第一章几乎专门讨论社会认同理论作为理解民族关系的一种方式。我开始认为有几种重要的机制：本简介试图弥补这一差距。

种族并不是唯一呼吁理论多元化的人。我认为，致力于解决同一适应性问题的多元化机制很常见，特别是对于旨在解决对生物体具有非常高的潜在成本或收益的问题的系统。例如，一个充分的攻击性理论必须包括普遍的适应性，即攻击性在特定的背景下被触发（例如，不忠迹象引发的性嫉妒；对内部群体的威胁；某些类型的厌恶刺激）（Berkowitz 1982；Buss 1999）。然而，我们还需要能够解释攻击性方面的性别差异、个体差异和群体差异的理论。这意味着遗传和环境影响对各种进化系统的重要性，包括与攻击性相关的气质/人格系统（寻求感觉、冲动和社会支配地位）。情绪化（与表现出愤怒和烦躁的倾向有关）和反社会（与无法体验同情、同理心和爱的情绪有关[MacDonald 1995a]）也有影响。最后，学习机制（例如接触成功的攻击模型）和认知机制（例如过度归因敌对意图的倾向）也与攻击有关（Coie＆Dodge 1998）。

下面讨论种族认同现象背后的四个系统：社会认同机制、遗传相似性理论、种族/族裔人类模块和领域通用问题解决机制。

社会认同理论

第一章 分离及其不满 强调社会认同理论对于理解种族冲突的根本重要性。我最近看到威廉·格雷厄姆·萨姆纳 (William Graham Sumner) 于 1913 年撰写的一句话，表达了所有已被现代心理学证实的基本观点：

对集体的忠诚、为集体的牺牲、对外人的仇恨和蔑视、内部的兄弟情谊、外部的好战——所有这些都是共同成长的，是同一处境的共同产物。它因与宗教的联系而神圣化。他者群体的人是局外人，我们群体的祖先曾与他们的祖先发动过战争。 。 。 。每个群体都滋生自己的骄傲和虚荣，吹嘘自己优越，高举自己的神性，蔑视外来者。每个群体都认为自己的风俗习惯是唯一正确的，如果它发现其他群体有其他风俗习惯，就会激起它的蔑视。 （萨姆纳 1906 年，13）

正如第一章所述，社会认同研究表明，处于受威胁群体中的人们会形成一种共同命运的心理意识。社会认同机制似乎对群体外部威胁的存在高度敏感，这一事实与人们继续追踪个人自身利益的假设是一致的；在没有威胁的情况下，人们更加个人主义，而在受到威胁时，群体和个人的利益越来越一致，群体成员越来越具有共同的命运。

在军事冲突和其他群体间激烈竞争的情况下，人类群体的共同命运很可能发生，在这些情况下，叛逃对个人来说并不有利，或者根本不是一种选择。在尝试为这些过程制定一个演化方案时，我认为战争是最有可能满足这些条件的选择。战争似乎是前国家社会中反复出现的现象。调查显示，超过 90% 的社会参与战争，其中绝大多数每年至少参与一次军事活动（Keeley 1996, 27-32）。此外，“只要有足够数量的墓葬，只要现代人类出现在现场，凶杀暴力的明确证据就变得更加常见”（Keeley 1996，37）。由于其发生的频率及其后果的严重性，原始战争比文明战争更加致命。原始社会和史前社会的大多数成年男性都参与战争，并且“一生中反复目睹战斗”（Keeley 1996，174）。

在潜在的叛逃者被内群体草率处决或严厉惩罚的情况下，或者在幸存者被征服的外群体草率处决或失去获得妇女和其他资源的情况下，可能会出现共同的命运。几乎没有证据表明在州前战争中存在高水平的纪律和胁迫，尽管至少在某些情况下发生过（Turney-High 1971）。然而，懦夫经常被羞辱，而勇气是一种非常受重视的特质（Keeley 1996, 42-44；Turney-High 1971），因此，由于社会压力，从战斗团体中叛逃确实会付出代价。也许更重要的是，屠杀被征服的人民，尤其是男性，一直是战争的一个持续特征。在掌权过程中，阿兹特克人可能“屠杀了那些反对他们的人，就像所有征服者一直所做的那样”（Keegan (1993, 114)。在建国前的战争中，虽然妇女经常被视为战利品，但立即死亡却是最常见的。通常，妇女和儿童的命运以及成年男性囚犯的某些命运：“在大多数原始社会中，无论武装还是手无寸铁，成年男性都会在战斗、袭击或战斗后的溃败中被毫不犹豫地杀死。投降并不是一种实际的做法。”成年部落成员的选择，因为被俘后的生存是不可想象的”（Keeley 1996, 84）。

因此，我们有理由认为，群体间激烈冲突的情况经常导致命运共同体的情况。此外，Boehm（1997）表明，人类狩猎采集群体在一段具有重要进化意义的时期内以“平等主义伦理”为特征——这一时期足以影响遗传和文化进化。平等主义伦理意味着肉类和其他重要资源由整个群体共享，领导者的权力受到限制，搭便车者受到惩罚，几乎所有重要决策都是通过共识过程做出的。因此，平等主义伦理使得个体很难以牺牲同一群体中的其他个体为代价来提高自己的适应度，从而导致群体内行为相对一致，选择压力相对较弱。温和形式的社会控制，例如八卦和扣留社会福利，通常足以控制潜在的统治者，但更极端的措施，例如排斥和处决，记录在民族志文献中。伯姆认为，通过控制群体内部的行为差异并增加群体之间的行为差​​异，平等主义伦理改变了选择水平之间的平衡，并使群体之间的选择成为人类进化的重要力量。

尽管社会认同机制是泛人类普遍存在的，但第一章认为犹太人有强烈的群体归属感，这种归属感有时会导致殉难而不是离开群体。这些人极易产生一种命运共同体的感觉，以至于从心理上来说，背叛群体并不是一种可行的选择。特别引人注目的是 1 年十字军东征期间犹太烈士的故事，当时人们宁愿杀害家人也不愿皈依基督教（见第一章）。

作为对被要求背叛宗教律法的回应的殉难是犹太教经典宗教著作中反复出现的主题，从《创世记》中的“以撒的捆绑”开始（即亚伯拉罕同意上帝的命令牺牲他的儿子），并包括《创世记》中的几个故事希伯来圣经的后期部分（以赛亚书：40-55；《但以理书》中沙得拉、米煞和亚伯尼歌的故事）、次经（例如，《马加比四书》中哈拿和她七个儿子的故事）、斐洛和约瑟夫斯，米德拉什注释，密西拿和塔木德（Agus 1988；Droge & Tabor 1992）。来世的个人福祉是这些著作的一个重要主题，但也有一种意识形态认为，在某些情况下的殉难对于团体的成功至关重要：“这是通过这些正义之人的鲜血，通过为了赎罪他们的死，神圣的天意保护了被虐待的以色列（Maccc. IV 17:22）。

《巴比伦塔木德》（b. Sanhedrin 74a-75a）中的讨论提供了相互矛盾的观点，其中一个团体认为，必须殉道才能避免犯下涉及偶像崇拜、乱伦、通奸和谋杀的罪行，而更严格的团体则认为，如果一个犹太人公开要求违反任何法律，无论多么微不足道（包括犹太人穿白色鞋带而不是罗马人穿黑色鞋带的习俗），“即使是为了一个很小的戒律，也必须殉道，而不是违反它。”后来，迈蒙尼德（生于 1135 年）认为，虽然英勇反抗宗教迫害是犹太社区的“规范理想”和“合法而崇高的行为”（Halkin & Hartman 1985, 57, 66），但为了避免殉难而进行的越轨行为除非在某些有限的条件下，否则不需要，并且违法者尽管过去犯过罪，仍可以保留为社区成员（Maimonides 1985，25）。反映犹太教的集体主义倾向，迈蒙尼德判断是否需要殉难或违法的标准是，整个社会采用一种策略或另一种策略是否会更好。

