



—Wide World.

Scene of struggle—Russian delegate Andrei Gromyko walks out on a Security Council meeting in 1946.

THE U.N.: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS

The Same Mandate, a Different World

By RICHARD C. HOTTELET

AS THE Security Council's Dominican debate in May rasped its way from acrimony through vituperation to a fruitless recess, one of the brightest men at the horseshoe table uttered a warning.

Arsene Usher of the Ivory Coast recalled the words of an unnamed Latin American ambassador: "You know, here there are always certain things that disappear. When there is a dispute between two small powers, if we deal with it the conflict between the two small powers disappears. If there is a dispute between a great power and a small power, alas the sad truth is that the small power disappears. If there is a dispute between two great powers, then it is dramatic, because it is the United Nations that disappears." And, added M. Usher, "I think that the Security Council is about to disappear. . . ."

For twenty years the United Nations has struggled with the implications of this by no means invalid assessment. Disappear may seem too strong a word. Today the organization has 114 members. Only Indonesia has withdrawn. The U.N.'s activities reach around the world. Its over-all annual budget is in the neighborhood of \$500 million, mainly for the U.N. Special Fund and the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance

as well as for the work of its specialized agencies—UNESCO, the World Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, and the rest. But the political role in which the United Nations was cast by the charter signed in San Francisco on June 26, 1945, is bitterly in dispute. Politically the U.N. appears to have been reduced to a state of impotence or, at very least, to a condition in which it can act only in occasional, auspicious concatenations of circumstance. Wishful hopes at its birth that the U.N. might be the key to the millenium of peace were dashed all too soon. Now it seems that even the more modest desire for an organization that would be somewhat more than the sum of its parts—able to fill vacuums and ward off emergencies in the name of the world community and its freely adopted charter—has slipped beyond immediate reach.

Two things have become clear. First, the real hope and pressing need for an agency to help keep the peace in a changing world were combined with a false premise: that the major signatories were interested in the same kind of peace and the same kind of change. Second, the globe itself, in a period of widespread upheaval, has been transformed beyond the scope of the literal charter or the original blueprint of the U.N. organization. It is the stress of this

seismic shift that is felt in the financial constitutional crisis now paralyzing the General Assembly and shaking the entire structure. No \$62,000,000 misunderstanding is big enough to tear the U.N. apart, nor is a dispute over Article 19 or any other technicality in the Charter. The U.N.'s crisis today is political in the deepest sense of the word, engaging the interests and philosophies of great nations.

It is easier now than it was twenty years ago to see where confidence was misplaced or the risk poorly calculated in creating the United Nations. But no amount of hindsight invalidates the purpose of the Charter as far as the United States and most of the other members are concerned. Emerging from a six-year world war of unparalleled intensity, compounded with mechanized, rationalized bestiality, the human race seemed determined to start anew. The old system of coalitions and power balance had only set the stage for the biggest conflict of all. Sad experience with the League of Nations had shown where good intentions could go wrong. Even before the explosion at Los Alamos sounded the start of the nuclear age, most men believed that war had priced itself out of the market. Simple prudence required the construction of machinery to ensure a lasting peace.

Idealism was in it, too, without which



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The U.N. in the Cuban crisis—Adlai Stevenson reads a statement from President Kennedy.

no great work of man (even a bad one) is carried forward. And it helped—as far as the West was concerned—to overcome certain qualms and difficulties that arose at the beginning. The alliance with the Soviet Union had never been easy. It became more difficult as victory over the Axis drew nearer. The broad principles of a United Nations were shot through with practical disputes over voting and representation and organization. The Soviet Union worked consistently to impose on the U.N. a form and a mandate that could not be used against Soviet desires or without Moscow's consent, even if that crippled the U.N.'s effectiveness.

The United States, striving for maximum capacity in the organization, was prepared to be realistic in the face of Soviet insistence and the demands of domestic critics. Washington readily accepted the veto—would not, in fact, have joined the U.N. without it. Obviously, when it came to enforcing a Security Council decision with military means against an aggressor, this could be done only with the approval of the big five. And none of them could be expected to surrender the power in the last resort to protect itself against a misuse of the charter. The big powers later registered the assurance that the veto would not be invoked unnecessarily. But that meant nothing. So deep was the conflict between the restrictive and liberal interpretations of the charter that President Truman, late in the day, threatened to withdraw the United States from the San Francisco Conference and from the United Nations if the Soviets insisted on retaining the procedural veto as well—the right to prevent issues from even being raised in

the Security Council. And it was no good augury that Moscow's open violation of the self-determination principle in the Yalta agreement, its maneuvering to impose a Communist government on Poland once and for all, kept Poland from being represented at San Francisco.

The course of Soviet policy, inside and outside the U.N., moved Adlai Stevenson, at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, to ask bitterly whether the Soviet Union had ever really joined the United Nations. "Or does its philosophy of history and its concept of the future," he asked, "run counter to the pluralistic concept of the Charter?" But, in the early years, the disposition was still strong to speak of growing pains and necessary adjustment. This was the case when the first Russian veto was cast not in the defense of a vital interest but because a Security Council resolution on the presence of Anglo-French troops in Syria and Lebanon did not condemn Britain and France in terms violent enough to suit the Kremlin.

