

A New Face for Ex-Colonials

"Politics in Africa: Prospects South of the Sahara," by Herbert J. Spiro (Prentice-Hall. 183 pp. Hardbound, \$3.95; Paperback, \$1.95), predicts that the continent's infant nations will be neither Western nor Communist in character. John Hughes, Africa correspondent of *The Christian Science Monitor* since 1955, and author of *"The New Face of Africa,"* is a Nieman Fellow at Harvard this year.

By JOHN HUGHES

IT'S A brave man today who dares forecast the future in Africa. This is a continent that already, by the speed and scope of its anticolonial revolution, has confused all the time-tables and confounded many of the prophets.

Independence for Ghana touched off the revolution in 1957. But though the trend elsewhere in Africa seemed ultimately clear, who could have forecast that in five brief years the revolution would be all but over? That French and British Africa would be free, with even Mau Mau-scarred Kenya hovering on the brink of independence, and that Belgium's tight preserve of the Congo would be a sovereign African state, and that the Portuguese would be embattled in their long-quiet colony of Angola?

Undoubtedly aware of the pitfalls of prophecy, Herbert J. Spiro has eased himself into the business very gently. Thus, despite the subtitle, "Prospects South of the Sahara," this is primarily a background volume, designed to help us develop our own perspective on the new Africa that confronts us.

Mr. Spiro is associate professor of political science at Amherst College, and his useful little book is the result of a year's study and travel in Africa. Quite obviously, he has done an impressive amount of research and has read all the relevant government reports, newspaper clips, and scholarly tomes. Perhaps inevitably, and probably intentionally, this is a book in academic vein, and so, just as inevitably, it lacks the color of personal acquaintance with events. Thus, while there is much about what Dr. Nkrumah has written and said, there is little that tells what

sort of man he is. There is a clinical précis of events in the Congo, but no breath of the drama and tension that gripped anyone who was actually there during the crisis.

Some of Professor Spiro's deductions and statements may stir controversy among his readers. Highly debatable are such flat statements as: "Their own pre-colonial history is of no interest to the Africans themselves," and that African leaders since independence "have been too busy as politicians for serious reflection about the future pattern of politics in their countries." Then there are more specific issues, such as Professor Spiro's dismissal of the Congolese army's military equipment, when in fact it was the most up to date and impressive in black Africa, and his assertion that African problems are only "peripheral" to the British government, which can thus take a "fairly detached"

view of African events, relatively uninfluenced by "special interests or the fickleness of public opinion."

In the light of many of the Verwoerd government's actions there may be some questioning of Professor Spiro's view of white Afrikaner "legalism." Similarly, when Dr. Nkrumah's political opponents find themselves locked up in a Ghana jail it is doubtful they would agree that "African notions of time and space lend a less unpleasant aspect to arrests than they have to us."

Hence this may be seen as a book useful to stimulate discussion and deduction about Africa, rather than as a manual to be learned by rote.

Meanwhile in his broad approach Professor Spiro exhibits sympathy and affection for the new Africa and its peoples and arrives at a personal conclusion with which few African specialists will quarrel. This is that Africa is going to be essentially African—not Western or Communist in character; that politics may take on new African dimensions in that continent, brushing aside Western concepts of democracy and parliamentary procedure; and that we of the West must foster our patience and understanding towards the peoples of the new Africa.

Parting the Veils Over Red Rifts

"The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961," by Donald S. Zagoria (Princeton University Press. 401 pp. \$8.50), and **"Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era," by Alice Langley Hsieh** (Prentice-Hall. 186 pp. hardbound \$4.50; paperback, \$2.25), discern significant patterns and meanings in the party cant employed by Peking and Moscow. Robert A. Burton served as secretary to a founder and leader of the Chinese Communist Party.

By ROBERT A. BURTON

SOME of the most revealing work on Red China is being done by people who have not necessarily been there at all. Instead, they have steeped themselves in Chinese and other published Communist material. They have defined significant patterns and meanings in the highly stylized, almost symbolic language used by Communists. And by combining their interpretations of these patterns and meanings with other available information they have often turned out exceedingly enlighten-

ing analyses. Their methodology is far from being mystical. It may constitute an art rather than a science, but in qualified hands it has a good deal of precision to it.

Two such works on Red China, both of them important, are "The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961," by Donald S. Zagoria, and "Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era," by Alice Langley Hsieh.

"The Sino-Soviet Conflict" is an especially impressive job. Mr. Zagoria has mobilized a great mass of material in a simple, orderly fashion that permits the reader to see his conclusions grow organically from substantiating evidence. It is his position that, with factionalism and the open airing of differences proscribed in the Communist world, Communist parties and individuals are forced to differ through "esoteric" or "symbolic" communication. Thus, differences over policy or strategy alternatives are heavily veiled in doctrinal exegesis. It is merely necessary to identify the veils for what they are to see the fascinating practical controversies they obscure. As Mr. Zagoria points out, the evidence drawn from this technique has been much used in

studies of Soviet power hierarchies. He impressively demonstrates the technique's applicability to Sino-Soviet behavior as well.

