

more miserably in some of its objectives, end more tragically for its principals, or leave a more bitter heritage of controversy.

"The whole expedition," the *Melbourne Age* was to conclude after the episode, "appears to have been one prolonged blunder throughout." It traveled at the wrong season; it was overloaded and moved too slowly. It suffered from the incompetence of leaders and the disloyalty of followers. But mainly it was dogged by mischance. It is less the loss of Burke and Wills that the imagination broods upon than the macabre dance of death in which the rescuers and the perishing alternate in returning to the camp, each unaware of the others' visits.

It is gratifying that this "genuine and wholly Australian legend" has been re-examined by an Australian born and bred, even though Alan Moorehead now lives in Italy and has written chiefly of Africa. Readers of *The White Nile*, his moving account of early exploration in Africa, will be prepared for the vivid presentation of sound research that enriches *Cooper's Creek*. The book's opening pages are a remarkable evocation of this oldest and strangest continent.

Moorehead retraced Burke and Wills's entire route by Land Rover when he returned to Australia to study their papers. One surmises that there are few areas which, in a century's time, have changed so little.

The Great Arab Conquests is perhaps the most illuminating of all. Glubb has undertaken not only to interpret the early Arab military operations, but also to describe the characteristics that helped to establish an empire stretching from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean.

He asserts that the pattern of Arab political behavior, especially that of the Arabs of the desert, has not essentially changed during the past thirteen centuries. The strategy used by Faisal and T. E. Lawrence in World War I was fundamentally the same as that of the Prophet Mohammed in the seventh century. Mohammed's enemies were concentrated in Mecca, an urban center, and he dealt with them by cutting off their caravan routes to Syria. In World War I the Turks had maintained garrisons in Medina and Mecca, which depended on the railway (the modern caravan) running between Medina and Damascus. Lawrence placed himself north of Medina, where he was able to cut the Turkish lifeline to Syria. Like the Prophet Mohammed, Lawrence realized that the assistance of the Bedouin Arabs was necessary to desert campaigns, and he used them in his efforts to control the town dwellers—as indeed did Glubb himself.

The character of Arab warfare, Glubb points out, seems to us almost incomprehensible. Final victory often seemed in their hands, but they would turn homeward after issuing a challenge to fight again a year later. "To a great extent," observes Glubb, "these methods of warfare continued between the nomadic tribes of Central Arabia well into the twentieth century. Certain tribes were almost perpetually at war with one another, without either side having the least desire for final victory. The condition of unending war provided the romantic background against which the young, the gallant and the enterprising could perform the deeds of prowess which lent poetry, color, and glory to their otherwise monotonous lives."

The Islamic religion augmented the Arab love for warfare, especially the belief that death in holy wars against unbelievers would assure the warriors' instant admission to Paradise. However, the Prophet Mohammed, according to Glubb, was not a warrior and had few military gifts. The general maintains that Mohammed's final success depended more on his statesmanship than on military campaigns. "In an age of violence and bloodshed, he realized that ideas are more powerful than force," and his personality was so persuasive that his ultimate success depended on peaceful rather than on violent methods.

Mohammed had called upon his Arab followers to maintain peace among

A Military Mecca

***The Great Arab Conquests*, by Lieutenant-General Sir John Bagot Glubb (Prentice-Hall, 384 pp. \$6.95), asserts that the pattern of Arab political behavior—especially that of the Arabs of the desert—has not essentially changed during the past thirteen centuries. Majid Khadduri is director of Middle East Studies at the School of Advanced International Studies at The Johns Hopkins University.**

By MAJID KHADDURI

WHEN General John Bagot Glubb, after spending more than a quarter of a century in the service of Jordan, was summarily dismissed by King Hussein, the Arabs expected that the general, relieved of the command of the Arab Legion so unceremoniously, would respond with unfavorable comments on their king and country. Instead, Glubb began to speak and write on behalf of the Arabs in a manner that no Arab writer has yet been able to achieve. Indeed, he went so far as to give plausible reasons for his dismissal.

He had been for long, he said, a close friend of King Hussein's grandfather, King Abdullah, and the two men discussed Arab affairs freely. As a lad Hussein attended some of the meetings and listened with awe to the intimate talks of these two extraordinary men. After Hussein ascended the throne, he might still have felt the same respect for Glubb, though not necessarily the same confidence as did his grandfather. In the circumstances it was not unnatural, Glubb concluded, that the young king should respond to nationalist pressure.



Sir John Bagot Glubb—
"insight and perspective."

For thirty-six years the general served in the Middle East—twenty-six of them in Jordan, for which he provided the most efficient military unit in the Arab world.

While still in the service of Jordan, Glubb published *The Story of the Arab Legion*, in which he described his desert experiences, as well as the exploits of Jordan's efficient fighting force. In 1957, a year after he left service, he published *A Soldier with the Arabs*, wherein he recorded his personal views on Arab political affairs during the postwar period. In *Britain and the Arabs*, published in 1959, he traced Britain's policy in the Arab world back to 1908.

themselves, which would not have been possible for a martial people had it not been for Mohammed's successors, who diverted the Arabs from intertribal warfare to a fight against the infidel. The great Arab conquests were accomplished by the Arabs' love for war, by their mobility, and by the internal dissension and weakness of their neighbors.

