

treasure house of railroads, harbors and highways, hydroelectric developments, modern sugar, aluminum and oil refineries, rice, tea, sugar cane, sweet potato and peanut plantations, and copper and coal mines. Furthermore, Formosa has been the beneficiary of some half billion dollars in direct and indirect aid from the United States. Altogether, the recovery of the island's economy has been more than merely encouraging. In some fields, things are actually better than during the Japanese heyday. Real wages, for example, compare well with those prevailing in 1937, and power production is better than under the Nipponese.

But, despite all this progress, Dr. Riggs is frankly skeptical of Generalissimo Chiang's chances of reconquering mainland China. The forces at his disposal are felt to be utterly inadequate. Even if the United States were to provide transport and air power, the Nationalists would remain hopelessly deficient in manpower. One serious setback on the mainland, says Riggs, and the show would be over.

The appendix of the volume includes a sort of Formosan separatist's manifesto, written by one Joshua Liaq from exile in Hong Kong. It represents an important—if submerged—viewpoint among millions of Formosans, and deserves further study.

## *Hic Jacet*

By Gustav Davidson

MY father was poor,  
my mother lonely;  
their hunger fed  
on hope only.

How vain that hope,  
how unbestowing,  
they little guessed—  
and died unknowing;

died, like all  
who walk the earth:  
the lost, the driven,  
doomed from birth;

died (like Him, the  
thrice-denied,  
the spears of the righteous  
in His side).

And this is as much  
as can be said  
of fathers, mothers,  
myriads dead:

the whole of their lives,  
words graved on stones;  
the whole of their anguish,  
dust and bones.

# Disaster with Offspring

REVOLUTION IN CHINA. By Charles Patrick Fitzgerald. New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 290 pp. \$4.50.

By KENNETH SCOTT LATOURETTE

HERE is a book that must be read by all who seek to understand the present situation in China. The author, a member of the faculty of the Australian National University and an eminent Sinologist, has written a widely used history of China and was for a time a resident of Peking under the Communist regime. He therefore combines scholarship, time perspective, and first-hand observation as he seeks to interpret recent events.

Slightly less than half of this little volume is a historical narrative. In it the author first gives the situation which prepared the way for the present revolution. He recognizes it correctly, as not having been created by the Communists, but as having a long past. He sees it as due partly to pressure from the Occident, operating from the sea, but as arising chiefly from fundamental weaknesses in the "three pillars of support" of traditional China which, "riddled by white ants," "suddenly collapsed." The first of the three pillars was the conviction that the Chinese Empire was universal, the "only source of power, of orthodox doctrine, and of civilization." It was shattered by the disturbing discovery that Western peoples were civilized and must be dealt with on the basis of equality. The second pillar was agriculture, the basic occupation. The enormous growth in population in the eighteenth century, aggravated by the impact of Western imports, brought serious pressure on it and in consequence on the economy of the empire. The third and main pillar was the "orthodox doctrine of Confucian ethical and political teaching," perpetuated by the state and the scholar class. On contact with the West it proved "neither fallible nor essential to civilization." As the structure which was sustained by these pillars collapsed, democracy as we in the Anglo-Saxon world understand that term was tried, but failed because the Chinese did not have the necessary background for it. Now Communism has entered and triumphed because, so the author contends, it represents "the fundamental concepts of Chinese society in a form fitted to the changed world." As the Communists have framed them, they are "world sovereign authority . . . coterminous with



—Scott Long in Minneapolis Morning Tribune.  
"Sad Story of Two Extremes."

civilization; a balanced economy by which only luxuries and surplus products are exchanged, the basic industries and basic transportation being managed by the state; [and] the establishment of an orthodox doctrine which harmonizes all the activities of the human being and provides a code of ethics, of politics, and of every other activity, including economics." The author professes neither to be pro-Communist nor anti-Communist, but he clearly believes that the present regime, with modifications, is to continue for an indefinite period and that not even a third world war is likely to upset it.

The latter part, somewhat more than half of the book, is devoted to various aspects of the revolution. Among them are Christianity and Christian mission, which Fitzgerald deems to have failed, the relations of the Western powers to the revolution, which he maintains to have been inept, the place of the revolution in the Far East as a whole, and possible future developments. Mr. Fitzgerald holds that China "is inevitably taking over the leadership in Asia." But he is not sure of the long-term future of Mao's New Democracy. He holds that to survive, it must, "like every previous regime which has governed in China," "conciliate the interests of the peasants and those of the scholars," and he is not at all certain that it will succeed

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in holding the allegiance of the latter. He has much to say of the mistakes, as he views them, of the United States and of the unhappy dilemma in which that nation finds itself in the Far East. Yet he believes that Moscow has also been guilty of blunders, among them, probably, underestimating in 1945 and earlier the strength and significance of the Chinese Communists. He is also frankly puzzled by the Russian policy in Manchuria and is not clear whether it was dictated by stupidity or by extraordinary prescience. He certainly does not believe Stalin and his cohorts to have been infallible nor the tie between Moscow and Communist Peking to be eternally firm.

