

A Dangerous Generosity

By Leo Cherne, *executive director, Research Institute of America, Inc.*

EDGAR ANSEL MOWRER provides in *"An End to Make-Believe"* (Duell, Sloan & Pearce, \$3.95) a remarkably perceptive analysis of the failure of the United States to win the Cold War. In this, his second book in two years, Mr. Mowrer recalls the fateful illusions that have led to the multiplication of dismal consequences; and, in pages that move even more swiftly than the events they record, he plays out the sequence of self-deluding conceptions which may indeed, if uncorrected, destroy us.

There are few less fashionable words in the lexicon of contemporary America than "power." "Compared with the men of 1783," Mr. Mowrer says, "the leaders from 1941 to 1961 seemed provincial. They lacked the sense of power politics." Moreover, the United States has consistently misunderstood the unmistakable intentions of the Soviet Union and the nature of the power struggle in which we are engaged.

Edgar Mowrer follows the thread of this misunderstanding through the Administrations of Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower. Our illusions, as they are examined in this important volume, have uniquely American roots. Our policy is frequently a reflection of American generosity, of a heritage of fair play and optimistic faith and naïve idealism. The qualities that have given rise to our errors have more often than not been admirable. The consequences, however, can be fatal.

As Mr. Mowrer takes us back the highway paved with good intentions, he demonstrates the bitter frequency with which we were led to give to the Soviets that which they would otherwise have been unable to take.

A basic misunderstanding of the nature both of Soviet Communism and Communist philosophy led Roosevelt to the final fateful assumption upon which he gambled his wartime policy, namely, that he could "handle Stalin." He sincerely expected to transform a fanatic Communist and power-mad despot into a public-spirited leader of a peaceful world community. On this assumption he placed his great stakes—and lost. . . .

Mr. Mowrer outlines American war-

time policy, which never "seriously considered the danger to the world of too complete a Russian victory." Because of this misconception, he says, "Rarely has any war given one of the victors such vast spoils to use against its former allies"; this at a time when one world leader, Winston Churchill, perceptively observed that Russia and its Western Allies were not fighting the same war.

The roll call of Soviet victories since 1941 is long and painful. The author details the extension of "make-believe," which he considers responsible for many of these victories, into the Truman era at war's end when the new U.S. President failed to understand the wisdom of Churchill's pleas that we occupy Berlin and Prague, that we stay on the Elbe until Stalin fulfilled his pledges to Central Europe, and that we maintain indefinitely a substantial garrison in Europe.

The fact that military power in our time is a political force of undeniable importance was in some respects least understood in the Administration of the military leader, Dwight D. Eisenhower. In fact, in a moment that obviously left veteran foreign correspondent Mowrer stunned, President Eisenhower discarded military might as a political force when at Geneva he turned to Marshal Zhukov and assured him that "under no circumstances is the United States ever going to be a party to aggressive war—against any nation."

To the Russians, Mr. Mowrer says, this remark "was the door opened to unlimited expansion provided only that

they refrained from direct attack on some part of the world that interested the United States. No longer any fear that a carefully provoked military uprising in, say, Cuba or the Congo, wherein the hand of Moscow was conspicuous, would trigger an American attack upon the USSR or Red China. The chief obstacle to an all-Red world was removed by the man Moscow regarded as its chief opponent."


The significance of these developments was not lost on the rest of the world, he says. ". . . whatever the President wanted, the rest of the world, allies, neutrals, and enemies alike, suspected that the U.S. was no longer a dependable protector, or the dominant power or adversary to be greatly feared."

The recital of the occasions where America pleaded, conceded, cajoled, helped, promised, and agreed during this twenty-year continuous engagement with the Soviet Union becomes supremely ironic as the echo of the over-fifty-megaton bomb reverberates in the atmosphere.

The history Edgar Mowrer recalls is not an endless recollection of dismal failure. There have been moments, as Harry Truman undoubtedly recalls with particular pride, when America was pushed to the wall and turned to face an adversary with the unyielding instruments of power. Virtually without exception these have been the moments of some measure of victory for us in the Cold War. But the moments of success have been matched by moments of opportunity lost, courage betrayed, freedom undefended. In this, the fifth year after the Hungarian Revolution, there are reminders in these pages which are painful but which could prevent tomorrow's pain.

