

# Trade Winds

Jerome Beatty, Jr.

For the seventy-fifth birthday of a maiden aunt who loves music, Herbert L. Marx, Jr., of Teaneck, New Jersey, and other nieces and nephews presented her with a Toshiba stereophonic radio, equipped with separate speakers. The Japanese-made radio arrived securely packed. The music-loving aunt was pleased to see stamped on the box: HANDEL WITH CARE.



After the demise of *The Saturday Evening Post*, old stories kept popping up. One was from John Tebbel's book about the magazine's famous editor, George Horace Lorimer. A serial installment ended with the heroine drinking at night with her married boss in his home, while his wife was away. The next installment began with them having breakfast and the wife still gone. The

*Post* readers of those days were shocked. Lorimer answered their protests with a form letter that said, "The *Post* cannot be responsible for what the characters in its serials do between installments."

"If imitation is the truest form of flattery, I should really be flattered," writes Stefan Lorant in his new book, *The Glorious Burden*, a pictorial and text record of the American Presidency from 1789 till now. He is referring to his 1953 book, *The Presidency*, which he says led to a whole lot of subsequent books on the same subject and based on his own research.

"Scores of pictures I had unearthed," he says, "made their reappearance in these books . . . They omitted any reference to my work . . . Even my mistakes were slavishly copied. In my earlier study I had identified the cartoon 'Mad Tom in a Rage,' as representing Thomas Jefferson . . . In my subsequent research I found that the figure is not Jefferson but Tom Paine. Yet that illustration appeared in many other books with the

faulty caption, suggesting that the research of these bookmakers did not go much further than the perusal of my volume."

Mr. Lorant, certainly one of the most indefatigable legmen, has collected more than 30,000 illustrations relating to the Presidency. Of these he picked 1,500 for *The Glorious Burden*, added 350,000 words of text, and put together a 959-page book which is an amazing historical accomplishment. Lorant has uncovered plenty of new material for researchers, and provided an exciting story for the rest of us. As for imitating or equaling this one, forget it. This is it.

A cartoon editor studies rough drawings brought or sent to him by a few hundred cartoonists who live around the nation. If he thinks one is funny, he has it drawn up by the cartoonist and eventually it gets published in the magazine of which the editor is cartoon editor. That's what Lawrence Lariar has been




doing since 1941. Since 1957 he's been on *Parade*, and on February 5 he studied the 2,432,544th rough of his career. I know this because I asked him, as I had just received a copy of his *Best Cartoons of the Year* (Dodd). That's for the year 1968; it's the twenty-seventh consecutive anthology in this series.

The funny thing about Lariar is that he is a serious chap. Of his ninety-two published books, a couple of dozen are mysteries in which folks get murdered and beaten up. So as not to confuse us, he signs them with pseudonyms like Adam Knight and Mike Morris, etc. One of them concerned a cartoonist who was found dead in the men's washroom of a Manhattan magazine. I won't reveal the ending, but the cartoon editor, whose name was Butler, didn't do it.

**Sharps and Flats:** Lee Dembart reports that the elevators at the swanky Tokyo Prince Hotel have phones in them. On the wall is a plaque on which is engraved the following message: "How to Use the Telephone. Please push a White Button of the receiver after you took it off, and you can tell."

► Tessie Jaksohn of New York got a letter from our subscription department apologizing for "the erotic service."

► Something got lost in the translation of that Sam Goldwynism in *TRADE WINDS* [Feb. 1]. Ira Gershwin said, "You're



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looking very well, Sam." Goldwyn replied, "What good does it do?"

►In *The Algonquin Wits*, Robert Drennan writes that Franklin P. Adams once asked a friend if she knew whose birthday it was. "Yours?" she ventured. "No," said Adams, "but you were close—it's Shakespeare's."

►In the August 1968 issue of *Soviet Life* there was a Coin-a-Caption Contest for American readers, in which they were asked to suggest a title for a picture of a photographer followed by seven piglets. Winners were just announced. Susan Chaffee of Goffstown, New Hampshire, slipped in "Animal Farm" as one of the winning entries.

►In 1918 when they laid the cornerstone of Westminster College's Swope Chapel in Fulton, Missouri, a copper box with documents for posterity was interred with it. Fifty years later the box was opened. Water had seeped in and destroyed everything. So much for posterity. However, old newspaper files revealed that the contents had been: pictures of three members of the Swope family, an alumni catalogue, a college catalogue, a copy of the campus publication, a commencement week program, and a Bible. Digging up time capsules doesn't sound like a very interesting occupation.