没有理由认为如此极端的自我牺牲是一种泛人类的心理适应；并非所有人都对我们的群体有如此深厚的依恋。事实上，欧洲人更倾向于个人主义，并且似乎普遍缺乏犹太人特有的深刻的群体认同感（MacDonald 1998/2002）。无论如何，有相当数量的人在心理上无法选择离开群体，这表明群体间选择必须被假定发生在人类中。即便如此，这些人的存在并不是群体成为选择工具的必要条件。即使所有人类在群体归属上都是完全机会主义且善变的，因此群体成员身份总是取决于个人的自身利益，但为了理解协调群体的行为，仍然需要群体作为选择的工具（Wilson 2002）。

遗传相似性理论

第一章还简要讨论了遗传相似性理论（GST）。我的讨论是尝试性和谨慎的，反映出该理论在许多进化论者中受到了明显的负面接受。 GST 通过提出评估表型相似性作为遗传相似性标记的机制，超越了亲属识别（Rushton 1）。这些提议的机制促进了积极的态度、更大的合作以及对类似其他人的利他主义的更低门槛。商品及服务税是解释性状的遗传力与配偶和最好的朋友对这些性状的正向分类程度之间存在相关性这一发现的唯一方法。 Rushton (1989) 最近发表的一篇论文表明，人们不仅对多种特征进行积极分类，而且大多数情况下对更具遗传性的特征进行积极分类。

Tooby 和 Cosmides (1989) 认为，即使人们可以想象一种基于表型相似性评估遗传相似性的机制，它也不会独立于现实世界中的生物相关性：“更新世人类在其一生中遇到一个与当地人口平均水平相比“基因相似”程度更高的非亲属的情况可以忽略不计。”但这不是关键问题。更新世的人类很可能被选择为总是偏爱他们的亲戚（亲属选择），但在婚姻、联盟和资源交易方面也优先进行分类，部分原因是遗传相似性。只要群体不只由直系近亲组成，就很容易看出这就是适应性的——例如，通过使一个人与一个人的孩子关系更密切，与一个人的配偶更兼容。我同意托比和科斯米德斯的观点，即这种机制不会导致利他主义，但会增加参与互利互动的好处。这种机制可能是亲缘选择的结果——作为评估关系较远的亲缘关系的一种手段。但没有理由认为这种机制一旦进化，将仅限于共同祖先的基因。确实如此，怎么可能呢？毕竟，共同的遗传祖先本身无法被评估，但表型匹配仍然是遗传相似性的一个很好的线索，拉什顿发现的大部分内容都可以用这种方式解释。图比和科斯米德斯没有讨论只能用商品及服务税来解释的三个关键发现：选型交配、心理学研究中已记录的相似性的强大影响，以及人们倾向于根据更具遗传性的特征（即性状）与他人进行搭配的事实。 ，朋友在某种特质上的相似程度与该特质的遗传力之间存在相关性）。

商品及服务税对种族中心主义理论具有重要意义。这意味着从表型和遗传相似性到表型和遗传差异的连续体也是情感连续体，更大的表型和遗传相似性促进了喜好、友谊、婚姻和联盟的形成。这反过来表明仇外心理的遗传基础独立于群体理论，即独立于社会认同理论。它意味着该系统促进的对他人的喜欢和不喜欢与对方是否是社会指定（文化构建的）内群体或外群体的成员无关。

重要的是要通过注意相似性和遗传性之间的关系发生在类别内来限定这些发现，例如，在认知能力领域内，配偶和朋友之间的一般智力（h = 8）比特定认知具有更大的相似性能力（h=.5）。这些数据还支持了婚姻和亲密友谊关系中资源互惠的重要性，因为，例如，配偶和最好的朋友在年龄、态度和宗教方面比在身体特征上更相似，尽管后者更具遗传性。 （与长寿相反，年龄根本不具有遗传性。）其他在这些方面相似的人可能会为人们提供更多的心理奖励；而其他人在这些方面具有相似性，则可能会为人们提供更多的心理奖励。例如，相似的兴趣和态度构成了相互吸引的基础，而相似的性格特征（如感觉寻求）则促进了共同的兴趣。发展文献中的一个共同发现是朋友建立共同点。兴趣和态度截然不同的孩子确实没有什么可以做朋友的。友谊、婚姻和其他自愿联盟从根本上来说是宝贵资源的互惠关系（MacDonald 1996）。

因此，关于人类关系的相似性，存在两种互补的进化理论——一种基于对他人遗传共性的吸引力（例如，为了智力和各种其他受遗传影响的特征而进行选型婚姻），另一种基于他人资源价值的互惠（例如，一位美丽的年轻女子嫁给了一位来自不同种族的富有的年长男子）（Lusk, MacDonald & Newman 1997）。

由于商品及服务税隐含的相似性检测机制评估的是低水平的遗传相关性，因此预计它们不会产生可检测到的向他人提供无回报资源的水平（利他主义），而是会影响自利行为的成本/收益结构。没有心理学证据表明友谊、婚姻和联盟关系中的相对喜好通常涉及这种利他主义。事实上，DeBruine（2002）发现，在两人信任游戏中，如果对方的脸与自己相似，受试者就会表现出更大的信任。然而，尽管对表型相似的他人有更大的信任，但在伴侣无法报复的情况下，表型相似性对自私背叛伴侣的信任没有影响。

婚姻、友谊和种族归属关系从根本上涉及互惠，而自利是所有这些关系的一个明显组成部分：选型交配增加了与孩子的关联性，因此，一个人在同样的养育努力下会获得更大的遗传回报。如果当你成功时，基因相似的其他人也能成功，那么成功的联盟和成功的友谊会给自己带来更大的回报。任何与基因相似的其他人的成功联盟都有较低的信任门槛（DeBruine 2002）和较高的背叛门槛：在面对其他自利机会时坚持维持联盟仍然符合一个人的自身利益。这些考虑因素与种族群体代表遗传自利的稀释库的观点非常吻合（Johnson 1997；Salter 2002；van den Berghe 1999）。

“人类”模块处理的族群

Gil-White (2001) 认为，人类大​​脑倾向于将民族和种族群体视为生物种类，因为它们表面上与动物物种相似。这种倾向是一种进化上的意外——被称为“外延适应”：将族群或种族视为生物种类并没有自然选择，但大脑被愚弄，认为不同的族群和种族是生物种类，因为它们在本质上与自然种类相似。有多种方式，包括规范的同族通婚（他们互相通婚）、基于血统的成员资格，以及文化创造的表型标记（划伤、着装形式）的存在，这些标记使不同的种族群体显得不同。吉尔-怀特认为，种族群体成为一个有用的本质主义类别，支持有效的推论，不是因为种族的任何生物学现实，而是因为不同种族群体特有的文化标记降低了群体内互动的成本。

Hirschfeld (1994, 1996) 提供了一些反对这种类比转移模型的论据，在这种模型中，人类社会类别是从朴素的生物类别中类推的（另见 Gil-White 2001 的评论）。赫希菲尔德指出，发展数据表明，种族知识的发展并不与类比转移模型预测的动物物种知识协调发展。他主张建立一个针对人类社会类型的特定领域模块。赫希菲尔德假设，内在人类的先天特定领域模块与文化输入之间存在相互作用，即种族是人类的内在类型——它是遗传的，并且与身份高度相关，甚至比其他类型的表面物理特征更重要。肌肉发达或职业等特征。人们不能自愿加入或离开这样一个社会类别。即使是 4 岁的孩子也认为种族类别是本质化的和自然的：“幼儿对种族的思考包含了类似理论的概念系统的定义原则，即本体论、特定领域的因果关系和概念的区分”（Hirschfeld 1996， 88）。 “但种族种类不是自然种类（至少不是传统上所设想的那样），而且它们当然不是由外部现实触发存在的种类”（第 197 页）。