The lands lying between the Tigris and the Nile valleys, now regarded as among the principal parts of the Arab world, were inhabited for the most part by non-Arab races, who retained a national character different from the Arabs', although they had adopted the Arabic tongue and the Moslem religion. Glubb correctly points out that these peoples have displayed no significant martial qualities and were held after occupation by relatively small Arab garrisons. The conquering Arabs intermingled with them, especially by marriage, and were completely assimilated, although the Arabian culture was greatly enriched by the contributions of the new converts to Islam.

Glubb distinguishes between the tribes of Eastern Syria and Trans-Jordan, who were largely of Arab origin, and the peoples of the Syrian and Palestinian coast, who were non-Arabic in ori-

gin. The latter have continued to display remarkable intellectual vigor as politicians, conspirators, demagogues, and merchants. As soldiers, however, they have few victories to record. "The equal application of the name of Arab to them" suggests Glubb, "and to the descendants of the [Arab] warriors . . . serves greatly to confuse the politics of today."

Although he loves the Arabs and pays high tribute to their martial qualities, General Glubb is not uncritical of them. He points out some of their weaknesses—their personal jealousy, which he regards as the principal flaw in the Arab character, and their tribal feuds, which exhausted their resources in intertribal warfare. He also calls attention to their rebellious nature and their refusal to submit to authority, save to a leader who commands universal trust.

Glubb's book is perhaps the first study of Arab military campaigns written by a military expert. Readers seeking a deeper understanding of Arab affairs and looking for a balanced and sympathetic exposition of Arab history in the formative period can profit from this book. General Glubb is to be congratulated on a work written with insight and perspective.

class in the colonies, with the epithet of traitor. Yet treason was the accusation the Tories themselves leveled against the Patriots who defied the King and his Royal Governors.

Mr. Callahan has attempted to correct the perspective of chauvinistic historians, to whom the Patriots all wore halos and the Tories were all vile. However, at times he has almost reversed the exaggeration: he pictures Lord North as a witty, good-natured Englishman and militant Tories as only retaliating against rebel atrocities; he mitigates the massacre at Cherry Valley, and emphasizes the severe punishment of captured Tories ". . . drawn to the gallows . . . cut down alive, their entrails taken out and burned, their heads cut off and their bodies divided into four parts."

Using original, previously unpublished source material, the author presents, not always in contiguous sequence, vivid accounts of the various troops raised by the Tories, such as Simcoe's Queen's Rangers, Johnson's Royal Greens, De Lancey's Light Horse Battalion, The Queen's Own Loyal Virginians. In addition there are innumerable portraits of gallant Tories who fought, suffered, and usually died violently for the sake of an all too frequently ungrateful mother country.

The author states that although the Tories were individually capable, with normally adequate supplies, they failed through lack of organization to achieve maximum success. That, to a lesser degree, also characterizes this book. Individual chapters are excellent and the supply of factual information is impressive; but the thread of continuity is fragile. Perhaps this is relatively unimportant; such a book is not intended to be read at one sitting. And, as a source or historical synthesis of a neglected subject, it is invaluable.

As independent Americans we are grateful to the intrepid Patriots who thwarted the efforts of the Tories. However, we can fully agree with Lord North's comment on the tragic fate of the Tories: "They exposed their lives, endured an age of hardship, lost their interests, forfeited their possessions, their connections and ruined their families in their cause. Never was the honor, the principles, the policy of a nation so grossly abused as in our desertion of those men, who are now exposed to every punishment that such desertion and poverty can inflict, *because they were not rebels.*"

Riding with the King's Men

Royal Raiders: The Tories of the American Revolution, by North Callahan (Bobbs-Merrill. 288 pp. \$5), seeks to correct our perspective regarding the one-third of the colonial population who remained loyal to the mother country in 1775-1783. William C. Kiessel frequently writes on the Revolutionary period.

By WILLIAM C. KIESEL

AS THE subtitle states, this is an account of those colonists whose allegiance was with King George III and Parliamentary law during the interecine period of 1775-1783.

Most historians call the members of this group Loyalists, their own self-designation. North Callahan prefers the term "Tory," as used contemptuously by their enemies. He quotes a contemporary definition of a Tory as ". . . a thing whose head is in England, its body in America and its neck ought to be stretched."

Except for Lorenzo Sabine, Claude H. Van Tyne, Leonard Labaree, and a

few others, this subject has been generally neglected by historians, and even when not it was seldom presented in an unbiased light. North Callahan, biographer of Daniel Morgan and Henry Knox, believes that for too long the average American has considered the Revolution as a spontaneous, holy crusade by all the colonists to throw off the yoke of England. Such was definitely not the case.

Realist John Adams estimated that during the long-drawn-out fratricidal struggle for independence only a third of the population were Patriots, another third were indifferent, and the remainder were Tories. Three-fourths of the two-and-one-half million population of the thirteen colonies were of British descent and accustomed to thinking of themselves as Englishmen.

In opposing King George, Washington was never able to concentrate more than 20,000 troops at any one time. This is significant when we realize that roughly 50,000 Tories actively served the Crown, and approximately 100,000 to 200,000 Tories fled the colonies during or after the Revolution.

We now calumniate these Tory "defectors," the conservative, professional

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