

Cooing Down the War: The Senate's Lame Doves

by John Rothchild

It is still difficult, in this tenth year of Vietnam, to find the war in the halls and offices of the United States Senate. Even the chambers of the doves share in the schizophrenia of the nation—the war is repressed to back rooms where legislative aides struggle to stamp the horrors of refugees and bombings in the consciousness of the general public, but the public that visits the outer offices is reminded only of the beauty of Kentucky or the Big Sky Country or of the fecundity of the Idaho potato.

It is as hard to reconcile the front and back rooms as it is to reconcile the dove senators with their actions on the war. Life goes on here, like

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The senators in the drawings are, left to right: Percy, Kennedy, Church, Cooper, McCarthy, Fulbright, Hatfield, Goodell, Gravel, Nelson, and McGovern.

everywhere, not as usual but as if it were as usual, and the person who stops in these offices is smothered in reasonableness. Surrounded by the scenic posters and soft clickings of typewriters and the drone of aides who recount the antiwar victories to date—the Mansfield amendment, Cooper-Church, the repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution—the urgency is padded by politics and time. The Senate always takes time, they say. It probably never could have started this war. Now, ironically, it seems equally unsuited to end it for the same reasons. The limits of Senate doveism go largely unperceived by the peace forces that still base their actions on writing letters and appealing to senators. Many who have lost hope in the Executive and the House of Representatives continue in the unexamined belief that Senate doves have done everything they could in the past, and therefore will do so in the future.

In the offices, the assistants seem, without prompting, to play an early



convert game. Nobody is ready to declare that his man is the earliest dove on record, but the competition persists. In Frank Church's office, one gets a brochure entitled "The Day Frank Church Became a Dove," which goes on to say that "while Fulbright plugged for support of Saigon, the Idahoan pointed to perils of an Asian war" in a Senate speech of June 23, 1964. It was a meek speech—"I am for [our] policy. I will vote for the added money that may be needed. But I am just setting up some warning posts that had better be pondered if we are to avoid a tragic trail of casualties in Asia." Over at Mark Hatfield's you are told that he was the only governor to vote against the resolution supporting the war at the 1965 and 1966 National Governors' Conferences. George McGovern claims a speech as early as Church's, and early doveism moves Fulbright to lament the fact that he was floor manager for the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.

The attractiveness of early conver-

sion to peace, however, also carries certain disadvantages. More recent converts, like Milton Young of North Dakota, might be automatically granted the immunity of innocents, the judgment that his prior heresy was all right because it was sincerely held, the absolution that makes one equal in the faith even at extreme unction. His thoughts are now purified and his previous record was honestly consistent with his views. The doves who decided that the war was wrong or immoral around 1965, however, have a hard time explaining their voting records and their inaction since then, the five-year lag between their conclusions about the nature of the war and any significant opposition to it, the drag between the ends and the means.

By 1966, senators like Fulbright were already active in seeking to change the public's mind on the war, and yet only two senators, Morse and Gruening, voted against the \$13.1-billion supplemental for Vietnam that year. According to the Friend's Committee on National Legislation, "Although many Congressmen, largely from the President's own party, have continued to express alarm over the Vietnamese conflict, they have also continued to vote funds to expand the war."

By 1967, according to the Associated Press canvass, 40 out of 84 responding senators said they disapproved of the President's war policy

for one reason or another. But in that year, only three senators, the usual two plus Gaylord Nelson, voted against the \$12-billion supplemental to carry on the war. The Senate also approved a four-year extension of the draft, 70 to 2, with Morse and Gruening in opposition. And a Gruening amendment to prohibit sending draftees to Southeast Asia without their consent, remarkably similar to a bill introduced in the House this year, likewise garnered only two supporting votes—Gruening and Morse. During this time, McGovern, Hatfield, Proxmire, Bayh, Muskie, Kennedy, McCarthy, Church, and Fulbright were all in the Senate.

In 1967, Mike Mansfield began his role as mild peace mediator by introducing an amendment to substitute for, and thereby kill, one offered by Morse and Joseph Clark that would have blocked further bombing of North Vietnam and prohibited an increase of personnel in Vietnam to over 500,000 men. Instead, the Mansfield statement expressed the intentions of Congress to support our boys in South Vietnam, offered support for the peace efforts of “men of good will,” and called for an international conference.

The climate of opinion that could seriously accept such nonsense in the middle of an undeclared war still existed in 1968, when again only Morse and Nelson voted against the supplemental, this time for \$6 billion. William Proxmire did introduce an amendment to delete \$268 million for increased B-52 raids, which he called “a moral equivalent to nuclear war,” but it was defeated, 10 to 79, on the grounds that expanded bombing was a defensive response to Viet Cong attacks. This amendment got some dove support—Morse, Hatfield, McGovern, Young, Nelson, Pell, Clark, Hart, and Javits all voted for it. But Fulbright and Kennedy were absent from the vote, and Church, Percy, Bayh, Hartke, Cooper, Case, Muskie, and Symington all voted for the bombs.

