

## And the Bell Still Tolls

**"Spain: A Modern History,"** by **Salvador de Madariaga** (Praeger, 736 pp. \$7.50), is a leading Spanish intellectual's record of his country's history from the nineteenth century through the turbulent years of Spain's Civil War. Our reviewer is novelist **Ramón Sender**, who was a brigade commander during the Spanish Civil War.

By Ramón Sender

THE well-known Spanish author puts in order the political events which throughout the nineteenth century and the early twentieth led Spain to the convulsion of the civil war. We all know the outcome of that war. One of the belligerents won the last battle. And it is still enjoying power, thanks to the hard eloquence of the bayonets. In a certain way, then, the war has not yet ended, since a natural equilibrium has by no means been re-established.

The victorious band defends itself with censorship as well as the harsh prohibition of civil rights. And with the help of the American Department of State, which, incidentally, does not match the Latin American democratic spirit. Of course, Franco also uses the memory of 1,200,000 dead—official figures. Of these only 400,000 fallen on the fields of battle. And the others? Ah, the others . . . They no longer exist but Franco knows how to use their shadows.

Madariaga's position in "Spain: A Modern History" cannot be clearer and is expressed in a long paragraph quoted below in which the victors will acquiesce, while among the vanquished and their moral supporters it will provoke scandalous protests. Madariaga says:

Why had the Rebels won? The lazy answer, and the passionate, is: "Because they had the help of Germany and Italy." This answer will not do. Important though it was, this help was not crucial, and no honest and well-informed student of Spanish affairs would dare be dogmatic as to what would have happened if no foreign help whatsoever had accrued to either side. The chief reason for the failure of the Revolutionaries was the Revolution itself. When the Rebels rose, the Revolutionaries

found that most of the springs of public force had gone over to the Rebel side. This in itself was due to the weakness which the Government had evinced for some time in matters of public order. Two alternatives remained for the leaders of the Republic: to get out of the way and let the military take charge, or to arm the people. The first would have been similar to the course King Alfonso had taken in 1931, when, faced with a popular rebuff, he was wise and patriotic enough to prefer his own exile to a civil war which he could have launched with much better chances of winning it than the Republican Government ever had. Had the Republican leaders imitated him, though this time the challenge was an illegitimate and rebellious one, they would have spared the country the horrors of the Civil War and the state of beggary and prostration in which she finds herself today. Moreover, they would have prevented the German and Italian inroads into Spain. In the end, military rule is never lasting in Spain, and experience shows that it always leads to further endeavors to establish parliamentary democracy. However, that did not happen. The leaders of the Republic chose the other alternative: they armed "the people," a hope-


lessly romantic conception dating from the French Revolution, which in actual fact meant arming a number of fiercely rival workers' unions, and chaos.

No one in the Spanish Republican camp will agree with Madariaga. In reality there is an obvious and grave lack of political sense in this opinion of Madariaga's. It is the opinion of a utopian "neutral."

Man must fight for freedom wherever the danger is present and whatever the conditions may be. As they used to say in Mexico in the times of Benito Juárez: "Better die on one's feet than live on one's knees." Of course, the Communists took this slogan in Spain, as a disguise.

WHAT didn't the Communists take in those three years in Spain? Everything except the enemy positions. Nevertheless Madariaga is right in something: in his criticism of Moscow. It is necessary to observe once again that it is easy to be right "twenty years later." But the trio "Negrín, Codovila—a South American mercenary of the Communist Third International—, and Alvarez del Vayo" was imposed by Stalin, the infernal grandfather. At different times Madariaga recalls in his book that Alvarez del Vayo was the Communist agent inside the Spanish Socialist Party—and at the end of the war, when everything had hopelessly deteriorated, the Communist agent inside the government.

The book is written with a skilful dialectic sense but if the author hits



—Collection of Pablo Picasso.

Picasso's "Weeping Head" (study for "Guernica")—" . . . the memory of 1,200,000 dead."

the mark when passing judgment on the Communists, he errs regarding the monarchists. His praise of the deceased King Alfonso, for instance, cannot fail to amaze us. For this a certain courage is necessary, it is true, and the author has it. Madariaga is the only one among writers of consideration who in our time has the temerity to praise Alfonso XIII, whom the monarchists themselves were only able to pardon after great casuistic efforts. Granting that Madariaga may be a monarchist—and he is within his rights—we cannot see why it is necessary to rehabilitate Alfonso XIII in order to make way for Juan III. On the contrary, the farther away his father's shadow, the bigger will be the chances of success of the actual pretender. We hope that he—Don Juan—is aware of this.

