

jects for Morris, belatedly, was designed to deprive him of any further possible excuses for failure to produce on Bangladesh”—along with Biafra the two major studies agreed to at the program’s beginning.

It is easy to understand why Morris would not have, under his new restrictions, wanted to work on Bangladesh, since completion of that study might mean the end of his relationship with the Carnegie Endowment. The longer Bangladesh took, the longer Morris could enjoy the support, both financial and logistical, of the Endowment. He was aided by a May 1974 board resolution which extended the Bangladesh deadline until June 1975. By using the Carnegie name—and its prior reputation for noncontroversial monographs—Morris was able to get access to middle-level State Department officials who are generally off-limits to the press.

There was also a less self-interested reason why Morris objected to Carnegie’s refusal to fund any new projects. Without new studies, the students who had already been recruited for the summer of 1974 would arrive in Washington and find there was little for them to do. Even though Hughes had rejected all the new proposals, Morris, for some reason, interpreted the response as a go-ahead signal for still other projects.

Twelve interns came to work at the Endowment last summer. Three months later the interns left, bitter about their experience. Said one, “We thought we were coming to Washington to work for the good of the country, but we turned out to be working for the good of Roger Morris. We were lied to, deceived, and pushed around.”

Morris divided the students into three groups—one each to study food, foreign affairs and the press, and Chile. About three weeks into the summer, two students were discussing press coverage of Biafra outside of Hughes’ office when the Endowment president overheard them. When he realized they were not working on

Bangladesh, Hughes ordered Morris to cancel the other programs. Morris protested that this would leave the students without anything to do. Morris’ response to Hughes’ order was interesting, particularly in light of what he had written about the accomplishments of the student intern program in the Endowment’s 1974 annual report: “I think we have disabused several young people of a somewhat conspiratorial view of American policies, institutions in general, and foreign policy in particular.” Morris reportedly called a staff meeting to tell students to continue to work in their respective areas, but to inform anyone who inquired that their work related solely to Bangladesh.

The students were a bit confused, but they went along. They continued with their research—in two cases going on week-long trips at Carnegie expense to Chicago and Nashville—but it was only a matter of time before things came to a head. The climactic event occurred one day in late July when Hughes caught a researcher duplicating a Morris manuscript for *Rolling Stone*. Hughes exploded and fired her. Even at this point, despite later denials, Morris continued his hidden activities. At one point, an assistant even instructed the students to leave the Endowment by a rear entrance so they could carry their research materials away with them. This was too much, even for the confused and compliant students. As a defiant gesture, they left by the front door—research and all. One student explained later, “I’ve had enough peace and humanitarianism to last me for a couple of years.”

Dueling Memos

Over the next few months, Hughes searched for a way to fire Morris without causing the kind of controversy in the press and with his board that he has tried so hard to avoid. One especially troublesome area for Hughes may have been two

sharply anti-Kissinger articles that Morris wrote for the *Columbia Journalism Review* and *The Washington Monthly* in May and June, respectively. Hughes may well have agreed with much of the articles' criticism of Kissinger, but the double-barreled blast from a Carnegie employee was bound to appear unseemly in the eyes of Hughes' respectable constituency. What made matters worse was that the article which appeared in this magazine was also critical of State Department correspondents Marvin and Bernard Kalb—which for a potential Secretary of State is akin to a Broadway producer sponsoring an attack on Clive Barnes or Walter Kerr.

To get rid of Morris, Hughes sought to find a bureaucratic solution, as ex-government officials are wont to do. In mid-October he prepared a "memorandum of understanding" regarding the terms on which Carnegie employees could publish outside of the Endowment. Aimed almost exclusively at Morris, it states that "the Endowment reserves the right to claim or forego credit on publications produced at any time which were drawn from research data derived from Endowment employment, entree, and auspices."

Shortly thereafter, Morris resigned, claiming in a 15-page letter that he had been unreasonably restrained. "It was a paranoid and quixotic letter," said Hughes, "The board of trustees did not even discuss it." In his letter, Morris complained about "conditions of abuse" and "insults." He received a letter from Hughes in return telling him that he was "sad but not surprised" at his sudden departure. Today Hughes insists that the Humanitarian Studies Program is not dead. He points to a few remaining projects.

