
the United Nations it is inevitable that the names I use must coincide with some persons' names somewhere in the world. To such individuals I apologize for any irritation caused." The real question, of course, is not of names but of identities. Somewhere in the world, for instance, there must be someone whose name is certainly not Mr. Cannon but who has a job like that held by Mr. Cannon in the book and who may very well feel that Barlow has him in mind. "Irritation" is a weak word for the probable reactions of such a person.

A more serious aspect of this problem is the uncertainty of the reader as to what is fact and what is fiction. Since most of us know little about Africa, Barlow's book is particularly perplexing. Why does he call his territory Angolique? The name presumably is a combination of the names of two Portuguese territories, Angola and Mozambique, but has it some special significance for Barlow? How close are the rebels in this book to the men who have led rebellions in the Portuguese territories in recent vears? Is Barlow's account of the domination of the U.N. by the U.S. factual or an expression of prejudice? The ending is obviously fictional if not, as one hopes, fantastic; but are we to take it seriously as an indication of what Barlow thinks might happen in the future? It is because the reader is inevitably concerned with such questions as these that the book, in spite of Barlow's good intentions and literary skill, remains a non-novel. -GRANVILLE HICKS.

FRASER YOUNG'S LITERARY CRYPT No. 1227

A cryptogram is writing in cipher. Every letter is part of a code that remains constant throughout the puzzle. Answer No. 1227 will be found in the next issue.



LETTERS TO THE Book Review Editor



Nonsense and Nonsense

JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, whose integrity no one ever has questioned up until now [SR, Jan. 21], might well have kept out of the shabby business in which Mrs. Jacqueline Kennedy and the junior Senator from New York threw around a great deal of money and political power in the thoroughly nasty, un-American work of censoring, or at least trying to censor, history.

For a man with Dr. Galbraith's credentials to say: "This is nonsense" to the charge that the unhappy affair raises sharply the issue of a fundamental public right to know is, in itself, nonsense.

Dr. Galbraith has had occasion to swear that he will support and uphold the Constitution of the United States. (So, incidentally, have the junior Senator from New York and former Federal Judge Rifkind, the Kennedy attorney.) That includes the First Amendment, a most precious part of our Bill of Rights, which supposedly grants us the right to publish freely. The Kennedys (with the honorable exception of Boston's Ted) now have whittled the First Amendment down so that it grants us the right to publish freely material which is not unpleasing to a rich and politically powerful family.

Dr. Galbraith and other Kennedy friends would do well to remember that they are dealing with a young man who would do literally anything to become President and with a charming and beautiful young woman who would have been much more at home in Versailles than she is in a democratic America—and not with their brother and husband, the late and greatly lamented President of the United States.

DONALD MCLEOD POND. New York, N.Y.

MAY I COMMENT briefly on your symposium on the Manchester book controversy? Arnold Gingrich believes he detects an inconsistency in publishing a President's view of his Secretary of State, on the one hand, and objecting to the violation of the privacy and grief of a President's widow, on the other. If he will read J. H. Plumb's admirable piece, he will discover the answer. The historian's test is whether the statement relates to the conduct of public affairs. When it does, the historian is surely within his rights to publish it. When it does not, then, as Mr. Plumb comments, waiting "ten, twenty, thirty years would be a matter of indifference for any historian."

I should add that, while I am in full agreement with Mr. Galbraith's brilliant piece, he errs in saying that A Thousand Days was "an authorized history." While that book was written with the full knowledge of the Kennedy family, it was a personal memoir for which I bear entire responsibility. Nor did it draw on Mrs. Kennedy's oral history interviews. Mrs. Kennedy in the course of a long friendship has told me many things, but I used nothing in A Thousand Days derived uniquely from her without her permission.

ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR. New York, N.Y.

Just a Figure Eight

GRANVILLE HICKS, in discussing Nabokov's vocabulary [SR, Jan. 28], seems to have a lot of trouble with the author's "lemniscate," describing the trace of a bicycle on wet sand.

While not as starkly simple as the circle, Bernoulli's lemniscate is not the obscure profundity that is suggested by Mr. Hicks's dictionary definition. A more down-to-earth definition is ". . . a curve such that the *product* of the distances of any point on it from two fixed points, called foci, is constant."

Ice skaters refer to their traces of this same curve as a simple "figure eight." . . .

JOHN P. FITZGERALD. Richmond Hill, N.Y.

Olympian

I SHOULD LIKE TO NOTE my thanks and appreciation to those responsible for accomplishing whatever negotiations were required for accession of the Olympian faculties of Dr. J. H. Plumb for SR. It is in my considered opinion one of the truly significant events in the popular periodical field.

Dr. Plumb has managed to arouse imaginative interest in a category of books too long, too often neglected for lack of reviewing (digestive) capacities equivalent to his.

I shall remain a subscriber so long as I am able to find in SR such a qualitative standard of style and intelligence. GEORGE MOLDOVAN,

Johnson City, Tenn.

Glimpse of Joyce

LEON EDEL'S PHILIPPIC on Joyce [SR, Jan. 21] showed a surprising lack of objectivity (not to mention good will!). It seems to me that his article revealed only a "glimpse," and a poor one at that, of the writer. Literati from Pound to Anthony Burgess have expressed opinions on Joyce's work and character quite different from Mr. Edel's. In the future, you might consider giving him space to document his criticisms more fully —maybe along the line of the recent eulogy on Marcus Aurelius [SR, Jan. 7]?