While the antiwar senators were

convinced that Vietnam was at best a tragic mistake, none refrained from voting the same kind of military assistance to other Indochina countries that began the Vietnam involvement in the first place. By this time, plenty of doves were against the war per se, but they were not opposed to the context from which it emerged. Thus, as late as 1968, a bill that made Defense money usable in Laos and Thailand for support of local forces was passed with the customary three dissenters—Gruening, Morse, Nelson. Among those voting for the bill were Fulbright, Hart, McGovern, Proxmire, Case, Cooper, Hatfield, and Javits.

Hawk Stennis and Hawk McGovern

Before 1969, the great rhetorical gulf that split the legislative body into hawks and doves could not be detected in the voting records. Except for Morse, Gruening, and sometimes Nelson, they were all equal hawks on the tally sheets—Stennis and McGovern, Bellmon and Church, Byrd and Hatfield. Some were, in theory, against the war, some believed by this time that Vietnam was a disaster and that the government had lied about it, but voting against it was a different matter.

Not only did doves find nothing inconsistent in sanctifying the munitions, commitments, and money that would later fuel the war in places like Laos while at the same time decrying what these commodities had caused in Vietnam, but even in Vietnam itself the belief persisted that the bullets still had to be provided. Some doves started voting against the defense budgets around 1969 and 1970, but in 1970 a Goodell-Nelson amendment to prohibit the use of defoliant chemicals in Vietnam was rejected by a vote of 22 to 62. While many doves voted for it, a substantial number, including Church, Percy, Cooper, Kennedy, Symington, and Javits, opted for the defoliants.

The distinctions that divide doves are not any greater than those that

separate doves and hawks. The press has magnified the pro- and antiwar opposites in its trick mirrors, but it is almost impossible to differentiate a Ted Stevens, long a supporter of Nixon policy who recently co-sponsored an amendment to set a fixed date to end the war, from a Charles Percy, who voted for the Cooper-Church amendment but against the first Hatfield-McGovern; or an Edward Kennedy, who supported the Gravel filibuster but voted for defoliants in 1970, from a Hubert Humphrey, with an equally mixed record; or a John Stennis, who votes against all antiwar amendments, from a John Sherman

Brooke, whose commitment seems to hang in the balance of phone calls; the political doves like Muskie, Bayh, Kennedy, Mansfield, and Javits; the decoy doves like Cooper, who seems more concerned with the Constitution than with the war. Even among the small group of consistent and devoted doves, there are marked differences in instinct and manner—Mike Gravel, the first to be willing to embarrass the



Cooper, who votes against all except his own. The difference between a Javits or Bayh and a Milton Young or Henry Jackson is a matter of a few votes, and in many specific instances, they vote together on the war issue.

There have always been confusing degrees of doveism, but it is especially troublesome now that the blurring of peace reflects the blurring of war. If troops don't know who the enemy is or why we are fighting, it is equally hard for peace forces to sort out motives and commitments, and true pacifist ornithology among the putty doves like Packwood, Percy, and

club; McGovern, Alan Cranston, and Harold Hughes, who likewise do not temper their fervor too much and seem ready to try anything; Fulbright, somewhat tired after years of opposition, who does not organize and push but is unequalled in hearings and lends his vote to every action; Church the committed constitutionalist; Gaylord Nelson, who is not publicly recog-

nized as a dove leader, but who has the longest and best voting record on the war of any active senator; Hart and Proxmire, who are almost always right on the votes.

The records of the dove senators, still curiously obscured, seemingly have more to do with folkways of the Senate than with their opinions on the war. Before the Goodell bill of 1969, which would have set a date for withdrawal and cut off funds afterwards, nobody had thought of a way to legislate an end to the war—nobody, in fact, had considered it within the context of the Senate. “That was my frustration,” Goodell now says. “When I went around in 1968, everybody was wringing his hands and saying the President should get us out, but nobody had found a vehicle to do anything within the Senate.” And when he introduced his bill in 1969, after years of war and dovish speeches, he couldn’t get any co-sponsors. “Not Hatfield or McGovern or anybody. Gene McCarthy said it was too risky.” In explaining why it wasn’t until 1969 that someone tried to legislate an end to the war, or until 1971 that any senator devised a filibuster to starve it, the institution of the Senate itself is always the first answer.

