

him and explains: "They do not all see that the way to approach me is strictly through the heart—that I am like a child."

Sukarno repeatedly insists that he is not and never could be a Communist. This is not only because of his belief in God, which was deepened during his periods of imprisonment by the Dutch, but also because Communism requires slavish obedience, and, as he says, "Anybody who ever came near to Sukarno knows he has too much ego to be a slave to anybody—except his people."

Sukarno has believed the Communists could and should be included as part of a unified Indonesia, and for some time he managed to keep them under some sort of control. The abor-

tive coup of last September 30 seemed to indicate he was losing that control. What the future will bring to Indonesia is still uncertain. However, this book will be an indispensable background for unfolding events. It does much to explain Sukarno's and most Indonesians' preference for Socialism over capitalism, why Sukarno and Hatta could not work together, why Western style parliamentary democracy and freedom of the press have not flourished in Sukarno's Indonesia, and many other fascinating bits of untold history.

Americans may still disapprove of Sukarno but surely after reading this book they must recognize that here is a man who cannot be ignored and who must not be underrated.

The Man Who Lost Russia

***Russia and History's Turning Point*, by Alexander Kerensky (Duell, Sloan & Pearce. 558 pp. \$8.95), a political autobiography, seeks the causes for the overthrow of the author's Provisional Government by the Bolsheviks in 1917. Harry Schwartz is a member of The New York Times's Editorial Board. His latest books are "China" and "The Soviet Economy Since Stalin."**

By HARRY SCHWARTZ

NEAR the end of this book Alexander Kerensky tells of a 1923 conversation in which a German Social Democrat asked him, "But how could you have lost power when you held it all in your hands?" How many thousands of times since that fateful November day almost half a century ago must that question or its equivalent have confronted Kerensky! One would have to be completely devoid of human sympathy not to understand his internal ordeal these past decades as he has watched the consequences of his defeat.

Kerensky's view emerges clearly enough. His régime was overthrown primarily because of the blows inflicted upon it by the "right," i.e., by those who wanted to replace the young Russian democracy with a military dictatorship, and who accordingly supported General Kornilov's abortive coup of August 1917 with all its disastrous political and psychological consequences. Kerensky considers that his "one great mistake" was in not speaking out clearly enough against the coup, which he knew was being prepared. He considers that the

campaign of slander "aimed both at the Provisional Government and at me personally in the wake of the Kornilov affair was undoubtedly one of the major factors in the destruction of democracy in Russia."

There is a goodly measure of truth in all this, for the widespread belief that Kerensky had collaborated with Kornilov and also wanted a dictatorship—but with himself, not the general, as dictator—helped mightily to discredit the Provisional Government. There is also much truth in Kerensky's remarks on the blindness of the moderate leftists, who failed to understand Lenin's true character and goals, and who therefore in varying degrees cooperated with the Bolsheviks, or at least refrained from opposing them vigorously when such

opposition might have been effective.

But this is a politician's worm's-eye view of history, appropriate enough on the morrow of a battle, but hardly satisfying as the fruit of almost five decades of reflection. In this view—as in the book generally—the people of Russia and the mighty forces churning them in 1917 appear only dimly, and the impression is given that if only a handful of generals and politicians had been more far-sighted things might have turned out differently.

The thesis would be more defensible if the author had been readier to re-examine in the light of their consequences the policies he himself followed. Kerensky, after all, was practically *the* Provisional Government for most of its short life, the "persuader-in-chief," as he proudly reminds us in a footnote, whose oratorical genius in the first post-czarist months did so much to sway the multitudes toward respect for his régime. But there came a time when Kerensky's speeches no longer exercised their earlier sorcery; they brought only ribald mockery from masses and politicians alike. Was it simply slander that produced this change? The record suggests a negative answer.

The fact which Kerensky fails to recognize is that his own understanding and his own policies did not keep pace with the progressive radicalization of Russia during 1917. That evolution—of which Trotsky wrote so eloquently in his history of those fateful days—was ultimately what determined the outcome. To the bitter end Kerensky remained the classic middle-class radical. His concerns were the need for continuing Russia's participation in the great slaughter of World War I, for full, formal legality in handling the land reform the peasants demanded, for preserving the Russian empire as intact as possible. Kerensky might have held his power longer if he had responded to the cry for peace at any price, and if he had had fewer lawyer's scruples about how the peasants took over land. But then he would not have been Kerensky.

This book is, of course, more than mere self-justification, and it can be read as a fascinating personal memoir of life in Russia between the 1880s and 1917. But self-justification before history is clearly the book's primary objective, and as such it fails. Rather, it tends to make more understandable the judgment pronounced many years ago by N. N. Sukhanov in his irreplaceable account of the Bolshevik Revolution: "I used to say that Kerensky had golden hands, meaning his supernatural energy, amazing capacity for work, and inexhaustible temperament. But he lacked the head for statesmanship and had no real political schooling."



