

# Alternatives to Extinction

***"Preventing World War III: Some Proposals,"*** edited by Quincy Wright, William M. Evan, and Morton Deutsch (Simon & Schuster, 436 pp. \$6.95), presents in a symposium procedures for avoiding international holocaust. Franklin A. Lindsay, president of Itek Corporation, was assistant to Bernard Baruch, the U.S. representative to the first United Nations negotiations on control of atomic arms. He also worked with the Marshall Plan.

By FRANKLIN A. LINDSAY

ANY BOOK of proposals to prevent another world war would be valuable if it contained but one important and constructive idea. This work does better than that although it has many deficiencies. Of the twenty-eight contributors to the symposium, all are academicians; more than half are philosophers, psychologists, psychiatrists, and social and political scientists. Not one, however, is a historian—yet the subject of these essays is the prevention of war. The editors apparently concluded that the history of several thousand years of armed conflict can make no contribution toward avoiding the next one.

Also missing from the list of contributors are men who have had direct military and foreign-office experience in coping with the problems of war and peace—possibly on the ground that this book should be dedicated to a fresh look. However, the editors' distrust of the motives of the men who are today responsible to their governments for maintaining the peace is immediately revealed in the Preface, in which it is stated that, whereas the military is an old and respected profession, there is no comparable profession concerned with the maintenance of peace. Nevertheless, though some may disagree with the policies and methods pursued by the professional foreign-service and military officers of the Western democracies, there can be no question that they, as a group, are dedicated to the maintenance of peace as their mission in life.

Many of the contributors are aware of the overwhelming difficulties of setting up a workable arms reduction system based on formulas for balancing

one type of hardware against another. Similarly they recognize the snags in negotiating a practicable system of inspection. We are offered several good analyses of the psychological nature of conflicts among men and nations, as well as insights into the problems that will be faced in gradually building a world society based on commonly accepted rules and laws; but by and large the authors do less well when they begin to outline procedures.

An outstanding exception is T. C. Schelling's proposal for stand-by inspection forces located throughout the world, which, in a time of great crisis, could be instantaneously available. He envisages situations in which a nation may urgently want to prove to a potential enemy that it is *not* engaged in a hostile activity such as preparing a surprise attack, or that a single nuclear rocket-launching was a ghastly mistake and not a signal for massive retaliation. Under such circumstances an immediately accessible inspectorate whose word would be accepted by the other side might prevent a nuclear holocaust. This is a limited but constructive course with some chance of acceptance.

G. I. Pokrovsky, the single Soviet contributor, advocates an extension of the international scientific cooperation of the International Geophysical Year to other projects, such as an international weather-forecasting service using artificial satellites. He magnanimously suggests, however, that the entire project be financed by the "super profits" earned by the capitalist arms manufacturers.

Several of the authors point out the hazards inherent in the escalation of tension and the attendant possibility of war as nations react to actual or imagined threatening acts by potential enemies, thereby provoking further maneuvers by the adversary. They also point out the real dangers of the double standard by which we judge ourselves and our enemies. Morton Deutsch in particular provides a good description of the psychological forces contributing to and perpetuating hostility between nations. Most of the writers, moreover, place equal blame on the Western democracies and the Communist governments for creating this atmosphere of mutual distrust. They do not, however, give adequate recognition to the very strong unilateral efforts made by

the West during the last thirty years to reduce tensions, nor to the almost complete lack of reciprocity on the part of the Soviets.

C. West Churchman, in an article pleading for deeper inquiries into the underlying human problems of war, observes that the trouble with many plans for world peace is that they don't confront anybody with anything. They simply say that *if* men could be persuaded to do thus-and-so, then such-and-such desirable events would occur.

Lewis Bohn, for example, proposes the use of the lie detector, truth serums, and hypnosis to ferret from a nation's leaders the knowledge of any evasions of arms control agreements. Similarly, Ralph Gerard advocates the use of lie detectors "if national leaders will submit to them." But what hope can we have that the Soviet Union would submit to such treatment if it will not accept the minimum of physical inspection?

Seymour Melman proposes a system of popular inspection of arms control agreements in which the citizens of each country would report directly to an international authority any activities that look suspiciously like evasion. But if this degree of direct popular support were possible, world government would already be in sight.

Robert Gomer advocates the transfer of arms for the major powers to a "mutually acceptable" neutral nation, which would thereby become more powerful than either the U.S. or USSR, and which would be expected to act impartially as an armed arbiter between the two antagonists.