Shouting up the Line

The glue of the Senate has, to date, been stronger than the most divisive issue of our time. It has not been undone by a higher version of the confrontations that have taken place at the universities or on the streets, and, while tact may be an important political tool, something of the desperation of the war could not coexist with it. The perimeters that hold in the tempers also hold the outrage within the proper rituals, which provide time for waiting, cooling, and avoiding ultimate conclusions. As former Senator Charles Goodell says, “From 1964 to 1968 you had senators who took strong views against the war but still in terms of Senate structure, its establishment. I would put Fulbright in

that category—he saw the frontiers and wouldn’t go beyond them. He used his committee but would never make a specific, direct, attack.”

Kenneth Clark wonders if great thoughts can come from large rooms. It is also worth wondering what extreme measures can ever emerge from the Senate, where the war has reached the last rhetorical straw, but, according to an aide of Senator Fulbright, “I don’t think it’s reached the point yet where he’d stop the whole congressional machinery to cut off funds for the war”; where, according to John Holum of Senator McGovern’s staff, “It still hasn’t gotten to the point where the peace issue crosses party lines so you get a Democratic peace candidate supporting a Republican one, and so on”; or where the Pentagon papers given months ago to Fulbright and McGovern were filed away and forgotten because both senators were afraid to use classified materials. Doug Ross, former assistant to Senator Joseph Tydings, worked closely with the antiwar senators during last year’s Hatfield-McGovern efforts. He says, “They were willing to fight the war within conventional political boundaries, but they feared that Nixon would spring a trap on them. George McGovern seemed most interested in doing something, but even he wasn’t ready for a Profiles in Courage. And this war was simply not something that kept them up nights.”

Until recently, the dove senators have been committed only to a war of rhetoric, which they won long ago. There was a time when even words were courageous, but the war has won a victory over the words by seducing them, so that now it is not distinctive to talk against the war, even while you are escalating it. The incursions into Laos and Cambodia were supported in the Senate by professed doves like Dole and Stennis—their disagreement with men like McGovern, they all say, was just a tactical dispute over the best way of getting out. Even Hatfield pays some homage to this thinking, in referring to the first Hatfield-

McGovern Amendment: "We were told that those who supported the amendment were not the only ones who were for peace. That all senators were for peace, but disagreed over the means to achieve it. Of course we agreed."

Perhaps Vietnam could not fail to be lost in the rites of forbearance and compromise fashioned during the last century to insure the survival of the Senate. Many issues, from tariffs to civil rights, might have brought down the government if the senators had expressed the depths of their antipathy for what the other side stood for. The traditions have held through Vietnam, as eulogies of friendship between doves and hawks are common. Mark Hatfield, speaking for his amendment to end the war, bubbles with these words for one of its arch opponents, John Stennis:

Mr. President, I have listened carefully to the comments and the presentation made by the Senator from Mississippi, the chairman of our Armed Services Committee.

I am grateful for the relationship that we have here as colleagues on this floor, but more than that, as close personal friends. Often, people from outside the Senate organization cannot understand how men can deeply, vociferously, and intensely differ on issues and still maintain mutual respect and personal friendship. I think of all the men and one lady with whom I have served in this body, this is always one of my most reiterated thoughts as it relates to my personal relationship with the senator from Mississippi.

One can understand civility as a necessary part of politics, but it is hard to reconcile the anguished views on the war with the friendly embrace between the senators. If the sedative of decorum is the price of survival, it also puts the outrage to sleep. And this fondness for congressional decorum explains in part why doves have never attempted to end the war by disrupting Senate business.

This inaction was not due to any lack of suggestion. Daniel Ellsberg, who visited Senator Goodell after his defeat made him a lame duck in late 1970, tried to get the senator to filibuster against defense appropriations or some other war measure. But since



Goodell had not been reelected, he decided his efforts would be futile. Lester Jackson, a political science instructor at the City College of New York, suggested to some senators in 1969 that they work to enlist the support of 34 committed colleagues (the number necessary to stop cloture and continue a stall), rather than pursue the futile task of passing resolutions or bills that either had no impact or could be easily defeated in the House or vetoed by the President. Finding people against the war was easy. But finding anybody who would do everything in their power to stop it was a different matter. Many of the doves are liberals who have long been against Rule 22, which provided the conservatives so much leverage on civil rights, and the vision of segregated motels apparently overrode that of the burning hamlets, and the rule became more important than the issue of the war itself.

The men who call this a desperate war have not acted desperately. Many of them were surprised by the filibuster, surprised by Gravel's all-night reading of the Pentagon papers, surprised, as Vance Hartke was, when a veteran approached him at a recent party and inquired, after hearing about all the dove frustrations, why they hadn't tried a hunger strike on the floor of the Senate.

