

Apologia for Doug

"MacArthur: 1941-1951," by Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby and John Chamberlain (McGraw-Hill Book Company. 441 pp. \$5.75), is an account of the command of the U. S. armed forces in the Far East from World War II to the Korean incident, as seen by its chief intelligence officer. Here it is reviewed by Brig. Gen. S. L. A. Marshall, military critic of the Detroit News and European theatre historian of the U. S. Army during World War II.

By S. L. A. Marshall

ON NOVEMBER 27, 1950, when General MacArthur at last took formal notice that a Chinese army had arrived undetected on his front and was at the point of destroying his forces in North Korea, he spoke of a "new war" and thereby made official a situation as obvious as Everest.

Some hours later his General Staff heard the most curious G-2 briefing of record. The speaker was of impressive bulk, of pompous manner, and normally given to majestic gesturing. This time he was easy, relaxed, with a wry smile on his face. He pointed to the situation map, saying: "It speaks for itself. You see there is a fifty-mile gap between our two flanks, no communications in between, and the enemy moving through. This is a most unusual situation in war. I trust that in time it will in some way be repaired."

For those few seconds Gen. Charles Willoughby, G-2, was magnificent in his candor and Hollywood poise. The spell was broken when someone asked by what date the Yalu froze over. Willoughby didn't know. An Air Force captain said it would be solid by mid-December. The meeting went on.

Within a few weeks Willoughby was publicly minimizing the tactical importance of the gap and saying that the Reds had never turned 8th Army's flank. It was a time of almost agonizing pressure for him and, if his memory fogged slightly, he was not alone.

"Sir Charles," as some of his close associates called him, was getting heavy sniper fire from his rear. The national press blamed him for all the

underestimation of enemy power which had turned Korean operations into a mockery of our intelligence system. Making no public reply, he kept his dignity at the expense of his peace of mind. Knowing that the cold facts were in his favor, he was still ridden by an almost pathological fear that his career would be the sacrificial goat on the altar of American defeat.

In secret he prepared his case, and it was a dilly. Its six pages quoted his estimates made during the twelve critical months of 1950. Laid alongside them was proof of how his warnings on Korea had been snubbed or discounted by CIA, the Joint Chiefs, and, yes, MacArthur. He had always been right but nobody believed him.

Of that personal crisis or the paper or the histrionic briefing there is no mention in "MacArthur: 1941-1951," the book Willoughby has written with John Chamberlain's literary assistance. I lift them from old notes. Their omission, however, from what purports to be an objective summing up of ten years as MacArthur's left bower is an index of the quality of this writing, as to revelation, balance, fullness, fairness. It has them not. Willoughby has written just another fulsome eulogy of the man who lifted him from obscurity to a national name, and for that reason, if no other, the tribute is paid in dubious coin.

THE greatness of MacArthur as a man and soldier is hardly a subject for dispute. But an otherwise vital legend becomes indistinguishable from myth when any mortal is portrayed as above personal or professional fault, a sort of divinity walking on the universal sea of human infirmity.

When MacArthur was relieved Willoughby thought it time to turn in his soldier suit. He soon lost himself in Spain, amid press reports that he was adoring Franco's footwear. However exaggerated, they bore not on his role as the great oracle of enemy secrets. As there are divergent opinions about the merits of the claim, and fog still obscures most of the figure, judgment is for the birds, history, and heaven.

It was not as G-2, really, that Willoughby composed, with yeoman help from pastepot and shears, this new



GENERAL WILLOUGHBY SAYS: On the Pacific command: "... MacArthur thought the entire Pacific Theatre should be unified under a single command. He argued for such unification, but without success. He was entirely willing to relinquish his own seniority of command and serve in a subordinate position..."

On the atomic bomb: "Japan was ready for the coup-de-grace—and it could have been administered with conventional weapons. . . . Had Truman kept the atomic bomb a secret, the American politico-military position today would be impregnable. . . . MacArthur did not ask for the atomic attack. He did not even know of the existence of this bomb until a few days before its public use."

On warning Washington about the invasion of South Korea: "... a secret agency in Korea, sent there from MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo . . . in the critical six months immediately before the outbreak of the war [filed] 417 special reports. . . . All were of increasing urgency and covered every facet of the North Korean threat. . . ."

On crossing the Thirty-Eighth Parallel: "... the charges made in the press of the world 'that MacArthur crossed the parallel and went into North Korea on his own initiative and in reckless defiance of superior authority' were fantastically false."

On MacArthur's dismissal: "In retrospect, it must seem that all of the Administration's 'reasons' masked something deeper. General Bradley said on one occasion that MacArthur 'was not in sympathy with the decision to try to limit the conflict in Korea [and] avoid a third war.' Yet MacArthur desired only to destroy the enemy where he had chosen to attack, in Korea. His proposals to bomb the Yalu bridges, to avail himself of the right of 'hot pursuit' of enemy aircraft, and to utilize his own air and naval forces to carry the war to the enemy's supply and communications were hardly a prescription for a third world war."

version of "Inside MacArthur." Wearing two hats, a staff officer becomes privileged to speak through either one. Under MacArthur, Willoughby also "administered" the historical operation. That is a military euphemism meaning that a chief has bodies to boss but isn't necessarily responsible for their work output.