The conflict Mr. Zagoria traces involves so many issues and is so intense that he believes no amount of papering over is likely to eliminate its causes. Apparently Peking is convinced that a decisive balance of power lies with the Communist world. In 1957 it began trying to induce the Russians to exploit this state of affairs. Using Soviet power as a defense shield, Peking strongly advocated making Communist foreign policy gains, using warfare where expedient, in the belief that the West would be afraid to retaliate.

Moscow apparently felt that in the nuclear era the balance of power on the Communist side was not all that decisive. It insisted upon a long-haul policy of attrition against the non-Communist world. Both Peking and Moscow pressed their policies with mounting insistence, and in the process Peking's position became an open challenge to Soviet leadership of the world Communist movement. Numerous issues other than foreign policy were, or became, involved in the rift.

Serious as this rift is, Mr. Zagoria feels that Moscow and Peking have more in common with each other than with the West. This sets a rational limit to the conflict between them. Neither can be expected to align itself with, say, the United States against the other. Nor, in seeking to keep Peking in line, could Moscow be expected to apply pressures that would

jeopardize the Communist regime in China.

Within some such limits, however, the rivalry between Peking and Moscow can be expected to continue as the Communist movement gropes for an international organizational structure to replace the uncompromising centralism of Stalin's day. This continuing situation naturally has all sorts of implications of advantage and disadvantage for both the Communists and the non-Communists.

FOR the West, for example, Mr. Zagoria stresses the need to step up efforts to convince both Moscow and Peking that the balance of power is not shifting in the Communist favor and that Western strength, even when used to deter Soviet ambitions, in effect strengthens Khrushchev's hand against Mao Tse-tung. It also convinces the Russians that their cautious approach to the non-Communist world is necessary. Meanwhile, as Peking works out its economic and military deficiencies, as it moves inevitably toward eventually having its own nuclear bombs and ICBMs, and as the USSR continues to grow stronger, the Communist challenge to the West will remain. It may well increase.

"Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era" is a deft analysis, rather narrowly limited in scope, of Peking's efforts to evolve a military doctrine and adopt a military posture suitable to an era of nuclear bombs and ICBMs. The book fits in quite snugly as a companion-piece to Mr. Zagoria's work.

The hallowed military doctrine of Mao Tse-tung, Miss Hsieh indicates, is outmoded in this era. In order that a relatively weaker force conquer a stronger adversary, Mao emphasizes the necessity for a prolonged conflict. This doctrine was used with telling effect against the Japanese and the Nationalists. But how do you prolong a war when you have no nuclear bombs or ICBMs and your country is devastated in the first hours of the war by a nation that does have such weapons and that does not bother to invade with ground forces?

After considerable struggle within the army and the Party, Peking adopted a policy that Miss Hsieh calls "transitional." It is a policy that looks to the day when Communist China will have an independent nuclear capability, at which time military training, organization, and weapons will be geared to that capability. Meanwhile, with no nuclear capability of its own, and with the Kremlin apparently unwilling to give them nuclear bombs, the Chinese Communists are almost wholly dependent for defense against a nuclear power upon the Soviet deterrent shield. Peking has on occasion tried to force the USSR to use that shield as an umbrella under which Chinese Communist forces would try to take the off-shore islands and Taiwan. But Russia, which is skittish about the possibility of being drawn into a war with the United States, has withheld the promises of atomic support without which Peking feels it cannot risk even a limited war with the United States.

Therefore, until such time as Peking's indigenous nuclear bomb production program begins turning out bombs, Peking's bellicose intentions can be checked by Moscow's temperance. Quoting another study, Miss Hsieh estimates that, with help the Russians may be giving, Peking may be able to detonate her first nuclear device this year or next. She might then build a limited nuclear stockpile by 1965 or 1966.

Whenever Peking does attain even a limited nuclear capability, her prestige, real military might, and political leverage will, Miss Hsieh notes, greatly increase. Such a prospect may be a bleak one for Moscow. But no doubt the prospect is even bleaker for Washington. For while Peking is very angry indeed with Moscow, she is many times more angry with the U.S. Both Mr. Zagoria and Miss Hsieh suggest that the principal hope of preventing this anger from erupting into a nuclear war is a continuing, and probably heightened, effort by the United States to demonstrate that it will not back down in the face of threats of war.



—Eastfoto.

Mao Tse-tung chatting with Nikita S. Khrushchev in Peking—a bleak prospect for Moscow, but "no doubt . . . even bleaker for Washington."