**I**F Don Juan follows in his father's footsteps the monarchy announced for this very year will not last as long as the Republic. And it will end in a similar catastrophic way.

In his works of historical exegesis and in his literary essays Madariaga's gifts are well known, and we have all praised them from time to time. His political abilities, however, one can question. In his book Madariaga remembers that in 1934 he was Minister of Public Instruction, during the Republic. The most important decree of his short term of office was the creation of a new decoration at the moment when the civil war was brewing. This decorative approach to the problem was not very helpful.

We hope that this time the panorama that could come out of his "exposition of facts" may not crystallize. Madariaga's previsions are those of a neutral spectator who from the other side of the English Channel is endeavoring to see things reasonably. Like all extreme "neutrals," Madariaga will bring upon himself every kind of disapproval. Actually we are not living in a period of neutral serenity but of inspired passion. The facts examined in "Spain: A Modern History," in spite of everything and contrary to the author's own foresight, may have in them implicit certainty of a not far distant democratic solution. Liberal monarchy? Republic? Any solution that contributes to the pacification of the country and improves the conditions of the people will be well received. But if a monarchy it must be a *liberal monarchy*. Which is a contradiction in Mediterranean countries. Statesmen must have natural gifts in this art of contradiction which is politics. Otherwise Spain will continue to be the victim of historic occidental evil.



—From the book.

Buddha figure on Mandalay Hill.

## Economic Blueprint

**"Building a Welfare State in Burma: 1949-1956," by Frank N. Trager** (Institute of Pacific Relations. 118 pp. \$4), is an account of Burma's progress and economic development since becoming an independent nation. U Thant, Permanent Representative of Burma to the UN, assesses the study.

By U Thant

**D**R. FRANK TRAGER, director of the Burma Research Project, New York University, was director of the TCA (Point Four) program in Burma from 1951 to 1953, and he has since then consistently taken an absorbing interest in Burma. The original draft of this book under review was prepared for the 1954 Kyoto Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and since then "its basic argument has been re-examined in the light of a growing body of data."

The book is a judicious and objective guide to the economic development of independent Burma. However, Dr. Trager has only 118 pages in which to cover the whole panorama of economic planning and activity for an underdeveloped country, and he can only do so by adopting handbook tactics. Cramped for space the author talks only in terms of facts and figures, movements and tendencies. This involves considerable sacrifice of analysis and interpretation.

This does not, however, in any way mitigate the validity of his principal arguments. He holds the view that the most serious defect in the total planning is that the drive toward in-

dustrialization has completely overshadowed Burma's basic economic activity: agriculture. He is convinced that agriculture has not received the attention it deserves in over-all government policy. He expresses doubt as to whether there will be an adequate number of top- and medium-level skilled technicians in scientific, engineering, managerial, and other fields, even for the curtailed four-year program. He is afraid that Burma's "thin layer" of top leadership may not be able, physically and psychologically, to handle the ever-present strains of the developmental program period, and he is equally afraid that this is true for the small group of experienced senior civil servants.

In spite of these doubts and fears, Dr. Trager is convinced that Burma is well on the way to a welfare state. His whole thesis is illumined by an unmistakable note of optimism. Among other premises on which he bases his optimism is the extraordinary rise in capital formation since 1950. The fixed capital formation at present is 78 per cent above the pre-war level, and total gross capital formation is 26.8 per cent of gross domestic product, a percentage rarely exceeded anywhere in the world at any time. The revised four-year plan envisaged increased investment in agriculture, while all other sectors (except construction) were sharply curtailed. The program for the industrial sectors has been trimmed to more manageable proportions. The consequences of this trend of investment began to be evident in 1957.

The book is a well-documented economic essay on young Burma, but economic activities alone, however well directed, do not lead to a welfare state. What then is a welfare state? It is a compromise between the two extremes of Communism on the one hand, and unbridled individualism on the other, and as such, it sets a pattern for any humane, just, and progressive society. It guarantees a minimum standard of subsistence without removing incentives to personal enterprise. The conception of a welfare state, therefore, denotes several other services besides the adoption of well-meaning and correct economic measures. It comprises health services designed to secure improvement in the physical and mental health of the people and the formulation of educational policies directed toward the provision of a basic education for all, and the effective introduction of vocational and technical education. It also stipulates the training of our youth for good citizenship and democracy.