


A PRESCRIPTION FOR THE WORLD



LORD RUSSELL: "The same reasons which existed for the creation of national governments exist now for the creation of an international government."

By **BERTRAND RUSSELL**

Few contemporary historians or philosophers have spent as much time studying and analyzing the ills of civilization as Bertrand Russell, now eighty-two. The Saturday Review has asked the recent Nobel Prize-winner to write his prescription for the world today, taking into account both the record of the past and the promise of tomorrow.

ORGANIZED war, an institution which has existed for some six thousand years, has at last become incompatible with the continued existence of the human race. Perhaps this incompatibility is not yet absolute. I think it possible that if a world war were to break out in the next few years a few Patagonians and Eskimos might survive it. But it is quite clear that this dazzling hope cannot survive more than a few more years of technical progress in the art of war. Serious students of the matter, except those who have some axe to grind, are agreed about the hopelessness of large-scale war in the future. And when I say "hopelessness," I mean the word in an absolute sense. I mean that there is hardly anybody in the world whose desires will be

realized by a world war. I say "hardly anybody" because there may be a few pessimists who would welcome the extinction of man. But they are certainly few, and I shall ignore them. We are therefore faced with a new and very difficult problem. We have to choose between war and human life. We can no longer, as heretofore, have both.

This problem has two aspects: on the one hand, the creation of such institutions as shall permanently prevent large-scale wars; on the other hand, the steps by which the creation of such institutions can be approached.

I do not think that permanent peace can be assured by the creation of an international Authority possessing all the more important weapons of war and leaving to national states only

such forces as may be necessary for internal police purposes. The existence of such an Authority will secure permanent peace only if certain further conditions are fulfilled. There must not be large national contingents which, at a crisis, might refuse to obey the supreme command when its orders appear to conflict with the national interest of those contingents. It would be necessary that every division of the army, every warship, and every air squadron should be of mixed nationality. The supreme command also would have to be vested, not in an individual, but in a committee of mixed composition. The same precautions would have to be observed in the matter of scientific research into methods of warfare and in the manufacture of munitions. If these precautions were observed it should be impossible for civil war to break out between different contingents of the international force.

A great many people object to the ideal of a single international armed force on the ground that it might lead to a military tyranny. This danger exists equally with national armed forces. It was so strongly felt in Eng-



land when a standing army was a new institution that the law against military disobedience operated only for one year, and to this day has to be passed afresh by Parliament every year. There has never, since 1688, been any danger of a military tyranny in England. The Duke of Wellington hated the Reform Bill of 1832, but, though at the height of his power and fame, it never occurred to him to employ the army against Parliament; and if it had occurred to him not a man would have obeyed him. The same methods by which the civil government has preserved control over the armed forces in national states could be employed in an international state, provided that the necessary sentiments of loyalty to the central government existed. The creation of such sentiments would not be nearly as difficult as the creation of a world government. It may be conceded that the danger might remain as a remote possibility; but, since the alternative is the extinction of the human race, this slight risk would clearly be worth running.


WHAT should be the powers of the Central Authority? They should be such only as would be absolutely necessary for the prevention of war. In all other matters national sovereignty

should remain unimpaired. In addition to the monopoly of armed force, the Central Authority would have to possess control over treaties between national states. No treaty should be valid until the Central Authority had sanctioned it. Moreover, the Central Authority should have the right to revise treaties if lapse of time had made them obsolete or unduly onerous to one party. I think the Central Authority should exercise some control over the distribution of raw materials in order to remove the temptation to imperialism (whether economic or political) which exists when important raw materials are found on the territory of a state which has not the technical capacity to utilize it. I do not think that the Central Authority should interfere with national immigration laws, since, if it attempted to do so, it would arouse an opposition which would probably destroy it. It should, however, attempt to raise the standard of life in the poorer countries of the world, since their envy of more prosperous nations might easily be an incentive to war. I think that in the course of time it should come to exercise a certain degree of control over education by discouraging virulent and disruptive forms of propaganda. It would have to be part of the constitution of the

Central Authority that it had a right to raise revenue. Probably the simplest method would be an agreement to pass on to it a percentage of the national revenue of its constituent states. The Central Authority would also need a limited power to requisition land for bases and for military purposes. I do not think that any further powers need be granted to it, since these powers would suffice to make large-scale wars impossible.