第三种可能性是，我们有一个人类模块，其设计不仅是为了以本质主义的方式对人进行分类，而是以本质主义的方式对不同种族/族裔群体的人进行专门分类——与身份高度相关，并且不能被人改变。赫希菲尔德的结果与这样的模型是一致的，因为它们表明，即使在很小的时候，孩子们也会以比职业或体型更本质的方式看待种族，尽管它们当然也与他的观点一致，即有关种族的信息是由文化提供的。

值得注意的是，蒙古民间心理的一部分是，来自附近其他民族的人看起来不同，即使他们接受了另一个民族的文化，他们也会继续看起来不同。因此，吉尔-怀特的研究对象认为，被蒙古家庭收养的哈萨克儿童即使是在蒙古文化中长大，“看起来或行为也不会像蒙古人”（Gil-White 2001, 523）。他们认为，尽管已经融入了外群体，但仍有一些“内部”因素使他们与外群体有所不同。

吉尔-怀特的研究对象可能是正确的，即种族群体之间至少会存在一些身体甚至行为差异（例如，俾格米人和非俾格米人之间的体型差异，或者凶猛或聪明的声誉），即使来自这些种族的个体也会存在。群体是在另一种文化中长大的。他们的本质化倾向可能反映了对群体之间真正受遗传影响的差异敏感的适应——对经常遇到在可观察到的、受遗传影响的特征方面存在差异的其他人类群体的适应性反应。从这个角度来看，对仅在文化上与自己群体不同的群体进行本质化的过程是一种旨在应对群体之间真正遗传差异的适应性机制的失败。

有证据表明，我们对种族的判断就像认知适应一样发挥作用——它们表现出信息封装（限制特定类型的输入）、快速、无意识的处理和自动化——所有这些特征都强化了针对种族外群体的适应的论点。 Gil-White 的分析中尤其没有提到这一点（Rothbart & Taylor 2001）。内隐、无意识和快速处理是进化认知模块的标志（Tooby & Cosmides 1992）。 Hart 等人与此模块化提案一致。 （2000）发现受试者没有报告对种族内群体或外群体的情绪反应有任何有意识的差异。然而，他们杏仁核的录音却讲述了一个不同的故事。哈特等人。 （2000）发现，通过功能磁共振成像记录评估，黑人和白人对种族内群体和外群体成员的照片表现出不同的杏仁核反应。众所周知，杏仁核会下意识地对恐惧的面部表情以及蛇和蜘蛛等进化准备好的恐惧来源做出反应（Le Doux 1996；Öhman & Mineka 2001；Whalen 等人 1998）。 Hart 等人指出，杏仁核对外群体面孔的激活更大。 （2000）发生在后来的刺激演示中；受试者习惯于重复出现内群体面孔，但不习惯外群体面孔。这些发现与 Whalen (1998) 的提议一致，即杏仁核充当警戒系统，监视环境中是否存在潜在威胁的刺激，并在刺激不再被视为具有威胁时停止响应。其他几项研究表明，受试者对种族内群体和外群体面孔的反应不同（例如，Fiske 1998）。例如，受试者能够更好地回忆起种族内群体成员的面孔（Platz & Hosch 1988；Bothwell et al. 1989）。

值得注意的是，这些结果特定于面部特征，而不是 Gil-White (2001) 强调的文化强加的内群体/外群体标记。如上所述，DeBruine (2002) 发现，在两人信任游戏中，如果对方的脸与自己的脸相似，受试者就会表现出更大的信任。类似地，Heschl（1993）发现，苏联的政治家如果与党的领导人长相相似，就更有可能支持该领导人。这些结果表明，人们对面部相似性作为遗传相似性的标记很敏感。

然而，在缺乏来自跨文化样本和更密切相关但外观不同的族裔群体的数据的情况下，现在断定存在一个进化的、特定领域的模块，旨在以本质主义的方式对不同种族/族裔群体的人进行分类还为时过早。方式。还应该指出的是，与典型的认知适应不同，人类模块没有被封装，因为有意识的信仰和态度也会影响对种族和民族外群体的反应（例如，van den Berghe 1981）。然而，缺乏封装并不是一个关键问题。例如，众所周知，杏仁核以模块化的、特定领域的方式对进化上重要的恐惧来源做出反应，但也知道对经验影响做出反应，如习得性恐惧的情况（LeDoux 1996；Öhman & Mineka 2001）。

认为人类拥有一个模块，将种族和民族差异视为纯粹基于遗传影响的身体特征的内在自然种类，要求人类群体在进化适应环境中与受遗传影响的身体特征不同的其他种族或族裔群体反复互动。 EEA）——人类进化的环境。这样的论点还要求对种族或民族有有效的推论，这些推论可能选择特定于种族或民族的本质主义架构作为受遗传影响的类别，并且关于民族或民族的推论比赛对欧洲经济区的健康产生了影响（参见 Barrett 2001, 12）。

关于第一点，哈彭丁（Harpending，2002）指出，长距离迁徙很容易发生，步行并持续数代，使因遗传原因而长相不同的人们相互接触。例如，南非的班图人与科伊桑人住得很近，或者俾格米人与非俾格米人住得很近。卢旺达和布隆迪的各个群体看起来截然不同，并且彼此步行接触。哈彭丁指出，在过去 40,000 万年的人类历史中，由于遗传原因而看起来不同的民族之间的这种相遇“很可能”很常见。人类大多是固着不动并以静态承载能力生活的观点与历史和考古学相矛盾。哈彭丁则指出“人口激增”。例如，因纽特人在北极定居，并在几百年内消灭了多塞特人；班图人向非洲中部和南部的扩张发生在一千年或更短的时间内，在此之前非洲主要是黄色（即科伊桑）大陆，而不是黑色大陆。其他例子包括汉族在中国的扩张、努米克人在北非的扩张、过去几个世纪祖鲁人在南部非洲的扩张，以及当今南美洲亚诺马莫人的扩张。从东方入侵欧洲也有着悠久的历史。 “在星爆世界里，人们会与长相截然不同的人有很多接触。”

最后，各个领域之间存在相当大的重叠。 智人 人类进化过程中的物种和亚种，如尼安德特人和现代人类（例如，Noble & Davidson 1996）。现代人类传播的扩散波模型假设，现代人类作为一个亚种出现，由于具有 N 个纯合基因座的共同适应基因复合体而具有选择优势（Eswaran 2002；Eswaran & Harpending 2002）。在 N (~4-5) 的中间值下，现代人和古代人之间的交配被强烈选择，因为假设个体必须拥有所有“现代”基因才能受益。古代人和现代人交配的后代在这些位点上是杂合的，并且只有 (1/2)^N 这种交配的孙辈将是现代的。这将为特定于受遗传影响的人类身体特征的人类模块的进化提供强大的选择压力。

在现代人类群体中，研究表明即使在密切相关的群体之间也存在可测量的遗传距离，例如英国人和丹麦人之间（例如，Salter 2002）。与外群体相比，个体对其部落和种族群体有更大的遗传兴趣（包容性适应性），并且会受益于促进内群体和外群体之间的歧视的机制——与社会认同理论（见下文）相同的进化逻辑，或者事实上，吉尔怀特的理论外延适应模型。

假定的进化人类模块预计会加剧群体之间的不信任和敌意，因为外群体被视为由本质上和本质上不同的人组成（Hogg & Abrams 1987）。社会认同研究表明 社会流动 （即群体边界可渗透的程度）影响内群体/外群体的态度。对渗透性的认知会减少对利益冲突的认知，并降低其他群体以集体方式行动的能力，而对不可渗透性的认知会导致涉及与其他群体竞争和对外群体负面评价的群体策略。族裔群体“将他们的差异与归属关系联系起来，这些归属关系被认为是固有的，因此很难或不可能改变”（Horowitz 1985，147）。人们倾向于将外群体中的人视为“不同种类”，因此不是一个群体的潜在成员，从而导致群体之间发生更大的冲突。

