

MR. DULLES AND HIS FOREIGN POLICY



—Pierre Boulat.

When Secretary of State Dulles faced reporters at a recent press conference, he found them full of questions about a new book. The newsmen had been looking at Time reporter John Robinson Beal's **"John Foster Dulles"** (Harper \$4.50) in which the author says that he "received insight" into his subject's official actions through interviews with Mr. Dulles himself. In view of what had happened the last time Mr. Dulles had given special interviews to a Luce writer (the now-famous "brink of war" article in Life), many of the reporters were obviously hoping for further spectacular revelations about Mr. Dulles's intricately calculated diplomatic moves. They seized on Mr. Beal's statement that America's abrupt withdrawal last fall of the offer to finance Egypt's construction of the Aswan dam was a deliberate slap in Nasser's face, intended to show all neutralist nations that they cannot play on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Noting that Mr. Beal claims that the withdrawal was made in full knowledge that it involved grave risk of war, the reporters wanted to know how much the author was relying on Mr. Dulles's words in this interpretation. Mr. Dulles refused to answer saying, "I don't care to comment on articles written about me."

But the question of just how official were Mr. Beal's interpretations of the Secretary's acts remained unanswered. Within a couple of days the whole "brink of war" controversy had revived around the Aswan dam incident, and around other crises, too. For Mr. Beal maintained, just as had the original Life article, that Mr. Dulles's willingness to risk war had pulled the West out of tight spots in the Korean armistice negotiations, the Viet-Nam settlement, and in the Quemoy-Matsu island affair. Amid cries of "Brinkmanship!" on one hand and "Statesmanship!" on the other, it became evident that two images of our Secretary of State were before the public eye. In one he is a cagey lawyer, enchanted with his own cleverness, and eager to convince the public of it with the aid of a friendly press; in the other he is a dedicated Christian, turning his skill at advocacy and his masterly chess-player's brain to the task of outwitting a ruthless and clever enemy. Herewith, two evaluations of Mr. Beal's controversial book.

"STATESMAN"

By JOHN FRANKLIN CARTER, newspaper columnist, radio commentator, co-author of *"The New Dealers,"* *"The American Messiahs,"* *"Our Lords and Masters,"* and other books.

WITH the possible exception of John Hay, no American Secretary of State since John Quincy Adams has come to office with a finer preparation than did John Foster Dulles. And no Secretary of State since John Jay, with the possible exception of William Jennings Bryan, has been more bitterly attacked and ridiculed than has Secretary Dulles.

As adumbrated in Thomas E. Dewey's foreword and spelled out in detail by John R. Beal, author of *"John Foster Dulles,"* Mr. Dulles's achievements in office have been formidable. Among other things, they have kept us out of war and checked Soviet expansion at the expense of the Free World. The

reasons for the wide hostility to his conduct of our foreign relations are only (and properly) hinted at in the text of this thoroughly informed and extremely friendly appraisal of the attempt of one extremely durable man to achieve a just and durable peace.

The best part of the book is that which recounts the years of preparation. Dulles comes of old American, though not Mayflower, pioneer stock—chiefly Scottish and English. His grandfather, John Foster, and his uncle, Robert Lansing, had been Secretaries of State and he was suckled on world affairs, with special emphasis on the Far East. As a young man, he hesitated between the career of missionary and diplomat, but decided to be a lawyer and ended by being both. He accompanied his grandfather to the Hague Conference on International Peace in 1909, representing Imperial China; he studied philosophy at the Sorbonne on a Princeton fellowship; he got his law degree in Washington and joined the great Wall Street law firm of Sulli-

van & Cromwell. He went to the Versailles Conference for the War Trade Board. Later he practised international and corporate law with great success.

This "biography" is but prologue to a spirited defense of the foreign policies this many-sided, much-traveled man has developed. The reasons for hostility to his conduct of our foreign relations are only indicated: journalistic antagonism to his personality; his knack for expressing bold thoughts in brutally frank terms—"agonizing reappraisal," "massive retaliation"—and his bold actions, dubbed "brinkmanship," in risking war to save peace; and the undisguised desire of one of our powerful allies that no one so well-versed in world affairs as Mr. Dulles should be allowed to serve as Secretary of State.

His diplomatic achievements, as recounted by Mr. Beal, are most impressive: successful "brinkmanship" in Korea, Indo-China and Formosa, the liberation of Austria, economic and atomic unification in Western

Europe, German entry into NATO, American dissociation from colonialism in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, the expulsion of the Communist regime in Guatemala.

John Robinson Beal is mistaken in crediting his hero with authorship of the anti-subversive concept—"first introduced into the anti-Communist defensive strategy by Dulles at Caracas" in 1954. That concept was originated by President Truman in his Turkish-Greek aid "doctrine" of 1947, which provided for defense against "internal aggression." It is also clear that Mr. Beal is too glib in attempting to explain away the Dulles-fostered promise of "liberation" for Soviet satellites in the Republican platform of 1952. That was naked and unblushing politics, not diplomacy at all.

Mr. Beal's account of the Aswan Dam decision—"the right timing, the right geography, and the right order of magnitude for a major gambit in the cold war"—has now become front page news and needs no further comment. But it is distinctly in order to observe that in all of Dulles's alleged acts of "brinkmanship" the only war which resulted came not from the Soviet Empire, and that, as Beal points out, Dulles stopped the Suez fighting within a week. This momentous decision, to invoke the U.N. against Britain, France, and Israel, was taken because, as Mr. Beal correctly reports, "the 'colonial' attitude, making exception to the U.N. Charter's renunciation of force when dealing with weak or 'backward' nations, threatened the loss of all Asia in the cold war for men's minds."