THE exchange, by the U.S. and USSR, of 10,000 of each other's college students as mutual hostages against surprise attack is suggested by Morton Deutsch. The internationalization of national armed forces and espionage services under the control of an international command is proposed by Herbert Kelman. But the crucial problem of establishing the political dominion of these forces is passed over with the statement that the number of seats in the central command is to be determined by "some formula."

Those who espouse complete unilateral disarmament, as do Erich Fromm, Bertrand Russell, and David Daiches, must, if they are intellectually honest, be ready to follow their policies through to the complete and bitter end. They must be prepared for the possible destruction of freedom in the West and the establishment of repressive terror comparable to that experienced in parts of Europe during the Second World War—expecting only that after many years or even generations of suffering,

the real values of Western civilization will prevail in a new society. Fromm, Russell, and Daiches do recognize these implications of their policies and say they are willing to accept them. But they tend to overrate greatly the probability that the Soviets will follow our example and voluntarily destroy their arms.

In his article Bertrand Russell claims that U.S. soldiers are trained in what to do *when*, not *if*, war comes and that young men are "encouraged to expect, if not desire" nuclear war. Lord Russell should check his facts about the United States more carefully before making such charges.

Arne Naess of Norway recognizes the military indefensibility of small coun-

tries today and argues persuasively for a defense based on passive resistance thoroughly prepared in advance. His program can have real usefulness as a deterrent to aggression in Norway and in countries substantially larger.

All in all, the book falls far short of the problem. William Evan, one of the editors, concludes that the preservation of peace is too important to be left solely to the generals and the statesmen. One might also conclude that the preservation of peace is too important to be placed in the hands of the intellectuals, unless they are equipped to make the hard and serious effort needed to understand the terrible realities and complexities of the problems involved in preventing World War III.

to the process by which United States experts decoded Japanese secret diplomatic messages. In the clearest exposition of the subject yet to appear in print, the author shows that the need for extreme secrecy in the use of MAGIC often made it impossible for proper evaluations to be made of the material. Even top officials had to read the messages while a courier waited to return the papers to the safe.

On one of the great controversies of the Pearl Harbor hearings—the reception of an "execute winds message," indicating that relations between Japan and her potential enemies were reaching the breaking point—evidence is lacking to prove that an authentic "execute" message was ever intercepted. The author shows that the wording of intercepted messages did not actually indicate that war would be declared on the United States, and even less that an attack would be made on Pearl Harbor.

Lacking the knowledge available to postwar observers, the men charged with assessing the meaning of intercepted messages and other Intelligence material could easily mistake the nature of warnings that now seem definitely to point to war. Officers straining to hear the clear signal of Japan's intentions were often distracted by the noise of contradictory statements. Phrases in instructions which we now know referred to Pearl Harbor were plausibly interpreted to indicate several alternative actions.

The President and his chief military advisers shared with the Pacific com-  
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## The Hidden Signs of War

**"Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision," by Roberta Wohlstetter** (Stanford University Press. 446 pp. \$7.50), places the blame for the success of the Japanese surprise attack on human error and organizational weakness. Military historian Forrest C. Pogue is writing a biography of General George C. Marshall.

By FORREST C. POGUE


THE CHARGE that officials in Washington "conspired" in 1941 to withhold from commanders in the Pacific warnings of a forthcoming Japanese attack is dealt a crippling blow by Mrs. Wohlstetter's detailed and objective examination of the evidence on the subject. Human error and organizational weakness, rather than sinister design, must bear the blame.

Basing her account primarily on the thirty-nine-volume record of the Congressional hearings on the Pearl Harbor attack, and on interviews with a number of "pick and shovel" military officials of the 1940-41 period, the author spells out exactly what the military leaders in Washington and in the Pacific knew about Japanese intentions, and what they did about it. Her painstaking analysis will aid even the casual reader to understand the workings of rearward intelligence operations.

While Navy headquarters in Hawaii had more information on the enemy than Army headquarters and did not always share it, the Army knew that a state of extreme tension existed between the United States and Japan that

should have indicated the need for a full alert. In Washington, Army Intelligence officers often missed the true picture in the Pacific, and Mrs. Wohlstetter suggests that at times "G-2 was less informed and less equipped to estimate the situation than a good news agency. . . ." The Office of Naval Intelligence, while better staffed and more highly esteemed than its Army counterpart, was held in check by a rule barring it from preparing estimates of enemy intentions.

Nearly sixty pages of the book are devoted to MAGIC, the name applied



—Wide World.

Pearl Harbor—"the Army knew that a state of extreme tension existed."