

The Saturday Review



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Six Easy Ways of Losing to Communism

THERE is a much easier and cheaper way to lose to world Communism than by military defeat. We need not spend sky-high sums for hydrogen, plutonium, and uranium continent-smashers, nor need we strip our resources or expend our manpower. All we have to do is to concentrate so hard on what we hate that we forget what we are trying to protect. In fact, there are six simple ways to get us quickly to where we say we don't want to go:

1. *We can all act like third-rate political party hacks.* We can kick each other's shins in the cause of partisan advantage until no one will be left standing. We can take the position that it is more important to cripple our political opponent before the next election than it is to safeguard the system by which free elections are possible. We can proclaim the fact that if a man belongs to the opposite party he is a self-confessed traitor to his country.

2. *We can be cowards.* We can flee from the things we believe in because we fear that someone may attack us unfairly if we put our beliefs to work. If knaves arrogate to themselves the definition of what constitutes patriotism, we can become their parrots. If the Communists talk peace, we can prove our patriotism by calling for war. If Communism identifies itself with freedom and social justice, we can denounce their objectives instead of the phoniness of their claims. We can bow abjectly before the long finger wandering accusingly at random, lest it come to rest upon us. We can proceed on the assumption that the long

finger is unerring and that all the courts and legal processes so laboriously established to prevent abuse and injustice are either innocuous or superfluous. We can make private distemper sovereign, more fearful of the penalty of appearing to stand in its way than of the loss of those institutions which alone can deal with costly distempers, private or public.

3. *We can keep good people out of Government.* Our young people can be convinced that those of them who are foolish enough to go into Government service can expect low income and high abuse. We can go far beyond the legitimate requirements of loyalty to Government, we can leap far out in front of the valid safeguards against subversion, and we can create a no-man's land called "security risk." In such a land, literally, no man is safe for even if his own actions have been sound he can be judged by the actions and characteristics of those he may have known. Thus, at our military research centers we have already lost the services of a large number of scientists and research specialists, who are not accused of being subversives and who have not sought shelter under the Fifth Amendment, but who have had to answer for the unproved actions or associations of acquaintances, some of them long since forgotten. These scientists and research specialists have not yet been adequately replaced. Meanwhile, a loyalty review board, acting under the laws, has barred one of the nation's leading scientists, from the nation's "secrets," adding that if members of the board had been able to exercise their own mature and responsible

judgment, they would have decided otherwise. The country seems to have forgotten that it is not the knowledge that is given by the Government to the scientists that will determine our strength, but the knowledge that scientists give to the Government. One of the charges made public is that the scientist had had an illicit relationship with a woman. Nothing is said about the fact that such a disclosure before the public gaze may itself be illicit and immoral. If an impeccable private life is the new yardstick, who will be left to apply it?

4. *We can cut ourselves off from the majority of the world's peoples.* We can show so little knowledge of the broad movements of history and so little awareness of what the real issues are in the rest of the world that nothing that we say to other people will seem sensible or relevant. We can chatter unceasingly about what we want others to do without taking the trouble to find out what their own histories and culture make it natural for them to want to do. We can convince other peoples that we do not know what we are doing; in particular, that we do not know everything we should know about the big bomb we are setting off, thus creating doubts about our ability to equate power with responsibility.

5. *We can continue to run a weak second to Soviet propaganda activities in many parts of the world.* We can continue to reduce our appropriations for our information and library and radio services to the point where Communist propaganda has a clear field. We can continue to dismantle our mobile moving-picture units which were doing a good job of giving a rounded picture about the American people. In short, we can continue to fulminate against Communism in the United States Congress, but clam up when it comes to doing anything specific against Communism in the battle of communications and ideas.

6. *We can make anti-intellectualism the national pastime.* We can take the position that anyone who believes in books or who is interested in serious books is a dangerous fellow. We can create a new ideal for our young people—the ideal of the man who knows too much to read, who has too much inside information to have to think, who is so filled with empty slogans and guesses that he does not have to understand real problems. We can ridicule the professor, lampoon the artist, and despise the poet. In short, we can try to immunize ourselves against ideas at a time when ideas will determine the future. —N. C.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

ADMIRAL McCULLOM AND PEARL HARBOR

IT IS HARD TO BELIEVE that Admiral McCullom is the author of SR's review of "The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor" [SR May 29].