The peace constituencies have never pressured the doves to filibuster, play rough, or take any other drastic actions to stop the war. Instead, they have been satisfied with the speeches and the gestures—which Standard Oil or the AMA would find a totally unacceptable performance from the senators they support. “Anything done by congressional peace advocates has been gratefully accepted and applauded,” writes Lester Jackson. “Dove constituents have been impressed with debates and hearings, with resolutions and with resolutions repealing resolutions, with moral victories and symbolic events.”

While outside groups appeal to doves to understand the nature of the

war, the Senate's perception of its own nature is what has kept actions so far behind words. Perhaps senators are no different from the rest of us, who can call the war immoral but still pay taxes to support it, or who can wear peace buttons to work in a company that makes war materiel or in a university that survives from its investments in the defense industry. The institutions of America have made individual views often irrelevant—just as company can have racist hiring practices while all of its officers believe in equal rights, the national war assembly line can be comprised of people who oppose the war, all shouting up the line as they manufacture their respective parts, taxpayers shouting to the senators, senators shouting to the big man at the end of the line. The Senate is a carrier of the war, no different from many other institutions that find it easier to go outside of themselves and appeal for a cure than to stop the flow of the disease through their own bodies.

“Senator X Wouldn't Pay For These”

When Senate doves appeal for a war cure, they usually address themselves to the President, for the White House is the center of antiwar efforts, a gravity that drags every dove into its orbit. The war itself would not have happened, the Senators say, without a bully Executive that disdained the Congress, and yet the current fight against that Executive seeks his approval, seeks to persuade him as if he were Commander-in-Chief of the peace forces, too. Jerry Tinker, of Senator Kennedy's staff, says, “The best way is to *persuade* the President. We don't make executive decisions, it is not the nature of the legislative branch. The Senate never does anything clear-cut or definitive. I think Kennedy believes these bills to be a bad thing because if you had a good President, you wouldn't need them.”

From the earliest days, dove efforts have been limited to what the President would accept. Congress has

never passed antiwar legislation that was opposed by the Administration. Ernest Gruening recalls a meeting with Lyndon Johnson at which he “actually twitted us on this—he said, ‘I don’t care what kind of speeches you make as long as you don’t vote against the appropriations.’” George Reedy, who was LBJ’s press secretary at the time, says, “They must cast about for a means of action that will push the President into getting out without getting his back up. You don’t want to alienate him, you’ve got to convince him.” Reedy also agrees that “Johnson never put the real heat on them—but he might have if he’d had to.”

The doves have opposed policy, but to stop the war would be to make policy, a burden that only a handful of them would be willing to carry. Most wouldn’t be willing because the average Senator has no more idea what is going on in foreign affairs than the average reader of *The New York Times*. They can test the edges of policy, and demand a voice in its making, but few would make Congress responsible for policy—few relish the vision of the President on television telling the nation that communism has taken over in Indochina because the Congress forced him to withdraw too fast. “The senators got very frightened,” says Doug Ross, former Tydings staff man. “It’s a very dangerous game.” Tom Dine, assistant to Frank Church, says that “senators are still used to being treated like children.”

Part of this timidity about facing down the President on the war arises because voting for defense automatically is essential within the context of the Senate—and the senators therefore have no credible threat against the President. While opposition to any other legislation is within the rights of a senator, voting against any defense bills is like civil disobedience, a congressional version of not paying taxes. Voting against defense is worse, in some ways than lying in front of troop trains, because, it is thought, such a move involves taking the guns

out of our boys’ hands. There is that vision of a battlefield with a few brave young Americans surrounded by a closing knot of North Vietnamese, while a credit adjuster slips through the enemy lines to repossess our guns, and declare, “Senator X wouldn’t pay for these.”

This image has had much more power than even the communist hordes or the domino theory in deterring antiwar senators from actually doing anything other than asking the President to end the war. It is part of the whole confusion between President as Executive and as Commander-in-Chief that has resulted in the logic that even if a war was started wrongly, it is unpatriotic to force a President to stop it before he is ready. The fear of repossessed ammunition has no basis in fact; there are enough stockpiles and materials in the pipeline so that the President could wage the war long after Congress cut off the funds, if he wanted. But it is a fear that combines neatly with the new rationale for Vietnam—that we are there to protect the men who are there—and has tied up the logic of the Senate, waterlogged the antiwar bills and amendments, and made even doves sound like reluctant versions of Senator Robert Dole, who always supports the President because he is the President.

