

A Debate

ese harbor a historic enmity for the Chinese, an enmity born of 1,000 years of domination. Nor is it likely that men (as well as women and children) will spend years in the hunted life of the guerrilla without having some more tangible goals. These goals have been offered to them by the National Liberation Front.

IN March 1960, guerrillas in South Vietnam calling themselves the Nam-Bo Resistance Veterans Organization met in hiding and declared that they had taken up arms in "self-defense." In September 1960 the North Vietnamese Communist Party took note of the "Southern people's revolutionary struggle" and advocated the establishment in South Vietnam of a "broad national united front against the U.S.-Diem clique." In December 1960 the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam was created. Brian Crozier believes that as early as 1959 the North Vietnamese Communist Party showed its intention of directing the insurrection in the south, whose leadership had by that time been assumed by Communist elements. On the other hand, such French observers as Philippe Devillers and Jean Lacouture believe that Hanoi belatedly and rather reluctantly came to the aid of its embattled brethren in the south. The truth may lie somewhere between these two versions, with Hanoi's original moral encouragement being replaced over the years by a flow of arms, trained cadres, and political directives.

The NLF is a Communist-style revolutionary popular front, with specialized organizations for workers, women, intellectuals, ethnic groups, etc. The South Vietnamese Communist Party is only one of the political groupings that ostensibly make up this coalition. Until this summer the Communists (known as the Popular Revolutionary Party) down-

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2. Why We Can't Withdraw

By LEO CHERNE

MUCH HAS BEEN SAID about the South Vietnamese government—its instability, the imperfections of its democratic institutions, and the inadequacy of its economic and social programs. Much of the criticism is sound. It would indeed be relevant to the wisdom of our involvement if the government of South Vietnam were intent on forcing its defects on North Vietnam or on imposing its will on its neighbors in Laos, Cambodia, or Thailand. Far from wanting to export these defects, the South Vietnamese ask only to be left in peace to overcome them.

This is the real tragedy of Vietnam—that history has denied it the chance to grow and evolve in peace. Unless that fact is understood, no proper American policy can be formulated or understood.

The U.S. has expended massive effort and substantial funds to help meet the social, economic, agricultural, and educational needs of the Vietnamese people.

We are in Vietnam, not to sustain a particular government or even a particular philosophy of government. We are, however, deeply involved in a military defense of Vietnam because there has been a military assault upon *any* non-Communist government in Vietnam. During the last five years the Vietcong focused its special fury on the civilians working in the countryside to

enlarge the economic and social horizons of the Vietnamese peasants. Teachers, nurses, tractor operators, village chiefs, sanitation engineers, agricultural specialists—these have been among the 10,000 Vietnamese civilians who were kidnapped and assassinated.

All that can be claimed after eleven years is that the South Vietnamese people are still independent. But that is a claim bursting with promise. It means they are free to make their own progress or mistakes, free to be Buddhists or Catholics, free to overturn regimes. No curtain separates them from the rest of the world, no Marxist-Leninist can direct their lives from a foreign capital or take them out on a course of aggression dressed up as a "war of national liberation."

ONE may conscientiously urge an American withdrawal from Vietnam. But there should be no illusion about the consequences. There will be a bloody purge of the non-Communist leaders and intellectuals, such as has occurred in every other Communist takeover; "National Liberation Fronts" from Thailand to India will spring into new life to carry on the wave of Asian Communization.

Some few have said they welcome such an outcome in the name of "Marxism." Their view has the virtue of consistency since they explicitly seek *both* American withdrawal and accept the inescapable aftereffects. Others, however, who urge attrition of the American effort in the sincere belief that political choice and social welfare would thus be reinforced should reflect long and hard

The author is executive director of the Research Institute of America and chairman of the executive committee of Freedom House, an organization devoted to strengthening freedom in the U.S. and abroad.

on the consequences of the policy they urge.

There is good evidence that the Asians themselves have been doing precisely this kind of soul-searching and coming up with some sober answers. Cambodia's "neutral" ruler, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, for example, calls the Cambodian Communists "the valets of North Vietnam." The *New York Times* of November 10 quotes his warning that if Thailand and South Vietnam pass into the Communist camp, the Red Cambodians "will not so much as lift their little finger to prevent these neighbors laying their hands on part of our national territory."

In Sukarno's Indonesia, the world has just been treated to the spectacle of a Communist attempt to destroy a government which by no stretch of the imagination could be called "pro-Western" or an "imperialist puppet."