理性选择机制

关于种族的进化讨论常常忽略这样一个事实：人类拥有理性选择机制，能够进行成本/收益计算，旨在在新环境中适应性地实现进化目标。在心理学术语中，这些是领域通用机制，例如g（心理能力的一般因素）、经典条件反射和社会学习，它们使人类能够在新颖、复杂和相对不可预测的环境中做出理性的、适应性的选择。麦克唐纳 1991；麦克唐纳和恰佩 2002）。应用于群体成员资格问题时，这种机制使人们能够根据即时成本/收益计算机会主义地加入或离开群体（参见Goetze 1998），有效地监控群体边界以防止搭便车，并规范与外群体的关系（MacDonald） 1994/2002）。

例如，经济奖励的承诺可能会促使一个人放弃一个群体而转向另一个群体（例如，那些在土耳其占领巴尔干半岛期间皈依伊斯兰教的人）。犹太宗教法对举报其他犹太人或危及其他犹太人生命的犹太人有非常详细的规定；这些法律在源源不断的案件中被援引，这些案件针对的是背叛其他犹太人的犹太人，通常是为了个人利益（Shahak & Mezvinsky 1999）。理性选择机制也是在不断变化的环境中定义和追求群体利益的基础，例如，在现代多民族民主国家的制度结构中。

对一般智力的讨论强调它对于解决新问题至关重要。从进化的角度来看，一个关键功能是在不熟悉和新颖的条件下实现进化目标，其特征是最少的先验知识（流体智能）：“[流体智能]推理能力由策略、启发式和自动化系统组成，这些系统必须用于处理“新”问题、导出关系以及解决归纳、演绎和联合推理任务”（Horn & Hofer 1992, 88）。智力研究一致发现，更聪明的人更容易在不熟悉和新奇的条件下实现目标，而这些条件的先验知识最少。智力是“当你不知道该做什么时所使用的东西”（C. Bereiter，in Jensen 1998，111）。

一般模型是人类进化的动机倾向可以通过多种机制获得。进化心理学家经常指出，人类并不是被设计为广义适应最大化者——我们的适应是为了解决过去特定环境中的特定问题（例如，Tooby & Cosmides 1992）。然而，这里采用的模型——旨在在新颖的、不可预测的环境中实现进化目标的领域通用机制模型——具有完全不同的含义。也就是说，人类被概念化为追求进化目标的潜在灵活的战略制定者（Alexander 1979），而族群则被概念化为理性的利己主义者（Tullberg & Tullberg 1997）。

例如，在亚洲和非洲的种族分裂社会中，种族群体通常会组建政党，以便在当前的制度结构内推进他们的利益（Horowitz 1985，293ff）。在这种制度结构中采取适应性行为需要领域通用的问题解决机制——根据对当前形势的评估制定明确的计划、结成联盟、团结内部成员并获取资源。同样，当代西方社会中少数群体的利益通常是通过政治和法律程序的知识来促进的：制定筹集资金的机制；利用和创建社会科学研究来影响媒体信息；召集内群体成员并操纵内群体和外群体成员；显然，犹太人相对较高的平均智商、较高的平均财富、强大的群体联系以及在媒体和学术界的代表性过高，是种族激进主义的黄金标准（MacDonald 2003）。由于智商与经济成功之间的联系（Gottfredson 1997；Lynn & Vanhanen 2002），东南亚华侨和犹太人等具有较高智商（领域通用能力）的群体能够获得较高水平的经济成就。经济上的成功；因此，他们有资源支持有效的民族利益组织并影响政治进程。为在不断变化的环境中解决新问题而进化的领域通用能力被用来推进进化的古老目标。

一些理论家认为，族群不是自然实体，而是社会建构的实体，通常旨在实现族群领导人（我想，至少在某些情况下，他们的追随者）的政治和经济利益。这种观点与这里开发的领域通用观点非常吻合。种族确实可以出现和消失；它们结合或分裂，亲属关系可能会以自利的方式被操纵（例如，Anderson 1983；Horowitz 1985）。人们相信，即使不总是现实，也有共同的血统。然而，我们有充分的理由认为，合并和分散往往反映了进化上可理解的利益。正如 van den Berghe (1999, 23) 指出的那样，“种族关系总是涉及生物血统的客观现实与对该客观现实的主观感知、定义和操纵之间的相互作用。”

考虑到生物血统对于理解人类利益的重要性以及领域通用机制为实现这些利益所提供的灵活性，我们可能会问，考虑到拥有数亿人口的大国的进化新环境，人们通常如何发展出一种生物适应性族群？人类和具有无数遗传断层的人。设计适应性策略并不是什么新鲜事。除其他外，《旧约》提供了一个清晰明确的战略，用于在经济上生存和繁荣，同时保持内群体的遗传完整性，并专门从事特定的经济领域。还有其他例子，包括斯巴达人（MacDonald 1988，1994/2002），以及几个模仿旧约实践的基督教团体（例如清教徒，摩门教徒，重洗派）（Miele 2000；MacDonald 1994/2002；Wilson 2002） 。反映理性自身利益观念的另一种常见模式是，族裔群体追求与密切相关的群体同化的策略，以增强他们在后殖民时代典型的多民族环境中的力量。例如，当加蓬成为一个独立国家时，方族“意识到，在政治冲突中，他们的氏族和方言分歧是不利的，他们开始重建以前的团结。方氏复兴的一个突出部分是一个共同起源和迁徙的传说，它建立在真正的家谱基础上，但也包含新的元素，历史准确性值得怀疑”（Horowitz 1985，70）。

在当代世界中，最大化个人遗传利益的一个明显策略是使用通用领域的问题解决机制，根据他人与自我的遗传距离来发现与他人交往的理想模式。族群是繁殖种群；个体对种族群体具有遗传兴趣，因为他们自己的种族群体比其他种族群体具有更集中的包容性适应性（Salter 2002）。例如，群体遗传学研究表明，不同欧洲群体在遗传上比大陆上分离的种族更接近（Cavalli-Sforza 等人，1994），并且这些群体之间的距离大致相当于消息灵通的历史学家、人口学家或游客会期待。在所有条件相同的情况下，斯堪的纳维亚人与其他斯堪的纳维亚人比与其他欧洲人有更大的遗传利益重叠，而欧洲人对其他欧洲人比对非洲人有更大的遗传利益。

关键是，无论遗传距离的模糊性如何，人们都可以创造性地决定如何最好地制定策略，以在当前环境中促进他们的遗传利益。在当代世界的新环境中创建适应性族群的推理是一个可以通过领域通用机制解决的问题。例如，Goetze（1997）指出，政治单位的最佳规模随着环境的变化而变化：小国家在敌对帝国的世界中是不可行的，即使在现代世界，小国家也可能成为不利的受害者。区域环境。种族战略家可以查看欧洲遗传距离图，并决定促进、组织和认同与他最接近的遗传群体的运动。因此，瑞典人可能会选择瑞典和挪威基因库的进步。或者这样的人可以查看更大的地图并促进、组织和认同高加索人群体，或者可以促进、组织和认同高加索人与东北亚人之间的联盟。如何决定这些问题是一个务实的问题，涉及优化长期进化利益，最好通过领域通用机制的去上下文化和抽象功能特征来实现。

