Moscow to continue her plans for domination beyond her borders.

Russia could be induced, so Mr. Angell believes, more quickly to adopt an attitude of reasonable negotiation if she knew that the Western point of view was not broken into fragments by international rivalries and intra-national dissension. The divisions exist; it would be folly to ignore them. But they can be overcome by an increasing cooperation on the part of the Western nations.

A greater unity of the non-Russian world is not the alternative of an effective UN and the inclusion of Russia therein. It is the indispensable condition of UN success and the inclusion of Russia.

It may in time lead to a world authority that can give us the peace which only a sense of security in our own way of life can bring.

"The Steep Places" was obviously written primarily for English readers; and in some portions it falls too easily into the British idiom. Some readers will find an unnecessary defense of the policies of British imperial administrators; others may challenge the author's interpretation of Britain's role in world affairs. But no one will find naïveté or impractical suggestions in these pages. Grave though the crisis be, it is inspiring to follow an analytical appraisal of the difficulties and opportunities we now face.

John Allen Krout, professor of history at Columbia University, is the author of "An Outline History of the United States" and other books.

Ancient Culture—Modern Problem

INTRODUCTION TO IRAN. By Elgin Groseclose. New York: Oxford University Press. 1947. 257 pp. \$3.50.

Reviewed by T. CUYLER YOUNG

IN THIS little book Elgin Groseclose, who has thus far been known for technical treatises on monetary problems and charming novels in Near Eastern settings, enters a new field of literary endeavor and tries to interpret for the general reader a people that boasts an ancient culture and poses a modern problem. Unfortunately it would appear that the author in this adventure has not been so successful, except where he can speak authoritatively about Iranian economics and finance and can deal with subjects which naturally lend themselves to romanticizing. Although there are some excellent sections where sympathetic insight and literary craftsmanship combine to stir a glowing appreciation of many aspects of the arts and graces of Persian life and culture, and equally competent appraisals of economic situations and problems faced by the Iranian people, this introduction falls short of becoming standard or indispensable; there are too many inaccuracies and inadequacies for such attainment.

It is well that the book is concerned primarily with recent and contemporary Iranian history and affairs, since the author reveals his limitations in the treatment of the ancient material. It is annoying to hear about the Persian "race" and to observe the loose and unscientific way in which this term is used; in the same category is the glamorous treatment of the Aryans, too reminiscent of Hitlerian racial romanticism. To be told that the "horse and the wheel first appear in history as major instruments of warfare" at the Medo-Babylonian siege of Nineveh (wrongly dated in 606 B.C.) pains the ancient historian. Why should Ahura Mazda (Wise Lord), the God of Zoroaster, be interpreted as "The Lord of Great Knowledge" on one page while on that following the name is explained as "The Lord of Righteousness"?

Although there are occasional factual inaccuracies in the chapters dealing with very recent history in Iran, these are minor and need not prevent appreciation of valuable information about and keen interpretation of the contemporary scene in Iran. Yet the major shortcoming of the work arises from the author's absorption in this very "scene" — that which meets the eye, but without deeper appreciation of what lies behind and beyond the scene, which will almost invariably

escape the visitor who does not command the vernacular of the people, however friendly his approach or extended his visit.

The author describes in considerable detail the social, economic, and political aspects of contemporary Iran and the attendant problems; more than once he struggles to set forth the moral and spiritual achievements, failures, and problems of the Persian people. But one comes to the end unsatisfied: there seems lacking any truly vicarious entering into Iranian life and thought with consequent understanding of the essential Persian problem — the intellectual and spiritual appraisal of Western culture and the proper and possible Iranian reaction and adjustment to it, with full appreciation of the realities of the modern world, and adequate loyalty to the essentials of inherited indigenous culture. But perhaps this is too much to expect of an "introduction."

These strictures and limitations aside, it remains true that in this very readable book we have some unique and valuable contributions to an understanding of the modern exponents of an ancient and glorious history, who are bound to play an increasing part in the history which is now in the making.

Lo, the Indian!

MEN OUT OF ASIA. By Harold Sterling Gladwin. New York: Whitteley House. 1947. 390 pp. \$4.

Reviewed by HARRY L. SHAPIRO

EVER since the commentators discovered Columbus's mistake and finally recognized that the American Indians were not the inhabitants of India, Cathay, or Zipangu, they have been busy trying to explain how whatever civilization they (the Indians) could boast of must have been acquired from Old World sources. One of the first suggestions along this line (refurbished repeatedly in the course of over four centuries) also solved the mystery of the Ten Lost Tribes of Israel. They had migrated to America! The Mormons later found this a useful idea, too. Unfortunately, the Ten Lost Tribes have had other claimants as well, among them a solid little group of Britons. Another explanation involved Atlantis, long since disappeared below the waves of the Atlantic but formerly a way station for the culture bearers from Europe, who eventually reached the shores of America and established the civiliza-