As Thailand's Foreign Minister, Thanat Khoman, sagely pointed out several months ago, "The Communists never have spoken the line of quitting. When they go some place, they stay there." Thanat warned his American friends that they must not speak of quitting either. "The Thai government knows better," he said, "but some people are not so sure we can depend on outside help."

TO understand more completely what the Asian peoples close to North Vietnam fear, listen to the first-hand account of Professor P. J. Honey of London University. As one of the few universally acknowledged authorities on North Vietnam, Professor Honey cannot be accused of playing the role of U.S. apologist. This is what he wrote of Ho Chi Minh's North Vietnam in *The Spectator* early this year:

Overworked, underpaid, and underfed, the ordinary people have long since lapsed into a state of resigned apathy. Disillusion was forcefully, if briefly, expressed in the newspaper published during the "Hundred Flowers" campaign, when the authorities rashly permitted criticism to appear. But Phan Khoi, the editor of the paper, *Nhan-Van*, was hounded to death and most of his contributors still languish in jails.

Government is of the most oppressive kind and control exercised by the Communist oligarchy is rigidly enforced. Everyone must enroll in officially sponsored organizations ranging from national mass movements down to local street committees. Through these a man receives political indoctrination, "volunteers" for unpaid labor, is criticized by his fellows and criticizes them in turn. On December 17, for example, a young schoolteacher, Le Duc Tri, was tried for "forming a choir, a philanthropic society, and an

Vietnam Year by Year

September, 1940. Japanese troops occupy French Indochina (including Vietnam).

May 19, 1941. The Indochinese Communist Party and various non-Communist groupings decide on a "National Front" policy and form the Vietminh (led by Ho Chi Minh).

Summer 1944. Ho Chi Minh, just released from prison by the Nationalist Chinese, agrees to a collaboration with the Nationalist Chinese (then occupying North Vietnam). The Chinese hope by this alliance to gain mineral rights.

March 10, 1945. Japanese announce to Vietnamese puppet Emperor Bao-Dai that his country is now "independent."

July 17-August 2. Victory powers at Potsdam, at the suggestion of the U.S., decide that Vietnam shall be occupied north of the 16th parallel by the Nationalist Chinese and south of that line by the Indians and the British, and that the whole country shall be placed under trusteeship without participation of France in its administration.

August 13 (VJ Day). The Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) and the Vietminh hold a "national conference" and decide to make a strike for power before the Allies land.

August 19. Ho Chi Minh seizes control of Hanoi.

August 25. Bao-Dai hands over the government to the ICP-Vietminh regime.

September 2. Ho Chi Minh proclaims, in Hanoi, the independence of the "Democratic Republic of Vietnam" with Bao-Dai remaining as "Supreme Advisor" to the DRV.

Early autumn. Nationalist Chinese forces loot their way to Hanoi, in the process giving the Vietminh sufficient time to gain control over North Vietnam.

Early October. French troops in POW camps south of 16th parallel released by Japanese. Other French reinforcements arrive, aided by British. To counteract them, South Vietnamese Communists attempt to carry out a scorched-earth policy in South Vietnam that embarrasses Hanoi.

October 17. Vietnam-American Friendship Association is formed in Hanoi. At its inaugural, American General Philip E. Gallagher sings over Vietminh broadcasting station.

January 1946. Controlled elections are held in Vietnam by the Vietminh.

February 28. Ho Chi Minh, under the pressure of a starving population, concludes a treaty with the French under which the latter recognize the "Republic of Vietnam" and are given permission to station 15,000 troops north of the 16th parallel, to be relieved within five years by Vietminh forces that France is to train and equip.

March 18. Bao-Dai flees North Vietnam in a U.S. Army plane, takes up residence in Hong Kong.

May 31. At Saigon, Admiral Thierry d'Argenlieu, who had been appointed by the French as the first High Commissioner to Indochina (the title of governor general had been dropped), acting without authorization from Paris, recognizes the "Republic of Cochinchina" in exactly the same terms as the "Republic of Vietnam" had been recognized in February.

November 20. Vietminh fires on a French ship that is bringing a captured Chinese junk loaded with contraband into Haiphong harbor.

November 23. French forces order Vietminh to evacuate Haiphong. When they refuse, the French fire. Thousands of Vietnamese civilians stream out of the city. The French, incorrectly believing them to be armed, fire into the mob. In all, 6,000 civilian Vietnamese are shot or trampled to death.

December 19. Vietminh forces attack French troops throughout Indochina. The French-Indochina war begins.