鉴于我们目前对人类遗传距离和人类行为的了解，以及巩固能够在世界舞台上有效行动的强大联盟的需要，某些选择显然比其他选择更好。例如，我认为对于斯堪的纳维亚裔美国人来说，促进斯堪的纳维亚裔美国人的利益而排除更大的群体是愚蠢的，因为更大的群体将拥有更大的政治影响力，特别是在美国这样的多种族背景下。我认为最好的策略是与包容性健身模型进行类比，在该模型中，人们根据遗传距离参与种族群体——在极端情况下与全人类联手对抗外星入侵者。

请注意，在这个遗传景观中，没有一个自然位置可以合理地引导一个人的能量。不同的环境需要不同的反应，即使是最好的选择也是在不确定的情况下做出的。对于居住在科索沃的塞尔维亚人来说，有效的应对措施可能与居住在美国的塞尔维亚人有很大不同。前者感到受到有凝聚力的、非同化的欧洲民族/宗教群体（阿尔巴尼亚人）的威胁，而后者感到面临着许多不同民族和种族群体的多语言、与欧洲裔民族的更大分歧的合作。美国似乎是一个显而易见的选择。但无论做出什么选择，解决领域通用问题对于做出的选择至关重要。

结论：遗传距离的重要性

在这里讨论的机制中，只有 GST 和假定的进化人类种族/族裔种类模块意味着基于遗传的遗传距离评估。社会认同机制是由足球比赛中敌对双方的同一种族人群触发的，甚至是任意创建的群体，以及当外群体是不同的种族或族裔群体时。赫希菲尔德和吉尔怀特认为，关于种族和民族的本质主义思维并不是真实的、受遗传影响的种族或民族差异的结果。除了通过基于当前对遗传相似性的科学估计形成最佳联盟来最大化遗传利益之外，领域通用理性选择机制还可以用于实现任何数量的人类目标（例如，社会地位）。

我认为社会认同机制在欧洲经济区是适应性的，因为一组重要的外群体是居住在附近地区的群体，这些群体在外表上没有表现出可察觉的身体差异，但平均而言遗传相似度却低于内群体。也就是说，即使在外表上没有可察觉的差异，特定部落或乐队的成员与其内群体的其他成员的关系比与其他部落或乐队的关系更密切。因此，导致有利于内群体和外群体的歧视的机制也往往会在基因上使人们受益。显然，在多种族、多民族国家，社会认同机制常常可能导致适应不良行为，因为群体内部
外群体可能会被媒体、民族领袖和其他精英所操纵。

不评估遗传距离的机制似乎无法解释世界许多地区种族意识异常顽固的连续性。正如 van den Berghe (1999, 31) 指出的那样，许多种族群体非常稳定。比利时的弗莱明人和瓦隆人“几乎与朱利叶斯·凯撒写作时他们的祖先所在的地方一模一样” 德贝洛·加利卡”。很难想象社会认同机制如何能够产生如此稳定的稳定性，因为即使在任意创建的群体中也会触发这些机制。商品及服务税提出的遗传距离评估机制并被纳入假定的种族/族裔人类模块中，是种族现象持续存在的最合理的候选者。有大量证据表明多种动物和植物存在直接亲属识别机制（Pfennig & Sherman 1995）。评估这些遗传敏感过程在种族冲突中的重要程度是困难的，因为在实际情况中，种族差异与各种文化标记相一致，例如语言和宗教，预计会触发社会认同机制。因此，很难知道遗传距离的判断实际上与作为种族内群体一部分的感觉相关的程度。

人们可以想象一个思想实验，在这个实验中，人们被完全剥夺了他们有意识地持有的群体身份，然后根据遗传距离评估他们的分类程度。商品及服务税研究结果表明，基因相似的其他人会被优先选择作为配偶、朋友和联盟伙伴。然而，这样的世界是一个原子论的世界。它本身不足以创造族群。为了实现这一目标，需要社会认同机制，包括建立和维护群体边界。社会认同研究的结果表明，界限可能以任意方式划定，但仍然会导致内群体偏袒和对外群体的歧视。然而，商品及服务税的结果预测，这些群体将缺乏内群体的融洽关系和凝聚力，而内群体与他们所生活的外群体相比，在基因上更加相似。由外表相似的人组成的基因相似的群体也会触发假定的种族/族裔人类模块，从而导致一种自然的“我们”意识。

从这个意义上说，由基因相似的其他人组成的族群确实是自然群体，并且基因相似性的机制，并且很可能是种族/族裔人类模块，最终解释了种族作为人类群体的持久力。

鲁宾（Rubin，2000）对种族冲突的分析有很多值得钦佩的地方。我同意社会控制可以改变群体内部或群体之间行为的成本结构。这种社会控制是群体进化策略的一个关键方面（MacDonald 1994/2002），也是西方社会一夫一妻制的重要支持（MacDonald 1995b）。在犹太人中，社会控制是内群体经济行为的一个重要方面，因为它们通常限制犹太人在与外群体的商业往来中相互竞争，从而解决搭便车问题。我也同意，人类并不局限于一套为应对过去反复出现的挑战而进化的心理机制。正如上一节所述，人类能够使用学习和通用智能等领域通用机制来在复杂、新颖和不确定的环境中实现我们进化的动机倾向（Chiappe & MacDonald 2003；MacDonald 1991，1994/2002）。

鲁宾驳斥了我对群体间敌意的分析，因为从经济学的角度来看，它“错过了贸易收益增加的关键点”（第 64 页）。然而，进化分析的关键点是，在心理层面上，人们并没有进化到对整个社会的福利或社会其他成员（除了亲属）的福利感兴趣。通常，敌意在相互竞争最激烈的人中最为常见（MacDonald 1994/2002，第 5 章）。这些发现与我们所知道的有关进化心理机制的一切非常吻合（见上文和第一章）。因此，毫不奇怪，例如，1 世纪印度尼西亚的土著商人和工匠被华人取代，或者 20 至 16 世纪被犹太人取代的波兰商人会对被认为是外来的族裔持消极态度。损害他们的个人利益（MacDonald 20/1994；Mackie 2002，1988）。如果他们绝对肯定地被告知，整个社会因他们失去生计或接受较低的社会地位而受益，他们的态度就不会改变。如果流离失所者是来自其他民族的人，他们的敌意只会被放大，因为这种情况会引发群体间冲突的社会认同机制（见第一章）。

鲁宾忽视了种族等级问题。他提出了一种理想化的族群互动模式，在自由贸易的氛围中，利用专业化和分工，使整个社会的利益最大化。一个民族专门制造帽子，而且效率很高，而另一个民族则专门制造剑和武器。这两个群体会从贸易中受益，也会因贸易壁垒的设立而遭受损失。

然而，纵观历史，当一个群体被视为总体上在经济上处于主导地位时，即当他们被视为处于种族等级制度的顶端，或者他们是剥削性经济体系中的中间人与统治主体人口的外来精英合作。当一个群体的地位更高、更富有，并且相对于另一群体更有可能担任监督角色时，对内群体/外群体竞争的看法就会加剧（见第一章）。这种情况不仅会引发内群体/外群体竞争的社会认同机制，还会引发社会地位寻求的进化机制。从进化的角度来看，渴望高社会地位的动机是由于财富、权力和繁殖成功之间的紧密联系而演变的——这种联系至少在整个 1 世纪在欧洲大部分地区和其他地方仍然很重要（Betzig 19；Lynn 1989；麦克唐纳 1996/1994，第 2002、5 章）。

正如在当代美国，由于一些族裔群体在享有声望和利润丰厚的职业中代表性不足，因此在平权行动方面长期存在斗争，二战前的东欧和中欧地区普遍颁布法律限制犹太人接受教育和进入政府。工作并组织抵制犹太企业（Hagen 1998）。同样，在荷兰殖民时期移民到印度尼西亚的华人在 20 世纪初取代了新生的本土商人，并最终主导了整个经济（Mackie & Coppel 1976, 5）。整个20世纪，华人和印尼土著社区之间关系十分紧张，包括排华骚乱以及各种试图维护土著居民经济利益的民族主义经济政策和平权行动政策。这些行为有可能损害了整个社会（但见下文）；然而，对整个社会的积极影响与理解人们的情绪无关，这些人的向上流动之路似乎被由不同族裔群体成员组成的有凝聚力的网络所阻碍。