PETER GOODSELL.

Montour Falls, N.Y.

Wrong Arch

IN SR RECOMMENDS, Feb. 4, Plutarch and His World should read Petrarch and His World.

New York, N.Y.

NAID SOFIAN.

SR/February 11, 1967

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Advice and Dissent

The Arrogance of Power, by J. William Fulbright (Random House. 264 pp. Hardbound, \$4.95. Paperback, \$1.95), points out the widespread doubt that America has the moral and intellectual qualities necessary to employ her military and economic potentials wisely. Frank Altschul is chairman of the Committee on International Policy of the National Planning Association.

By FRANK ALTSCHUL


I T IS, if anything, an understatement to say there is an uneasy feeling throughout the land that many of the recent decisions taken by our government in the field of foreign policy have been ill-advised. This feeling often finds expression in open dissent, for which Senator J. William Fulbright in *The Arrogance of Power* eloquently supplies the rationale. In doing so he effectively disposes at the same time of the flippant charge of Nervous Nellyism.

In the course of a sober analysis of many aspects of our foreign policy, Mr. Fulbright focuses attention on our principal source of preoccupation–Vietnam. In his words, "the official war aims of the United States government, as I understand them, are to defeat what is regarded as North Vietnamese aggression, to demonstrate the futility of what the Communists call 'wars of national liberation,' and to create conditions under which the South Vietnamese people will be able freely to determine their own future." He does not doubt the "sincerity of the President" and his associates "in propounding these aims." What he does doubt, and doubts very much, "is the ability of the United States to achieve these aims by the means being used." Furthermore, he questions "the ability of the United States or any other Western nation to go into a small, alien, undeveloped Asian nation and create stability where there is chaos, the will to fight where there is defeatism, democracy where there is no tradition of it, and honest government where corruption is almost a way of life."

Senator Fulbright shares with many of his fellow citizens certain fundamental misgivings. Have the aims of our intervention, whether in the Dominican Republic, for example, or in Vietnam, been fairly presented to the American people? In regard to the Dominican Republic, he feels that "there is no doubt that the fear of Communism rather than danger to American lives" was the basic reason for intervention. About Vietnam he says, "when all the official rhetoric about aggression and the defense of freedom and the sanctity of our word has been cited and recited, we are still left with two essential reasons for our involvement in Vietnam: the view of Communism as an evil philosophy and the view of ourselves as God's avenging angels, whose sacred duty it is to combat evil philosophies."

It is the wisdom no less than the legality of pursuing this course as a sacred duty that Senator Fulbright challenges. He feels that in the formulation of policy we have not given sufficient weight to the changing aspects of Communism or the rising tide of nationalism. It was the aggressive character of Soviet imperialism, using Communism as a weapon, rather than the Communist ideology itself that threatened us in the aftermath of the Second World War. In Senator Fulbright's words, "a strong Communist state which poses a barrier to expansion by an aggressive Communist power may be more desirable from the viewpoint of American interests than a weak non-Communist state whose very weakness forms a vacuum which invites conquest or subversion." Implicit is the suggestion that a united Vietnam vigorously nationalist and historically strongly anti-Chinese in character might in the long run prove to be in accord with the true interests of the United States, even though tainted with a Communist ideology.

This is a conception clearly at variance with our alleged objectives. But are we not following a will-o'-the-wisp in our apparent determination to transform South Vietnam, which under the Geneva Accords was regarded merely as a temporary zone, into an independent nation when no such independent nation has previously existed? That such an attempt is an adventure in futility seems to be the Senator's view. And the cost of the effort is not limited to the tragic loss of American lives and the diversion of American resources that could be better employed elsewhere. There are collateral costs of great magnitude, described by Senator Fulbright as "Fallout." Because we have embarked upon a course of action which we would have criticized violently if pursued by others, we are today the subject of deep-seated criticism



-Paul Conklin (Pix).

J. William Fulbright---"collateral costs of great magnitude."

ourselves. Here we are paying a price of immeasurable proportions. Not only has the prospect of any détente with the Soviet Union been dimmed, but, no less important, our position of leadership in the free world and Asia as well is being seriously undermined. While no one questions our military and economic power, there is widespread doubt that we have the moral and intellectual qualities necessary to employ this power judiciously. We seem to have strayed a long way from "a decent respect for the opinion of mankind."

Under the heading "An Alternative for Vietnam" Senator Fulbright sets forth a program of eight points which, if followed, might lead us step by step out of the predicament in which we now find ourselves. No one, including Senator Fulbright, would presume to predict the outcome. Yet few would quarrel with the end he seeks—to bring peace and tranquillity to Vietnam, to substitute constructive endeavor for the devastation of continuing warfare, and finally to neutralize as much of Southeast Asia as is willing to accept the guarantee of neutralization.

This is a profound and stimulating book which the Administration could study to great advantage. In a chapter entitled "The Senate and the Senator" there is a revealing statement that should be noted: "There are still other areas in which I am proscribed from leadership or initiative by the strong preferences of my constituency." Possibly this will satisfy the many admirers of Senator Fulbright who have been critical of his attitude in regard to civil rights legislation. For had he followed in this domain the dictates of conscience rather than those of political expediency, the nation would in all likelihood have been deprived of his unique and enlightened contribution over the years to the discussion and formulation of American foreign policy.

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