Much Ado About Nothing

The meanderings of one such water-logged bill—the Cooper-Church amendment to prohibit the introduction of U. S. ground troops into Cambodia—illustrates better than anything else the ironies of the dove efforts to end the war. When he wanted to arouse Congress’ fervor by proclaiming its own responsibility and bemoaning its lost glories and its power to declare war, Church would speak of the unaccountable Executive and of the decline of Rome: “The Roman Caesars did not spring full blown from the brow of Zeus. Subtly and insidiously, they stole their powers away from an unsuspecting Senate. They

strangled the Republic with skillful hands." When, however, he sought white support for the Cooper-Church ban, he soothed those who were against tying the President's hands by telling them that the amendment would not hamstring or limit the President, who already agreed with it anyway: "From a conversation I had with the President last evening, it is my understanding now that he no longer takes exception to the limiting language. He feels it conforms with his own policy in Cambodia."

The first Cooper-Church amendment, which prohibited American ground combat troops into either Laos or Thailand, became law in December, 1969, with little opposition. The sponsors had, however, forgotten Cambodia, a little loophole through which plunged thousands of troops in April, 1970, at the very time Cooper and Church were considering a second amendment to close the loop. The second Cooper-Church, an amendment to the Foreign Military Sales Bill, was debated for seven weeks during May and June, 1970, while the American soldiers were mopping up the Cambodia countryside. The amendment was riddled with further amendments by an Administration that wanted to stall its passage long enough to make certain that it appeared after the President had withdrawn from Cambodia through his own will, and not through congressional persuasion. It passed the Senate 58 to 37 on June 30, precisely at the time we were getting out, anyway. The House did not pass the bill, and it was blocked in the Senate-House conference for six months. Finally, on December 31, the conferees agreed to drop it.

Church participated with the rather strange coalition of Gordon Allott, Jacob Javits, and Robert Griffin, to work out compromises on his bill that had the effect of gutting any meaningful ban on the air war or on the hiring of Asian mercenaries to fill in for GIs, so that the symbolic ban on U. S. ground troops could be put through.

According to Cooper assistant Bill Miller, "the compromise was worked out by the Senate group with White House and State Department help."

The amendment came up again with the Foreign Assistance Act of 1971, which was debated on the floor of the Senate during December, 1970. The bill was important because President Nixon had stolen away about \$100 million in foreign assistance money for use in Cambodia during 1970—money that Congress, in its relative wisdom, had specifically given to Taiwan, Greece, and Turkey. This was done without the consent, or even the knowledge of Congress, and now Nixon was returning to ask them to approve his move by replacing the transferred funds and also to appropriate money for Cambodian military and economic assistance.

The whole future of the war seemed to be contained in this bill. Here the elements of unlimited presidential power and disdain of Congress came to rub against his need to seek legislative blessing for the new war policy, Vietnamized, based precisely on this kind of money assistance to Indochinese soldiers. Here was the Cooper-Church amendment to prohibit U. S. ground troops in Cambodia, which sought to reform the past, the already irrelevant war, and separate amendment by Mike Gravel to cut off the foreign aid to Cambodia, which struck at the heart of the new policy.

And the debate also had something of the feel of an American Legion teenage legislature, because it was admitted throughout that probably nothing the Senators did would make any difference. The acquiescence in the President's policy would have political value, like a Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, but if the President wanted money for Cambodia, he would still find it in other places. Senator Fulbright said: "I support the motion of the Senator from Alaska on the, in a sense, very narrow ground that authorizing new money will be interpreted as an endorsement of a policy."

The Senate's amendment will not have any serious effect on the availability of dollars for the President's use."

The war has always seeped through the pores of the Senate, around loopholes in the law and into the Executive. As an example, Fulbright cited Section 614 of the Foreign Assistance Act, which permits the President to give up to \$250 million a year to any country that is a victim of "active communist or communist-supported aggression" without regard to the requirements of the act. Although highly relevant to the Gravel amendment, this prerogative is only a small nodule on the mound of transfer powers, stockpiles, and special powers that makes Congress the President's credit card. "I reiterate," said Fulbright, "that there is no way to prevent this." "We are," he continued, "placing hundreds of millions of dollars, if not billions of dollars, of military equipment, all over the world in countries with which we do not even have treaties."

Senator Church opposed the

Gravel amendment, perhaps to protect his own. His arguments surprisingly paralleled the Administration rationale for the whole war. We shouldn't be in Cambodia, he said, it was a mistake. But now that we are there, we must accept our responsibilities and fund the military. He waned into early doveism by proclaiming, "I know of no member of this body whose opposition to the war goes back any farther than my own," but then talked of a fear that Cambodia might fall into the hands of the enemy, the same fear that led Nixon to keep troops in Vietnam:

Mr. Church: If nothing is done, no financial assistance extended, no weapons or equipment furnished—it is quite likely that all of Cambodia could quickly fall into enemy hands.

Mr. Gravel: What effect will that have?