It is, of course, easy to find debatable points in a book which deals with such controversial issues. The author is certainly not pro-Communist, but he is quite clearly pro-British, and this bias has affected some of his judgments. He seems not to have understood the genius of Christianity and of Christian missions. He appears not to have taken adequately into account the basic economic problems which China presents to any regime nor to have faced frankly the issue of whether the Communists are likely to solve them. It is at least questionable whether, as he asserts, "there is no real doubt that the new system has obtained the support of the people." It can also be argued that the T'ai P'ing movement, of which he has a good deal to say, collapsed much more from irremediable internal weakness than, as he maintains, from the failure of support by the Western Powers and the aid which the latter gave to the Manchus. In spite of these and other questions on which honest and informed opinions differ, the book is one of the best which has been written on the Communist stage of the Chinese Revolution.

#### LITERARY I.Q. ANSWERS

1. Helen, in *Troilus and Cressida*. 2. Caesar, in *Antony and Cleopatra*. 3. Petruchio, in *The Taming of the Shrew*. 4. Othello, in *Othello*. 5. Leonato, in *Much Ado About Nothing*. 6. Lear, in *King Lear*. 7. Valentine, in *Two Gentlemen of Verona*. 8. Lysander, in *A Midsummer Night's Dream*. 9. Hermione, in *The Winter's Tale*. 10. Oliver, in *As You Like It*. 11. Claudius, in *Hamlet*. 12. Countess of Rousillon, in *All's Well That Ends Well*. 13. Isabella, in *Measure for Measure*. 14. Juliet, in *Romeo and Juliet*. 15. Shylock, in *The Merchant of Venice*. 16. Antipholus, in *Comedy of Errors*. 17. Sebastian, in *Twelfth Night*. 18. Cymbeline, in *Cymbeline*. 19. Ferdinand, in *The Tempest*. 20. Virgilia, in *Coriolanus*.



—From "Panzer Leader."

Guderian near Roslau (August 5, 1941)—"the willing and decisive tool."

## "How Green Were My Steppes"

PANZER LEADER. By General Heinz Guderian. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. 527 pp. \$7.50.

By S. L. A. MARSHALL

THIS World War II memoir of General Heinz Guderian quite accurately reflects the man. He is a hunk of a German, with a warm personality, a charming presence, a love of hard work, and a talent for organization. He is also a first-class fighting man, though more of a plunger than a planner capable of understanding the whole design. He is also, politically, one of the most limited if not stupid men who has served a great state during crisis in modern times.

He was one of the key figures in Hitler's rise to power over Europe and in Germany's defeat which came of it. Anyone viewing his career in detachment would find it hard to determine whether he contributed most to the rise or to the fall.

Captain B. H. Liddell Hart, the distinguished British critic who writes the foreword to Guderian's book, appears in the role of a special pleader for a friend and disciple. Seen through his eyes, Guderian is a genius with almost boundless military gifts, and handicapped mainly by that lack of political insight and judgment which is so frequently marked in the military technician.

That is a possible view of any great tactician if one concentrates only upon his successful strokes on the battlefield and excludes consideration of his

acts and influence on the over-all design and fortune of the state.

But in view of Germany's defeat, Guderian is hardly deserving of any such analysis. He was the main architect of the German armored force. His thinking was not particularly original. In the time when Germany was using mock-ups instead of tanks because of the Versailles Treaty, Guderian became a convert to the ideas of J. F. C. Fuller and Hart, who had theorized that by basing the offensive on armor warfare could be revolutionized. Accepting the tactical doctrine, Guderian set about creating the instrument, and so doing became the willing and decisive tool of an aggressor already on the prowl. He was heart and soul with his master at every point when the military object seemed within reach. He resisted Hitler only when he thought the scheme so ambitious as to risk defeat.

Without decisive strength in armor, Nazi Germany couldn't have risked unlimited aggression. And in turn, reliance on that weapon begot the overreaching which promoted Germany's battlefield defeat.

A soldier's part in this cannot be overlooked, although the soldier will not himself see it. Guderian complains bitterly that Nazi industry would not turn out carriers and other parts fast

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