


PEACE ALONE IS NOT OUR OBJECT



Men in the middle of day-to-day affairs are tempted to think in terms of the slogans and public outcries of the moment; it's difficult for them to stand far enough aside to judge their doings in general perspective. Historians, on the other hand, are used to grand developments on the scale of generations and centuries; they not infrequently misinterpret current events. What we need, then, are modern appraisers who possess the historical training to put the past and present side by side. Executive director of the Research Institute of America Leo Cherne is not only a well-known businessman; he has also given many addresses (before the Army War College, among other places) on America's place in history.

By LEO CHERNE

PEACE alone is not and cannot be the proper objective of effective diplomacy. Had peace itself been the only objective World War II would not have begun. Peace was always available on Hitler's terms, and Germany's capitulation could have been won on a variety of terms short of unconditional surrender months before the bloody termination.

On the eve of the Big Four foreign ministers' meeting it is important for the United States to understand the nature of the problem before us. The worst folly of statesmanship is to go to war unarmed. The next worst course is to go to an international conference without a policy. We dare not go back to Geneva with

basic misconceptions about our adversary and lack of insight about ourselves.

Even though there is no unanimous judgment about Soviet intentions the following facts about Soviet behavior seem clear: the Soviet Union has not sought to begin World War III at any point in its advance since 1945; the Soviet Union has sought maximum available expansion short of global war; the Soviet Union has never relied exclusively on its military armor. Equally important to the Soviet objectives have been the disciplined organizations of Communist Parties throughout the world; the establishment of a myth identifying the Soviet Union with peace, encouragement of neutralism and nationalism among colonial peoples; the exploitation of every international griev-

ance among the nations of Western Europe; the exploitation of economic difficulties and racial frictions in Western democracies; the fanning of local wars; the watchful waiting for crisis in the West.

Only during one period of the thirty-eight years of Soviet Government did the Soviet leaders neglect this multitude of weapons. That period has now ended. During the arteriosclerotic days of an aging and stubborn Stalin Russia ignored the counsels of Marx, the flexibility of Lenin, the historic directions of Communism. The spirit of Peter the Great walked in the Kremlin; and the Soviet Union launched on the most historic series of blunders in all of Russian history.

Rigidity, intolerance, overt aggression, truculence, and vulgarity produced the following results: The U.S. initiated the Marshall Plan and the nations of western Europe were saved from the chaos that Russia wanted; NATO was established and the continent of Europe entered into a far-reaching defense agreement; Yugoslavia was alienated—lost and not destroyed; the Chinese Communists, regarded as almost certain losers by the Kremlin, won out virtually on their own; Iran fell from the Kremlin's grasp, and Greece was extricated from under the Soviet boots. For all these mistakes the Kremlin

was responsible. It miscalculated American reactions to the Korean grab. Not only was South Korea lost, but a disarmed America was compelled by Soviet tactics to rearm. Within the United Nations Communist misjudgment drew to America's side even the neutral countries. Berlin was besieged—unsuccessfully—and a reluctant Germany and France were forced into each other's arms. Division among the nations of the West and economic crisis within them were averted more by Soviet error than by Western resolve.

These Russian miscalculations explain the "new" tactics of the post-Stalin era. The quotation marks around the word "new" are essential, for most of what we're seeing is old. It is as old as Lenin's slogan: "Two steps forward and one step back." It is as old as the NEP period of Soviet development when cultural and economic exchange with the West was inaugurated. It is as old as Intourist, which brought a wave of American writers, playwrights, engineers, technicians, journalists to Moscow in the late Twenties and early Thirties. It is as old as Lincoln Steffens, who saw the future and thought it worked. It is as old as the United Front and then the Popular Front. It is as old as the mildness of Maxim Litvinov and the Soviets' agreement to end Moscow's direction of the Communist Party in the United States. It is as old as Amtorg and the millions in trade that poured through its Manhattan offices. It is as old as the Soviet worship of Ford. It is as old as Earl Browder's wartime cordiality toward the NAM.

