

majestic book, a simply superb piece of analysis, made but the more alarming because its tone is cold as a glacier. Toward the occurring failures of the Administration in its dealings abroad he takes this same objective and hence nonpartisanly dignified approach. There is enough ranting in the press against Secretary Dulles, either for talking out of turn, or for some other reason, falling short as a modern Atlas. As Mr. Finletter sees it, those who take this short view are mistaking effects for causes, if not growing ulcers out of marginal worries.

Power—there is the heart of the matter in the atomic age. Either you have enough in the arsenal to be sure of the knockout blow or, failing that, you vote death to foreign policy. Men have agreed on this since the time of the Greek city-states, the main difference now being that death can arrive so suddenly.

PROPORTION and perspective are achieved in the Finletter presentation through the unique device of dividing the atomic era into three definite periods. First, the one of American monopoly and supremacy. Next, that of

Russia becoming ascendant in strategic air strength with sufficient A- and H-bombs to kill the United States. Last is the period when the man-guided air fleets are obsoleted by ocean-crossing guided missiles fitted with fissionable warheads.

Monopoly was assuring while it lasted. Our chance for parity is fading with every round of the clock because we are still thinking and arming on a Phase-One scale, though the Russian power to deliver a killing attack will exceed our own by 1956. Should we continue to mark time instead of preparing, and by some miracle survive the parlous years when we are at the mercy of a superior Russian air fleet, guided missile warfare will become full grown sometime in the 1960s. In that line of development, both as to stockpiling and research, Russia had already gone far past us.

This, briefly, is the central theme, though in stressing it because of its limitless urgency any reviewer must perforce slight the detailed analysis of our foreign problems which gives the book its remarkable substance. But in the final sense that omission becomes self-justifying through Mr. Finletter's assertion that, however worthy the

hope which we stake in our system of alliances with other free nations, our world position and prestige are doomed to collapse left unsupported by an adequate fighting power.

Here, again, he is specific. The shadow is nearing and we will soon be in eclipse. For survival the United States must immediately start expanding toward a power base equal to the task of smashing Russia even should the Communist powers begin war with a full-armed blow against us. It can do so only by radically increasing the count of bombers in SAC.

Armed with anything less than that, in the judgment of the man who has made a more scholarly review of the problem than any living American, the United States has little chance either to forestall World War III or forestall the ruin of its hopes for an improved world order based upon collective security.

How far short do we fall? Mr. Finletter steers clear on the tricky business of expressing it in numbers of planes, air wings, or H-bombs. He says that when the Administration moves to spend an additional \$12,000,000,000 annually on its air requirements there will be reason for confidence that it takes a true reading on the world situation.

This being an election year, the alternative is an agitated wait.

Still, that workout for the nerves could be not without profit, provided that the interval be not too long and that it terminates by an increasing number of Americans and their servants in Government swinging around to Mr. Finletter's ideas. For his book I would wish—vainly, I know—50,000,000 readers. It is like an unexpected and full exposure of the bravest and most chilling thoughts from the best minds along the two sides of the Potomac. Many of its passages, if found in a bureaucratic in-basket, would call for it to be stamped "Top Secret." With appropriateness it might have been titled "So Little Time" or, for that matter, "Strategy," for it is both an instruction in the art and a warning of judgment day.

I am a dirt soldier. For most of a lifetime I have been passionately concerned that the elements of military power be seen in proportion, and I have had no patience with those windy voices which were ready almost from the day of Kitty Hawk to say that we should cast down institutions which are the safeguards of survival. But there are new things under the sun. Those who put them so clearly that failure to understand must be charged to fear or ignorance are great minds of the day. Count Mr. Finletter among them.



Your Literary I. Q.


Conducted by John T. Winterich

BIOGRAPHICAL BREVITIES

Fannie Gross of Asheville, North Carolina, presents ten fragmentary comments (with names of commentators attached) which were made concerning ten important authors. Can you identify them? Allowing ten points for each correct answer, a score of sixty is fine, seventy is finer, and eighty or better is superb. Answers on page 59.