June 5, 1948. On a seaplane off the coast of North Vietnam, Bao-Dai signs, with French government officials, a document that recognizes the independence of Vietnam but proclaims "its adherence to the French Union as a state associated with France." (But actually only part of Vietnam is under the control of France.)

March 14, 1949. Elections are held in Cochinchina. Out of an adult population of 3,000,000, only 1,700 vote.

April 23. Cochinchina becomes the "Republic of Vietnam."

May 8, 1950. Secretary of State Dean Acheson announces that U.S. will send "economic and military equipment to the Associated States of Indochina [Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia] and to France . . ."

August. A U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group of thirty-five men is sent to Indochina.

May 8, 1954. French forces in Vietnam surrender at Dienbienphu. More than \$2 billion in American aid had been contributed to the French war effort.

May 8-July 21. Delegates from Great Britain, the USSR, France, the U.S., Communist China, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, and the Vietminh regime meet

at the Geneva Conference on Indochina. Agreements are signed specifying that Vietnam is to be partitioned along the 17th parallel into North and South Vietnam, but country-wide elections leading to reunification are to be held by July 20, 1956. An International Control Commission (ICC) is established to supervise the implementation of the agreements. The U.S. and South Vietnam do not sign, but the U.S. declares that it "would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the aforesaid agreements with grave concern. . . ."

July 7. Bao-Dai appoints Ngo Dinh Diem as premier of South Vietnam.

January 1, 1955. U.S. begins to give direct assistance to South Vietnam, is soon training South Vietnamese Army.

July 20. South Vietnam rejects a North Vietnamese invitation to discuss preparations for reunification elections.

October 23. Bao-Dai deposed by referendum and Premier Diem becomes the first president of South Vietnam.

November 16, 1961. President Kennedy announces he will not commit U.S. combat forces at this time, but increases arms support.

February 7, 1962. Two U.S. Army air-support companies arrive in Saigon.

June 3, 1963. Buddhist demonstrations break out against Diem regime.

June 11. First Buddhist monk burns himself to death.

September 2. The *Times* of Vietnam charges that the CIA had planned a coup for August 28 to overthrow President Diem.

September 27. Elections are held in South Vietnam. All candidates approved in advance by government, many unopposed.

November 1. President Diem and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu assassinated after military coup.

January 30, 1964. South Vietnamese government of Duong Van Minh ousted by Major General Nguyen Khanh.

May 2. A U.S. aircraft transport ship is sunk after an explosion in Saigon Harbor.

May 18. The White House requests an additional \$125,000,000 for economic and military aid to Vietnam.

August 2-4. Two American destroyers attacked by North Vietnamese torpedo boats. President Johnson orders "air action" against the torpedo boats and their bases.

February 1965. Gen. Khanh deposed. Pham Huy Quat becomes head of a civilian government of South Vietnam.

February 7. Guerrillas attack a U.S. compound at Pleiku. U.S. bombers retaliate by striking targets in North Vietnam.

April 7. In a speech at Johns Hopkins University President Johnson offers "unconditional" talks and suggests that once a settlement is agreed to in which the independence of South Vietnam is assured, the U.S. would be prepared to consider a \$1 billion aid program for Southeast Asia.

May 6. Two Marine divisions are sent to Vietnam in the first deployment of combat units.

May 19. U.S. planes resume bombing of North Vietnam after a five-day moratorium.

June. Brigadier General Nguyen Cao Ky heads a new military regime in South Vietnam.

September 23. U.S. lays a new bid for Vietnam peace negotiations before the U.N.

October 14. Dean Rusk says North Vietnam is apparently no longer demanding an American withdrawal from Southeast Asia as a condition to negotiations.

October 26. The U.S. announces it has received no sign that another pause in bombing raids on North Vietnam would persuade the Hanoi government to begin peace negotiations.

October 31. Two U.S. planes bomb the friendly village of Deduc in error, killing at least forty-eight civilians and wounding fifty-five.

November 9. American planes mistakenly bomb the friendly village of Locthuonghiet, killing one woman and wounding ten other civilians.

November 16. The U.S. State Department confirms that in August 1964, the Johnson Administration turned down an opportunity for peace talks with North Vietnam that had been secretly arranged by U.N. Secretary General U Thant. Dean Rusk explains that the North Vietnamese had attached conditions that were unacceptable.

November 17. U Thant says that there is still time to find a peaceful solution if major concessions are made by all sides.

