

Saturday Review

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Success Costs Less Than Failure

WHEN the fighting ended in Korea in 1953, this was the reckoning:

800,000 Koreans homeless;

415,000 Korean soldiers dead;

56,000 U.N. troops from the United States, Canada, Great Britain, Turkey, Australia, France, Colombia, Ethiopia, Greece, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, New Zealand, South Africa, Thailand, and the Philippines dead.

The dollar cost to the United States was \$18,000,000,000—and we haven't finished paying for it yet. The current expense of maintaining armed forces in Korea, as well as policing the truce, runs in excess of \$100,000,000 a year.

The question that many people asked about the Korean War at the time was whether the U.N. might not have been able to prevent it from occurring by having troops at the highly volatile dividing line between the two parts of Korea. In a more general way, of course, people have asked why the U.N. has to wait until a crisis develops into a shooting war before it is able to act.

These questions are being answered today. For this is precisely what the U.N. has been doing in the Congo. All the elements of a super-Korea were present in the Congo in July, 1960, when the Congo became an independent nation. The Congo is situated in the heart of Africa and has radiating power throughout a large part of the conti-

nent. It is one of the richest nations in the world in terms of material resources, being a prime producing center for copper, tin, uranium, and cobalt.

The Congolese were not prepared for self-government. The result was the kind of disintegration that made it a potential arena of conflict among outside powers. Belgium's troops returned in an attempt to restore order. The Soviet Union sent arms, trucks, and planes to the Congo at the personal request of the then Premier, Patrice Lumumba. The United Nations sent troops to restore order and reduce the danger that the vacuum in the Congo would be filled by the Soviet Union or any other outside nation, large or small. The United States government supported the action of the U.N. in the Congo both because of its commitment to an independent Africa and because Soviet troops in the African heartland might have forced a U.S. decision to go into the Congo with force of its own.

IN any event, the only agency in the world that was in a position to head off a showdown situation acted in time. It sent 20,000 troops. It also sent large numbers of teachers, engineers, doctors, dentists, lawyers, business and trade experts, agricultural specialists, road builders, mechanics, communications and transportation experts.

Danger in the Congo has not been fully dissipated. But for the first time since July, 1960, when the trouble began, affairs in the Congo seem to be

in hand. The threat of the big-power confrontation has sharply diminished. The United Nations still faces an ordeal in the Congo, but it has already made its most important contribution to world peace since its founding.

It costs money to fight a war. It also costs money to avert one. The cost of maintaining U.N. stabilizing operations in the Congo has been about \$10,000,000 a month. This is added to the cost of maintaining U.N. emergency forces in Gaza. As a result, the U.N. will have an estimated deficit of almost \$200,000,000 by the end of 1962. The money has to come from somewhere. If it doesn't, the U.N. cannot continue. It is not a national sovereign government that can levy taxes or maintain a debt indefinitely. Therefore, the U.N. is asking the member nations to subscribe to a bond issue of \$200,000,000. The money would be repaid over a twenty-five-year period with an annual interest yield of 2 per cent.

The question now before the United States is whether it will subscribe to its full share. The United States, enjoying 80 per cent of the world's income, has a quota of only half the full amount of the bond issue, or \$100,000,000. This is equivalent to less than one cent for every five dollars we put into national armaments each year. It is far less than the amount we write off each year in false starts in manufacturing military equipment or in planes or missiles that are obsolete even before they go into general production. It is less than one-fifth of one per cent of the cost of putting a man on the moon. Finally, it is less than it cost to fight a war in Korea for only one week. Yet an attempt is being made in the United States to block the required appropriation of funds—not a gift, not an assessment, but a loan repayable with interest.

What is being debated now is the cost of U.N. success. It might be useful to consider what the cost would be if the U.N. should fail. In the latter case, the amount of the bond issue could be multiplied by one thousand times or even ten thousand times and no one would have any way of knowing whether it would be enough. But the essential question has nothing to do with dollars or bond issues or deficits. The essential question is whether the peace of the world can be kept without a world organization and, also, what has to be done to develop that organization into an agency with the responsible powers of enforceable law. For if the U.N. can evolve into such a body, then the people on this earth have a reasonable chance of staying alive, improving the conditions of meaningful existence, and advancing the prospects of human freedom.

—N.C.

