

events and personalities which have over the years imprinted themselves on my memory." Bowra himself was so much more than a dean and a professor of Greek at Oxford; he was a man dedicated to assiduously cultivating close acquaintance with the living and the long dead. One finds amusing recollections of Yeats, Connolly, Waugh, Gilbert Murray—even the legendary malaprop Dr. Spooner, who announced to a class that he was leaving for London by the "town drain." Bowra gives us a new story, not exactly a Spoonerism but typical. The docent approached a recent arrival at New College and invited him to come to tea and "meet Mr. Casson." "But I am Mr. Casson." "Come all the same."

Sir Maurice is a splendid example of what the study of the humanities, especially Greek literature, can do for the human mind. Two other books just issued give evidence of his great devotion to letters: his *Landmarks in Greek Literature* (Weidenfeld & Nicolson) and *Poetry and Politics, 1900-1960* (Cambridge University Press), the latter volume being a series of lectures Sir Maurice delivered last year at Queen's University, Belfast. Seldom since Winckelmann has a modern man so articulately explained his cultural debt to Hellas.

**Italy has just lost** a literary gray eminence in Emilio Cecchi (1884-1966), who operated in almost every genre of prose and poetry. He was one of Italy's most active internationalists, having early explained Huxley, Lawrence, Faulkner, and Hemingway to his countrymen. He preceded the illustrious Mario Praz in probing nineteenth-century English literature. He wrote and lectured on Giotto, Lorenzetti, and the Sienese School of the *trecento*. His novels and poetry were highly esteemed, if little known outside the peninsula. As a critic he excelled, and his aphorisms and *mots* are often quoted. He once accused Croce and Gentile of cultivating "a philosophy which suicides into a history."  
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## The Domain of the Contingent

***Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations*, by Raymond Aron, translated from the French by Richard Howard and Annette Baker Fox (Doubleday, 820 pp. \$10), uses the traditional historic-humanistic approach in examining the problems of current foreign policy. Hans J. Morgenthau is Albert A. Michelson Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science and Modern History at the University of Chicago. Among his many books are "Crossroads Papers" and the three-volume "Politics in the 20th Century."**

By HANS J. MORGENTHAU

ATTEMPTS at developing a theory of international relations are of very recent origin. They were started in the aftermath of the First World War, for the purpose of making the peace of the world more secure. Their main instruments were philosophical speculation and historical analysis. The period following the Second World War has witnessed an enormous quantitative expansion and qualitative transformation of these attempts at understanding international relations in a theoretical manner. Abstract theories and quantification became the order of the day. Behaviorism, systems analysis, game theory, simulation were to be the new theoretical instruments with which we were first to understand and then to master international relations.

The heyday of these new fashions appears to be over. Enormous amounts of foundation money have been spent, much brain power has been expended, and the intellectual interests and academic careers of many young scholars have been put at the service of the new theories. Yet the results have been disappointing. International relations are still as intractable in theoretical terms as they have always been, and their practical intractability is more threatening than ever.

This disappointment was inevitable. It is the result of the very nature of international relations, which puts strict limits upon our ability to theorize. International relations is another word for recent and contemporary history. History, however, is the domain of the contingent, the accidental, the unpre-

dictable, and insofar as it is that, it cannot be comprehended by theoretical means. Fortunately for the theoretician, history is not only that; it is also the expression in time and space of immutable human nature. In that respect it is susceptible to theoretical understanding. For human nature, operating within the social framework of international relations, brings forth certain social phenomena and institutions, such as the balance of power, the policies of the status quo, imperialism and prestige, armaments races, and diplomacy, which lend themselves to theoretical analysis.

It is fortunate that the publication of Raymond Aron's monumental work coincides with the decline of an intellectual fashion in the United States. For this book, first published in 1962 in France, proves not by methodological argument but by its very existence what can be learned about international relations and the basic problems of current foreign policy through the traditional, historic-humanistic approach. The book is divided into four parts: theory, explaining concepts and systems; sociology, dealing with determinants and constants; history, discussing the global system in the thermonuclear age, and praxiology, analyzing antinomies of diplomatic-strategic conduct. Within this general and somewhat loose conceptual framework we find a discussion of all the major problems with which the theory and practice of international relations presents us today. It is hardly necessary to say, in view of Mr. Aron's record and reputation, that his arguments are always elegant, almost always sound, and frequently profound.

