## *Books in the News*










# Patterned for Peace

By Edgar Ansel Mowrer, *author of "Challenge and Decision."*

LAST year 150 Americans with a sprinkling of foreigners met for three days in Chicago to "consider the abatement of some world tensions and the promise of others." The cosponsors were the University of Chicago and a group calling itself the Council on World Tensions (formerly, World Brotherhood, Inc.).

The conference had been well prepared in advance and its ostensible goals were four: 1) a strengthened and enforceable body of world law, 2) the social and economic well-being of all peoples, 3) an open world with freedom of travel and communications, and 4) a strengthened United Nations.

Out of that meeting came **"The Promise of World Tensions"** (Macmillan, $3.50), consisting of an illuminating preface and an epilogue by the editor, Harlan Cleveland, eight studies of varying length and interest, and three policy papers prepared in advance.

The participants included six Nobel Peace Prize winners, and several individuals, including the editor, who have since been tapped for service by President Kennedy. The contributions were different notes in a single cry for peace, called by participant Adlai Stevenson "surely the loudest and clearest in this war weary world." The result of the conference was therefore both a cry for peace and a spelling out of the many fine things that we might do if we had peace.

Thus in his opening study Harlan Cleveland quotes with approval Father Dominique Pire's description of present summit diplomacy as a "double infirmity," a "dialogue of the deaf"; "the Russians cannot hear us and we cannot hear them." I submit that the leaders on both sides hear only too well. Unfortunately, they are seeking quite incompatible things and only when one or the other side ceases will agreement become possible. In fact, Mr. Cleveland corrects Father Pire by remarking that the world is going to be changed only by "our repeated demonstration that neither diplomatic truculence nor more military power will get Communists anywhere . . . world domination is simply not within their grasp." (How true!)

But that is not what most of these authors seem to believe. Even Mr. Cleveland thinks that "fear-driven anti-Communism produces . . . in the long run, bad policy." Maybe so. But does he imagine we shall thwart the Soviet bid for world dominion without anti-Communism, or is he appealing for more courage? In any case, he ends with the admirable appeal "to tighten our resolve and our sense of urgency about the promise (not merely the danger) of the only world we live in."

One promise is world-wide rule of law. Lawyer Louis Henkin makes several points: 1) that world law can only reflect a world community; 2) that such a community does not now exist although there are already "significant areas of coincidence of interest between East and West within which some 'law' exists" (very few, I regret to say); 3) that the "law of the United Nations Charter generally exists" (what an exaggeration!) and, finally (his best point), that nothing prevents likeminded nations right now from building enforceable law for areas which they control. (Unfortunately, of the eight undertakings which he says it is "in the interest" of the Big Powers to accept, the USSR—unquestionably a Big Power—has so far accepted none.)

An admirable study is that on possible economic development by Harlan Cleveland and Irving Sverdlow—once more provided that the cold war permits. Less admirable is Harry Ashmore's study of international communication, if only because he rashly compares the few faint restrictions placed upon travel and international contact by the United States with the almost complete control of them by the Soviet Union (recipe for rabbit sausage: one horse, one rabbit?). Two brief studies on racial equality by Principal W. Arthur Lewis of the West Indies and Ralph Bunche

show the value of some tensions and suggest a widened role in Africa for the United Nations—"if the cold war can be kept out of West Africa" (as in the Congo?).

Editor-scientist Eugene Rabinowitch eloquently dilates on the possible role of science as a catalyst between rival nations. Scientists on both sides (mostly) speak the same language. Thus though the world "is now further from fundamental unity than it seemed to be a hundred and fifty years ago," science "offers a reasonable prospect for a common enterprise of all nations" (would it did!).

Adlai Stevenson and Lester B. Pearson, two politicians, seem the furthest from political realities. Adlai sees the USA and the USSR as two armed men feeling for each other in a dark room, neither of whom "dares put his weapon down for fear the other may not." (Actually, Russia is feeling for our throat; the USA wants out.) Mr. Pearson notes that the "winds of change" are against any war as a method of settling anything. But all he recommends as substitute is more nongovernmental meetings. The three policy papers at the end of the book, while nobly motivated, provide nothing new.