November 30. McNamara says it seems clear that North Vietnam has elected to "raise the level of conflict" and that the inescapable conclusion is that it will be "a long war."

orphans' association" in his village of Duc-long, Ha-tinh province. His sentence of seven years' rigorous imprisonment is a measure of the morbid suspicion and fear with which the authorities view any organization other than their own.

It is this small, impoverished, totalitarian Asian state which is the root cause of so much of today's international disagreement and dangers.

American policy in South Vietnam needs to be viewed against this background. Vietnam is not an isolated piece of geography; it is, and has been, a cockpit for world struggle. Its tragedy may have been discovered recently on some campuses, but its importance has dominated a thousand years of Chinese history during which Vietnam was a Chinese colony. Aggressive Imperial Japan understood the significance of Vietnam, which had to be conquered in 1941 in order to make possible the main assault upon Burma, Malaya, and ultimately India. Its absorption now behind the bamboo curtain is part of a similarly explicit purpose.

In fact, in 1956 Professor Hans Morgenthau wrote, "The Communists expected, and in view of all the facts that were then available had a right to expect, that sooner or later South Vietnam would be dominated by the Vietminh."

Vietnam can, therefore, not be separated from this long stream of history nor, for that matter, from the repetitive pattern of aggression by European as well as Asian imperialism. Furthermore, the outcome of the struggle in Vietnam will radiate to distant corners of the world. We are indebted again to Professor Morgenthau for a crisp and correct understanding of these relationships. In the shadow of the 1954 Geneva Conference, when some unsophisticated observers were still persuaded that Ho Chi Minh was fundamentally nationalist, Professor Morgenthau stated, "The struggle for Indochina was a struggle between Communism and the Western World and, more particularly, the United States. For those who made that war possible, in the first place, that is to say, the Soviet Union and Communist China, the war had nothing to do with national liberation or colonialism. It was an attempt to extend the sphere of influence and domination of Communism."

It is possible, of course, to agree that Vietnam has been the consistent object of tenacious Asian Communist ambition and still conclude that the attainment of these purposes by Hanoi and Peking presents no problems sufficiently grave to concern the United States, or sufficiently dangerous to warrant the escalating risks of military action. This requires response on several levels, first historical.

In 1931 a farsighted Secretary of

State, Henry L. Stimson, confronting Japan's assault upon Manchuria, urged President Hoover and the British government to oppose this aggression. But a dozen arguments were advanced to demonstrate that Japan's aggression was temporary and limited, confined to an area complementary to its economy. The Stimson insight and recommendation were thrust aside. Manchuria led to China, China led to Indochina, and the sequence was arrested finally only at the borders of India in 1945, and only with the ghastly expenditure of American, European, and Asian life.

WE need not go back quite that far. Fifteen years ago, a not dissimilar ambition thrust an invading horde across the thirty-eighth parallel in Korea. More recently, one of the world's most unoffending nations, Tibet, lost its age-old independence and is now a vassal to Communist China. For more than ten years, Communist insurrectionary war sought the collapse of Burma, Malaya, and Indonesia. The voluntary American grant of independence to the Philippines was followed by an almost successful Communist guerrilla takeover. When Communist China made its first incursions across India's northern frontier, Prime Minister Nehru mournfully told his Parliament, "It did not occur to us that our neighbors would resort to aggression."

The United States invested the vast moral capital with which it emerged from World War II to persuade and even compel its Western Allies to disgorge themselves of their imperial Asian holdings. It is central to American foreign policy that these areas freed of nineteenth-century colonial bondage should not be swallowed by a new and more ruthless imperial neighbor.

In essence, the alternatives in Vietnam fall into two broad categories: Shall the United States assist the continuing effort of South Vietnam to retain its national independence until a cease-fire and negotiated settlement provide reasonable assurance that independence

Killed in Action in Vietnam

	U.S.	South Vietnamese	Vietcong
1961	1	2,500	9,000
1962	31	4,400	21,000
1963	77	5,700	21,000
1964	146	7,000	17,000
1965*	1,104	9,086	26,475
Totals	1,359	28,686	94,475

*Through Nov. 27; sources for figures are as follows: U.S. dead, Department of Defense; South Vietnamese dead, South Vietnam; Vietcong dead, U.S. and South Vietnam.

will not be threatened by its northern neighbors, or shall the United States withdraw and permit the absorption of South Vietnam into an expanding world of Asian Communism?

