

seems to make of our administration of the Marshall plan is that we were needily peremptory in 1950-1951 in getting Europe to rearm and in shifting from economic to military aid. But this was in fact forced on us by the communist invasion of Korea, by the entrance of China into the war, and by the aggressive practices of Soviet Russia. Russia was not willing to permit a peaceful competition between the free world and her dictatorship. We had to take up the challenge and get effective support for freedom in the world.

**M**Y OWN criticism of ECA and of the State Department would be of a very different nature. While the general work was good there was serious understaffing in both services—particularly in some of the European missions. In addition, the high officials of both agencies opposed the efforts of ur-seeing members of Congress to use the Marshall Plan to help Europe move further on the path towards democracy. In 1949 and again in 1950 the high officials fought Senator Fulbright's suggestion to use some of the funds to induce the European nations to integrate economically and to take steps towards political union. Only when the time was nearly up and our influence rapidly diminishing, did ECA and the State Department take related and largely ineffectual steps to carry out what Fulbright had earlier advocated.

Similarly, in 1951 and 1952 the upper echelons gave no support to those of us in Congress who were trying to pass the Benton-Moody amendment which earmarked some funds in order to stimulate foreign firms to break away from the European price-fixing cartels and to deal collectively with the non-Communist unions. Once this resolution was passed by a narrow margin ECA promptly proceeded to sabotage the program and made no real effort to carry it out.

It is true that the officials of these services suffered unjustly at the hands of some members of Congress. But it is also true that the officials of State and the upper echelons of ECA treated even their friends in Congress with a polished disdain. They had to accept the constructive and invaluable suggestions of Senator Vandenburg, but towards virtually all others they turned a deaf ear and refused to treat the legislature as a cooperative partner.

In my judgment the basic attitudes and behavior of both legislators and officialdom towards each other must improve before we can hope for the highest effectiveness. The fault is not all on one side.



—Fabian Bachrach.

Charles P. Curtis—"incisive remarks."

## Scientist on the Scale

**"The Oppenheimer Case,"** by Charles P. Curtis (Simon & Schuster. 281 pp. \$4), is a distinguished Boston lawyer's analysis of the case of a distinguished American scientist and what it has revealed about our security system. It is reviewed below by Frank Altschul, vice president of the Council on Foreign Relations.

By Frank Altschul

**A** PERSONNEL Security Board, under the chairmanship of Dr. Gordon Gray, held hearings in the matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer from April 12 through May 6, 1954. The transcript of these hearings, running to almost a thousand pages, is a fascinating document which far too few of us will be able to take the time to read. Having weighed the testimony and examined in detail the FBI file on Dr. Oppenheimer, together with other relevant material, the board issued its findings and recommendation on May 27, 1954.

As Charles P. Curtis points out in his book "The Oppenheimer Case," the board stated: "We find no evidence of disloyalty. Indeed, we have before us much responsible and positive evidence of the loyalty and love of country of the individual concerned." Unlike the United States Atomic Energy Commission, which in its decision on appeal was for no apparent reason curiously silent on this subject, the board went out of its way to affirm and reaffirm its complete confidence in Dr. Oppenheimer's loyalty. Furthermore, as Mr. Curtis reminds us, "Oppenheimer was not only


loyal. He was discreet." The board was quite emphatic in asserting "that Dr. Oppenheimer seems to have had a high degree of discretion reflecting an unusual ability to keep to himself vital secrets."

"The nation owes these scientists," said the board, "a great debt of gratitude for loyal and magnificent service. This is particularly true with respect to Dr. Oppenheimer." Nonetheless, two members of the three-man board, including the chairman, having "given particular attention to the question of his loyalty" and, having "come to a clear conclusion . . . that he is a loyal citizen," found themselves "unable to arrive at the conclusion that it would be clearly consistent with the security interests of the United States to reinstate Dr. Oppenheimer's clearance and, therefore, do not so recommend."