Mr. Church: That would have a direct bearing on our position in South Vietnam. It would have a bearing upon the continued withdrawal of American troops and the rate of their withdrawal. It could profoundly affect such prospects as there are today for a

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successful completion of the President's withdrawal program."

The Church forces were willing to support the new war in order to help President Nixon stop the old one, to give guns to Cambodia for a meek, retrospective echo in the foreign policy debate. As Gravel put it:

If the victory of the Cooper-Church amendment—and that victory, let me say, is the interpretation of a remark by the President at a Christmas party—if the price for that victory is the legalization and the undertaking of the Cambodian affair, the expansion of the war in Southeast Asia, and our agreeing to that as a part of national policy . . . that price, to my mind, is too much to pay.

To further complicate the problem of separating the doves from the doves, the Gravel amendment got 33 votes, including those of Fulbright, Goodell, Hart, Hartke, Hughes, Kennedy, Mansfield, McCarthy, McGovern, Nelson, Muskie, Proxmire, and Symington. Its victorious opponents included Church, Bayh, Case, Cooper, Cranston, Javits, Metcalf, Percy, and Packwood. Cooper-Church, of course, was finally passed. Church called the passage "a historic moment."

Frank Church is one of the best and most committed doves, supporting the recent Gravel filibuster against the draft and the Hatfield-McGovern amendments. His record makes the more nimble-footed and confused doves like Bayh, Cooper, and Muskie look mushy indeed. His performance on the Cooper-Church amendment is not, therefore, evidence that he is less sincere than the others—but that the legislative process molds them all.

Part of the price of the Cooper-Church effort is the energy that Church poured into it. While there is much reason against the war, there is so little passion that it is tragic to observe Church expending his on a seven-week debate, and what is thought to be the most extensive lobbying campaign ever undertaken for an antiwar measure, regarding a milky bill that amounted to another request for the President.

Peace by the Nose

Doves talk of appealing to the people to persuade the President, and yet they have never synchronized the legislative machinery and the protest machinery. The combination of public fervor and antiwar bills arises only rarely, usually after an unpopular executive action like Cambodia. Doves have waited for the people to come to them. David Mixner, one of the leaders of the October, 1969, Moratorium, says, "The senators could have ended the war long ago, but they lacked the courage. They let the people lead them rather than vice versa. They surrendered any respectable leadership on the war at the very time people were begging for leadership."

"Fulbright, Percy, and Case all turned down support of October 15," Mixner says. "Fulbright always felt more comfortable in an academic setting, as if he were the tenured professor for the whole war."

The doves wait for the people, and their consciences seem as profoundly affected by the waxing of the polls as the tides are by the spell of the moon. During the first Moratorium, according to Mixner, there was no problem getting support. Peace was high on the charts. "Before that," says Doug Ross, "the polls showed it to be a 50-50 issue. The idea was to wait. But it was quite easy to pick up a senator for the Moratorium, because pressure had started to build and there was no counterpressure yet." Over 100 congressmen signed up to speak.

About six months later, Mixner went back for similar endorsements: "In 1970, it was Earth Day, and we held demonstrations against the war on April 15. I couldn't get any more than 18 congressmen to speak. I went to a party and Gaylord Nelson was there. 'Why don't you come and work on Earth Day this spring,' he said. 'The issue is environment this year. You guys missed the boat.'"

Waiting for the people was, of course, another version of waiting for the President. He controlled the an-

nouncements and the non-events on which the polls were based. "Between the Moratorium and Cambodia," says Doug Ross, "there was a regular cycle. We'd get some senators ready to hit out at him, and then he would make an announcement of some troop withdrawals or something. It threw them off, and the whole thing had to be started and gone through again. And when they were ready, Nixon would come out with something else. His timing was uncanny."

While senators often complained of lack of public opposition to the war, the pace of their antiwar bills was sometimes affected by too much peace activity—and their fear of being associated with it. The first Goodell bill went to the Foreign Relations Committee about the time of the October, 1969, Moratorium, and, according to Goodell, hearings on the bill were delayed for several months because Fulbright and others did not want their committee to be associated with the peace movement and its tint of possible violence. In a meeting of Senate doves held in June, 1970, Thomas Eagleton suggested they hurry the Hatfield-McGovern amendment to a vote, so that if they lost, it would occur before the students were back in school, thereby averting demonstrations.

They fell, in short, into the half-truth trap, out of a fear that if they told the whole truth, they would lose effectiveness. And yet the other side of the half-truth would always appear, demanding a whole new process of re-education, appeals, and rationales. Instead of emphasizing that ending the war will save all lives, for instance, doves jumped on the save American boys campaign because it had short-term effect. But now that Americans are coming home, they must go back and start again with the more difficult job of telling people that Asian lives count, too. Instead of emphasizing that negotiations are a waste of time when the positions of the two sides are fundamentally incompatible, they repeatedly called for the talks, which

have now taken up almost three years. They harped on the costs of the war to gain support from the economy-minded, but discounted the fact that the costs could be reduced and the war continued. They preached anti-communism—saying that the war was an unwinnable way to stop the hordes—when many of them did not believe a communist takeover in Vietnam was worth fighting against.

