

hind-the-scenes importance of the Pentagon and of American big business in opening up Spain despite army suspicion are given scant attention. Nor is it certain that Franco's cabinet reshuffle of February 1957 was an "almost complete victory" for the army. To one observer, at least, it was more a victory for Opus Dei's technocrats, who now seized the economic helm and began swinging Spain from autarchy to a modern, liberal economy. The army, which accepted the changes reluctantly without fully comprehending them, has been grumbling ever since at the mounting wave of student-worker-priest demonstrations that are inevitable when a right-wing dictatorship begins to nod.

HOWEVER Payne gives credit to the army for having helped wipe out illiteracy and for having inculcated with a "formal discipline" some two million Spanish males in the past twenty-five

years. That he skates carefully around the army's probable role when Franco dies indicates that he, like most wary observers, prefers not to speculate. No one, not even the army itself, yet knows what will happen when the *Caudillo* is no more. All that can be said is that the army, while it may not select the successor, will at any rate veto anyone it suspects, whether Don Juan, Prince Juan Carlos, a regent, or a president. Payne says the army has become in recent years "apolitical," thus paralleling what he calls the "political vacuum" in all Spanish society.

Professor Payne infers, and most would agree, that so long as the army remains loyal to Franco he will continue to rule. Eventually, however, it will be the two million who have learned "formal discipline" from the army who will choose between stability or chaos, thus determining the future of Spain and Europe.

out of touch, as bureaucracies often are, with public opinion and even the various governments. "What there is of the united Europe," writes Spinelli, "is neither a Europe of the peoples nor a Europe of states, but rather a Europe of supranational offices; of European executives."

In a brilliant analysis not of the desirable results but of the emerging reality, he describes in nontechnical terms understandable to the layman the conflict and crisis of the European Community. It is most important to "mobilize public opinion" in the various European countries, for without it the European bureaucracy, the Eurocrats, work in a vacuum without vision of a great design. In his discussion of the main contemporary problems Mr. Spinelli is as wise as in his examination of the past. The present reviewer agrees that in the area of foreign and military policy "involving control of the world nuclear equilibrium and the ways to replace it with a saner world order, the interests . . . of Europe and America are so closely connected that it is not desirable now to aim at European nuclear sovereignty, but at the limitation of American nuclear sovereignty through the progressive participation of Europe in the planning, financing and control both of nuclear strategy and the policy which presides over it."

But if progress is to be achieved in this direction the Eurocrats will have to make a great effort to gather around them the broadest and firmest consensus possible. Instead of discrediting it, the Community should welcome the European parliament and not confine itself to submitting its proposals to the Council of Ministers, but seek support in the various parties of the European nation-states; otherwise it will be bereft of all political dynamism. The recent elections in France clearly revealed a strong movement there in favor of returning to the policies of Schuman and Monnet, the French "fathers" of the European conception. In spite of its division by languages and religions and the proud past of its nation-states, Europe may, if public opinion can be aroused, be nearer not only functional but genuine unification than similar movements in Latin America, the Arab world, and Africa.

E Pluribus Unum?

***The Eurocrats: Conflict and Crisis in the European Community*, by Altiero Spinelli, translated from the Italian by C. Grove Haines (Johns Hopkins. 229 pp. \$5.95), analyzes realistically the possibilities of Continental federation. Hans Kohn is the author of, among other books, "The Age of Nationalism: The First Era of Global History."**

By HANS KOHN

ALTIERO SPINELLI, one of Italy's leading political scientists interested in the unification of Europe, published in 1965 his *Rapporto sull'Europa*, which has now been brilliantly translated by C. Grove Haines, director of the Bologna Center of Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. It is common knowledge that the European movement for unification reached its climax in 1955 and has since declined. Spinelli's book is short, readable, and well presented, without the ballast of superfluous and irrelevant legal discussion of what ought to have happened; it discusses what really happened, and thus merits the close attention of Americans who have supported the unification of Western Europe as a countermove to the unification of Eastern Europe under Soviet leadership.

Both unification movements are going through a grave crisis at present. Local nationalism, unexpected ten years ago,

asserts itself everywhere. Five years ago many informed observers expected that Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco which were "united" by traditions, language, religion and a common struggle against French colonialism would after "liberation" join into a federation of the Maghreb, the western extension of the Arab world. Nothing of the sort happened; the three countries have jealously preserved their full sovereignty and even fought over disputed frontiers. The same is true of Africa as a whole, even of the three East African countries that emerged from British tutelage, under which they cooperated more closely than they do today. The Benelux nations are as far from any true integration as are the Scandinavian. The countries of Latin America that share a common background of history, religion, and language go their separate ways with little contact among them. Armament races and disputed frontiers are as common in the "new" lands as they were or are in the "old" nations of Europe.

Though still being discussed, scant progress has been made in the last ten years toward an integrated Western Europe. In spite of the "rhapsodic initiative" — more accurately, invocation — of "European-oriented national political leaders," the peoples were and are satisfied to "move in the familiar sphere of the reconstruction of the nation-states." What was created in Luxemburg and Brussels was a European-oriented bureaucracy, hoping for the "functional approach to European unity," but largely



More Than Cement and Barbed Wire

Berlin: The Wall Is Not Forever, by Eleanor Lansing Dulles (North Carolina, 245 pp. \$6), describes from personal observation the development of the confrontation between East and West Germany. Louis L. Snyder is the author of "The Blood-and-Iron Chancellor," a documentary-biography of Bismarck.