McCullom in 1941 was stationed in Washington as head of Far Eastern Section, Naval Intelligence. We had broken the Japanese codes and were day by day decoding and translating all their diplomatic messages. McCullom was one of seven on the Navy Department Distribution list who received a copy of every message. Short and Kimmel in Hawaii had no decoding machine and Washington sent them no copy or digest of messages.

At the time of Pearl Harbor McCullom was in a position to know and did know how inadequate and misleading was the information available or made available to Short and Kimmel and did his best to supplement and correct what they were receiving.

On December 1, 1941, he prepared a memorandum digest of the Japanese situation which he considered should be sent the Naval Command in Hawaii. This was discussed by Admiral Stark, his principal advisers, and Commander McCullom himself. Admiral Stark decided not to send it.

On December 4 McCullom tried again. This time he drafted a proposed dispatch summarizing the United States-Japanese situation for transmission to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, which contained the phrase "War between Japan and the United States is imminent."

Admiral Turner showed him the "war warning" dispatch of November 27, upon which so much reliance was placed in the review, and asked whether he still thought his message was necessary. McCullom said he did, but the message was never sent.

If his advice had been followed and the information he wished sent had been sent and had been supplemented by a day-to-day report of later developments, the raid on Pearl Harbor would not have been a surprise and might never have occurred.

Why this officer who made these honorable and intelligent efforts to save our fleet should not refer to them in a review of Admiral Theobald's book is as inexplicable as his failure to mention the strange events and omissions of December 6 and December 7.

It would be easy to answer the arguments made in the review but too long for a letter. The book itself is the best answer.

ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY.

Boston, Mass.

A REPLY FROM THE ADMIRAL

IT IS QUITE evident that Mr. Montgomery disagrees with my review of Admiral Theobald's book, but his reasons for so doing are, as he intimates, probably too many for detailing in a letter. In any



"Oh, dear, you're not planning to work on your vacation . . . ?"

event, he does not state them. He limits himself to expressing surprise that one such as myself, who tried repeatedly to get more information (or at least an expression of his views) to our Pacific commanders and failed, could have written such a review.

Mr. Montgomery has been most kind in summarizing my efforts (as they appear in the record of the Joint Congressional Committee investigating Pearl Harbor) to get more information and considered opinion before our Pacific commanders, including Admiral Kimmel. It has always been my view that Intelligence should err, if err it must, on the side of giving too much rather than too little information. I have also felt that it is the function of Naval Intelligence at whatever level to give to the commanders concerned its considered opinion of what the enemy may do or may not do as developed from the best information at hand. The command in Washington, quite obviously, did not agree with my views. I may add that this was not particularly novel either before or after Pearl Harbor and later on. I have often felt that the extremes of secrecy imposed on the use of "Magic" as well as certain other intelligence, before, during, and after Pearl Harbor, often tended to make this valuable information useless in practice.

To get back to the point, however, it seems to me to be the function of the reviewer of a book to:

- State as briefly as may be consistent with clarity and fairness, the principal theme of the book.
- Express an opinion as to how well or how poorly the author has developed or supported his theme.

- In the light of (a) and (b) above, and in a work of this nature, take one or two major arguments of the book and subject them to critical appraisal.

I believe that in my review I stated the theme of Admiral Theobald's book accurately and fairly. More briefly restated it was:

- The President of the United States deliberately goaded Japan into war as a means of insuring United States entry into the European war on the side of the British.
- To this end he had the active or tacit connivance of the highest officials, both civil and military, in the Government and in the remote Pacific commands.
- The Hawaiian commanders were deliberately tricked into error leading to catastrophe, by calculated denial of information in order that by their sacrifice the American people might be adequately aroused.

I find the evidence set forth in the book in support of these theses unconvincing when considered in the light of all the facts developed by the several Pearl Harbor investigating bodies and in the light of our historical position, right or wrong, in the international politics of the Pacific basin. It seems to me that reasonable appraisal of the developed facts, as well as an appraisal of the character of the men themselves, does not warrant any such charge as that Roosevelt, Hull, Stimson, Knox, Stark, Marshall, Hart, MacArthur, and others wilfully connived at the de-