This is not to say that *Peace and War* is without flaw. Three such flaws, two minor and one major, must be mentioned. Mr. Aron is rather hasty in discussing the theories of others and does



not always do them justice, either in presenting their content or in criticizing them. Furthermore, Mr. Aron has the disconcerting habit of raising an important problem and then dropping it, thus leaving the reader in suspense. Finally, and most importantly, Mr. Aron had to come to terms with the dilemma that faces any theoretician of international relations: how to strike a balance between the historical and the contemporary material which will elucidate his theoretical propositions. If he opts too strongly for the historical, the relevance

of his theoretical propositions to present-day problems will be lost. If he embraces too much of the contemporary, he runs the risk of soon becoming obsolete. It seems to me that Mr. Aron, being a professional commentator on the modern scene, has erred in the latter direction, allowing his theoretical propositions, especially in Part III, to be overwhelmed by contemporary material. Coming from so knowledgeable and wise a pen, his comments are of course eminently worth reading today. But are they going to stand the test of time?

Vietnam, there is little that the Secretary General or the United Nations can do except to nudge or needle the reluctant parties along the path of negotiation. Except when backed by a big power with a national interest in the issue, smaller countries, the author finds, are more susceptible to persuasion.

**I**N an address to the Supreme Soviet on January 14, 1960, Premier Khrushchev said: "The government which would be the first to begin the nuclear arms tests would take upon itself a heavy responsibility before the peoples. . . . The Soviet Government . . . will continue to abide by its pledge not to renew experimental nuclear explosions in the Soviet Union. . . ." Nevertheless, the USSR did break the moratorium on nuclear testing at the end of August 1961, and Prime Minister Nehru at the nonaligned conference meeting at Belgrade did not engage in any denunciation that the world could hear. And at the opening of the sixteenth General Assembly of the United Nations in the fall of 1961, Krishna Menon of the Indian Delegation took the lead in attempting to prevent any censoring of the USSR for breaking the moratorium, and in trying to prevent a favorable majority on the resolution requesting them not to test a high-megaton weapon. Still other smaller powers joined in the attempt, through the cumbersome United Nations procedures, to block the United States' moves for progress on a nuclear test-ban treaty.

It is readily apparent that Great Britain, France, and the USSR do not wish to see an emergent Germany as a nuclear power, even though subject to NATO and U.S. restrictions, and that smaller countries wish to see all nuclear weapons destroyed and nuclear tests stopped. This is a fact which the USSR is not slow to utilize. The intransigence of General de Gaulle, his unswerving determination to have a nuclear force of his own, his efforts to degrade NATO at a time when the military power of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR are increasing, his flirtation with Communist China, his complete distaste for our attempts to

## Realism Is the Principle

**Modern International Negotiation: Principles and Practice**, by Arthur Lall (Columbia University Press, 404 pp., \$8.95), defines the various proceedings by which nations are led to a peaceful settlement of disputes. Arthur H. Dean was chairman of the United States Delegations to the Nuclear Test Ban Negotiations in 1961-62 and the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference in 1962.

By ARTHUR H. DEAN


**A**RTHUR LALL of India, currently a professor at the School of International Affairs of Columbia University, has been a diplomat, a governor of the International Atomic Energy Agency at Vienna, a participant in many international conferences since the close of World War II and the inauguration of the United Nations, and a delegate to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva and the test-ban negotiations there. He has written a well-thought-out and scholarly work in which, after defining international negotiations, he proceeds to describe the why and wherefore of the acceptance by the nations involved of peaceful methods, the several procedures and their scope, the role of the third parties, and the factors that impede or promote successful negotiations.

*Modern International Negotiation* carefully describes events that lead up to a crisis; the proceedings in the United Nations or other organizations or forums; the enormous amount of drafting, proposing, and conferring that goes on between delegations, foreign offices, or groups of nations such as the Commonwealth, the Organization of American States, or the Arab League; the various steps, plays, and counterplays that take place in order to bring the contestant

parties to the negotiating table; the apparent reasons for the ability or inability to reach agreement, and how nations with differing ideologies learn to accommodate themselves to things as they are. The author defines the roles of the Secretary General, the Security Council, and the General Assembly, the work of the various committees in the United Nations and of the International Court of Justice, and the concepts of international law that are evolving in the developing nations.

At the end of each chapter Lall sets forth various principles which he derives from the preceding discussion. These are at once cogently formulated, persuasive and logical. We can, however, deduce that powerful economic and military powers, while polite and deferential to smaller powers and while not themselves easily pushed around, are realistic about what they can obtain.

The author makes it clear that when the leading powers are in agreement many matters which do not affect their vital interests can be settled by negotiation. But he also makes it abundantly plain that when a dispute does touch the vital concerns of the nations who have veto powers in the Security Council, as in the case, for example, of Cuba or



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