将显示经济个人主义和自由贸易的社会效益的现代经济模型应用于历史数据是有很大问题的，因为很简单，这些模型并没有描述许多传统社会和一些当代社会的经济关系。正是在这些情况下，种族敌意最为明显。在许多社会中，外来族裔群体被统治精英，特别是外来统治精英引入，充当与土著人民的剥削关系中的经济中间人。这是犹太历史上的一个突出主题（见第 2 章；另见 MacDonald 1994/2002，第 5 章）；这种情况也发生在东南亚，欧洲殖民列强进口中国商人和工人，作为他们与土著居民之间的中间人群体（Mackie & Coppell 1976, 5）。

从古代世界开始，一直延伸到 20 世纪的东欧，犹太人自愿充当王子剥削的代理人，这是反犹太主义的一个共同主题：

主要原因是犹太人在城市地区充当国王的收税人的职能，因此城市将犹太人视为君主的代理，将犹太人视为大规模剥削的对象。 犹太人按照国王的利益行事，似乎在与城市的利益背道而驰。 因此，我们再次谈及我们所提到的现象：国王与人民之间的根本冲突-这种冲突不仅限于金融事务，而且还涉及与人民生活息息相关的所有政府领域。 在某种程度上，由于这种利益冲突，犹太人可以在中世纪的严酷气候中幸存下来，很难相信当他们来到基督教欧洲定居时他们并没有意识到这一点。 确实，自加洛林人时代以来，他们提出的要求在他们安顿下来之前确保保护的要求表明（a）他们意识到国王在许多问题上的立场与普通百姓不同，并且（b）为了他们的利益，国王已准备好与“外来”犹太人共同谋求违反基督教臣民明确意愿的事业。 因此，从某种意义上讲，犹太人与中世纪国王的协议类似于他们与古代世界中外国征服者达成的谅解。 （Netanyahu 1995，71–72）

从社会中其他人或整个社会的角度来看，处于这些职位的人所做的某些职能是最佳的，这并不意味着某些职能是必要的（或不可避免的）。即使某个特定的经济利基（例如贸易商）符合公共利益，占据该利基的人也与其他人存在利益冲突。
消费他们的服务。种族敌对的许多例子都涉及因种族群体之间经济关系的压迫性质而产生的敌意——源于人们认为需要更大的互惠和更少的剥削。商人和放债人可能是必要的，但降低放债人及其贵族赞助人总收入的比例将符合债务人的利益，也可能符合经济正义的规范概念（特别是如果这些职业都是高薪职业）。

鲁宾忽视了这样的历史背景：犹太人集中在放债、包税和房地产管理等种族领域，多年来对他们产生了极大的仇恨。在传统社会中，这些活动不是市场经济的一部分，而是精英剥削的一个方面。例如，鲁宾将放贷视为一种为债务人提供的服务，使整个社会受益——其模式是由具有可预测经济盈余的人在郊区购买房屋或创办企业，并在一定期限内支付 5% 至 10% 的利息。年。然而，从中世纪到20世纪，在东欧大部分地区，绝大多数贷款是向那些生活在温饱或接近温饱的人们发放的，而且贷款利率过高。放债领域往往没有自由市场；在许多情况下，放贷者通过获得部分利润的贵族或城市授予特许经营权而获得从事这些活动的权利。然后，放债人收取他们认为可以从客户那里获得的一切费用，但利率有时会因破产债务人的投诉而受到限制。此外，教会通常代表债务人对抗债权人。

Parkes (1976, 353) 发现中世纪的利率在 22-173% 之间。 43 年，法国北部的利率上限为 1206%，并对复利进行了监管，试图降低 65% 加复利的普遍利率（Baldwin 1986, 282；Chazan 1973, 84；Rabinowitz 1938, 44）。放债人经常超出利率的法律限制。例如，在卡斯蒂利亚，允许放债人获得 33-1/3% 的利息，“不断重复这些限制和规定，禁止通过虚构的销售和其他欺诈手段，通过各种巧妙的手段来获得非法增长，这表明，法律受到尊重”（Lea 1906–1907, I, 97；另见 Parkes 1976, 356）。

以这样的利率发放的贷款简直是剥削性的，毫无疑问，它们引起了破产债务人的仇恨和教会的深切关注。在这种情况下的放贷确实使放贷者及其贵族支持者受益，但是，就像今天的高利贷一样，它只会导致绝大多数客户——尤其是较贫困阶层的贫困（Parkes 1976, 338; Mundill 1998, 247）——而不是整个社会的经济增长。贷款是发放给绝望的人、愚昧的人和挥霍无度的人，而不是发放给经济前景良好、愿意投资创造经济增长的人；它们“不是为富裕的农民制作的”。 。 。而是入不敷出的农民；不是成功的乡绅，而是浪费者；对农民来说，不是在收成好的时候，而是在歉收的时候。工匠，不是当他卖掉他的商品时，而是当他找不到市场时。

毫不奇怪，一个世纪的这种制度超出了任何社区的承受能力，而犹太高利贷的故事就是邀请、保护、抗议和谴责的不断交替”（Parkes 1976, 360）。城镇经常向统治者付钱，以获得驱逐放债人的特权（Parkes 1976, 209）——大概是承认放债人的存在不会给整个社区带来好处。例如，13世纪末法国自由城向国王菲利普四世提交的请愿书抱怨放债人“绝对彻底地摧毁了该城镇和地区”（Parkes 1976，335）。 1289 年，西西里国王查理二世下令将放债人逐出法国领地，他承认自己从放债人那里“享受了广泛的世俗利益”；作为驱逐的回报，他获得了一项税收，“作为我们因驱逐上述[放债人]而损失的利润的补偿”（in Mundill 1998, 283）。历史记录充满了对不分种族的放债人的仇恨。然而，来自不同种族或宗教的放债人激起了更多的敌意，这反映出种族作为一个社会类别的重要性，引发了上一节讨论的群体冲突的心理机制。
鲁宾认为，即使少数群体维持垄断或卡特尔，社会也会受益。他认为，只要创办一家企业与垄断者竞争，任何垄断都可以有效地削弱。此外，如果垄断是有效的，整个社会就会受益，因为有效垄断的利润最大化价格将低于低效非垄断。

这忽略了一些重要的历史现实。在传统社会中，包税、房地产管理和许多放债等垄断通常是通过特许经营或租赁创建的，并由国家权力维持。因此，没有理由认为它们将是有效的垄断。即使情况并非如此，打破民族垄断也常常需要克服巨大的障碍。例如，犹太宗教法禁止犹太人挑战其他犹太人的垄断，并且这些法律得到遵守（见 MacDonald 1994/2002，第 6 章）。此外，犹太人发展垂直垄断的情况并不少见，例如原材料的垄断强化了制成品的垄断（MacDonald 1994/2002，第5章）。

泰国的情况表明，打破民族垄断是多么困难。从十九世纪开始至今，华人主导了所有零售贸易、大米营销和加工以及建筑行业，而泰国人则主要是小农，由人数较少的贵族政治和军事精英主导。中国对贸易和商业的实质垄断使泰国人难以立足。华商之间紧密的族裔纽带有助于降低他们的做生意成本，因为族群内部比族群之间的信任度更高（Landa 1994）。 “普通的中国商人对其他中国商人充满信心；他对泰国人不太确定”（Coughlin 1960, 123）。泰国零售商从中国批发商那里得到的条件比中国零售商更差——价格更高，信贷更紧。由于泰国商人相对较少，经济困难时他们没有金融支持体系。