By LOUIS L. SNYDER

BAEDEKER, the indispensable travel guide, describes the Berlin Wall as consisting partly of a concrete barrier three feet thick and partly of barbed wire entanglements, prefaced by a "death strip" ten meters wide and a closed zone of 100 meters. Some fifty-five streets connecting the two divisions of Berlin, in addition to 129 roads formerly connecting West Berlin with the East Zone, have been blocked.

To this information Eleanor Lansing Dulles adds that troops, probably 30,000 in number, man 193 watch towers, 208 bunkers, and other reinforced positions. The Wall extends for about twenty-eight miles within the city, and the barrier surrounding the Western sectors of Berlin is more than seventy miles long. The patrols walk in pairs and have orders to shoot unauthorized persons.

The Eastern part of Germany has been called the largest prison in the world. It requires almost 100,000 border guards to keep the people in. It is estimated that there are 30,000 or more Vopos and Grepos in Berlin alone. Stationed along the "green border" with its mine fields, its watch towers, its machine guns, and its police dogs, are some 70,000 more armed men. These . . . have murdered some unnumbered victims who have attempted escape.

Eleanor Lansing Dulles is the granddaughter, the niece, and the sister of American Secretaries of State. Recently retired, she had a distinguished career in the State Department from 1942 to 1962, holding a number of positions, most of them concerned with international finance and German or Austrian affairs. She has much to say about current Germany and the Germans. Observant, enthusiastic, and witty, she saw and heard much from the bureaucrat's window as well as from the dinner table.

She is an admirable lady—and an able one.

The reader will find that the author could not quite decide whether she wanted to write a book on the Wall, the recent history of Berlin, or her own part in the cascading events. The result is a *mélange* of all three. One is taken on a historical tour as well as on an illuminating visit to the Wall, accompanied by personal anecdotes illustrating the Cold War at its vortex.

The opening chapters give historical perspective on the Berlin of today and yesterday, with sections about the Nazi years, the blockade (1948-1949), and the work of Chancellor Adenauer. Attention is paid to the complicated East-West relations, the increasing unrest in the East Zone, and the frustrating struggle for unity.

The most successful chapter is on the Wall itself. The author is at her best



when she tells of the first overt acts, the official reactions, the death of Peter Fechter, the dramatic story of the tunnels, and the grim statistics. She shows how the free world was at first outraged by the cement barrier and barbed wire, and how the Wall eventually became a kind of sadistic attraction.

Warnings of the imminent erection of the Wall were clear. Both Germans and Soviets expected some major action or countermeasure, and they were bewildered and incredulous when nothing happened. "It can be deduced from the reaction in Washington, London, and Paris that the authorities in these capitals believed that, as in Hungary in 1956, the vital interests of the Soviets were at stake, that the plan to defend the Wall would be carried through by force. For reasons of global strategy, they did not wish to challenge the Soviets as they were to do later in Cuba."

Mrs. Dulles might have strengthened her analysis with more attention to Soviet motivation. In Western eyes, the Wall was an admission of ideological bankruptcy, a shameful recognition that all was not well inside the Soviet paradise. The Communists, on the other

hand, dismissed psychological overtones of ridicule as *incidental and unimportant*. What was decisive, in their view, was the fact that the Wall halted the loss of East Germany's labor force, so that its economy steadily improved.

Other chapters deal with the relations between the divided Germanies, life in the East Zone twenty years after, the vulnerability and strength of Berlin, and the attitude of the young people in the new era.

IT is always presumptuous for reviewers to give hindsight advice as to how a book should have been written. Yet I cannot resist suggesting that Mrs. Dulles might have done better had she focused her entire volume on the background, building, and significance of the Wall. Whenever she turns to that subject she has something of value to say, something of considerably more interest and importance than brief historical surveys, economic reports, and parlor sociological commentary.

The unfinished quality of the book bears witness to the importance of a discriminating editor. Such a one would have advised the author to drop most of the opening personal material and relegate it to the Dulles family archives as delightful memorabilia. He would also have pointed out that the two-page section on "The Morgenthau Plan" has virtually nothing to say about that much-discussed topic.

Above all, such an editor would have explained tactfully to the author that the Dulles family has performed so brilliantly in public service that it is really unnecessary to belabor the point with expressions of sibling admiration.

"Dr. Adenauer, in a cordial mood, clearly wished to get from me some preliminary sign of the man he was later to term 'the greatest man he had known,' his friend, my brother Foster." "Brandt and Foster sat on the leather couch opposite the portraits of my grandfather, John W. Foster, and my uncle, Robert Lansing, previous Secretaries of State." "The International Film Festival opened at the Congress Hall on John-Foster-Dulles-Allee. . . ." "In spite of my restraint and the obvious impossibility of acting in a covert manner, I was accused in the East Zone of starting the 1953 revolt."

As interesting as these reflections and reminiscences are, the importance of this book lies in its examination of Berlin as one key to the peace of Europe. The author admits that she is unable to answer the main question that she has posed: "I cannot say when the Wall will be breached. I cannot forecast when reunification will come. I can only state my firm conviction that the Wall will be dismantled in a meaningful period of contemporary history."