

enough, one of the most important sections in the diorama is painted by the book's single non-African, Wargee of Astrakhan, a widely traveled merchant who may have been the first white man to visit Timbuktu and to report from personal observation on that ancient center of learning in the once-great Songhay empire of the western Sudan.

Africa Remembered was not published to contend for best-seller ranking. It is essentially a work of meticulous scholarship, and its awesome volume of footnotes may frighten off more than one reader. In fact, without wishing to downgrade the tremendous need for serious study of all subjects dealing with Africa, I have to suggest that editor Philip D. Curtin and his colleagues may have overdone the addenda bit. Seldom have I come across any writing in any discipline that enters on so uninhibited a spree of microscopic hair-splitting. At times there are as many as three or four

elaborately detailed footnotes to a single sentence, and not a few of these do no more than repeat the text almost verbatim; for the life of me I fail to see what conceivable service such frills perform. Put me down as a yahoo if you will, but it seems to me that Mr. Curtin might at least have placed these interminable appendages at the end of the book, rather than break the rhythm and flow of an engrossing narrative with an incessant barrage of exasperating interruptions.

But this single shortcoming need not, indeed should not, prevent enjoyment of *Africa Remembered*. Unless he is a specialist, the reader is advised to ignore the footnotes—and certainly not to be intimidated by them. Concentration on the broader, clearer strokes of the text will be rewarded by a rare and altogether fascinating look at a little-known dimension of Africa's history and, far more significantly, of its people.

In the Wake of the Boer War

South Africa — An Imperial Dilemma: Non-Europeans and the British Nation 1902-1914, by Benjamin Sacks (New Mexico. 356 pp. \$8.95), finds the roots of apartheid in the early years of this century, when London subordinated rights for non-whites to achieving a reconciliation with the Boers. Geoffrey Godsell is an editorial writer for the *Christian Science Monitor*.

By GEOFFREY GODSELL

IF ANYBODY wants a better understanding of the roots of the South African government's present controversial racial policies, this book is a valuable help. But it is likely to leave any reader who is not a supporter of those policies filled with gloom.

Most people with no involvement in South Africa are inclined to assume that the sad story began only after the Nationalists came to power in 1948 and set out formally along the road to apartheid and then "separate development." Benjamin Sacks's study is a chastening reminder that the sources of the problem go back much farther, and that the current anguish was in fact built into South Africa when it emerged, under British rule, as a unified state in the wake of the Boer War.

South Africa—An Imperial Dilemma covers precisely that period. The tendency of most historians writing about

those years has been to concentrate on the development of relations between Boers and Britons; Dr. Sacks's main subject is the status of the other South Africans, the non-Europeans, between 1902 and 1914. And since their condition is the chief concern of the world community today regarding South Africa, his book has an almost sickening timeliness.

From the start, as the author so unemotionally establishes, there was a core of determination among the white minority in South Africa never to share its power and privilege with the non-European majority. The only difference today is that the core embraces virtually the whole, and the rest of the world has been brutally made aware of it. From the start, efforts were made from outside to soften that determination, or at least to try to save non-Europeans in South Africa from permanent helotry. The only difference today is that the outside efforts come from the United Nations and not exclusively from Britain, which in the early years of the century had a measure of responsibility under international law for what went on in South Africa.

Then, as now, those exerting outside pressure for human decency were told from within South Africa that if they drove too hard, the likely result would be no concessions at all, and a worse lot for the non-Europeans. Then, as now, apologists for South Africa's racial policies were to be found mostly among reasonable, conservative politi-

cians abroad. Then, as now, there was the handful of brave, humanitarian women inside and outside South Africa fighting for the rights of non-Europeans. Then, as now, there was the Jewish voice raised in behalf of the oppressed. Then, as now, there was the smearing of the character of the few dissenting whites in South Africa. Then, as now, there was the representation of the blacks as subhuman, the humiliation of the Indians, and the cruel choice forced on the Coloreds. Then, as now, there was the emphasis on maintaining and furthering the economic well-being of South Africa.

Dr. Sacks has organized his book methodically. It is divided into three main parts: the Chinese coolie experiment (in which Britain's record is perhaps least worthy), the status of black Africans, and the status of Indians. Each theme is treated exhaustively. One regrets only that the author did not include a map with his bibliography and appendices.

At times, as he relates, London subordinated rights for non-Europeans to the apparent need for reconciliation between Boer and Briton in order to secure a friendly outpost in South Africa as the threat of war with Germany grew. (That, too, of course, has a familiar ring in the different context of today.) And London was perhaps naïve in hoping that white South Africa as a whole would adopt the Anglo-Saxon sense of fair play. Yet in those formative years, to quote Dr. Sacks, "the British nation—officialdom and public opinion—held aloft doggedly the vision that an imperial moral standard must govern the conduct of member states." Nevertheless, the outcome for Britain was failure, if the yardstick is the present condition of non-Europeans in South Africa. Dare one hope that the United Nations can and will do better?