To the uninitiated it will seem incomprehensible, to say the very least, that a person of preeminent ability, whose loyalty and discretion were unquestioned, should have been denied the clearance necessary to permit him to continue to render brilliant service to his government. To trace the steps leading to such a seeming absurdity is the purpose of Mr. Curtis's book, which carries the appropriate subtitle "The Trial of a Security System." It is because he has been deeply aroused by the abuses and injustices which are the almost inevitable concomitant of the administration of the security system under present regulations that Mr. Curtis has undertaken to write this telling tract.

Mr. Curtis's book takes the form of a running commentary on extensive quotations from the transcript of the hearings. But these quotations bulk so large that they tend to overshadow the incisive and illuminating remarks of the author. Nonetheless, there is no mistaking the fact that in Mr. Curtis's view a gross injustice was done to Dr. Oppenheimer. And while he does not exonerate the board, his principal shafts are directed at the system under which it operated.

**F**OR in all fairness, one must admit that this was neither a simple nor a clear-cut case. The proceedings were conducted under Executive Order 10450, which set criteria and standards more searching than those prevailing in the past. Most of the "derogatory information" was not new. In spite of it, Dr. Oppenheimer had been cleared on more than one previous occasion. Yet the board had to reexamine all this in the light of a changed directive; and in the end sorely troubled men found it impossible to agree about the weight to be



—From "The New Yorker 1950-1955 Album."


"All right, Haskell—sell me."

**I**F YOU are an American don't worry if you find yourself laughing at only one of the three cartoons shown here. Of all the forms of communication probably none is more nationally stereotyped than is the art of cartooning. This generalization is illustrated by two new cartoon books, an American one, "The New Yorker 1950-1955 Album" (Harper, \$5), and one international in scope, "Cartoon Treasury," edited by Lucy and Pyke Johnson (Doubleday, \$4.95). Of the examples shown, the one at right is typically British, the one below is typically French, and one at top, being typically American, is probably just as unfunny to the French and the British as, the chances are, the French and British cartoons are to you, or all three to a Chinese.



—From "Cartoon Treasury."

"Let's have it a bit more rampant, George."



—From "Cartoon Treasury."

"It's a boy!"

allotted to the varied elements of a complex story.

Testimony overwhelmingly favorable to Dr. Oppenheimer was given by a large number of individuals of the greatest distinction. Men who had worked with him intimately, and for years, such as Dr. Vannevar Bush, Dr. Karl Compton, John J. McCloy, Gordon Dean, and David Lilienthal, among others, were uniform in their expression of complete confidence in him, and in their praise of his unique and invaluable contribution to the security of the United States. George Kennan, to select only one example from many, testifying "without reservation as to [his] judgment of Dr. Oppenheimer's character and loyalty," made this trenchant remark:

One of the convictions that I have carried away from such experience as I have had with these matters in the field of Soviet work concerning the Soviet Union is that these things cannot really be judged in a fully adequate way without looking at the man as an entirety. That is, I am skeptical about any security processes that attempt to sample different portions of a man's nature separate from his whole being. I must say as one who has seen Robert Oppenheimer now over the course of several years, and more latterly outside of Government, that I have these feelings and entertain them on the basis of my estimate of his personality and his character as a whole.

**I**N THE light of the foregoing, what can be said of the board? First of all, it had to operate within the framework of a rigid security policy, the shortcomings of which are underscored in Mr. Curtis's book. Then there were disturbing incidents to which the board obviously attached considerable importance. The most damaging was the Chevalier-Eltenton affair, the details of which are fully covered in Mr. Curtis's book. In dealing with an approach made to him on behalf of an alleged Communist named Eltenton, by his friend Haakon Chevalier, Dr. Oppenheimer admits that he told Colonel Pash a story which was in large measure a complete fabrication. He subsequently repeated this tale to Colonel Lansdale and General Groves. To have dealt in this manner with the General and with two Army security officers was highly improper, as was Dr. Oppenheimer's delay of about four months in advising the authorities of the Eltenton-Chevalier approach. This he now frankly admits, and he sincerely regrets the course he followed for rea-

(Continued on page 31)