►A recent *Popular Mechanics* article on marine toilets was entitled "Plan A Head."

►Putting 10 cents into a public phone booth on the streets of Manhattan is utter waste.

►In Harriet Stolorow's freshman English class at Jackson (Michigan) Community College, one of her students listed as a reference *Satyrday Review*. Hmmm.

►How come the Department of Agriculture keeps expanding while farms and farmers dwindle?

►Show me a tactful baby kangaroo and I'll show you a diplomatic pouch.

SOLUTION OF LAST WEEK'S  
KINGSLEY DOUBLE-CROSTIC (No. 1820)

(HERBERT) BLOCK:  
THE HERBLOCK GALLERY

The novel feature of this idea is that it would apply to the poor; there is nothing new about guaranteed incomes for the wealthy—and guaranteed profits and tax exemptions besides. Whether these things destroy the incentive of the rich to work for a living, I don't know.



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
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## THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR



## Can President Nixon Stop the Arms Race?

**"T**HE greatest honor history can bestow," said President Nixon in his Inaugural address, "is the title of Peacemaker." The President clearly recognized—as do most Americans—that without peace in Vietnam, without intensive and successful efforts to avoid conflict in the "tinderbox" Middle East, his Administration will be tarnished in the eyes of the American people and in the sight of history.

But, really critical as are these immediate and obvious challenges to peace, history will probably judge the actions of our Government in the years immediately ahead by another standard—the longer-term prospects for peace as determined by the current decisions we make concerning the nuclear arms race and negotiations with the Soviet Union on the limitation of nuclear missile and anti-missile systems. For we are engaged in a massive nuclear arms race and historically arms races almost inevitably have led to mutually destructive wars. Because of the destructive power of nuclear weapons, the very survival of mankind is literally at stake.


Negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union concerning the limitation of offensive and defensive missile systems should commence shortly. From all indications, both President Nixon and the Kremlin leaders give high priority to these negotiations—and it is long past the time when the momentous issues involved were given the attention they must have.

The setting in which Mr. Nixon has now assumed the Presidency is pertinent. Though partially obscured by the controversy over Vietnam policy, a major debate on many of the key issues relating to national security and the nuclear arms race has been in progress for several

years. This debate has centered on the issue of the deployment of the Sentinel anti-ballistic missile system.

A disconcerting aspect of this debate has been that the proponents and opponents of the Sentinel system seldom talked *to* each other, as opposed to talking *at* each other—in both the literal and figurative senses. Now the Joint Chiefs of Staff, representing the professional military viewpoint and strongly supported by leading members of the Armed Services committees of the Congress, have apparently succeeded in convincing the Congress to commit the United States to the construction of a "thin" ABM system. But notwithstanding authorization and appropriation in the last Congress, the Nixon Administration has temporarily delayed further procurement and site location for Sentinel pending departmental and National Security Council review.

**F**ORMER Defense Secretary McNamara, in his landmark speech of September 18, 1967, brought the issue to public attention and lifted the debate to a new level of sophistication and insight. He explained the dynamics of the "mad momentum" of the arms race and the dangerous cycle of "action and reaction" inherent in the interplay of U.S. and Soviet policy in the nuclear arms field with large risks and expenses but no real gains in security for either side. Two direct consequences resulted from Secretary McNamara's initiative. First, leading scientists of the academic community launched a series of attacks questioning the technical efficacy of the Sentinel system, and also warned of the dangers involved in "destabilizing" the current nuclear "balance of terror." Second, a bipartisan group of liberal and moderate





*The senior Senator from New York examines the staggering costs and perils of U.S.-Soviet competition in nuclear weaponry. "To preserve a climate of freedom in the world," he observes, "we need to use the whole range of political and diplomatic action open to us."*

Senators (including this writer), led by Senators John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky and Philip A. Hart of Michigan, offered a series of unsuccessful amendments to various defense appropriations bills, seeking to defer the deployment of the Sentinel ABM system.