Saith Ari the Learned: The late Barthi Guthmundsson was Keeper of the National Archives of Iceland from 1939 to his death in 1957. In *The Origin of the Icelanders* (translated from the Icelandic by Lee M. Hollander, Nebraska, \$5.75) it is his revolutionary contention, supported by copious records, that although to the greatest extent the founders of the island realm came from Norway, their ancestors were probably not Norwegians but east Scandinavians, i.e. Danes and Swedes, of Heruli extraction.

While Dr. Guthmundsson generously admits that some of his conclusions may seem a shade arbitrary or incidental, he offers massive and persuasive defense of his theories. The author's knowledge,

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The Reign in Spain

Politics and the Military in Spain, by Stanley G. Payne (Stanford. 574 pp. \$12.50), documents the increasing role of the army in Spanish government from the defeat of Napoleon in 1808 to Franco's most recent reshuffling of the cabinet. *New York Times* writer Benjamin Welles is the author of "Spain: The Gentle Anarchy."

By BENJAMIN WELLES

IN HIS *Spain: A Modern History* Salvador de Madariaga points out that the Spanish army has become an "indispensable" part of the nation's internal life because, as he says, it alone provides that "minimum of . . . mechanical order" essential to true progress. Now Professor Stanley G. Payne of UCLA confirms, in a masterly and magisterial new work, that the army continues to be the "ultimate arbiter of public affairs."

Professor Payne is the talented young historian whose *Falange: A History of Spanish Fascism* (1961) brought into perspective an oft-exaggerated bogey in modern Spanish history. At \$12.50 *Politics and the Military in Spain* is obviously intended for the institutional rather than the individual reader, and this is a pity, for it is a clear, absorbing, and meticulously documented work enlivened—though, alas, too infrequently—

by mordant wit and an eye for colorful detail.

The first 150 pages make somber reading. After the heroic if scattered resistance to Napoleon's invasion of 1808, which first taught the world "guerilla" warfare, the tale is one of royal favoritism, military intrigue, and the "bloat" of the corrupt officer class, with one gold-braided general for every 250 ill-trained, ill-led, and ill-equipped recruits, most of them doomed to die of yellow fever in the scattered empire.

Throughout the nineteenth century, as the "fat, fair, and immoral" Queen Isabella II switched her generals between her bed and her government, the nation swung between civil war and apathy, while the army, as Payne points out, became a "central factor in politics, not necessarily because the military were ambitious or greedy but because Spanish political society had broken down." Even the humiliating loss in 1898 of the last remaining colonies—Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines—to the young United States seems to have had little impact on the national torpor. The intellectuals bemoaned Spain's decadence, while the army draped itself in its dignity, broke up the offices of critical newspapers, and wrested from a weak Alfonso XIII the right to hale carping civilians before courts martial.

With brilliant detail Payne depicts the growing malaise at home as the

africanistas plunged on after gaudy victories in Morocco. By 1921 the Spanish army, led by fools and hobbled by knaves, stumbled into the disastrous rout at Annual when Abd-el-krim's ferocious Berbers cut down 8,000 madly fleeing Spanish recruits. "The political imbroglio arising from Annual," says Payne, "was the main cause of the overthrow of constitutional government in Spain."

From here on the book's tempo gathers speed. More conscription, more discontent; strikes and disorders; Socialism, Anarchism, Communism—all matched in counter-ferocity by the army, the bishops, and the bourgeoisie. With Alfonso's complicity General Primo de Rivera (father of the Falangist martyr) fastened on Spain an iron rule while promising a "swift, sensible, and worthy" solution to the stalemated Moroccan War. Eventually he achieved it, with the help of French troops, French ships, and a French general named Pétain; and then there appeared on the stage of history an iron-willed, icy-nerved colonel of the Spanish foreign legion, one Francisco Franco.

"Balding, plump, and about five feet three inches . . . instead of carousing with whores, cards, and wine as was the wont of so many *africanistas* [Franco] devoted himself entirely to his work." The "work," to which Franco has been devoting himself ever since, can be summed up succinctly: ruling Spain through a combination of total self-control, total ruthlessness, and a cynical appreciation of the strengths and weaknesses of the Spanish character.

The author takes the reader skillfully through the army plots that slither like eels before a darkening background of world depression, Stalin, Hitler, Mussolini, hunger, and despair. In 1931 Alfonso XIII skips from Spain to "avoid bloodshed," and, as the Second Republic stands helpless, terrorism mounts. Inevitably the Left and the Right go for each other's throats. The date is July 18, 1936.

"The military rebellion did not begin specifically as an anti-Republican movement," Payne makes clear. "It had no precise program or ideology other than of saving Spain from anarchy."

Franco's fierce postwar purges, the executions, the concentration camps, the Hitlerite controls over life and thought have eased considerably with the passing of the years; but still the maintenance of "order" is Franco's overriding policy, with an occasional tacking to catch each favorable wind.

It is only when dealing with modern political developments that Payne can be faulted. The vital importance of the Korean War, which linked America's need for bases with Franco's need for wealthy friends, and the growing be-



—Wide World.

Franco—"total self-control, total ruthlessness."

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