If negotiations promise an end to bloodshed and the protection of independence, discussion should of course be speeded. If negotiations endanger or impede that result, we ought not to be eager to enter them. Above all, negotiation must not be simply the instrument to enable the U.S. to terminate its commitment and to consign the Vietnamese people to a bleak and terrible future.

We provided humanitarian help for the 900,000 who, after 1954, voluntarily chose to leave all behind, flee North Vietnam, and sink new roots in the country now under ruthless onslaught. There are more than 700,000 additional refugees who have recently fled the countryside dominated by the Vietcong and with their act of flight have chosen the meager sanctuary provided by the government of South Vietnam. Shall we consign these, too, helplessly to their fate?

If the consequences were limited to the Vietnamese people, unhappy as the human aspect may be, weighed against the benefits of peace, it might painfully perhaps be contemplated. But our Communist adversaries have made quite clear that the tragedy will not be cauterized in Vietnam. Both Communist China and Communist North Vietnam have made their intention to next achieve the "national liberation of Thailand." Here, indeed, the real meaning of national liberation is made undeniably plain. By an anomaly of history, Thailand has never fallen into colonial hands. From whom, then, will it be liberated? The Thais, of course.

It is urgent that we examine the ominous implications of an American withdrawal under any circumstances other than the reasonably assured national integrity of South Vietnam. Both the President and the Secretary of State have repeatedly stressed the consequence this repudiation of an American pledge

would have upon more than forty other nations bound to us in alliance.

We ought to be particularly concerned with two of those alliances. America has been deeply involved in the massive effort to eradicate Fascism and the continuing effort to encourage, in Germany, a non-nationalist government tied irrevocably to Europe, with new, deep, and enduring roots in the soil of democracy. Most Americans believe that our pledge to defend Berlin and its alliance with the Federal Republic in Bonn are unbreakable. But bear in mind that we do not live in their insecurity. Nor, in fact, is our promise of automatic support totally compelling when measured against the awesome price we might have to pay. It must be observed that the shrewd general who governs France is quite persuaded that the United States will not, in a final moment of confrontation, risk its own destruction to defend Western Europe.

Now put a repudiation of the American pledge in Vietnam in that context. It could but serve to redirect the foreign policy emphasis in both German political parties. The present mild traces of fatigue, nationalism, and neutralism would be quickly replaced by a conviction that Germany's future must again rest on its own resources, that its relationships with its neighbors and its military requirements must be determined solely by German self-interest.

A similar anxiety does, almost certainly, involve Japan. A laborious effort to create the first peaceful and democratic society Japan has ever known was painfully begun in 1945. Japan's constitution forbids war, its impressive economy and industrial sinews are now harnessed to the ways of peace.

THE Asia that has emerged since 1945 is an Asia that permits this evolution, an Asia with a number of new and several democratic nations, of an independent and struggling India, with China, the growing giant, thus far unable to achieve total domination.

Those who think they see peace accomplished in our withdrawal from Vietnam should ask themselves if they are prepared to upset this perilous balance. Would they make Japan either an uneasy commercial partner of Red China or an ominous and ambitious antagonist? For this is precisely what Japan's self-interest would suggest if we withdraw.

It is not only, however, the effect on our new friends on which we must focus our anxiety. Reflect on the unequal encouragement our withdrawal would give to our adversaries. Let us recall that it was in Moscow in December 1960, before a young and untried Kennedy was yet to enter the White House, when Khrushchev and Kremlin leadership were at their all-time peak, that

Military Buildup

	U.S.	South Vietnamese	Vietcong (est.)*
Dec. 1960	773	245,000	less than 20,000
Dec. 1961	1,364	250,000	84,000
Dec. 1962	9,865	350,000	108,000
Dec. 1963	16,575	525,000	165,000
Dec. 1964	23,300		175,000
July 1965	80,000		
Aug. 1965	90,000		
Sept. 1965	131,700		
Oct. 1965	148,380		195,000
Nov. 1965	165,700	550,000	


*Including part-time guerrillas

the heads of eighty-one Communist parties of the world met to issue a manifesto that advocated the expansion of Communism via the route which was called "just wars, wars of national liberation, local wars."

The Soviet Union has had some reason to moderate its enthusiasm for these appetizing smaller ventures during these last five years. Its assessment of our impotence was sufficiently wrong to lead to the placement of missiles in Cuba. The failure of its own resolve in that deadly context not only altered the course of its own national policy but persuaded the Chinese Communists that the future of Leninist expansion was theirs, not Moscow's. Shall the United States be the nation that demonstrates to the Kremlin that China is right? Will the misguided hope for a temporary peace in the United States invigorate that wing of the Communist Party that repeatedly and explicitly says it wants no peace? Shall we penalize the tendencies toward detente in the Kremlin and reward the world revolutionary zeal of the aging purists in Peking?