Mr. McNamara's successor, Clark Clifford, gave strong support to the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the traditional strategic doctrines which underlie the JCS position. "Others within and without the Government are free to work unqualifiedly for the best of all possible worlds," Mr. Clifford said. "The Secretary of Defense must make certain that we are prepared for the worst. I find this responsibility neither uncongenial nor unrewarding . . . my own deeply held belief in the importance of dealing from strength has not resulted from the past half year alone but stems also from my experience with the Administration of President Truman in the period following World War II."

There is nothing sinister about the view of former Secretary Clifford and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The pertinent question is not whether Mr. Clifford and the Joint Chiefs were "wrong" or "dangerous" in their views. Their attitudes were certainly the conventional reaction to the thought patterns of their opposite numbers in the Kremlin who still carry the day in Soviet decision-making councils.

But perhaps it is more in the national interest to approach the issue from a broader perspective. "Military strength is not enough," President Nixon said before his election. "We must move away from confrontation in this nuclear age. . . . In short, for arms control to be successful, we must first establish prerequisites and incentives, and this requires a

cooperative pursuit of common objectives. We will succeed, first, to the extent that we can convince our adversaries to share our interest in stability and to rely on peaceful, not military, means for effecting change. Second, our success will depend not so much on mutual trust as on mutual knowledge, so that each side can know with reasonable assurance what the other is about."

These words go to the heart of the debate concerning the Sentinel ABM system and closely related questions involving the world strategic environment and the U.S. national security posture in the 1970s. As all those familiar with the ABM debate know, there has been little disagreement on technical questions; the entire controversy has turned on questions of judgment as to the intentions and designs of the U.S.S.R.

**T**HE Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis, Dr. Alain Enthoven, stated this explicitly when he told the Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, in explaining the mechanics of the Pentagon's Sentinel decision: "Finally it came down to the single really dominant driving assumption in this whole problem of the NIKE-X defense of cities, and that is: what would the Soviet reactions be?" From the evidence on the public record, it appears that this "single really dominant driving assumption" was decided by professional military technicians, whose horizons quite understandably are circumscribed and conditioned by established, conventional military assumptions concerning the Soviet Union.

My point is not that our military technicians are "wrong" in their assumptions about the Soviet Union. From their vantage point they are not. But what was

missing was the dimension suggested by Mr. Nixon's prescription that, in seeking arms control agreements with the U.S.S.R., "we must first establish prerequisites and incentives." Significantly, he stressed the importance of "mutual knowledge" of what the other side is about. This is a step beyond the conventional military approach. Mr. Clifford's decisions to proceed with the development of the MIRV (missiles carrying multiple, independently targeted warheads), to give priority to the construction of the Sentinel ABM system, and to proceed with the acquisition of two new types of nuclear attack submarines, have been questioned in many quarters precisely because they may not entirely meet President Nixon's prescription.

The danger, in my judgment, does not rest so much with the decision to proceed with procurement of these new weapons per se, but with the effect it may have on the prospects for successful negotiations. As President Nixon has noted: "Technology will not stand still for the arms controller any more than it does for the military planner." But the greatest care must be exercised not to launch a new cycle of the arms race before negotiations even begin to prevent this.

Concerning future negotiations to limit offensive and defensive missile systems, President Nixon has indicated that his program will be "based on the assumption that East and West will continue to carry on technological competition . . ." and emphasized that the "initial purpose of arms control is not to deliver a final 'package,' but to establish a framework of consultation which will enable us . . . to cope with the onrush of technology in a cooperative way."

While the approach suggested by Pres-

ident Nixon is sound and realistic, certain very troublesome questions remain which point up the urgency of getting negotiations started soon. First, there is the danger that the new weapons systems already announced by Mr. Clifford may—if the present hold on procurement and site location is lifted and they go forward—cause a “destabilization” of the nuclear balance. Moreover, the “action/reaction” issue raised by Secretary McNamara has been restated in a candid and highly pertinent way before a Senate subcommittee by the director of Defense Research and Engineering, Dr. John Foster, Jr. In replying to a question concerning the development of strategic nuclear weapons over the past decade, Dr. Foster said that “in each case it seems to me the Soviet Union is following the U.S. lead and that the United States is not reacting to the Soviet actions.” The former director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, William Foster, summed up the case succinctly when he observed recently that “we now have a relatively stable situation in which each side has a fairly good idea of the other side’s capabilities. With the deployment of new weapons systems, however, this situation could become very unstable and possibly dangerous.”