Unfortunately, the controversy doesn't end here. In recent months Roger Morris has published two articles which seem to be derived from the students' sub rosa research projects, without giving proper credit to the Carnegie Endowment. One was an

article on U. S. food policy, "Why Leave It to Earl?", which appeared in the November 1974 issue of *The Washington Monthly*. The article carried the by-line of Roger Morris and Hal Sheets, a Morris protege at the Endowment, and it was stated that "this article was written without any institutional sponsorship." The second article dealt with the press' coverage of Allende's Chile and appeared in the November-December issue of the *Columbia Journalism Review*. Neither article was discussed with Hughes. These articles were a clear violation of Hughes' mid-October memorandum on outside publication. Morris' article for this magazine, however, had already gone to press when the memorandum was written, and Morris had left the Endowment by the time the *Columbia Journalism Review* article appeared. In any case, the dispute here is not a legal one, but an ethical one. As one student—who didn't get any credit for the food article—put it, "It certainly is a coincidence that the food article came out just after we spent all summer working on it."

Appropriating the work of student interns and full-time employees is an all too common practice in Washington as well as in academia. In effect, congressmen do it all the time when they use ghost-written speeches and publish ghost-written articles. I recently applied for a job at another newly funded center and was sailing through the job interview until I asked innocently, "Can I write articles about the research I will be doing here?" The answer from the head of the center, who is a writer of some note with his own reputation to maintain, was, "Absolutely not, I want to keep all of that for myself."

Far more serious than the failure to give credit to the students was the failure to mention that some of the research—particularly the out-of-town trips—was paid for by the Carnegie Endowment. Both Morris and Sheets—who co-authored the food piece—vigorously deny the implication that

they used the Carnegie resources in any way. According to them, the material used for the food article was from the public record, and Sheets says he re-researched the students' work in order to avoid a charge of exploiting Carnegie resources. Of course the task of finding the original sources was done by the students, so Morris and Sheets got their bibliography on a silver platter. Similarly, Morris claims that the research for his Chile article in the *Columbia Journalism Review* was done after hours and on weekends by his two student research assistants. This becomes more difficult to believe, however, when one notes the trip Carnegie students made to Vanderbilt University's videotape library in Nashville and the easy familiarity with which Morris detailed in his article even visual aspects of television coverage over a three-year period of the Allende regime.

Moreover, the use of student researchers raises important questions about reputations built on the legwork of others. Journalists usually don't have the luxury of having researchers doing laborious research for them, but writers like Morris, who has never lost the mind-set of the National Security Council, tend to take those kinds of benefits for granted.

Big Boss Man

Washington has a tendency to bring out the hidden Machiavelli in almost everyone. In the case of Roger Morris and Thomas Hughes, it is difficult to tell who was taken for a longer ride. Morris clearly exploited the Carnegie Endowment to the hilt and much of it was probably done to further his reputation as "the Ralph Nader of foreign affairs." Hughes, on the other hand, made effective use of Morris in publicizing the work of the Carnegie Endowment and seems to have gotten rid of him at only minimal cost to his own State Department hopes. There were some embarrassing moments along the way, but people like Morris, who get public attention,

are supposed to be controversial. In a sense Morris and Hughes fooled themselves more than they fooled each other. But if Hughes came out a little better than Morris, he was still the original sinner in his frightened cancellation of the Biafra study. There may even be a further collaboration between Morris and the Carnegie Endowment, since Morris is now hard at work on the old, oft-neglected Bangladesh study, having promised the Endowment that he will turn something in to them even though he no longer wishes to be part of the Carnegie team.