It is urgent that the South Vietnamese have the opportunity to laboriously learn the ways of national independence and to protect the similar efforts in a handful of countries that still struggle with their own destiny in Southeast Asia.

But it is even more urgent that we not again contrive to visit holocaust upon the world in the name of an illusory, momentary peace.



—Hal Painter (Pix).

Demonstrator in San Francisco.

The Problem of Dissent

By HENRY STEELE COMMAGER

IT IS barely two months now since Pope Paul VI made his historic plea to the United Nations and to the peoples of the world for an end to war and a restoration of brotherhood. "No more war. War never again," he said, and the whole nation applauded his noble plea. But when young men and women from our colleges and universities take the papal plea in good faith, and demonstrate against the war in Vietnam, they are overwhelmed with a torrent of recrimination and obloquy that is almost hysterical. Even students catch the contagion. "We're sick and tired of peaceniks" shriek the students of the Catholic Manhattan College. Are they sick and tired of Pope Paul, who said, "It is peace that must guide the destinies of mankind?"

Surely it is time to bring a little clarity and common sense to the discussion of this matter of student protests and demonstrations.

First, as Attorney General Katzenbach has reminded us, there is no question about the right of students, or of others, to agitate, to demonstrate, to protest, in any nonviolent manner, against policies they consider misguided. That is, after all, not only a right but a necessity if our democracy is to function. People who ought to know better—Senator Dodd of Connecticut, for example—have loosely identified agitation with "treason." Treason is the one crime defined in the Constitution, and the Senator would do well to read that document before he flings loose charges of treason about. Students have the same right to agitate and demonstrate against what they think unsound policies—even military policies—as have businessmen to agitate against the TVA or doctors against Medicare. When, back in New Deal days, distinguished lawyers publicly advised corporations to disregard the Wagner Act and the Social Security Act on the ground that they were unconstitutional, when distinguished medical men called for the sabotage of Medicare, no one called them traitors. Businessmen and doctors and lawyers, to be sure, funnel their protests through respectable organizations like chambers of commerce, or the American Medical Association, or the American, and state, bar associations, or resort to well-paid lobbyists to express their discontent; students have no such effective organizations nor can they support lobbying. To penalize them for their

weakness and their poverty is to repeat the error of the Cleveland administration in arresting Coxey's army for walking on the grass, or of the Hoover administration in sending soldiers to destroy the pitiful Bonus Army. The rich and respectable have always had their ways of making their discontent heard; the poor and the unorganized must resort to protests and marches and demonstrations. Such methods have not customarily been considered un-American.

Second, we are not yet legally at war with Vietnam, though what is going on there has, to be sure, the character of war. Nor are we acting in Vietnam under the authority or the auspices of the United Nations, as we did in the Korean crisis. We are in Vietnam as a result of executive decision and executive action, and it is not yet traitorous or unpatriotic to criticize executive action. In so far as they were consulted on the matter, the American people voted, in 1964, for the candidate who appeared to promise them peace in Vietnam, and against the candidate who advocated war. It was not thought unpatriotic for President Johnson to demonstrate against war in Vietnam in 1964; what has changed in the past year is not the law or the principle, but Presidential policy, and it is not unpatriotic to fail to change when the President changes his policy.

BUT, it is said, whatever the legal situation, war is a fact. We do have 165,000 men in Vietnam; we do send our bombers out every day to rain destruction on our "enemies" there. The time for discussion, therefore, has passed; we must close ranks behind our government.

What is the principle behind this line of reasoning? What but that it is right and proper to protest an error—or what seemed even to President Johnson to be an error, as long as it was a modest one, but that it is unpatriotic to protest an error when it is immense. If this is sound logic, the moral for men in high position is clear. If any policy upon which you are embarked excites criticism, expand it, enlarge it, pledge all of your resources to it; then criticism will be unpatriotic and critics will be silenced. A little error is fair game for critics, but a gigantic error, an error that might plunge us into a world war, is exempt from criticism.

Is this the principle Senators Dodd and Lausche, Kuchel and Stennis, wish to adopt?

Third, there is the now popular argument that whatever the logic of protests, they are intolerable because they might give comfort to the enemy. Whatever may be said for the sentiment behind

Henry Steele Commager, the author of numerous books on American history, teaches at Amherst College.