


**World War II.** *A half dozen years after its end the war of 1939-1945 is already the most amply and ably recorded conflict in history. Much of the credit for this fact belongs to two men who are engaged on monumental, many-volumed studies: Winston S. Churchill, who is writing a combination history-memoir from his vantage point of wartime Prime Minister of Great Britain, and Samuel E. Morison, who writes as official (but uncensored) historian of the U. S. Navy. Churchill's fifth volume ("Closing the Ring") and Morison's seventh ("Aleutians, Gilberts, and Marshalls") are reviewed in this issue. In the Chronicles of America Series Eliot Janeway covers "the home front" in "The Struggle for Survival (page 13). Another new book, "Hitler's Interpreter" by Paul Schmidt supplements our knowledge of what went on behind the scenes of the Third Reich during the war years.*



## *Memoirs of a Tempered Realist*

**CLOSING THE RING.** By Winston Churchill. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. 749 pp. \$6.

By CRANE BRINTON

**M**R. CHURCHILL carries his dramatic gift for timing into the publishing business. This volume, the fifth in his history of the Second World War, is dated from the quiet of his house at Chartwell, near Westerham, in Kent—a town which also nourished General Wolfe. As it is published, he has once more moved to Number 10 Downing Street, which will not be a quiet place. Not even Mr. Churchill is likely to be able to finish the work in office. Any expression of hope that in spite of everything he may yet carry these memoirs to their logical conclusion on V-J Day must sound a bit ambiguous at this moment. But the historian must cherish the hope.

Political soothsayers will not find in this volume any obvious new hints about the way Mr. Churchill will use this renewal of power and responsibility. He is too good a historian, too anxious to put the events he is recounting as they seemed to him at the time, to indulge in much wisdom after-the-fact. Teheran, the dramatic core of his volume, does indeed cast its shadows before it. But the work remains history, contemporary history at its best, and no mere political pamphleteering.

After a brief survey of the war against the U-Boats in the Atlantic from 1942 to the eventual end of the

submarine danger in 1944, Mr. Churchill takes up the course of the war on the "Third Front"—the Mediterranean—with the invasion of Sicily in July 1943 and carries the narrative of the global struggle, political as well as military, to the eve of D-day, June 6, 1944. This is the war as the Prime Minister saw it, documented primarily from the papers that went out of and came into his office. Mr. Churchill has, however, made good use of the copious flow of memoirs and other writing on the war that has come out since 1945, notably the work of General Eisenhower, Admiral Leahy, Admiral Morison, and Robert Sherwood. In this volume the style, the tone, the philosophy—if one may use so academic a word—of Mr. Churchill are just what they were in the first. There is no flagging. Indeed, as the work progresses to the climax of D-day the reader is carried on in mounting excitement.

No one should build from this volume predictions that Mr. Churchill's current ministry will be marked by clear divergences from American policies. He may, indeed almost certainly does, hope to do something to lessen the tensions of a new war that is now rather more than cold. But from the fact that in this volume the grave differences he had with his "great friend" Roosevelt come out even more fully than they did in the last, nothing final can be inferred for the present crisis. He is, be it repeated, trying very hard to write history. If over De Gaulle, over Chiang Kai-shek, over the proposed Anglo-American thrust at Vienna from the head of the Adriatic, over a dozen other matters he now reveals how much he differed with the Americans, he is but faithfully reflecting the facts. In retrospect, and especially in the further retrospect of 1914-1918, the

close operational unity the Western Allies achieved in the crisis of the war looks more than ever like a miracle—a miracle that perhaps only Mr. Churchill could have brought off.

For he had constantly to subdue that sense of knowing, so natural in a nineteenth-century English aristocrat, the harsh fact that the Empire he guided was playing not second but third fiddle to the USA and the USSR. Even worse, he had, as what we may modestly call a tempered realist, constantly to get around or over an indecent realist in Stalin and an idealist crossed with a Machiavelli—or at least with a horse-trader—in Roosevelt. With Stalin it was not too hard, for Churchill always knew what he was up against, and the limits of the possible were pretty clear. But with Roosevelt it was very hard, especially since Roosevelt had the men, and the money too.

Between Churchill and Roosevelt there was, in spite of the admiration each had for the other—or was it for the position of the other?—a temperamental gulf rarely bridged between great men as effectively as in these critical years it was in fact bridged between these two. It is a gulf hard to define clearly and simply, for the geography of the human soul is not to be mapped as neatly as the metaphor implies. You may call it the gulf between the man without principles and the man of principle, though the contrast thus put is unfair to Churchill, who has the admirable decencies of the English gentleman, and was shocked at Stalin's proposal to kill off 60,000 top officers of the Wehrmacht as well as at the unnecessary destruction of the monastery of Monte Cassino. Perhaps we may in this short space settle for it as the gulf between Disraeli and Gladstone, though neither of the two contemporary leaders, except in the pinch, much resembles his Victorian counterpart.