The Central Government would of course be a Federal Authority with powers strictly defined by a written constitution. It might be found wise to make it a federation, not directly of national states, but of subordinate federations of states. These could be of approximately equal size, so that there would be no injustice in allowing an equal weight to each. Each subordinate federation should, if possible, itself decide matters concerning states both of which belong to it; only when it failed to do so should there be an appeal to the world federation.

The world federation should investigate every dispute between states belonging to different subordinate federations, and also between states belonging to the same subordinate federation, if that federation could not impose a solution. The world federa-



tion should make an award in every such dispute and should enforce obedience to its award by whatever methods might be necessary.

BUT all this at present is Utopian. There are many preliminary steps to be taken before anything of the sort becomes possible. Somehow or other world war has to be averted while these preliminary steps are being taken. How is this to be achieved?

The first step is to secure a diminution of mutual suspicion. I do not believe that either side at present desires to initiate a great war. Americans have declared repeatedly that they will not go to war except to repel aggression, and there is reason to think that the Soviet Government also is unwilling to embark upon aggressive war. But the American Government feels no confidence in the pacific intentions of the Soviet Government, and the Soviet Government feels no confidence in the pacific intentions of the American Government. If the tension is to be eased it is necessary, not only that neither side should intend aggressive war, but that each side should be persuaded that the other does not intend it. Each side is aware that a surprise attack in the style of Pearl Harbor could inflict appalling damage within a few hours. Military authorities in the United States do not conceal this fact, though I doubt whether it is generally realized in America. Malenkov himself has stated that a world war could only bring universal disaster. Nevertheless, on each side of the Iron Curtain there exists a vivid fear of a treacherous attack from the other side.

Since defense seems scarcely possible in the present state of military technique, the only counter-measures that either side can think of consist of an increase in offensive weapons and in the destructive power of sudden attack. Such measures inevitably increase mutual suspicion, and mutual suspicion makes the preservation of peace more difficult. Paradoxically, whatever increases the fear of war promotes measures and states of mind that make war more likely. Neither side dares to appear conciliatory for fear of being thought to show fear. Any sensible compromise which does not concede all that one party wants is condemned by that party as appeasement. The two sides are in the position of duelists in former times, neither of whom wished to be killed, but neither of whom could take the first step towards a reconciliation for fear of being thought a coward. We recognize nowadays that such behavior was folly on the part of individuals, but on the part of great

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ARMS AND MEN



—From "The Old Breed."

"The perfect strategy is one that brings victory without bloodshed."

Master of Indirect Approach

"Strategy," by B. H. Liddell Hart (Frederick A. Praeger, 420 pp. \$5.95), is a backward glance at all military history, and especially that of World War II, which may well be the chef d'oeuvre of the most stimulating military critic of our time. Here it is reviewed by Gordon Harrison, military analyst on the staff of the Detroit News.

By Gordon Harrison

WHETHER studies the art of war either professionally or from the viewpoint of a citizen concerned with the policies of survival will readily recognize two Englishmen, J. F. C. Fuller and B. H. Liddell Hart, as the preeminent theoreticians of our time. Of these perhaps Major General Fuller is the more original; Captain Liddell Hart at once the more serious and the more popular. Through some thirty books of military history and theory Captain Liddell Hart has eloquently urged the professional to a more critical appreciation of his task and the general reader to a richer understanding of history. Liddell Hart's force has been both the strength of his convictions and his skill as a writer. His own writings and his critiques of others have consistently set forth an uncompromising point of

view—the view of a man whose years of study and thought have been fired by something like the fervor of a crusader.

It was as inevitable that such a writer should have been read and judged as a prophet as that he should in time see himself in the same light and concern himself increasingly with his reputation. It is repeatedly remarked, for instance, that Liddell Hart's theories of the employment of armor decisively influenced General Heinz Guderian, the German exponent and commander of blitzkrieg. On the other side, Liddell Hart has been severely criticized for his pre-war writings, which, it is said, exaggerated the power of the defense. In fact, one may doubt whether any writing man, however brilliant or indefatigable, can claim a great creative role in military operations. As the basic ideas of war are relatively few and simple, the effective military thinking in any age is less the product of new theory than of an adjustment of theory to existing means; such adjustments necessarily are made primarily by generals and heads of state.

This is not to deny Captain Liddell Hart's influence, which has been as considerable as that of any military commentator of this century. It is to say that his importance rests not on a schematic exposition of tactics