

bered it would need to be at loss for something acceptable to say about any of these political philosophers whose name happened to come up.

Of course this is not, by its author's express declaration, a textbook. It is intended primarily for readers outside academic circles, particularly those engaged in politics and administration, who might be interested in the development of Western political

thought. And equally, of course, its pages are not intended as a surrogate for the works of the great theorists, but only as an introduction to them. Yet little as its author may have intended such a use and indignantly as he might repudiate it, the idle undergraduate and even the harried doctoral candidate will find this a first-rate cram book until the faculty gets on to it.

E. Franklin Frazier, and "The Family: Genus Americanum," by the late Ruth Benedict. Talcott Parsons writes on "The Social Structure of the Family," raising the "doubt whether the American type of family system is in the long run capable of sufficient stability to perform its extremely essential functions on behalf of our type of society." He proceeds to express some highly dubious views which, unfortunately, cannot be dealt with here. They are worthy of serious attention. Therese Benedek's chapter, "The Emotional Structure of the Family," is a most valuable contribution. "The young American husband who helps his wife in the many chores of child care . . . unknowingly begins the process by which it will become difficult if not impossible for him to perform the patriarchal role of the father. He becomes in the child's mind a part of the mother image." And much else to like effect. Benedek shows admirably clearly how the interaction between society and family determines the form of emotional pathology. Robert K. Merton's brilliant "Social Structure and Anomie" reappears here in a revised and extended version. In "The Facts of Life" Frank W. Notestein discusses world population trends. Karl W. Llewellyn writes refreshingly on "Education and the Family: Certain Unsolved Problems"; Charles Abrams and John P. Dean in "Housing and the Family" forcefully present the shocking story of what crippling living arrangements do to the family. Denis de Rougemont in "The Crisis of the Modern Couple" brilliantly attacks the practice of marrying upon the ephemeral basis of "romantic love." One may recall here Disraeli's remark to his sister, "I do not intend marrying for love. Most of my friends who married so either beat their wives or live apart from them." Erich Fromm has two important chapters, "The Oedipus Complex and the Oedipus Myth," and "Sex and Character." Max Horkheimer deals with "Authoritarianism," Arthur L. Swift with "Religious Values," Paul Schrecker with "The Family: Conveyance of Tradition," and a chapter by the editor on "The Conservation of Family Values." A most valuable book.

Man's Greatest Test

THE FAMILY OF TOMORROW. By Carle O. Zimmerman. New York: Harper & Bro. 1949. 256 pp. \$3.50.

THE FAMILY: Its Function and Destiny. Edited by Ruth Nanda Anshen. New York: Harper & Bro. 1949. 443 pp. \$3.50.

Reviewed by M. F. ASHLEY MONTAGU


THE family is in trouble, not only in America, but elsewhere in the world. In America one in three marriages ends in divorce; in England one in five. Juvenile delinquency rates increase each year with predictable regularity. These are but two of the most conspicuous evidences of family disorganization in the Western world. There are numerous others, the most pervasive being no less than the decay of Western civilization itself. It is the relation between the decay of the family and the breakdown of civilization which Professor Zimmerman is concerned to clarify in "The Family of Tomorrow."

A civilization is a system of applied values. It has often been said that Americans have no values. This is, of course, silly. The trouble with Americans is not that they have no values, but that they have too many of the wrong sort. Bearing upon this point Professor Zimmerman points out that the function of the family, beyond all other institutions, is to preserve, develop, and transmit the accepted values of a culture. Hence, "it arises inevitably that rejections of familism are also rejections of culture—nihilism, the denial of society itself." Furthermore, he shows by the plentiful citation of cases, that this has been so throughout the course of human history; a fact of which the editor of our second book seems to be unaware. The soundness of the proposition that control of a civilization or culture means control of the family system, has been demonstrated beyond any shadow of doubt by social scientists, and by controllers of men from Stalin to Hitler. The early fathers of the Communist movement

considered the family an unnecessary incubus upon the life of society. They soon discovered their error. Hitler, with his perverted vision, made maximal use of the family in the creation and destruction of the Third Reich. We in America seem to be unaware of the most valuable of all the values of our culture, the family. Our attitudes—and attitudes are values—toward the family are unsound, perverted, and atomistic. We marry for the wrong reasons, and we have children, or don't, for the wrong reasons. As Professor Zimmerman says, in this important book, the making of a family is man's greatest test. The community cannot take over the functions of the family.

We must create new values for the family, says Professor Zimmerman. Familism must become a way of life because it has prestige over other ways. As a step in that direction he calls for the formation of an American Family Institute. He invites correspondence on the subject. Let us hope he gets the most badly needed institute in the world.