SR/February 10, 1962

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

SENSE AND SATIRE

ROBERT LEWIS SHAYON asks why the political right has no entertainers to reflect their views as the liberals have [SR, Jan. 20]. To me, the answer is simple. Satire is the art of penetrating the puffed-up shell of argument to reveal the puny kernel that supports it. It is discerning beneath sublime words the ridiculous posture and pretenses of those who utter them. Satire is the great natural weapon against those of the extreme right who fill the air with pompous pronouncements of doom, and whose motto seems to be "To laugh is treason. Our sacred symbols demand the sacrifice of your sense of humor."

To deflate these self-appointed saviors of society we need laughter, and a sense of proportion. I recommend E. B. White, Thurber, and Harry Golden. . . .

MARJORY D. McMICKLE.
Oconomowoc, Wisc.

PROGRAM FOR ACTION

PERHAPS MANY OF your readers interested in forming local units of the Society for Individual Responsibility [SR, Dec. 2] do not know about *INTERCOM*, a highly useful publication put out seven times a year by the World Affairs Center of the Foreign Policy Association. It is an information service for citizen activity in world affairs and provides excellent reports on new programs, books, pamphlets, visual aids, speakers, public opinion, and sources of information. Information on it can be obtained by writing *INTERCOM*, 345 East 46th Street, New York 17, N. Y.

CAROL MEADE.

Baltimore, Md.

PERFIDY IN HUNGARY

IN HIS REVIEW of Ben Hecht's "Perfidy" [SR, Jan. 13] John C. Campbell tells us Hecht is angry at the late Dr. Rudolf Kastner because of "his failure to do anything for the masses of Hungary's Jews marked for doom in Auschwitz." This is an anemic, even misleading, way of summing up Hecht's charges. Right or wrong, what the book actually says is this: When the Nazis set out in 1944 to exterminate the Jews of Hungary, they feared another Warsaw Ghetto uprising (it had taken 350,000 German troops to end the rebellion). The Nazis therefore devised a ruse. They would proclaim an about-face in policy, tell the Jews they were to be resettled in pleasant surroundings, and thus trick them into voluntarily boarding trains actually bound for Auschwitz. To make the story believable they got Kastner, a leader of the Jewish community, to go among the Jews in city and countryside, assuring them of the Nazis' good faith and urging them to board the trains—though he knew just what awaited them. Then, after the first "shipment" had gone

off to Auschwitz, Kastner and his aides publicized faked letters from these "resettled" Jews, which urged everyone to come join them. If the Jews had known the ruse, thousands could have escaped across the lightly guarded frontier into Rumania, where at this time they would have been relatively safe. Instead, more than half a million trustingly boarded the trains and went off to the gas chambers. After the war, Kastner's testimony in favor of top Nazi exterminators in Hungary caused the war-crimes tribunal to take a lenient view of them. In short, Kastner's crimes were those of commission, not omission.

Now, whole cloth or not, the foregoing is what the book says about Kastner, whose story takes up most of its pages. Surely in a four-column review Mr. Campbell could have weighed these charges, or at least have acknowledged them.

HALLOWELL BOWSER.

New York, N.Y.

WHY JOHNNY CAN'T THINK

AFTER READING the article "Broken Bridges to Literacy" [SR, Jan. 20], by Alice Dalgliesh, the reader may wonder what will happen to Johnny when he is confronted with real literature, with writing that does not have shortened sentences and a graded vocabulary. I wonder too. Below is a typical example of the reading material given to students who, be-

lieve it or not, are eighteen- and nineteen-year-olds in a sophomore German class at a Midwestern university. The first paragraph is my own somewhat literal translation of the original short story "Krambambuli," by Marie Ebner-Eschenbach. The second paragraph is the same initial paragraph (again my own literal translation), as it is offered in the "reader" used in the class.

A man feels partiality for all kinds of things and systems. But love, genuine and enduring, this he comes to know only once. So, at least, was the opinion of the forest and game ranger Hopp. Of all the dogs he has already had and liked—even loved, what they would call "loved," anyway—only one has been unforgettable—Krambambuli.

Forester Hopp in his long life of hunting had many dogs, and he liked many dogs, but he really loved only one dog.

Perhaps the authors of beginning language books think along the same grooved lines as the authors of beginning English books, and believe that not only can Johnny not yet read, but also that he cannot yet think.

JERRY PRENTISS,
Indiana University.

Bloomington, Ind.



"I don't care if you have seen the picture on this flight—we're flying to London together!"