To be sure during this interval there were many changes—there was an ebb and flow in the doubtful affections directed westward by the Kremlin. Yet nothing basic was ever altered. Is there, then, nothing new

in the benign "spirit of Geneva"? History repeats itself, but never in the same way, and the personalities who play upon the stage are always different. The bibulous Khrushchev is neither the moon-faced Malenkov nor the surly Stalin, and Molotov at the utmost limits of his smile can never be a genial Litvinov. Bulganin could never be a Trotsky even if their uniforms were identical. The bureaucrat has replaced the firebrand; the vested interests of the new aristocracy make and interpret policy. There are other differences, too. The slave-labor camps are being deodorized; the secret police have learned a new discretion; the edge has been taken off the epithet. Tourists now poke their kodaks in Muscovite faces. Junketing Senators arrive and make political observations on the basis of good food and lavish hotel accommodations.

WHY these changes in outward Soviet behavior? Is the new look the product of agricultural crisis, the internal pressure for consumer goods, the shakiness of committee government, fear of the upstart Chinese Communists, economic distress within the satellites, the inevitable response to the historic rebellion in East Germany on June 17, 1953?

Undoubtedly each of these contributed to the result. But undue emphasis on these factors can only mislead. The overriding reason for the "new look" is that it is the best method of serving purpose. The Soviet Union's continuing policy has everything to gain from Western relaxation, from European neutralism, from an environment which allows the Soviet Union to reduce her own armament. We may yet weary of Korea; we may tire of the struggle to keep the southern half of Vietnam

free; Chiang Kai-shek will die. The strongest cards held by the Soviet Union are the trumps provided by the Western states. Democracies permit the freest expression of the will of its people. People *will* peace—they do so everywhere—but only in the democracies is that will capable of controlling governmental decisions. The American will for peace is the Soviet's major asset because this desire in a democracy is inevitably translated into reduction of armaments, taxation, foreign aid, and political warfare. The democratic will for peace may yet introduce less security, a lowered guard, reduced strength. The United States was the first to demobilize following World War II. It will be the first again if given the appearance of half a chance.

This factor is inherent in democracy. It is at the very heart of our system that results are achieved by compromise. In the diplomatic and political struggles between the West and the Soviet Union compromise always tends to be the giving up by us of things we have every right to in exchange for the promised giving up by the Soviets of things they have no right to. Our tendency is to begin bargaining with a reasonable compromise. The Soviet's pattern is to begin with an unreasonable all-out demand from which they yield nothing but a promised concession.

The major hazard flows, however, not from promises that are broken, but from the very inequality of commitments made. The Chinese Communists kept their promise and released a portion of their American prisoners. In return our official reaction is required to be a salute to their humanitarian decency. While we hail the spirit of Geneva the Soviets prepare to arm the Arab Middle East.

History during this dangerous interval is recorded not only by the big headlines, but the small ones, too. Even as a Volga of vodka flowed in a dozen diplomatic banquet halls a two-inch item in *The New York Times* recorded reality: "More flee East Zone; Record number cross to West during last month." Why in the September month of the "Geneva spirit" did 18,519 escapees seek sanctuary in the West? Is it because they saw the Iron Curtain being lifted, peace approaching, tyranny decaying, the secret police disbanded, free elections instituted?

Their reasoning has the dread sound of unwelcome truth. They hasten to escape not because the walls of their prison are coming down, but because they feel that the West

(Continued on page 29)



Your Literary I. Q.

Conducted by John T. Winterich

SHORT TO LONG

Here's a mess of plain old-fashioned anagrams. Each cluster of little words properly broken up and reassembled will produce a single long word of anywhere from four to eight syllables. No scoring this week—get one and you'll get all. Answers on page 31.

- | | |
|--------------------------|------------------------|
| 1. A RAMP IS A HOT NAG | 6. A DOT IS VAGUE SAND |
| 2. IT IS NOT A TIGER DIP | 7. PAINT MIXER ON TEE |
| 3. TRIED MALT AT ONE | 8. SHOOT AT LONG RIP |
| 4. IT IS LIFE IN MAN | 9. MEN WELD TANK COG |
| 5. I BLEAT IF ANY DIG IT | 10. ACE BRAIN IDLE |