

perimentalists concerned with a gradual abolition of the "war system," and those dedicated to the peace movement. Unfortunately, these categories are far from adequate: the second and third overlap considerably, and in the first we find lumped together both the champions of a forward strategy and men like Herman Kahn, Henry A. Kissinger, or Thomas C. Schelling whom Mr. Herzog calls the analysts, not to mention a motley crew of government agencies he quaintly labels the "government idealists." Thus, his labels mislead—but more labels, embracing reality more tightly, would have confused even more.

**F**ALLING into a pitfall that threatens the whole "war-peace establishment," Mr. Herzog tends to discuss the problems related to nuclear war (and to its avoidance) in a depoliticized context, as if the world of the weapons had become entirely divorced from the political universe whose drives and clashes command the use, or the nonuse, of force. Moreover, on the world stage that he pictures the United States and the Soviet Union are practically the only performers. To those two criticisms Mr. Herzog might reply that, after all, his mission was to report on what others had stated, not to improve on their views.

He could, however, have left the reader in a less dazed condition if his kaleidoscopic presentation had been followed by a more profound statement of his own stance—by a more incisive critique of the opinions reviewed and a more coherent defense of his own. His preference for the "experimentalist" approach, stated in a few phrases, reads more like the safe choice of the middle of the road than like a well-reasoned position. On a matter as delicate and vital as a strategy for peace, eclecticism is not only not enough; it is of little use. What is needed is a coherent statement of assumptions, of values, and of choices among alternatives. Anything short of that leaves the layman with the impression that the selection of a stand is as easy as the range of views is broad. Nothing, of course, could be more wrong. One cannot take a part of one view, then a part of another, reject this and buy that as if one were shopping at a supermarket.

To enlighten public opinion should also mean increasing its awareness of, and patience with, the complexities of decision-making. Mr. Herzog's pat conclusions will make the layman wonder why, if the solution is so easy to find, the experts engage in so much hair-splitting—and the specialist will wonder how, after having been exposed to the agonizing moral and political reasonings of the arms debaters, Mr. Herzog can still come out in his book with so deceptively simple an answer.

## De Gaulle's Doctrine of Deterrence

***The Great Debate: Theories of Nuclear Strategy*, by Raymond Aron, translated from the French by Ernst Pawel (Doubleday. 265 pp. \$4.95), while comprehending the appeal of Gaullism for other Europeans as well as the French, nevertheless finds it wanting as a practical policy in the thermonuclear age. Kenneth W. Thompson, a social scientist, has been a member of the political science faculties at the University of Chicago and Northwestern University.**

By KENNETH W. THOMPSON

**I**F WAR is too serious to be left to the generals, nuclear strategy is too important to be left to RAND and Pentagon analysts. Professor Raymond Aron finds in this proposition his justification as sociologist and philosopher for evaluating "the great debate" between the theorists and the practitioners of the thermonuclear age on both sides of the Atlantic. He painstakingly reviews the thinking that underlies each emerging strategy. Yet, ironically, this brilliant French scholar contributes most not in his review of the various academic schools of thought, but in plumbing the depths of present-day differences in the Atlantic Alliance. Every policy maker in London, Paris, Bonn, or Washington baffled by divergent national policies will find illumination in *The Great Debate*, for not only has Aron examined the logic of current policies in terms of national interest; he has traced their impact and meaning in other countries.

Thus he begins by explaining and defending the reasons for the shift in American policy from "massive retaliation" to the so-called "McNamara doctrine" with its stress on options, graduated responses, and limited or conventional warfare. American policy since 1961 has, in Aron's view, been firmly grounded in sound theory, the facts of geography, and the national interest. President de Gaulle's criticism is basically unsound; "The French doctrine of deterrence is a fatal rehash of the massive retaliation concept, and it is a miniature version ten years behind the times." Nor can Professor Aron find any comfort for France in the notion that a few French nuclear weapons would do more than provide Soviet leadership with "a con-

vincing impression of its [France's] own insanity."

Nevertheless Aron, though he is a critic of de Gaulle, provides a barometer of the climate of opinion in Europe which Americans may not fully apprehend. The McNamara doctrine bolstered European fears that the United States would soon be withdrawing its military forces from Europe. It led to the European claim that the United States was prepared to witness a conventional war on European territory and, indeed, by its nuclear strategy was encouraging precisely this alternative. Finally, it stimulated the belief that while the United States would strike back automatically if its own territory were attacked, it would follow a strategy of pause and limited warfare before contemplating nuclear retaliation in response to a Soviet attack on Europe.