1. "All of a sudden, without preface or warning, he breaks out into exquisite song like the nightingale from the brushwood and continues singing as sweetly." (Lord Roseberry)
2. "A great connoisseur of life and a very careless student of literature . . . ill bred, ill lettered and in some ways, perhaps, ill balanced." (Tucker Brooke)
3. "A beautiful and ineffectual angel beating in the void his luminous wings in vain." (Matthew Arnold)
4. "—, though he felt himself the equal of Satan, never quite ventured to put himself in the place of God." (Bertrand Russell)
5. "He saw with a strange combination of cool vision and hot rage what foolish creatures we are, and he lashed us unmercifully." (John Macy)
6. "Three fifths of him genius and two fifths sheer fudge." (James Russell Lowell)
7. "The most delightful, the most provoking, the most witty and sensible of men. He always made the best pun, and the best remark in the course of the evening." (William Hazlitt)
8. "— loves nothing so much as being hated, if the hatred is sincere; he loves nothing so much as being criticized if the criticism is honest." (Dr. Henry Frank)
9. "An old struggler, struggling against scrofula, against semi-blindness, against poverty, against neglect." (Augustine Birrell)
10. "Perhaps my strongest impression of him was that of sorrow. . . . Whenever I touched his face his expression was sad, even when he was telling a funny story." (Helen Keller)

Secretary-General on the Road



"In the Cause of Peace," by Trygve Lie (Macmillan, 473 pp. \$6), is a personal report by the first Secretary General of the United Nations of the first seven years of that organization's work. Lindsay Rogers, who reviews it here, is professor of public law at Columbia University, and from 1942 to 1947 was assistant director of the International Labor Office.

By Lindsay Rogers

IN "In the Cause of Peace," the first Secretary General of the United Nations, Trygve Lie, has written an interesting and readable book and has managed to escape some of the traps that often entice authors whose memoirs deal with recent events in which they have participated. The travelogue which chronicles Mr. Lie's journeys to many countries is more than a mere description of the great and near-great in what Lord Hervey slightly called the "theatrical pageantry of their public characters"; the conversations reported as having taken place in many capitals and at the United Nations are revealing and not always flattering to Mr. Lie's opposite numbers.

Again, there is no shying away from the major issues that the United Nations has faced—Palestine, Korea, and Kashmir remain unresolved—and there is frankness about the fumbling and inconsistent policies the Western Powers had, not only in respect of issues but toward the organization itself. Thirdly, Mr. Lie is a modest man, and while he makes no secret of the opinions he held on various matters and which he expressed to delegates from governments—or in letters to friends in Norway—there is no vain-glorious boasting of how right his position always was and how considerable the contribution he made to keep the cold war from becoming a hot one.

For the general reader, as I have said, Mr. Lie's book will have interest; for those who write about the first seven years of the United Nations and the international happenings that did not have their focus there the volume will be "history as record," since it sheds additional light (but little heat) on some transactions about which governments are still reticent. There are full details on the

manner of Trygve Lie's appointment and the extension of his term, when President Truman authorized Ambassador Austin to veto the designation of anyone else for the place. The rest of the American delegation to Lake Success and Secretary Acheson did not know in advance of this hasty, ill-considered action. American and British policy in respect to Palestine had many tergiversations and the State Department once changed its mind without notifying the delegation in New York. Mr. Lie proposed to Mr. Austin that they both resign.

In the opinion of the Secretary General the representatives of Communist China should have been brought to the United Nations. Indeed, in January 1950 Ambassador Gross declared that, while his Government regarded the credentials of Dr. Tsiang (the Nationalist delegate) as valid, it would "accept the decision of the Security Council on this matter when made by an affirmative vote of seven members." Under Congressional pressure the American attitude changed. Mr. Acheson later spoke of asking the International Court whether the veto could be used to reject the credentials of any representative of the Communist Government. Mr. Lie hazards the opinion that if the rep-

resentatives of the Peking Government had been at Lake Success it would not have dared send its armies as "volunteers" into North Korea. Perhaps it would not have agreed to the aggression by North Korea. Historians will long debate these matters and ask two questions. While the State Department could not openly favor the seating of the Communist representative should it not have encouraged instead of opposed the creation of the majority of seven in the Security Council? Did the Kremlin, for all its fine words, really desire the Peking Government to have contacts with the West and thus become less susceptible to Soviet control?

SEVERAL times Mr. Lie laments the neglect of Article 28 of the Charter. This provides that the "Security Council shall hold periodic meetings at which each of its members may . . . be represented by a member of the Government." The Secretary General thought that if the foreign ministers met Geneva would be the most suitable place. There they could "exchange views and opinions outside the immediate searchlight of the press, which would always be disturbing them more in New York." He might have added that the physical arrange-



"Good heavens—the price of tea is going up again!"