In the MacArthur theatre, uniquely, command took an authoritarian view of how operational history should be written, no matter that the nation staked the enterprise. Control by the War Department went unacknowledged. Guidance was spurned. The historians were not permitted to become a free-wheeling group, going where necessary to get their work done, and doing it without arbitrary censorship from on high. The present President of the nation encouraged just such an ideal standard as this in ETO. On the other side of the globe, command wanted a martial hymn of praise and damn well got it.

These were the so-called "MacArthur histories," ultimately published in Japan, never circulated, and supposedly destroyed when the pilot at Tokyo was changed. Public tears have been shed that this treasure trove was denied the nation, after such great labor and cost. Having read the books over several midnights, to get a line on their worth as historical properties, I remain dry-eyed.

Willoughby was keeper of the books. It is their undeniable authority, he says, which ponderates his own work. All good enough if one believes that compounded insistence establishes fact. But if one doesn't, and chooses to weigh Willoughby's historian abilities out of his product, the reliability of his sources are as impressive as his modest statement that MacArthur first picked him for a high staff position because of his faithful attention to historical studies.

As to organizational method, use made of source materials, continuity, assessment of fact, and inclusion of materials and opinions not pertinent either to a portrait of MacArthur or his method of conducting operations, the book offends every commonsense rule respected by the scholarly or empirically discovered by those who learn the hard way how historical standards are set.

Every page or so the flow of the story is interrupted by a diversion into largely irrelevant background material, the giving of heady opinions, or a flight into sheer romance. The writing is a tie-together of long and tedious extracts from other reports. Some of these are obviously "sitreps" or wholesale quotes from staff memoranda unreliable at best in that they reflect conjecture about things still unproved. Far worse, the point of origin much of the time goes unidentified.

AS TO error in fact, as well as error and distortion in interpretation, the book is so replete with it that any serious undertaking in refutation would itself be volume length. I do not here speak of little things; errors on dates and identification are trivia and should have been caught by the editor. The same cannot be said about the gross major-generalizations with which Willoughby writes about operations to which his desk was reasonably close. Of how the war went in Korea I found nothing which was recognizable, insofar as Willoughby tries to describe the flow of operations, and nothing which was dispassionately clean-cut, wherein he endeavors to alibi reversal, surprise, and defeat. Consider this: "Either Washington or the U.N. could have stopped our troops at any point in North Korea. Instead, each preferred the opiate of wishful thinking, the myopic resignation of the ostrich." Or this: "On November 26, 1950, the Red commander Lin-Piao launched his full forces across the Yalu and into battle." (They were already massed along the Chongchon and they started the steamroller on November 25.) Or this: "MacArthur's attack of November 24 was a reconnaissance in force but with freedom of action to advance or withdraw. The advance of November 24 upset the enemy's timetable causing the Red Chinese to move prematurely." To hell with the battlefield. Its blood-drenched facts are immaterial. History is what I choose to make people think.

Logic has no answer to claptrap. Therein lies one of the great frustrations of life. The final absurdity is more resistant than the utmost expression of honest wisdom.

Personality in Red

"The Appeals of Communism," by Gabriel A. Almond, in collaboration with Herbert E. Krugman, Elsbeth Lewin, and Howard Wiggins (Princeton University Press. 415 pp. \$6), seeks answers to the question of what makes people join the Communist Party. Here it is reviewed by Martin Ebon, author of "Malenkov: Stalin's Successor."

By Martin Ebon

ATTORNEY GENERAL Herbert A. Brownell, Jr., and FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover told President Eisenhower recently that the Justice Department plans to "utterly destroy the Communist Party, U.S.A." Their statement was received by the *Daily Worker* with an outburst of editorial self-pity—quite in character, Gabriel A. Almond's new book, "The Appeals of Communism," demonstrates, with the U.S. Communist Party's heavily masochistic personality. Whereas the *Cominform Journal*, world Communism's weekly bible, has party militance as its major theme, the *Daily Worker* seems always to be "defying," "asserting rights," "revealing," "disclosing," "drawing attention to," "denouncing," "branding," or "charging."

Professor Almond and his associates deal with Communist Parties in four Western nations: the "small deviational movements" of the United States and England, and the "mass working-class parties" of France and Italy. They have analyzed publications, and they have interviewed ex-Communists, to see how the Party version of the Communist personality stacks up against the real thing.

The picture that emerges is gratifyingly complex; gratifying, that is, to anyone who believes that in dealing with Communists we must have a better picture of our opponent than that of a monolithic scarecrow. Almond found that the French and Italian Parties harbor many members who have never been fully indoctrinated or disciplined. The British Communists have been unable to create within their Party the high pitch of hate—hate of the Laborites, for instance—that is a standard ideological tool in other Parties.

Within the Parties themselves there are various strata of responsibility, of idealism or cynicism, of camaraderie or mutual distrust. In France and Italy the Communists get supporters by playing up workers' and peasants' grievances; in Britain they appeal to