In returning with new arguments, the antiwar senators have to struggle against the boredom of having gone through all this before and also against the credibility problem of the Pentagon—the public keeps hearing new reasons, it wonders what the real reasons are for why the war is opposed, much as it wonders about the real reasons why the war began.

The Curse of Reelection

The peace issue suffers the burden of being a moral question sponsored by politicians. The senators cannot provide the higher instincts of a Berigan, while the cause itself does not call forth the lower instincts of a Bobby Baker, and peace is crushed somewhere in between by men who seek both the lower reaches of conscience and the two per cent margin of victory.

On the plane of the higher instincts, peace survives only on disinterested empathy, like the blacks did before voter registration. It is a precious commodity—too precious to be tested more than periodically against the grosser strengths of the political ego. The doves conserve their conscience, both outside and inside the Senate. The Goodell-Ottinger conflict—in which neither dove would let his feelings about the war interfere with his feelings about the other's election—is only a more public display of what has occurred at the few dove planning meetings, where cooperation is dismembered by contending political egos, where Eugene McCarthy can be ignored by all other Senate doves, none of whom would endorse him,

even while Hue was burning to the ground, because they didn't like Gene. McCarthy verified his own credentials in this regard by retaliating in kind—ignoring the rest of the Senate for the remainder of his term.

Although the egos are strong, they are unable to survive without the six-year nourishment of reelection. Every two years, we hear that doveism cannot survive without the reelection of key antiwar senators, but paradoxically, it is reelection itself that insures the continuation of the war, for the doves moderate their antiwar activity to keep a hair on the positive side of 50 per cent.

Watching Kitty Genovese

There is a tendency for everyone to believe that the way to stop the war is to do more of what they are already doing. Magazines print more magazine articles, marchers plan more marches, and the public increases its

correspondence to senators, who then edit the letters, make them into speeches, and read them back to the same people that wrote in. The tempo increases up and down the war assembly line, and each of us feels he can work harder for peace by serving his usual self-interests at the same time. Senators are perhaps the most susceptible to this, and if they delude themselves more than the rest of us it is only because they have greater power and believe that more of what they do will somehow stretch farther than more of what we do.

This doesn't mean that it is useless for senators to pass bills, but that the momentum of legislative machinery limits perspective on its importance. The recent Mansfield amendment is a good illustration. In other circumstances, passage of that amendment, which merely provides a withdrawal date but no cutoff of funds, would have been considered another significant victory in the long series of efforts to persuade the President. This time, however, Mansfield amended the draft bill, which was unsuccessfully filibustered by Gravel and Cranston in June. If the Mansfield amendment is diluted by a House-Senate conference, these two senators threaten to filibuster again, perhaps stopping the draft permanently.

Mansfield is important, then, only because it is riding on a guillotine that could immediately cut off the draftees from the military, and conferees who might have cavalierly gutted it are fearful that if they do, more senators will support the filibuster. But without the filibuster, Mansfield's amendment would have been another milestone on the road to nowhere.

The Senate doves' long willingness to take only short, testing, and collective steps into the bewilderment of the war could be understood only if the war were still a policy question, a matter of priorities and strategies on what Gravel calls "the great chessboard of life." The fact of the Senate's own participation in the killing has always been hidden in the decor-

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um and the appeals to the gentleman from Mississippi, so senators gasped in surprise when George McGovern referred last year to blood on these halls and when Gravel took the floor last December in what for the Senate amounted to blunt exchanges with Robert Dole about the guilt of all of them:

Mr. Gravel: That is the fallacy of it all. That is the total fallacy. That is the total fallacy. When you kill, you kill; it makes no difference when and how you do it. . . .

Mr. Dole: I am not killing anyone today.

Mr. Gravel: Yes; the Senator is, and I am, too. Let us not kid ourselves that we can stand here and absolve ourselves of the bullets that fly, when we pay for them. When we appropriate the money, we are as much killers as the others. Let us not kid ourselves on that. And the Senator should not kid himself on that. We are all collectively guilty of what happened in My Lai.

Mr. Dole: The Senator has some theories that the Senator from Kansas does not understand.