In "The Family: Its Function and Destiny" the editor, Dr. Anshen, makes many of the same points, in her opening paper, as Professor Zimmerman, particularly with respect to values. Ralph Linton follows with a brilliant chapter on "The Natural History of the Family"; and there are excellent contributions on "The Family in Islam," by Arthur Jeffery; in "China," by Francis L. K. Hsu; in "India," by David Mandelbaum; in "Russia," by Maurice Hindus; in "Latin America," by Arturo Torres-Rioseco; "The Negro Family," by



The World. December saw the publication of a book about the 1946 atomic bomb tests at Bikini—David Bradley's "No Place to Hide"—that deserves to stand beside John Hersey's now classic account of the first atomic bombing, "Hiroshima." This week we review a provocative analysis of the bomb's military and political implications by a British Nobel Prize physicist: P. M. S. Blackett's "Fear, War, and the Atom Bomb." Any consideration of the consequences of the bomb and future world peace must take into account the shadowy men in the Politburo, the subjects of Walter Duranty's "Stalin & Co.," another book of the week. In "The Tiger of France," also reviewed here, Wythe Williams depicts somewhat nostalgically the World War I premier of the Third French Republic, Georges Clemenceau, a man who might—and might not—have succeeded in preserving peace if he had lived into the 1940's.

Absolute Weapon & Absolute Security

FEAR, WAR, AND THE BOMB: The Military and Political Consequences of Atomic Energy. By P. M. S. Blackett. New York: Whittlesey House. 1949. 214 pp. \$3.

Reviewed by ROBERT W. FRASE

THIS study by a Nobel Prize winner in physics, former Royal Navy officer, and student of modern warfare attracted a great deal of attention when it was published last year in England, has been widely discussed throughout Europe, was quoted by Soviet delegates at the UN Assembly, has been reviewed in *Pravda*, and debated on the BBC.

Professor Blackett's principal theme is a criticism of the "Baruch Plan" derived primarily from a military analysis of strategic bombing. An extended examination of the bombing of Germany and Japan, plus certain assumptions as to the probable development of atomic weapons and aircraft within the next decade, leads him to conclude that atomic bombing has been greatly exaggerated as a decisive single military instrument in a war between the East and the West.

The feeling of insecurity which an unsound concept of the bomb as the "absolute weapon" has created in America is largely responsible, according to Blackett, for an attempt by the United States to recapture absolute security through the Baruch Plan. Having used the bomb themselves, Americans are further obsessed with the emotional conviction that it will be dropped on them as soon as the Russians have it, overlooking what he regards as important practical, technical, and strategic limitations.

The Baruch Plan and the UN majority proposals—which are treated as substantially the same thing to an ex-

tent which close comparison does not support—appear to the author as designed to satisfy the United States desire for security at the expense of the USSR. This contention is based primarily on the position of the United States on the sequence of stages for placing an international control scheme into effect, a subject not yet considered by the UN Commission in detail. Secrecy with respect to the location of the Russian industrial and military establishments which would constitute primary bombing targets is postulated as a key element in Soviet defenses. To start control with international ground and air surveys of world uranium resources, as the United States has seemed to suggest, would destroy this defense of secrecy without immediate comparable advantages. The American position during this initial period of one or more years would remain substantially unchanged since the best potential

bombing targets in the United States are no secret, Russia has no suitable air bases for attack, and the international control of the process of manufacturing explosive charges for bombs would begin only after completion of the raw material survey.

A secondary criticism is that Russia's comparative economic strength and well-being would be permanently weakened by subordinating economic needs to a wide geographical dispersion of atomic power plants to provide a safety factor if the control plan should break down. The brief chapter on potential economic benefits from atomic energy appears designed to support this view. While the difficulties of arriving at any firm judgments at this time are admitted, doubtful questions as to feasibility, cost, timing, and the ultimate magnitude of atomic power tend to be resolved on the optimistic side.

A subsidiary but persistent theme is the implication that biological warfare is a comparable instrument of mass destruction and for technical reasons cannot be controlled effectively by international regulation—so why all the fuss about failure to secure international agreement on the control of atomic energy?

Blackett's main thread of military and political analysis raises significant and important questions, some of them for the first time; but these points are obscured and confused by a lengthy inquiry into the genesis of American policy in 1945-47 in which he attempts to cram history into a simple mold, willy-nilly. Here the argument is held together at crucial points by newspaper quotations of dubious reliability and by omissions of relevant material even from documents otherwise cited. The most important single source of insight into what has happened and the possibilities of the emergence of any mutually acceptable control scheme—the detailed and voluminous records of the UN Atomic Energy Commission—is apparently *terra incognita* to Professor Blackett.

The positive suggestions which emerge are brief and rather anti-climactic: Live with the bomb and like it since an early war is not probable; armed neutrality for non-Communist Europe; and an attempt at general international arms limitation at some future date.

In contrast with his political discussion, Blackett's strictly military analysis is a most useful contribution, despite a tendency to minimize the power of the bomb and to magnify the possibilities of civilian defense and the interception of attacking bombers. On biological warfare, Blackett tends toward the exaggera-



—Justus in the Minneapolis Star.

"Still the Important 'Secret.'"