Aron reminds American readers that, paradoxically, the logic of the new American policy explains at least in part the reaction to Gaullism in Europe. Frenchmen in particular were predisposed to take de Gaulle at his word when he promised national security based on independent French action, as against calculated and limited retaliation from Washington. France was no longer to be excluded from nuclear technology nor solely dependent on Anglo-American protection nor constrained in her diplomacy by military weakness. Even if her nuclear arsenal should be too fragile to influence Soviet military action, her unilateral policy could have important psychological effect.

**Y**ET Aron concludes that Gaullism is mistaken, and that for the next ten or fifteen years France must continue to draw its security against Soviet attack from the American nuclear deterrent. "Fifteen years ago French and other European nationalists failed to understand that the Marshall Plan would eventually lead to the economic independence, rather than the enslavement of France and of Europe. Those same nationalists today refuse to understand that the same holds true in the nuclear sphere."

*The Great Debate* demonstrates once again that in the search for understanding we have no substitute for intelligence and imagination, applied to stubborn problems which specialists may formulate but which only wise men can clarify and resolve.

# The Men Who Stand for America

*The Secretary of State and the Ambassador: Jackson Subcommittee Papers on the Conduct of American Foreign Policy*, edited by Senator Henry M. Jackson (Praeger, 203 pp. \$4.50), sympathetically probes the problems of the State Department and the Foreign Service. Now deputy acting chancellor of the Center for Cultural and Technical Interchange between East and West, Honolulu, John M. Allison has been ambassador to Nationalist China, Indonesia, and Czechoslovakia.

By JOHN M. ALLISON

IN AN article discussing the possible future of J. Edgar Hoover after the Martin King affair, an unnamed Justice Department official was quoted in *Newsweek* as saying, "They'll make him an ambassador or something somewhere." Once again the American people were reinforced in a widely held belief, too often shared by both Democratic and Republican Administrations, that the job of ambassador has considerable pomp but usually no great importance and is just the place for a Congressional lame duck or a possibly embarrassing official, either civil or military, who must be sped away from the nation's Capital. Or, if the particular ambassador's job should be important, it can be filled by any prominent person from any walk of life.

Hopefully, the publication of this report of evidence accumulated and witnesses heard by Senator Jackson's subcommittee will help to convince those in power in Washington that the work of the Secretary of State and the ambassador in the field is of such critical importance and requires such a high degree of special training, experience, and expertise that it cannot be left to anyone who happens to become available, no matter how distinguished his record in other fields.

Unfortunately, the evidence points in the other direction. When it became necessary a few months ago to search for a new ambassador for an important crisis spot in Asia, a distinguished career Foreign Service officer with many years of Asian experience was recommended. But he was turned down, not because he was not qualified but because he was not sufficiently well known to the poli-

ticians and the public. In order to make clear on the front pages that the Administration was going all out to deal with this burning question a prominent general was chosen. Fortunately, the general picked was a man of great integrity and considerable ability, and when it was finally decided to send the Foreign Service officer along as his deputy he readily agreed. But, as the readers of this book will learn, that is no way to pick an ambassador, nor is it likely to improve the morale in the Foreign Service.

Senator Jackson's book is divided into two parts. The first consists of reports prepared by the professional staff of the subcommittee and deals with the basic issues underlying the conduct of our foreign policy, the position of the Secretary of State, and the role of the ambassador. The second part of the book contains the reports of witnesses who appeared before the subcommittee, including Secretary of State Rusk, Under Secretary Harriman, Professor Richard Neustadt, who has long studied the workings of the federal government, and three career Foreign Service officers who have been ambassadors.

I hope this book will be widely read by the personnel in the State Department and Foreign Service, as well as by the general public. It will be an eye-opener to those who still believe the

people on the Hill are the natural enemies of those who toil in Foggy Bottom. These papers, prepared by the professional staff of the subcommittee, show a deep understanding of the problems of the State Department and the Foreign Service, a real sympathy for the men and women dealing with those problems and a desire to help them get the means and the backing with which to do a better job.

The staff papers as well as the testimony of the witnesses make clear that American diplomacy in the nuclear age is a far cry from that of even thirty years ago. We learn that during the brief twelve years between 1950 and 1962 the texts of international agreements concluded between the United States and foreign governments fill thirty large volumes occupying seven feet of shelf space. And the staff needed to accomplish this and all the other tasks involved in carrying out our foreign policy now amounts to 24,000 persons, 17,000 of them serving abroad. Just before the outbreak of World War II the number was less than 6,200.

For those who are worried about our involvement in foreign affairs, who want to know just what it is that the State Department and the Foreign Service are doing, or who have doubted the quality of the people involved, this book will give many answers. As long as the Foreign Service can produce ambassadors with the intelligence, wit, and imagination shown by Ellis Briggs, Samuel Berger, and Edmund Gullion in their contributions to this book we need not fear. But if the lessons in this book are not learned and applied I don't know where we will get the Briggses, Bergers, and Gullions of tomorrow.

