

A Great Charter for Europe

By JAMES T. SHOTWELL

IN Survey Graphic for August, 1924, I described in a general way the work of the small American committee which had been concerned during the past winter with the problem of disarmament. That committee began originally with the idea of stating a program of disarmament which would embody primarily American principles and express American policies. As the work progressed, however, its program was changed. In view of the facts that America was not participating in any immediate effort at further disarmament, and that the League of Nations was concentrating upon this problem at the meeting of its Assembly in September, the committee made the basis of its study the problem as it would come up before the League of Nations rather than the distinctively American standpoint. At the same time, it tried to find a formula which might ultimately be acceptable to the United States so that if it should prove also acceptable to the League, there might be hope of the adherence of this country at a later date. The result was the so-called American Plan for Disarmament and National Security which was taken up by the Council of the League of Nations and became one of the chief bases of discussion in the Geneva Assembly.

Three members of the American committee attended the Assembly to explain the plan—General Bliss, David Hunter Miller and myself, and in view of the fact that so much of our plan was embodied in the protocol, it may be of interest to indicate the relative bearing of the two schemes. First, however, a word should be said about the methods employed in Geneva and the new spirit in negotiation which made possible so large a measure of success.

FROM the standpoint of procedure as well as of substance, the Fifth Assembly of the League marked a revolutionary break with the old diplomacy and the old state-system of Europe. The new democracy of the old world which has found voice in the labor government of Great Britain and the liberalism of France which on the eleventh of May last found expression in the cabinet of M. Herriot, were given power at a time when the conservative elements in both countries were rather relieved to be rid of the responsibility for a further continuance of their policies. The result was that Mr. MacDonald and M. Herriot were forced to win political success by an active instead of a passive policy. The negotiations at London showed this preoccupation with reference to the reparations problem; those at Geneva were the natural if not the inevitable consequence of the economic settlement, dealing with the other major problem—that of national security. The protocol of Geneva, unlike the Dawes plan, touches the very heart of continuing international relationships. It proclaims the revolutionary principle that war, aggressive war, is no longer permitted as a free prerogative of sovereignty and inaugurates a method of international cooperation to enforce peace. These things are fundamental; the world is just waking to their importance.

The success of the negotiations in Geneva—and that they were at least successful will be admitted by foes and friends alike—was largely due to the frank and open way in which they were carried on; and this in turn was due to some extent at least to the extreme frankness of Mr. MacDonald's opening speech. In it he laid forth the attitude of the Labor Party, not only toward the question of disarmament, but toward what he called certain failures of the league in the past, namely, the Upper Silesian settlement and other things. As one listened to his diplomatic *faux pas*—made deliberately—one realized how far removed the democratic governments of Europe were from the old-fashioned diplomacy. For a moment it was doubtful whether the brutal frankness of MacDonald had not made international relations more difficult instead of furthering them. The French even thought that his reference to the difficulty of ascertaining the responsibility for any war was a thinly veiled reference to the responsibilities for the war of 1914. Knowing that Mr. MacDonald had not been quite clear upon that point ten years ago, they were inclined to take this remark as meaning that he held that Germany had not been responsible for the World War. As this was just the moment when the German government was putting forth this claim, the incident began to loom up rather seriously, particularly as the whole speech was an uncompromising statement of the British point of view that sanctions were relatively unimportant compared with the agreement to arbitrate and disarm.

M. Herriot's speech in reply was awaited with great anxiety, for it was felt that upon it depended the possibility of any further negotiations between the two points of view: the continental European, represented by France, and that of the outlying states of the world, represented to a certain degree by the British. M. Herriot's speech under these circumstances was one of the most brilliant successes that history can record. His reply to Mr. MacDonald was in fact a constructive presentation of the idealism of France. He denounced war in the most passionate terms and committed his government to the principle of its outlawry. His personality as well is genial and winning, and as he proceeded with his statement, the case of France seemed hardly more than a further development of MacDonald's point of view, simply rendered more precise owing to the greater imminence of the danger of war in the case of a continental state. Starting from a common acceptance of the definition of aggression as the refusal to arbitrate—a definition based upon the American Plan—M. Herriot insisted that compulsory arbitration could not be treated separately from the problem of security and that in fact the three pillars of the temple of peace were compulsory arbitration, security, and disarmament. His insistence that these three factors should not be treated separately but form an indissoluble whole was accepted by the Fifth Assembly and was never lost sight of in the preparation of the Protocol.