—From the book.

Kerensky in Paris, 1918—he was *the* Provisional Government.

No Short Cut to Soviet Paradise

The Bolsheviks, by Adam B. Ulam (Macmillan. 598 pp. \$9.95), and *Power and the Soviet Elite*, by Boris I. Nicolaevsky (Praeger. 275 pp. \$6.95), in turn present the intellectual and political history of the triumph of Communism in Russia, and the events leading up to the seizure of power by Khrushchev. Max Nomad, once active in the revolutionary underground of Western and Eastern Europe, wrote "Rebels and Renegades" and "Dreamers, Dynamiters, and Demagogues."

By MAX NOMAD

ADAM ULAM's book is a cross between Russian revolutionary history and a biography of the Father of Bolshevism, whose original name was Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov. A well-documented work, such as might be expected from a prominent Harvard scholar, it has, however, some of the shortcomings characteristic of books by historians who were not contemporaries of the events described.

After an introductory chapter about the Ulyanov family, the author plunges, for eighty pages, into the history of the revolutionary ideas professed by Russia's intellectuals from the beginning of the nineteenth century until the 1880s, when the followers of Marx made their appearance.

Lenin's older brother, Alexander Ulyanov, who was executed in 1887, had been under the sway of the old Populist ideology, which envisioned Russia's transition from semifeudalism to a sort of idyllic agrarian socialism without the intermediary phase of capitalist industrialism. Some of the Populists were what their critics called "liberals with a bomb"—terrorists hoping to do away with czarist despotism by the short cut of tyrannicide. These were the heroes of the "people's will," most of whom were executed after the assassination of Czar Alexander II in 1881. However, the terrorists—in the West usually misnamed "Nihilists"—had so impressed Lenin's older brother that he attempted to emulate them. Was it an early insight into the hopelessness of revolutionary terrorism and of the philosophy underlying it that made Vladimir seek another way of avenging his brother? Or was it "con-

trariness," as Professor Ulam seems to suspect? It took much "contrariness" indeed for a Russian to embrace Marxism at that time, since it was a philosophy whose preachers expected Russia's liberation not from a revolt by the peasantry, constituting 80 per cent of her population, but from the country's industrial development and its still embryonic working class.

It seems to this reviewer that the author, in studying Lenin's career, occasionally did not see the forest for the trees. Most likely his reluctant admiration for Lenin prevented Ulam from imputing to him, in this particular connection, the conscious or unconscious Machiavellism that is the basis of all politics, whether "regular" or revolutionary. In other words, neither Lenin's Marxism nor his hatred for the educated middle and lower middle class was the genuine article. He accepted what was or seemed to be the realistic essence of Marxist philosophy—the class struggle and the economic interpretation of history—as against the naïve utopianism of Populism. And he flaunted his Marxism as a badge of his sophistication, for it was at that time in vogue among the vanguard of Europe's radical intelligentsia. But in his heart, and later in his writings, he rejected the automatic, or fatalistic, aspect of his teacher's very mild revolutionism.

Marx did not believe in the possibility of a socialist revolution in an under-

developed country; he did not believe that revolutions could be prepared or made by a determined minority of conspirators or professional revolutionists. In Marx's opinion, revolutions were either spontaneous or the result of a military defeat. Lenin, on the other hand, believed in the determining role of professional revolutionists and of their conspiracies. There is no doubt that the high opinion he had of himself and of his capabilities—after all, he was a genius, if ever there was one—led to his theory that a man's will, and particularly a great man's will, may overcome unfavorable circumstances.

LENIN'S main political tenet—the indispensability of an organization of professional revolutionists—offers the key to his alleged hostility to his own class, a hostility that Professor Ulam seems to explain only by his "contrariness" and "ambivalence." By setting up an élite of dedicated rebels—educated members of the middle or lower middle class, with a sprinkling of self-educated ex-workers—Lenin quite understandably turned emotionally against all the other men of education who, without risking their necks, as did Lenin and his followers, might eventually become the beneficiaries of his revolution. For that revolution at first aimed only at the overthrow of czarist absolutism; hence it was bound to elevate the political and the economic status of the entire bourgeoisie, both the capitalist property-owners and the noncapitalist owners of education. He also felt bound to attack the intelligentsia because he met with the political competition of other groups of radical intellectuals. Moreover, there were maverick currents within the radical movement whose spokesmen

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—Camera Press (Pix).

Lenin inspecting troops in Moscow's Red Square in May 1919—"contrariness."