What all this adds up to is something indigenous to so much institutional life in Washington, New York, university cities, and elsewhere across the country, wherever people gather in institutions to serve some larger end. Often the individual carnage and organizational failure is due not to insuperable obstacles but to the feeling of people up and down the line that they have to dissemble and manipulate and con the boss in order to get away with what they really want to do. Sometimes they are right. Perhaps Morris would not have been able to do his good work if he had been wholly candid with Hughes. But if that had been the case, perhaps Morris should have been willing, earlier in the game, to resign on principle. In the more typical case, however, a little bit of openness would go a long way. So often, if the employee only shows that he understands what most worries the boss about his work, he can find ways to avoid that point without giving up the heart of his effort. If someone in Morris' position can show that he understands what threatens someone like Hughes, and will do his best to avoid it, he will usually be able to do what he would otherwise have to hide. But to make this gesture of candor and understanding requires a basic faith that you are dealing with reasonable people, and that, unfortunately, is a faith that institutional life makes hard to sustain. ■

Tidbits and Outrages

Closed Club

Bert Powers is one of those you love to hate for his role in killing some of the daily newspapers in New York City. But a new book, *Who Controls the Mass Media*, by Martin Seiden, explains that it isn't just printers' unions and stingy advertisers who make it nearly impossible for a major daily to get started these days:

An important factor limiting the entry of new dailies in the major cities is the relatively high fee required by the major wire services. . . . A subscriber has to put down a one-year advance and sign a five-year contract. The price of the service, however, is based *not* on subscriber circulation, which for a newcomer would be low, but on the size of the market in which he operates. In the large cities, this involves a very substantial annual cost for just one wire service. When combined with a one-year advance, this means that there is a very stiff entry fee, and double this sum for two major wire services.

Interestingly enough, both AP and UPI are owned by newspapers.

Frozen Government

Soaring anti-freeze prices demonstrate the way our government keeps right on top of emerging problems. The retail price of anti-freeze has tripled between 1973 and 1974. Bewildered consumers were writing Ralph Nader for an explanation. He assigned his associate, Frank Warner, to search the bureaucracy for an answer. Warner found that neither the Justice Department nor the Federal Trade Commission nor the Department of Transportation had conducted a study. Worst of all, the Council on Wage and Price Stability hadn't investigated the matter, either.

Honesty Is Its Own Reward

Leroy Aarons of *The Washington Post* provides another illustration of our passion for rewarding those who tell the truth about our organizations:

In late 1969 and early 1970, under orders from Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman William C. Westmoreland, Peers compiled a massive secret report on the slaughter at Mylai, based on the sworn testimony of 401 persons and covering 20,000 pages of transcripts and documents.

That report, part of which recently was declassified and part of which remains secret, found that "both wittingly and unwittingly," high-level officers sought to cover up the Mylai massacre of March, 1968, in which 175 to 400 Vietnamese noncombatants were slain by soldiers of the Americal Division.

In his report he named 30 individuals who by "omission or commission" allegedly shared culpability for the cover-up. Only 16 were charged, four went to trial, and three were acquitted. The cases against 12 others were dismissed.

But some people have theorized that the Mylai report damaged Gen. Peers' career. In October, 1971, he was transferred to Korea, fully expecting to become a four-star general and commander of all American forces there. Neither happened. He was passed over for promotion and remained deputy commander until his retirement nine months later.

Can't Buy Me Love

Those liberals who are outraged by Nelson Rockefeller's gifts to people working in his administration may be amused to see how noble the practice was made to sound when committed by one of their heroes, Adlai Stevenson:

To fill his top appointive offices with first-rate men, therefore, required of Stevenson a great persuasive talent and administrative ingenuity. In nearly every case the man he wanted could accept appointment only at a considerable financial sacrifice—and he felt himself to be partially responsible, in a personal way, for the sacrifices these others made. He sought to discharge this responsibility by making cash gifts at Christmas time to those whose services and sacrifices were greatest. For this he used his own money in part. He used, too, some thousands that remained in his personal campaign treasury (as a result of post-election fund raising) after all his campaign debts had been paid. But most importantly he used a fund of ten thousand or so which had been made up, on their own initiative, by Dutch Smith and others of his well-to-do Chicago friends. (He's down there fighting to give us decent government, using some of his own money to do it," said Dutch to his friends. "We have an obligation to help him out.")

—from *The Politics of Honor* by Kenneth S. Davis

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