Landa（1994）指出，一般来说，华裔商人在与原住民的商业交易中要求现金，但接受华人同胞的信用条件（因为群体内的团结消除了不付款的风险）。从中国人的角度来看，潜在的交易者隐含地按照可信度进行排名，包括近亲、远亲、宗族、同乡、同乡（例如闽南语）、非闽南语华人和非华人。 “局外人较高的交易成本构成了进入个人市场的障碍”（Landa 1994, 108）。显然，与更大的基因重叠相关的信任度的增加反映了进化预期（参见 Alexander 1979）。

首先，中国中间商能够将利润预期作为无形资产，具有高度确定性，从而促进中间商创业。 其次，中国中间商能够减少私人保护合同的自付费用； 这使中间商公司的总交易成本曲线向下移动。 通过在中国中间商经济范围内建立有效的商品和货币远期市场，第三中间商能够节省商品库存和货币的持有量。 结果就是创建了“双重市场”：在中国中间人经济体内，远期市场和信贷交易与本地经济中的现货市场和现金交易并存。 （Landa 1994，108）

这表明，种族网络一旦形成，就很难因为纯粹的经济原因而被推翻。鉴于打破种族网络所持有的垄断的困难，它们似乎不太可能是有效的垄断，特别是当它们像历史上的犹太人垄断一样，受到王权的保护，免受与其他犹太人和外部群体的竞争时。我们确实知道，民族垄断往往是外来者敌视的根源——大概是因为垄断者倾向于提高价格（互惠的失败），但也因为经济不平衡的关系，其中民族外来者拥有优越地位。

东欧 arenda 制度是低效垄断的一个很好的例子；这也是对犹太人仇恨的一个常见根源。在里面 arenda 在这种制度下，犹太代理人会从贵族那里租赁地产。作为支付一定费用的回报，承租人将有权获得该地产的所有经济生产，并且还将保留对其居民的封建权利（包括繁重的强迫劳动要求）的控制权：

就这样，犹太人 阿伦达特 成为了整个地区人民生死攸关的主人，在这种关系中除了短期和纯粹的经济利益之外什么都没有，面临着将他的临时臣民削得只剩骨头的不可抗拒的诱惑。在贵族庄园里，他倾向于让他的亲戚和同教者负责面粉厂、啤酒厂，特别是领主的酒馆，按照习俗农民必须在那里喝酒。在教堂庄园里，他成为所有教会会费的征收者，站在教堂门口，从什一税缴纳者、受洗婴儿、新婚夫妇和哀悼者那里收取费用。在[皇家]庄园上。 。 。 ，他实际上成为了皇家代理人，将通行费、税收和法庭费用包出，并用皇家权威的所有尊严来装饰他的压迫。 （Davies 1982, 444；另见 Subtelny 1988, 124）

这种制度近似于奴隶制，唯一的区别是农奴被束缚在土地上，而奴隶可以自由买卖。在这样的系统中，工作动力很少，生产率也相对较低（例如，Sowell 1983）。奴隶制经济的生产力明显低于非奴隶制经济（Sowell 1998 168）。此外，临时承租人也没有动力进行资本改善，因为他们只是财产的临时持有者。与劳动力自由市场的社会相比，这样的制度似乎不会给整个社会带来好处，而且无论如何，很容易看出这样的制度会导致反犹太态度以及对以这种方式雇用犹太人的非犹太精英的敌意。这些消极态度将会加剧，因为 州长 来自不同的种族。

鲁宾认为，反犹太主义本身对于整个社会来说是不适应的，以宗教裁判所和纳粹主义为例。当然，在某些情况下，反犹太行动损害了整个社会。最明显的例子是反犹行动与犹太人为敌，而犹太人则积极反对反犹政府的利益。有几个重要的历史例子。在宗教裁判所期间，西班牙犹太人积极支持荷兰等反对西班牙利益的政府（Castro 1971, 244; Contreras 1991, 132）。 19世纪末俄罗斯沙皇的反犹太政策不仅激起了俄罗斯犹太人的广泛反俄行动，也激起了欧洲和美国富有的犹太人和犹太组织的反俄行动。例如，对俄罗斯反犹太政策的敌意促使美国犹太委员会带头废除美俄之间的贸易协定，并促使金融家雅各布·希夫资助 1905 年日本对俄战争，游说阻止俄罗斯获得融资，并资助最终推翻沙皇的革命运动（Goldstein 1990，26-27；Szajkowski 1967）。而且，正如鲁宾所指出的，德国在 1930 年代的反犹太政策导致核物理研究中心从德国转移到美国。这些政策也与美国犹太组织为敌，这些组织呼吁抵制德国商品，并形成了一个主张美国加入第二次世界大战以对抗德国的最重要的压力团体。

鲁宾引用了我的评论，即宗教裁判所对西班牙的知识分子调查产生了寒蝉效应，以支持他的观点，即反犹太主义对整个社会产生负面影响。思想停滞确实可能对社会产生负面影响，但更难表明，除了上述犹太团体的行为之外，反犹太主义通常会产生负面经济影响，至少在短期内如此。国家社会主义德国早年的标志是所谓的“经济奇迹”，它在没有通货膨胀的情况下消除了失业，并在国家支持的反犹太主义的情况下获得了广泛的民众支持。 60年至1933年间，国民生产总值增长了1937%，超过了1929年大萧条前的水平。到1939年第二次世界大战前夕，经济自124年以来增长了1933%（Haffner 1979，27；诺克斯和普里丹姆 1984，296；
普克特 1987 年，69）。

同样，西班牙的征服和探索时代在 1481 年宗教裁判所启动后不久就开始了，并一直延续到 1989 世纪。在此期间，西班牙成为欧洲最富有、最强大的国家。最终，西班牙的主要竞争对手是在中世纪驱逐犹太人的西欧国家，尤其是英国。人们想知道，如果英国犹太人没有遭受这种激进的种族敌视，英国的历史将会怎样。历史学家指出，清教徒姓氏表明商人和工匠的数量不成比例，例如“钱德勒、库珀、库里尔、卡特勒、德雷珀、弗莱彻、加德纳、格洛弗、梅森、默瑟、米勒、索耶、萨德勒、谢尔曼、撒切尔、 Tinker、Turner、Waterman、Webster 和 Wheelwright”（Fischer 26，1989）。清教徒在法律和商业领域也尤为突出（Fischer 49, 150）。如果像在东欧和中欧那样，犹太人在大多数这些职业中赢得了经济竞争，那么英国新生的中产阶级很可能会受到压制，就像过去 19 年整个东南亚发生的那样，由于与其他国家的竞争，他们可能会受到压制。华侨。东南亚、东欧、中欧等地对本土中产阶级的镇压，导致族群之间长期冲突；例如，在1985世纪初的波兰，犹太人主导了除农业劳动力之外的所有经济领域。限制犹太人进入某些地区的法律旨在让非犹太人在贸易、制造业和手工业方面获得优势（Mahler 172, 180, 19）。这种冲突在当今的东南亚仍在继续，就像 1994 世纪的东欧一样，人们指责中间人少数群体不忠诚（MacDonald 2002/1988；Mackie 1997；Suryadinata XNUMX）。

由于民族作为社会范畴的重要性，民族之间的竞争抑制了市场经济的发展。个人主义更有利于最优（个人）效用最大化，但如果一个种族群体的人们担心在与另一种族群体的竞争中失败，则不太可能发生（见 MacDonald 1998，第 5 章）。经济个人主义与基于群体的冲突不相容的假设与阿梅里科·卡斯特罗 (Américo Castro) (1954, 497; 另见卡斯特罗 1971) 的观点是一致的，即启蒙运动不可能在充满犹太人和非犹太人之间种族冲突的西班牙发展，就像发生的那样在宗教裁判所期间：“从这样的前提出发，不可能衍生出任何形式的现代国家，毕竟是中世纪等级制度和谐的延续。”