The second very troubling aspect of the decisions to proceed with new nuclear weapons systems is its staggering cost. While a “thin” Sentinel ABM system has been priced at \$5 billion, the “heavy” system requested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and supported by some

powerful Congressional leaders, is estimated to cost \$50 to \$75 billion. The replacement of Minuteman II missiles by Minuteman III will cost more than \$4.5 billion. Twenty-nine new high-speed Sturgeon class submarines will cost \$78,000,000 each, a total of more than \$2.25 billion, and Mr. Clifford has estimated that the new “silent” submarines he ordered will cost \$150 to \$200 million each. In addition, according to Mr. Foster, “three weapons systems which have been suggested but not yet approved bear a price tag, over the next few years, of somewhere between \$60 and \$100 billions.” This is far from a complete list.

The sheer magnitude in dollars of the next generation of nuclear weapons systems doubtlessly will have a braking effect on the arms race. Certainly the economy of even this nation is in no position to absorb expenditures for new weapons in this magnitude, unless we are prepared to become a real garrison state. The American economy is already dangerously overheated. Inflation is rising at a rate of more than 4 per cent a year, and our balance of payments position continues to be adverse. Even more importantly, we have urgent domestic problems—the crisis of the cities and other developments—which require large new federal expenditures in the years immediately ahead—and we are still fighting the Vietnam war.

The apparent eagerness of the Soviet Union to commence negotiations on the limitation of strategic missile systems is related also in considerable measure, I feel, to the almost prohibitive cost of the next generation of these weapons systems.

For these reasons I hope that prudence and moderation will prevail on arms limitation in the Nixon Administration, and also in the Kremlin. There should be no complacency with respect to the nuclear arms race. President Nixon made a most significant distinction at his first press conference when he stated that “sufficiency [of military power] is a better term than either superiority or parity.” But he will need all the help and support he can get from the liberal and moderate elements of my own Republican party as well as the Democratic party if he is to seek and to succeed in maintaining some discipline over the defense budget.

During the campaign, Mr. Nixon spoke of the need to “synchronize our national security programs and the search for arms control and disarmament agreements,” and, most significantly, he promised “. . . the evolution of a strategic doctrine, stressing the non-belligerent aspects of our national security posture.” This is a philosophy that many in the United States will wish to support. If President Nixon succeeds in translating

this philosophy into concrete effect, he will have achieved one of the great leadership revolutions of this century. Hitherto, the major departments of the federal government, and the powerful interest groups operating in the national security field, have exerted their energies and skills on a competitive rather than synchronized basis. The results of this *modus operandi* have been unfortunate on many occasions.


A truly synchronized effort in the national security field, including the evolution of a new strategic doctrine emphasizing the non-belligerent aspects of our national posture, could bring us truly enormous security benefits—more indeed than any of the proposed new weapons systems. But President Nixon can anticipate strong resistance to efforts to synchronize national security programs involving the several agencies and departments concerned. This resistance will come principally from habit and inertia—rather than ideology—although pockets of resistance on strongly held ideological grounds can also be anticipated.

**T**HERE are ways, I feel, in which the principle of synchronization of efforts in the national security field can be pursued, and there are some non-military, security “trade offs” or options, which could have the dual merit of achieving big security gains while saving billions in weapons expenditures.

A breakthrough in our relations with Communist China could change the entire world security environment, for both the United States and the Soviet Union, and enhance the security of our nation much more than, for instance, the development of very expensive new nuclear attack submarines. The same can be said of attaining a true peace in the Middle East. Similarly, the establishment of viable, new mechanisms for dealing with the recurrent balance of payments and monetary crises of the Western industrial economies could contribute more to the strength and security of the United States than an ABM system—“thick” or “thin.”

Then, of course, we always have our urgent domestic problems. Programs that generate breakthroughs on racial problems, inner-city decay, and environmental pollution could help solve the crisis of our cities and add immeasurably to the quality of life in the United States. Their success would significantly raise the morale of our own people, as well as our prestige and influence in the world, and thus directly enhance our national security. The possibilities noted here will be vitally affected by a more judicious deployment of our resources expended for “national security.”

In advocating vigorous pursuit of non-  
(Continued on page 63)



# State of Affairs

Henry Brandon

## Mr. Nixon's Middle Course

WASHINGTON.