The pinch is clear, however, in the divergent attitudes of Churchill and Roosevelt on the very similar problems of France and Italy. Churchill

Crane Brinton is professor of history at Harvard. His books include "Ideas and Men" and "The United States and Britain."

probably disliked De Gaulle as much as did Roosevelt. But for Churchill the important thing was to save France, and for Roosevelt the important thing was to get France saved according to the best democratic principles. Roosevelt wanted forty million Frenchmen to exercise their Rousseauian General Will after their liberation. Churchill was worried lest in the process of liberation by foreigners Frenchmen might come to feel that our kind of military government wasn't much nearer their General Will than the German kind. Even more clearly with Italy, Roosevelt's doctrinaire adhesion to the abstract principles of democracy made him want to get rid of Badoglio and the King right in the midst of the crisis of the Anzio landings; Churchill's doubts about Italian capacity for democracy reinforced his natural conservative desire to let ill enough alone. He wanted to keep the King.

Perhaps even deeper down in the fascinating contrast between the two men is a national difference heavy with import for the future. Here Churchill's most Churchillian retrospect on Mussolini, a passage which deeply offended many Americans when it appeared in the newspaper version of this volume, is a perfect case in point. Put baldly, Churchill's statement comes down to this: the only thing wrong with Mussolini was that he went in on Hitler's side instead of on ours. Otherwise, he was—for Italy—A Good Thing. Now this judgment is again the judgment of the realist, the man of action, the man who saw first of all the practical difference between a friendly and an enemy Italy. But may it not also be the judgment of a man who believes deeply that democratic values realizable in England cannot be realized in Italy? Roosevelt, on the other hand, is a good American, convinced that at bottom all human beings are—or would like to be—good Americans.

As in the previous volumes, this one bears the "moral of the work" now more than ever worth our pondering: "In War: Resolution—In Defeat: Defiance—In Victory: Magnanimity—In Peace: Good Will." This moral would seem applicable to a cold as to a hot war. Let us hope that the Prime Minister can help us carry it through.

## Motivations for Mobilization

### THE STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL.

By Eliot Janeway. New Haven: Yale University Press. 382 pp. \$5.

By ROBERT H. CONNERY

**T**HIS BOOK, as its subtitle states, is a "chronicle of economic mobilization in World War II"; but it is, in addition, a study in politics in the broadest and best sense of the term. It attempts "to explain the how of Roosevelt's greatness by telling the story of Roosevelt at his greatest—as War President and presiding genius over America's home front." It is the last of six new volumes being added, under the editorial direction of Allan Nevins, to the original fifty volumes of the *Chronicles of America Series*.

As the mobilization specialist for *Time* and *Fortune* Mr. Janeway had a unique opportunity to follow closely the economic policies of the war period and, one may suspect, had access to much primary material concerning Roosevelt's relations with Baruch, Nelson, Hopkins, Forrestal, Eberstadt, Wallace, and Truman. While he makes full use of the numerous recently published war memories, he adds much hitherto unpublished data. Consequently he contributes materially to our factual knowledge of relationships among the home front's high command.

This account is also an analysis and an interpretation. While he writes about economics, Mr. Janeway is more interested in what he calls "the politics of principle" than he is in the detailed techniques of marshaling labor forces, expanding facilities, or controlling materials in wartime. Many books have been written about the principles of politics but here is one that sets out to interpret the interplay of politics around "the principle of an economic mobilization." In this area Mr. Janeway breaks new ground and clearly demonstrates that as a skilful analyst he has few peers.

Wars, particularly modern wars, can be won or lost on the home front quite as much as on the battlefield. Roosevelt, says Janeway, expected to win the war on the home front, but "he expected to win it at the cost of the battle of Washington, which he was

perfectly prepared to see lost by the expendables he appointed to its high command." He gambled "that the home front would win the war as fast as the war could set it in motion." He "simply did not believe in planning—with a capital P—as the answer to the problems of society."

The first years of an economic mobilization are the most important because there is an inevitable "lead period" between the drafting board and the delivery of finished munitions. "To hindsight the story of the things left undone during the lost year of 1939-40 is unbelievable." It is for this reason that the years before Pearl Harbor and the first year of the war are particularly emphasized. The industrial mobilization plan of 1939 and why it was not adopted then; the fiasco of the War Resources Board; the parade of the mobilization agencies—the Defense Advisory Commission, SPAB, and OPM—and the long flirtation with Baruch are all discussed and interpreted against the political background. Roosevelt believed fundamentally in the "energy of the people and his own skill in improvising leadership in a crisis." Confident of his ability, he was perfectly willing to use politics to gain a principle.

The final momentum of victory was reached on the home front before it was evident on the battlefields. Not until the spring of 1944 did the shooting war reach its climax, but cut-backs in the industrial mobilization began in 1943. Just as in the case of the beginnings of war production, cut-backs suffered from being too poorly planned.

Janeway's style is sparkling and provocative—"politically, Roosevelt's performance was professional; technically it was amateurish." He had "a simple and abiding faith that the country could be trusted to lead its leaders toward mobilization; . . . what Roosevelt delegated was always responsibility and never authority; . . . he believed dependence upon organization disorganizes democracies."

This account is invaluable for an understanding of the present problems of industrial mobilization. Moreover, it is a book about which students of politics will long debate. Some of them may disagree with Mr. Janeway's analysis, but none of them will find it dull.

Robert H. Connery is a member of the political science department of Duke University. He is the author of "The Navy and Industrial Mobilization in World War II."