It is impossible in a hurried survey of this kind to characterize in detail other leaders of national delegations at Geneva. Of the two *rapporteurs* of the technical commit-

tees which drew up the protocol, M. Benés and M. Politis, the former is sufficiently known to Americans to call for no further comment here. M. Politis, the former Foreign Minister of Greece, however, has by his work at Geneva established himself as one of the foremost statesmen of Europe. His speech in the Assembly, answering the point of view of the British delegation, was admitted on all sides to be one of the greatest intellectual performances in recent political history. No description of the Fifth Assembly, however, would be complete without mention of M. Paul Boncour, the chairman of the French Committee of National Defense, whom M. Herriot left in charge of the French delegation. The future historian will find in the speech delivered by M. Boncour in the Third Committee on the tenth of September already an outline of the main points later embodied after much effort in the finished protocol. Observers at Geneva came to the conclusion that in M. Boncour not only France but Europe and the world have discovered a statesman of the first order.

The experienced diplomatic representatives of Italy, perhaps with memories of the Corfu incident in mind, were at first inclined to oppose the current which they saw setting in toward compulsory arbitration. But after Mr. Schanger had tested out the strength of the peace sentiment in a carefully prepared speech in the third committee, he and his colleagues were led to give their adherence to increasingly widespread opinion that a real turning point had come in European history, and that Italy should share in the glory of a great achievement.

Of the smaller powers, the Scandinavians and Holland were in the forefront of the forces for peace and disarmament. But this had been their traditional policy at Geneva. Much more notable was the support which came from the southeastern Europe which had hitherto felt that their security must rest upon more real guarantees than those of the league's idealism. When M. Marinkovitch, foreign minister of Yugoslavia, definitely committed his country to compulsory arbitration, he stated that it was the study of the American plan which had revealed a way by which that step could at last be taken. In this he was anticipated in his own country by the Croatian delegation to the Yugoslav parliament, which, under the leadership of M. Radich, had on August 31 unanimously declared their acceptance of the American plan. The result is that one may look to that very part of Europe where the World War began for a first sign of the adoption of a guarantee of peace.

THE little American committee was thrown into close contact with the various national delegations, and as a result of suggestions from those anxious to see the immediate adoption of a large part of its program, it recast the text of the Plan of Disarmament and Security so it might be better adjusted to the procedure of the league. The burden of the text was substantially unchanged, but instead of making the fulfilment of its proposals depend so largely upon a subsequent conference to be called next year, the Fifth Assembly itself was called upon to proceed with the declaration of the outlawry of war. This was done by dividing the text into two main divisions: one dealing primarily with compulsory arbitration and the outlawry of war, and the other with disarmament and separate treaties.

Under the caption Declaration Outlawing Aggressive War the first eleven clauses of the American text were thrown

together and one additional clause added to them. This clause was the one which called for acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice (Article 36 of the Statute of the Court). This furnished a short, clear statement of the outlawry of aggressive war accompanied by a permissive economic sanction which left the aggressor uncertain as to the value of its treaty rights in other countries, but did not impose any military obligations of enforcement. The test of aggression was as before a refusal to accept summons to the Court for an alleged overt act or menace by overt act.

The Protocol of Geneva embodies the substance of this proposed declaration in detailed formulae. It develops the various methods by which arbitration or judicial settlement of disputes may be carried out and it leaves the council a large measure of activity as a mediating agent to prevent disputes reaching this far. All of this was implicit in the American proposals, but the details were omitted because of the fact that the United States was not a member of the league and, therefore, any mention of the other agencies which the league members might employ to prevent disputes would be out of place in any formal American document. At the same time, it was explained to the European statesmen that the American text was intended to be adjusted to the needs of the league in this way.

It was only in the matter of sanctions that the protocol distinctly departs from the plan finally embodied in the American Plan. This was to be expected, for members of the league have already taken an obligation in this regard. The enforcement of peace is implicit in the covenant: Article 16 states that all members of the league make common cause with a victim of aggression and assist it with financial and economic measures to enable it to withstand the attack of the covenant-breaking state. It states as well that the aggressor shall "be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other members of the league." So long as the league would have to determine by unanimous action which state was the aggressor, his obligation of Article 16 could not be readily applied, since the presumed aggressor would most likely be among the judges of its own act. All of this was changed by the acceptance of the American definition of aggression, which automatically established who was the aggressor by the mere test of refusal to accept arbitration or judicial procedure. For then the obligations of Article 16 would also apply automatically.

As this was carrying the league over further than many governments were prepared to go toward a common action against war—any war—the obligation to enforce peace had to be modified and rendered less rigidly uniform. This was done by stating that while each state would meet its obligations "loyally and effectively in support of the Covenant of the League," in resisting any act of aggression it could itself determine to what degree and in what ways it would cooperate in enforcing peace. Article 11 of the protocol, which deals with sanctions, distinctly says that "geographical position and the particular situation of the different states as regards armaments" furnish varying criteria by which the governments themselves shall interpret the degree of their obligations. This express qualification was inserted at the demand of the Scandinavian states, which have been throughout all the debates of the League of Nations uniformly insistent upon proceeding at once to disarmament and pacific policies, but like most pacifists, fear that the enforcement of peace may itself develop into ag-

gression. Moreover they have been getting rid of their own armaments, without waiting for common action, and do not wish to be obliged to participate in any form of enforcement which would oblige them to retain instead of reduce their armies and navies.