The truth is that of all past American leaders, Foster Dulles most resembles Ulysses S. Grant. Both men were possessed of drive, stamina, determination, and a talent for massive simplification. Dulles's negotiation of the Japanese Peace Treaty is comparable in its brilliance to Grant's Vicksburg campaign. His series of "brink-of-war" decisions recall Grant's Wilderness Campaign. They called Grant a "butcher" but his strategy won the Civil War. By analogy, the Suez affair can be logically likened to Jubal Early's raid on Washington in 1864: it scared the capital but didn't affect the final outcome.

For, as Mr. Beal is at pains to point out, with John Foster Dulles the object is not to hold office, achieve popularity, or prove a point in debate, but to achieve a just and durable peace. He is far closer to Woodrow Wilson in his philosophy than to any other American statesman, but his policy is to fight it out on this line if it takes all the rest of the twentieth century.

"BRINKMANSHIP"

By CECIL BROWN, *newspaper correspondent for many years in the Mediterranean area, radio commentator, author of "Suez to Singapore."*

THE BURDEN of John Robinson Beal's 322 pages of adulation and glamorization of John Foster Dulles is to demonstrate beyond cavil that the object of this paean was and is the greatest Secretary of State of all time. His description of Dulles's formative years is informative. His narration of Dulles's conduct of foreign policy is fascinating. His conclusions are highly debatable, among them the refusal to ascribe to Dulles a solitary mistake, sensational in a human being, miraculously unique in a Secretary of State.

Item: Both Eisenhower and Dulles, in their 1952 campaigning, were either woefully misinformed about American policies and needs or were desperately determined to avoid reality. Opinion? Hardly. The Roosevelt-Truman Fair Deal New Deal of social reform, containment, challenge to aggression, brinkmanship, chaining Chiang Kai-shek, and foreign aid were taken over, gradually, lock, stock, and barrel by the Eisenhower Administration. But it took two painful years of mental tug of war for this Administration to adjust its campaign oratory to the realities and responsibilities of office.

Item: Mr. Beal reports that Secretary Dulles's first job was to restore the American public's confidence in the State Department. But, from the first day at his desk, Secretary Dulles permitted American foreign policy operations to suffer a serious, perhaps in some respects an irreparable, setback, by the quivering timidity of the State Department before the assaults of Senator McCarthy. Mr. Beal comes closest to separating decisions of Eisenhower and Dulles by saying, in effect, that the State Department cowered before McCarthy under orders of the President.

Item: Dulles carried to Cairo in 1953 a silver pistol as Mr. Eisenhower's gift to General Naguib, then the front man for soon-to-become Dictator Nasser. Without bothering about Freudian symbols of a pistol, the obvious symbolism is quite sufficient. Mr. Eisenhower or Secretary Dulles or both were determined to reverse the pro-Israel stand of the Truman Administration (more correctly, the United Nations stand for the survival of Israel). It is noteworthy that Nasser in the past four

years acted as though he had been provided with additional incentives to proceed with his avowed aim of exterminating Israel.

Item: Mr. Beal presents Secretary Dulles always as wise as wise can be in the ways of Soviet Russia. At the Geneva Big Four Summit conference in July 1956, Mr. Eisenhower made a notable statement. Here again, the demarcation line between the President's words and Dulles's thoughts is foggy. The President said to Bulganin: "I believe Russia wants peace as sincerely as we do." That handed the Russians a certificate of good conduct, beyond estimate of value to Moscow. But this item does not end there. True enough, we and the Soviets reached a mutual recognition that atomic war was not to be a solution of our differences. (Moscow, however, was prepared to risk the gamble of smaller wars; from then on, we were not, thus handing the initiative of power threats to Moscow.) But from Geneva in July until Geneva in October, while we stood bemused by the spectacle of co-existence, the Russians ran for all their worth with the American certificate of good conduct. When the Big Four foreign ministers gathered in October to wrap up the smiles and conviviality of July, the Soviets had

(a) established diplomatic relations with West Germany so as to negotiate directly with Bonn instead of through Washington (Dulles called that a victory for us);

(b) launched a new so-called peace offensive to undermine the North Atlantic Treaty Organization;

(c) Russia made an arms deal with Egypt (Dulles casually said Russia had a legal right to do it).

When the foreign ministers met in October, NATO was weaker, a Russian ambassador was sitting on the Rhine, and Russian technicians were sitting on the Nile.

Item: Mr. Beal presents Dulles as ever alert to the trend of affairs. Abruptly, last July 19, Dulles cancelled the American offer to help build the Aswan dam in Egypt and tossed in gratuitous remarks suggesting that Egypt's credit was about as sound as that of an itinerant fruit picker's. Dulles, being a canny lawyer and a student of dictators might well have assumed—in a business filled with assumptions—that Nasser, as a dictator, would have to save face, attempt a dramatic counterstroke.

Well, Nasser did react. He seized the Suez Canal. Dulles was not only unprepared. He wasn't even minding the store, being instead in Peru. And since American foreign policy, in a real sense, has been carried around