Mr. Gravel: The Senator does not understand that when he votes today for \$155 million, that the money is going down to the administration; that they are going to go to a factory with this money; that somebody is going to buy a box of ammunition; that somebody is going to take it to an airplane, put it on the airplane, that the airplane is going to fly to Southeast Asia, over Alaska, and land in Southeast Asia; that somebody will take the box of ammunition off and put it on a table; that a guy is going to come by, take some of the ammunition, put it in his pocket, walk over here, load his gun, and shoot another human being?

Mr. Dole: Is that a question?

Mr. Gravel: Yes.

Mr. Dole: Well, the Senator from Kansas has heard not many statements in this Chamber, because he has only been in this Chamber for a couple of years, but he has heard statements to the effect that this Chamber reeks with blood, and has heard others say that perhaps it reeks with self-righteousness but not of blood.

The war is now a moral issue. As Ernest Gruening says: "I have no criticism of the senators in 1965, 1966, or even 1967 who were bamboozled by the Administration and their faith in its veracity and good will. But the

thing has now become so foul and obscene and we see the Mylairs."

The war's immorality puts the Senate doves in a different light. The Senate is a coequal part of the government. It must take positive action every year to keep the war going. It must pass the Defense budget, foreign military assistance, and all the requirements of war which are now seen as ritual assent to the Executive will. Without that assent, the war's legislative Ho Chi Minh trail would be blocked. In this context, it must be remembered that before 1971 no efforts had been undertaken by doves to stop the war from flowing through the Senate, that before the Gravel-Cranston filibuster of the draft bill in June, no attempt had been made to shake things up in the club.

The doves have succeeded, through word massage, of dissociating themselves and the Senate from the course of the war. They have succeeded in convincing people that they are the impotent prophets, committed to peace but lacking in strength, concerned about the war but certainly not responsible for it. However, in the context of the Senate's required assent to Vietnam, the doves become partners in crime. Their efforts at change, like George Ball's in the Johnson Administration, must be balanced carefully against the moral weight of their continued membership in the Senate, and their acceptance of its will. It is hard to decide at what point a courageous George Ball or George McGovern becomes one more bystander to the murder of Kitty Genovese, when the desire to change policy is overridden by participation in it.

Dove senators discovered the war long before they discovered their own participation in it. When their anguish came, they put it in the back rooms so they could be effective senators. But now a few doves like Gravel have begun to show that the total power of a few is far greater than the well-controlled power of the many, and that the only way to be an effective dove senator is to risk not being one. ■

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Memo of the Month

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ANNOUNCEMENT
June 18, 1971

EMPLOYEE SUGGESTION PROGRAM CHANGES

Agency regulations for the administration of the Employee Suggestion Program have been changed to encourage and facilitate employee participation. These are important things to remember about the Suggestion Program:

1. You may submit your suggestion directly to the Employee Suggestion Coordinator in IOA/M. You need not submit your suggestion through your supervisor or the administrative channels of your office.
2. You may ask the Suggestion Coordinator for an "anonymous evaluation" of your suggestion. Whether you submit your suggestion directly to the Suggestion Program or through your supervisor, you need only send a separate memorandum to the Suggestion Coordinator asking that your identity not be revealed to the evaluators of your suggestion. You do not need to give any reason for requesting an anonymous evaluation.
3. You may submit your suggestion in a memorandum. Suggestion forms are provided at various locations throughout Agency buildings. If forms are temporarily not available or if you cannot find forms to use, send a memorandum with your suggestion to the Suggestion Coordinator, IOA/M.
4. Your job does not prevent you from suggesting. If your suggestion relates to your job you still should submit it. Supervisors should never stop a suggestion. The Suggestion Program and the evaluators will determine the relationship between your suggestion and your job, as well as any award you are entitled to if the suggestion is adopted. If you are a supervisor--suggest--nothing prevents your use of the Suggestion Program.

The Suggestion Program is one of the Agency's management improvement programs. Management improvements are always possible. You know your own job and may know, better than anyone else, ways of doing it better.

We are looking for ideas which contribute directly to economy, saving money, manhours, material, supplies and equipment; or ideas which carry out specific operations, producing useful changes in operating policy or procedures, improving the quality of a product, activity or program. The Agency welcomes active support and participation in the Suggestion Program by all employees.

Ideas for employee benefits and services that can be corrected through normal procedures should be submitted for customary administrative action. Ideas concerning routine safety matters should be submitted to the Agency Safety Officer in IOA/S. All other suggestions go to the Suggestion Program.

The complete regulations and award computation tables for the Employee Suggestion Program are found in the MOA, Part II, Section 490. TL-1664D & 994F (12/15/70) is the most current revision. You can review specific MOA regulations in your administrative office. Specific questions about the Suggestion Program may be telephoned to the Coordinator in IOA/M, x-24977.

THINK! PARTICIPATE! SUGGEST! SUGGEST! SUGGEST!

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