THIS brings us to the heart of the whole problem of America's attitude towards the protocol. If we admit that international peace cannot be established without national security—and this must be admitted by all thinking students of public affairs—then how can that security be safeguarded without adequate means of defense? The answer of continental Europe is to make the problem of security—which is at the same time the problem of peace—a matter of common international interest. War is a plague which must be stamped out by a common action.

The initiative of single states is not enough. The initiative in defense is almost as dangerous as the initiative of aggression. Indeed, the two are practically indistinguishable in fact. Hence, all overt acts are declared forbidden and the preparations for them are declared to be equally a menace. So far, all states are agreed, but the question is whether the prohibition should be accompanied by an enforcement to which all states would be morally bound to contribute. Those states which live most under the threat of war, to whom war is most real, naturally are most anxious that the police power shall be effective. This means continental Europe. Those states which have "by geographical position or peculiar circumstances" less to fear and who are, therefore, less conscious of their security from the very fact that they enjoy more of it than the continental states are naturally less ready to cooperate in the enforcement of peace, fearing that they may be involved in new entanglements and dangers which they might otherwise escape. This point of view, most familiar in the British and the American press, has seemed in the past to the continental powers as blocking the only possible methods of suppressing war, and is responsible for much of the charge of hypocrisy in Anglo-Saxon idealism in this field. Obviously the argument does not all lie with either side and a compromise had to be found. The result is Article II, of the protocol which leaves to the different governments the freedom to determine what, if any, shall be their contribution towards specific violations of peace. It definitely recognizes the fact that the obligation is to be measured not only by the common danger but by the special interests of the various states. The obligation is universal but the application is individual. This is a subtle point already misunderstood in comments in the American press and is likely to be more misunderstood as time goes on.

SO far we have been dealing with the question of compulsory arbitration and the outlawry of war which formed the substance of the declaration of the revised American plan. The problem of disarmament was met by two resolutions in the American plan, neither of which are to be found expressed—though one is implied—in the protocol. But if one reads the minutes of the discussions of the committee one finds that the reason for this is that details for the plans for disarmament were referred to the coming disarmament conference.

The first American suggestion was that there should be a recurring periodic conference devoted to the problem of disarmament, meeting at least once every three years. This

proposal met with objections upon the part of members of the secretariat who claimed that it was adding an unnecessary additional body to the already complicated structure of the league. They insisted that the committees of the Assembly would be able to carry on the continuing disarmament program and that the secretariat itself would be able to handle the routine. Some opposition also was encountered upon the part of those who were afraid that the recurring conference would open the door to floods of oratory and achieve very little. While these arguments are not without their strength, the fact remains that the problem of disarmament is so complicated, and in view of the progress of inventions is so constantly changing, that any agency able to deal with so large a subject must be more carefully adjusted to its task than a miscellaneous assembly could ever be. However, this part of the proposition is not in the Geneva protocol and will be a matter for discussion for the disarmament conference.

The other American proposal with reference to disarmament was for an international committee of investigation concerning the state of armaments. This has been partly embodied in Article 7 of the protocol, which states that "should the council be of opinion that a complaint requires investigation, it shall if it deems expedient arrange for inquiries and investigations in one or more of the countries concerned." The investigations called for in the protocol are somewhat different from those intended in the American plan, for in the protocol they simply supply evidence in a case of aggression. There is nothing said about a permanent organization, and in fact in the committee discussion this was deprecated by at least one of the Great Powers. On the other hand, the Conference on Disarmament may easily insert in its agenda the creation of "an International Staff for Peace" of the kind indicated in the American plan. This suggestion has met with very favorable reception upon the part of competent military authorities and is not at all beyond the limits of possibility. In the opinion of the American committee it is one of the most important of its proposals tending to prevent war rather than to conquer back peace after war has broken out.

FINALLY, the American plan frankly recognizes the existence of separate defensive treaties between two or more states but only on condition that each of those treaties contain in it a clause of compulsory arbitration with the presumptive enemy. This completely changes the question which so divided opinion in Geneva in the past. Treaties of alliance of this character have no misunderstanding quality. By their very nature they simply enhance the pacific agencies of the league. They mean no more than that certain definite dangers are specifically met by mutual insurance policies, all of them within the general provision outlawing war. They are distinctly peace pacts henceforth.