To repeat, the interest of this volume lies in its enthusiastic description of what people might do to "relax tensions" provided they got an opportunity. Even here the authors fall somewhat short. There is too little stress on the absolute need for world authority as the only reliable safeguard of peace. There is too little insistence on the need for proclaiming that our American purpose is a free and peaceful world order under law and that we propose to start realizing it immediately by organizing such countries as care to join.

Instead, Adlai Stevenson bemoans "our horrible war-games . . . this gang warfare of a delinquent universe." But fixing up the universe is quite a job even for what Lester Pearson called a "three-day concentration of unparalleled brain power."

After reading and rereading "World Tensions" I turned with relief to our new President's Inaugural Address:

> In the long history of the world, only a few generations have been granted the role of defending freedom in its hour of maximum danger. I do not shrink from this responsibility—I welcome it. I do not believe that any of us would exchange places with any other people or any other generation.

And it is in the cause of freedom that the authors urge us to enter the lists far more aggressively.

With much that the authors have to say about the military aspects of "protracted conflict" few qualified students of the subject would dissent. The strengthening of our alliances, and particularly of NATO, the building up of conventional forces, and the attainment of the highest degree of invulnerability for the nuclear deterrent are familiar themes. That we can do whatever needs to be done on a broad front without "undue sacrifice or unmanageable inflation, much less economic ruin" is powerfully argued. "We shall contend," say the authors, "that America *can* afford to survive and *must* make almost herculean efforts to do so within the next few years."

But in the struggle for the maintenance of freedom these efforts are designed to bridge the gap until the time when some durable *modus vivendi* with the Soviet Union can be achieved. They are aimed at reaching a position in which nuclear warfare from the point of view of both antagonists will *in fact* become "unthinkable." It is on this account that the following formulation is highly disturbing:

> . . . U.S. national and Free World strategy must rest on the people's will to face up to the possibility of total war and their readiness to marshal the efforts that will assure them victory in such a conflict.

# Freedom on the Offensive

By Frank Altschul, *who is the chairman of the Committee on International Policy of the National Planning Association.*

IN THE preface to "**A Forward Strategy for America**" (Harper, $5.95) the three principal authors – Robert Strausz-Hupé, William R. Kintner, and Stefan T. Possony—describe in some detail the methods followed in the preparation of this volume, published under the auspices of the Foreign Policy Research Institute and with the collaboration of a number of its research assistants. To examine the "full range of our foreign policy problems" was the ambitious task undertaken. To do justice to it "many academic institutions, research organizations, and governmental agencies" were consulted, together with countless other sources of relevant and valuable information. The material thus assembled was then subjected to a "systematic process of synthesis" to the end that from the mass of expert and at times conflicting views an orderly and logical presentation of the subject matter might emerge.

The resultant study furnishes a vivid example of some of the advantages and some of the limitations of pure research. The wide range of the problems confronting us in the field of foreign policy is explored with insight and deliberation. But those who are at all familiar with the wealth of literature currently available in this field will hardly find any novelty in the solutions proposed. Yet if for the initiated this compendium has little to offer, it may serve as a useful text for a wider and less well-informed audience as it presents on the whole a challenging analysis of the principal problems which preoccupy and perplex us in the international field.

The idea of "protracted conflict," originally developed in an earlier volume by Dr. Strausz-Hupé and his associates, has found general acceptance in our thinking. That it has penetrated the highest level of government was evidenced by a revealing paragraph in President Kennedy's Inaugural Address. Furthermore, the nature of the conflict is no longer obscure. It is not a struggle between a capitalist or a Communist form of economic organization, but rather between freedom and tyranny.

This possibility, of course, must be envisaged until, by appropriate measures taken by us, the balance of power has been restored. But the idea that under any circumstances victory could be assured in such a conflict runs counter to prevailing views. Certainly the cause of freedom—which is our cause—would become a highly theoretical concept for a decimated population surviving amidst the ruins of its cities and the destruction of much of its literary, artistic, and cultural heritage.

After all, in the age of thermonuclear weapons we arm to prevent war, not to win it. This would seem the only realistic view. Yet the thought conveyed in the passage quoted above recurs throughout the book. For example: "If it is our purpose to combat Communism, then it follows that our overriding objective is not to preserve peace at all costs, but to destroy the aggressive power of Communism." And somewhat further, "But without the willingness to use force and without the sacrifice which the use of force as well as the prevention of war entails, no major international crisis ever has been set-