A month later, Andrei Gromyko walked out of the Security Council because it insisted on discussing Iran's demand for Soviet withdrawal from Iranian soil. And three months after that, in June 1946, the Kremlin took the third portentous step of turning down the Baruch Plan. The Soviet Union had apparently concluded that it wanted nuclear equality in pursuit of its national advantage more than nuclear security in a system of international control.

Thus Russia's basic attitude toward the U.N. was clear before the organization was eight months old. Moscow saw the United Nations not as a noble venture in which egoistic aims could be reconciled and sovereignties ultimately

merged in a system of world law, but as a vehicle for the exercise of Soviet influence in the postwar world.

The Kremlin's view may have been reflected most accurately in Stalin's dictum that there was no real difference between the old Fascist enemy and Russia's Western capitalist allies. Foreseeing further clashes of interest, he joined a world organization together with his capitalist adversaries primarily in order to have his foot on the brake.

BUT the Charter is couched in terms of mutual interest. One objective common to the Soviets and the West is the prevention of a third world war. The Charter begins with the words, "We, the Peoples of the United Nations, determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind. . . ." Referring repeatedly to the maintenance of international peace and security, it provides a graduated scale of measures to settle disputes and to restore peace. But, naturally enough in the context of 1945, the danger that dominates the document is the pattern of aggression acted out in World War II. It is the great coalition of that war that must deal with the new threat. The United Nations military forces, conceived as the sharp teeth of the organization, are to be at the disposal of the Security Council with its Great Power veto.

However, the main contingency for which the peacekeeping machinery of the U.N. was devised has never arisen, even remotely. Italy, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria have long since lost the onus of former enemies. Japan has

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The Weaponry of Quiet Diplomacy

By ANDREW W. CORDIER

THIS IS a year of grave crises inside and outside the United Nations. It is also the twentieth anniversary of the United Nations. By vote of the General Assembly, it is also International Cooperation Year. To celebrate such a year when strains on international co-operation have reached a high pitch and when troubles abound in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and the Atlantic Community seems a surrender to the unreal and the sentimental. But for our country, at least, it is not an act of sentiment. Thanks to the vigorous leadership of the White House and the Department of State, a most comprehensive effort is under way to give the year substance and meaning. Thirty governmental committees, paralleled by thirty citizens' committees, have been set up to deal with various aspects of the international spectrum. It is already clear that their reports at the White House conference scheduled for November 29 will include significant proposals in support of useful patterns of international cooperation.

These positive steps represent precisely the type of response in which governments and peoples should engage when the clouds of dissension and war hover

over us. To surrender to crises, to be paralyzed by frustrations, or to resort to impetuosity as a quick way of cutting through tough problems is not true realism. Mankind cannot, indeed must not, grow weary, nor can its leaders falter, in the ever-present necessity of finding the paths of peace.

In Dag Hammarskjöld's last United Nations Day statement, on October 24, 1960, which now bears the mark of a last testament to mankind, he said, "No matter how deep the shadows may be, how sharp the conflicts, how tense the mistrust reflected in what is said and done in our world of today . . . , we are not permitted to forget that we have too much in common, too great a sharing of interests, and too much that we might lose together for ourselves and for succeeding generations ever to weaken in our efforts to surmount the difficulties and not to turn the simple human values, which are our common heritage, into the firm foundation on which we may unite our strength and live together in peace."

During the last year, the organization has been confronted with a crisis, perhaps without parallel in its life. An entire session of the Assembly was severely limited in its operation, while debate regarding the payment of arrears for peacekeeping operations and the con-

stitutional character of such operations reached a stalemate. Before the Assembly adjourned, it resorted to the time-honored practice of appointing a committee—the Committee of 33—which is to examine the question of the financing of peacekeeping operations and report to a reconvened session of the General Assembly on September 1.

In a curious kind of a way, the report, which was approved unanimously by consensus at the end of its first round of meetings on June 15, represented the first positive break in the impasse. On the positive side, it stated that the next regular session of the General Assembly should proceed with its work normally. The mandate to function in this fashion again should have a tonic effect on the work of the session.

But the report was equally important for what it did not say. There was no mention of Article 19 of the charter, which would deny the right of voting in the Assembly to members who were more than two years in arrears in the payment of their assessments. The United States delegate had declared early in the committee meetings that consideration of Article 19 rightly belonged to the Assembly and not to the committee. However, the debates in the committee have made it clear that

Easing delicate situations at the U.N.



—Leo Rosenthal (Pix).

Secretary General Trygve Lie (right) with U.S. Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, in 1946.



—Leo Rosenthal (Pix).

Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld with USSR's Ambassador Valerian Zorin and advisor Konstantin G. Fedoseev, in 1961.