In addition to this, it is declared that they are open to any other states, members of the league, to join them. Consequently, the closed, secret, aggressive treaty is to be a thing of the past.

Whatever reservations Americans may have concerning this or that element in the Protocol of Geneva, it is incumbent upon us in all humility to make our criticisms constructive and helpful, not carping nor hostile. How much more than this is incumbent upon us, let our own consciences decide.

Blind Alleys

By ETHEL KAWIN

“WELL, Sam, what kind of work would you like to do?”

Everytime that I put that question to a fourteen or fifteen-year-old boy or girl, I felt—deep within myself—like an utter idiot! If the eyes that I was looking into across my desk were earnest and serious, I knew that what that young person really wanted to do was something for which he ought to have years more of schooling, probably college; if they were ardent and eager, there was little prospect that the jobs available for him or her would satisfy any of the keen anticipation that they expressed; if the eyes before me were dull and lifeless, the chances were that the kind of work he did was a matter of relative indifference to their owner.

And inevitably my mind would travel quickly to friends and acquaintances of my own generation, most of them still seeking to find themselves, floundering quite helplessly in this bewildering world of vocations—businesses, arts, professions, jobs. Those who had had the advantage of a college education were, on the whole, little better off than those who hadn't, because no attempt at self-analysis, job-analysis and vocational guidance had been included in their college training. On up the scale my mind would travel to all the middle-aged misfits I knew, still trying to find their own particular aptitudes, and fit themselves into work where they “belonged.” And all the time I would be looking into Sam's or Mary's eyes, whether they were earnest or eager or dull, and thinking how absurd it was of me to expect that child to be able to answer my question honestly and intelligently.

But it was my job as a vocational counselor to ask him—and I always did. . . . I had entered the field of vocational guidance as a worker almost as soon as interests along this line crystallized sufficiently to form an organized movement. The first National Conference of Vocational Guidance was held in 1910, and I began work as a vocational counselor only two years later. The pioneers in the movement approached both industry and education, for the most part, in a spirit of true research. Knowledge of facts was their immediate objective. What were the facts about industry? What were the facts about education? Were the two related? Could they be related? The vocational movement represented a revolt against the old education of classical tradition which many people had come to feel was a thing aloof from and unrelated to life. There was a growing conviction among many that, when all is said and done, the child must be prepared to earn his living in the world of reality, the world of industry *as it is*. One can escape spiritually from the drab routine of a monotonous existence into a more colorful world through art, through the theatre, through books, through play and recreation. Such excursions into happier lands may afford a great relief from the dull grind of existence in a world which is not as we would have it be. But the great major-

ity of human beings must face the daily necessity of earning a living. Therefore it seemed a logical conclusion that the schools should train children for industry, and that skill in some occupation which yields a livelihood should be one of the fundamental objectives of education.

OUR first investigations of industry pointed definitely to one inescapable conviction. Industry as it existed offered nothing of value to boy and girl workers under sixteen years of age. The old apprenticeship systems were practically extinct. Very few boys and girls under sixteen were given any opportunity to learn a trade. They were usually employed at “blind-alley” occupations that in themselves had no educational value, and, for the most part, led to nothing. As early as 1913, Professor George H. Mead of the University of Chicago, who took an active interest in the work of the Chicago Vocational Bureau, pointed out in a convention address the fact that “the children are worth much more than the occupations to which we dedicate very many of them.” He urged the necessity of regarding and judging our whole process of child-training from the standpoint of the vocations into which we unconsciously drive the children.

As vocational surveys of industry became more intensive and extensive, the deeper grew this realization that the “children are worth much more than the occupations.” Convinced that the children must not be sacrificed, the pioneers of the vocational movement threw out a new challenge—“Shall the child be made fit for industry or shall industry be made fit for the child?”

With this, it seems to me, the vocational movement almost at its very beginning, struck the crux of the fundamental problem in the industrial world today. “Shall the child be made fit for industry or shall industry be made fit for the child,” translated into adult terms, is in reality the challenge of the progressive labor movements. Applied to the working “masses” in this era of machine production, it is “Are the machines to be the masters of the workers or are the workers to be masters of the machines?”

It could not take any honest vocational worker long to know that industry was not fit for the child of fourteen or fifteen, and that, moreover, such a child did not belong there. Therefore, instead of trying—even were it possible—to make industry fit for him, efforts were concentrated on keeping the boys and girls under sixteen years of age in school whenever possible, and in securing legislation that would make it compulsory for them to stay there. But, of course, there were thousands of them whom we could not keep in school with all our efforts. For them we did the best we could with what industry offered. Consideration was given to their school-records, their interests, aptitudes, deficiencies. Usually there was a personal conference with one of the parents as well as the child himself. These boys and girls were placed in the most promising positions that could be secured for them. Vocational counselors