BY PLANNING a trip abroad so soon after his Inauguration, President Nixon may hope to arrest the isolationist trend that has followed in the wake of the Vietnam war. It should also reassure the world, and especially the Europeans, that the United States has no intention of abdicating her world responsibilities. Mr. Nixon is an activist in foreign affairs and he is making this clear from the start.

This does not mean that he will be what is known as an "interventionist," the kind he used to be in the early Fifties. One indication is a sentence in his statement about the purpose of his European trip: "The future of the countries of the West can no longer be an exclusively American design." This remark set the tone for his European reconnaissance; it perhaps also sets the essence of the foreign policy he wants generally to pursue: a strong middle course between the interventionism that would lead to more Vietnams and traditional isolationism.

Dr. Morton H. Halperin, who is now on Dr. Henry Kissinger's staff in the White House as secretary to the National Security Council, tried to define such a middle course in the *Journal of International Affairs*, suggesting it be based on three main principles: 1) self-help; 2) regional responsibility; 3) residual U.S. responsibility. Self-help means that the country or the region must assume primary responsibility for its own security; regional responsibility, that "neighbors work together to deal with economic and political causes of instability"; and residual U.S. responsibility, that "the U.S. will continue to maintain conventional forces and especially air forces to reinforce the efforts of American treaty partners in deterring and, when necessary, resisting aggression."

Although this was written well before Mr. Nixon came to the White House, this approach comes close to what the new President likes to call "the buffer concept." This view is almost the opposite of that held by John Foster Dulles, whose disciple Nixon once was. Dulles, of course, believed in committing the United States as much as possible around the world. To the NATO responsibility he added commitments to the Middle East through CENTO, to Southeast Asia through SEATO, and to other countries through bilateral treaties. Nixon,

however, is well aware that the world has changed very much since then. The United States and the Soviet Union now stare at each other through nuclear gun barrels, and the problem is how to avoid direct confrontation.

The "buffer concept" is applied most easily to the Pacific, where Japan, the principal industrial power in Asia, provides an almost natural barrier. There is no such buffer protection in the Middle East. In this area, much now depends on the tacit understanding that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union will use force or the threat of force. Both Moscow and Washington are aware of the danger of either one's being sucked into the Arab-Israeli conflict, and are moving to reduce that danger. No American Government could stand for the destruction of Israel, something the Russians must be aware of.

It is also difficult to adapt the buffer concept to Europe, but here, too, Nixon may want to determine whether he can reduce the danger of direct Soviet-American confrontation. There are two basic approaches: creating a third force in Western Europe that would be based primarily on the British and French nuclear deterrent; or denuclearizing the center of Europe and gradually reducing the number of conventional forces in the area (once suggested by Sir Anthony Eden). The ultimate responsibility for the security of Western Europe would, of course, continue to remain with the United States. The Soviet posture, characterized by its crushing of Czechoslovakia, makes it difficult to think of Eu-

rope in buffer terms, and a new premium has been placed on Atlantic cohesion.

These are very likely to be the basic issues that President Nixon will want to discuss with European leaders before reaching any conclusions about American policy in Europe and before starting on the long, slow road of direct negotiations with the Soviet Union. Mr. Nixon has already said that technical negotiations, such as those about limiting the number of offensive and defensive missiles, must be accompanied by a political détente; otherwise arms control could prove to be a false safety valve resulting in increased tension because the Soviet Union might assume that it would be safe to allow tensions to rise again.

Essentially, Mr. Nixon will be groping for some in-between option that will save him from both Vietnam-like interventions and isolationism. President Johnson walked that middle path when he refrained from intervening before and after the abortive Communist coup in Indonesia in September 1965, and when he communicated with the Soviet Union in time to avoid a confrontation in the Arab-Israeli war.

President Nixon has demonstrated his commitment to foreign affairs. He is trying to keep ahead of American public opinion, which has not yet drawn up the balance about the war in Vietnam. It is still difficult to know whether Americans will judge the peace settlement, if and when it is reached, as a "sell-out" or as "honorable." Much may depend on this reaction. Much may also depend on the impressions the President will bring back from Europe. The basic trouble there is that the Europeans as yet have not succeeded in defining their own "common purposes," let alone those they share with the United States. But perhaps Mr. Nixon can give international diplomacy the new momentum it needs to usher in what he has called "the era of negotiations."



"I now pronounce you man and wife."