Edgar Mowrer has refused to accept the dismal choice—Red or dead. We can, he urges, be alive and free if we can but sustain the sophisticated, clear-sighted view of the world as it is, of the Soviets as they are, of Communist purpose as it has been presented to us bluntly by Khrushchev at Geneva, at Paris, at the United Nations, and most recently in the Soviet world, which stretches from the half-emptied tomb in the Kremlin to the wastes of Novaya Zemlya.

Mr. Mowrer's prescription is a harsh one. The temptation will be great to dismiss it. He was among the very first to illuminate the nature of Adolf Hitler. His volume, *"Germany Puts the Clock Back,"* was published in 1932. His prophetic pages failed to prevent disaster. But he tried! How hard, how faithfully, and how long he has tried has been painfully manifest during the twenty-nine years since then.



Tribal Scars and Old School Ties

By Robert Massie, U.N. Bureau chief at *Newsweek* magazine.

AFRICA's great surge to independence has inspired an outpouring of new books about that vast and largely unknown continent. All of them are useful and most of them are colorful, but few are as impressive as Smith Hempstone's "Africa: Angry Young Giant" (Praeger, \$7.95) and John Hughes's "The New Face of Africa: South of the Sahara" (Longmans, Green, \$5). The reason, perhaps, is that both these men are outstanding journalists who had spent many long months in Africa before the Congo violence brought reporters there by platoons. John Hughes of the *Christian Science Monitor* has been reporting from Africa since 1946; Smith Hempstone of the *Washington Evening Star* and the *Chicago Daily News* has lived and traveled in Africa for four years. As a result, both these books not only scan the dazzling surface of the continent; they also probe beneath for the contrasts, the complexities, and the significant portents for the future.

Taking Hempstone's book first—for it is the larger and the more rewarding—it should be pointed out that, despite his title, he is not writing about the whole of Africa. Rather, he is describing his personal travels across that broad middle belt of the continent stretching from the southern rim of the Sahara down to the north bank of the Congo River. This, of course, is a sizable slab of land. It includes the entire crescentlike sweep of French West and Equatorial Africa, now possessed by fourteen independent states; it encompasses the former British territories of Nigeria, Ghana, and Sierra Leone, and the river colony of Gambia; it also includes the American-founded state of Liberia. On the opposite side of Africa, Hempstone journeyed through the special desert and plateau world of Ethiopia, Eritrea, the Sudan, and Somalia.

Hempstone's method and style are not unlike John Gunther's. Bouncing across a frontier into an African capital, he sets down all the sights and sounds that assault him first. Then he moves through the history of the place, usually with a wry humor directed at both white and black colonialists, and often with a certain relish for the gorier details of some local massacre. Finally, he

interviews everybody on hand, from the emperor or emir or prime minister down to the border guard or chambermaid. When this is done, he distills from all these vivid details a clear and precise evaluation of political trends and possibilities.

Hempstone has his prejudices. He preferred to travel in Gallic Africa because "no matter how bad the day may be, the night always brings a shower, a tournedos provençal, a bottle of Beaujolais, a cheese board groaning with Camembert." But he recognizes the enormous potential inherent in Nigeria's millions and is concerned over the spreading threat of Soviet influence in Ghana and Guinea. Most of all, he wor-

ries about the stagnation and corruption with which President William V. S. Tubman is contending in Liberia. "It would be a tremendous blow," Hempstone warns, "if the one black country with which the United States has had the longest and most intimate of associations should turn her back. And this, of course, is just what Communist agents in neighboring Guinea are working to encourage."

John Hughes's book is only half as long as Hempstone's and covers twice as much geography—the whole of Africa south of the Sahara. Hughes has only thirteen pages for the whole of French Africa, compared to Hempstone's nearly 200. But what Hughes loses in detail he partially regains in his ability to move swiftly from contrast to contrast. In Nigeria, for example, he describes the thirst for television sets on which to watch ancient American Westerns on local stations. It is jarring but valuable to discover only a few pages later that South Africa has banned all

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WIND OF CHANGE: "The photo machine . . . catches life in a frozen instant . . . the drawing hand and the eye . . . trace the thing or event through space and time," writes Dr. Frederick Franck at the beginning of "African Sketchbook" (Holt, Rinehart & Winston, \$5.95). In his earlier "Days with Albert Schweitzer" the author recalled his experiences at Lambaréné, where he established a dental clinic; in this book he conveys through narrative and line drawings his impressions during a later visit of a continent in ferment.