在当今世界，东南亚的广大土著人民与统治这些国家经济的华人之间长期存在着冲突。在这场冲突中，土著精英倾向于站在华人一边，因为他们通过印度尼西亚所谓的“cukong”关系和泰国的类似关系而获得了个人利益。这些粗控关系实质上购买了保护以及获得政府合同和投资信贷的独家权利（Mackie 1976, 138; Mackie 1988, 244）——显然是一种腐败形式，使中国商人及其精英土著印度尼西亚赞助人受益，但损害了印尼人的利益。绝大多数印度尼西亚土著人，对整个社会有害。

华人商人与精英原住民政府官员和军官之间的这种粗暴关系是地位较低的原住民抱怨的一个常见原因，他们倾向于将自己的困境归咎于政府与华人之间的勾结（Dahana 1997）。由于华人作为经济上占主导地位的外来族群的地位，他们总是容易受到经济民族主义、旨在惠及原住民的种族偏袒平权行动政策以及对华人文化分裂主义表现的不满的影响。这些倾向在印度尼西亚更为强烈，很可能是因为泰国本土文化的个人主义倾向，以及印度尼西亚土著的穆斯林宗教加剧了对非穆斯林持消极态度的倾向。随着当代西方多元文化社会中种族竞争的加剧，担心不自由的经济政策重新出现并不牵强。最高法院最近批准的平权行动政策无疑是朝这个方向迈出的一步。

移民的成本和种族冲突的好处

鲁宾的经济分析使他对除了贸易好处之外的一切都打折扣。在他看来，更多的人口会带来更大的市场、生产和消费的更专业化以及更大的技术创新。而且，由于考虑种族差异会产生社会成本，忽视种族差异也会带来好处，社会可以通过增加不同种族群体的移民来最大化这些收益：“如果人口增长放缓或变成负数，就像许多发达国家的情况一样，世界，那么实现这些成果的唯一途径就是允许不同种族群体的成员加入社会”（Rubin 2000，64）。

是否需要通过替代性移民来解决生育率低于更替水平所造成的经济后果，目前存在很大争议。由于能源、耕地和水资源的稀缺，所提出的为不断增长的人口带来的经济效益忽略了潜在的环境问题和与长期可持续性相关的问题（Abernethy 2001；Grant 2001）。正如 Meyerson (2001, 403) 指出的那样，“人口下降的潜在优势和劣势一样多，包括道路和学校等基础设施支出的减少、自然资源消耗的减少以及温室气体和其他污染物产生的减少。在未来的世界和人类社会可能受到气候变化或其他环境问题的巨大挑战时，人口减少的国家可能有更多的减缓和适应选择。”

移民还降低了本地出生率（Macunovich 1999），这意味着本地人口的健康状况直接下降。此外，正如博尔哈斯（Borjas，1999）指出的那样，移民对于社会中的不同群体具有不同的经济成本和收益。当前的美国移民模式所带来的经济利益对于整个社会来说微不足道；超过 25,000,000 名外国出生的人的存在使美国人民的平均收入增加了约 0.1%——每个本土出生的人的平均收入不到 30 美元，而且主要受益者是雇主而不是雇员（Borjas 1999, 91）。最重要的成本是移民压低了移民与当地人竞争工作岗位的部门的工资（Borjas 1999）。这会降低本地生育率，因为工资上涨和经济乐观情绪向新进入劳动力市场的人发出信号，要求他们提高生育率（结婚年龄更小，生育更多孩子）（Abernethy 1999，2001；MacDonald 1999；Macunovich 1999）。此外，鉴于种族仍然是政治行为中的一股强大力量，非本土族裔群体的大规模移民会给当地人带来长期的政治成本，特别是当移民群体试图通过偏袒他们的民族来影响种族冲突和歧视的成本结构时。自己的小组（见下文）。因此，在个人层面上，移民可能是一场零和游戏，在当前条件下，当地人可能会输。

鲁宾完全乐观地认为，民主国家能够通过简单地提高冲突和歧视的成本来最大限度地减少种族冲突，就像美国过去 40 年所做的那样。东南亚的长期冲突表明事实并非如此——种族冲突确实是一个主要问题。阻碍完全民主和市场经济的因素。世界许多地区的种族冲突仍在继续。布克曼（Bookman，1998）表明，现代世界的种族冲突策略包括操纵人口普查、采取促生育政策以实现数字力量——这一策略在民主国家、同化（包括强迫同化）、人口转移（包括各种形式的种族清洗）、边界变化、经济压力（包括就业和教育方面的歧视）、骚扰、选择性税收政策、不同的工资率以及不同的拥有财产的能力。

此外，西方社会的种族冲突通过改变其成本结构而迅速降级，这表明，当一个或多个种族群体推动冲突有利可图时，种族冲突可能会迅速重新点燃。随着美国从一个欧洲人占多数的国家转变为一个欧洲人只是新兴少数群体、政治地位大大削弱的国家，种族冲突的成本结构很可能会发生变化。

一个重要的问题是，在自由市场的情况下，种族冲突是否会带来回报——也就是说，在国家不影响歧视和冲突的成本结构的情况下，特别是在没有惩罚的情况下。鲁宾认为，即使没有惩罚，围绕土地的种族冲突也不会得到回报，因为“土地只是众多资产中的一项”（第 66 页），而且我们的心理机制无论如何也没有进化到最大限度地提高我们的适应性。这些论点都没有说服力。土地确实只是众多资产中的一种，但一个民族能够控制一块土地，就能够以最大化民族利益的方式组织国家。民族国家能够规范移民政策，以确保他们保留对其领土的控制权；他们可以通过影响教育系统和媒体信息来鼓励民族自豪感；他们能够通过鼓励高出生率、补贴家庭以及支付公民生育治疗费用来影响生育率；它们可能会阻止与其他种族群体的人通婚——部分原因是歧视性移民政策；他们可以调节稀缺资源，以有利于本国人民，而不是作为国家少数群体生活的外来人；他们可以与其他国家的同族人建立密切的关系，以影响影响他们的政策。布克曼（Bookman，1998）表明，所有这些策略实际上都被民族国家所使用。 （人们想知道鲁宾是否会把他的想法应用到他自己的民族占主导地位的以色列的例子中；以色列已经采取了所有这些政策。）

确实，我们的心理机制并不是为了最大限度地提高我们的适应性而进化的，但是，正如鲁宾本人指出的那样，我们并不局限于为应对过去反复出现的挑战而进化的机制。如上一节所述，我们能够使用学习和通用智能等领域通用机制来最大限度地提高复杂、新颖和不确定环境中的适应度。尽管我们进化的目的不是直接最大化健身，但这并不意味着健身不是一个值得追求的目标。事实上，从进化的角度来看，这是唯一的目标；适应性是我们进化历史中心理进化的间接但必然的结果。在现代世界中，采用族裔群体战略的相对成本和收益可以使用领域通用机制来评估——与设计当代社会种族歧视的成本结构所使用的机制相同。

这意味着一个族群可能会采取行动来影响成本结构本身，即它可以设计一个制度，使该族群从歧视和冲突中受益，就像上面提到的以色列的例子。同样，在美国，由于惩罚种族歧视的成本结构而获得多数席位的种族群体可能有足够的权力改变成本结构，以有利于自己的人民——平权行动显而易见。

族群是繁殖群体，个体对族群具有遗传兴趣，因为他们自己的族群比其他族群具有更集中的包容性适应性（Salter 2002）。群体遗传学研究表明，不同欧洲群体在遗传上比大陆上不同的种族更接近（Cavalli-Sforza 等，1994）。在所有条件相同的情况下，斯堪的纳维亚人与其他斯堪的纳维亚人比其他欧洲人有更大的遗传利益重叠，而欧洲人与其他欧洲人的遗传利益比与非洲人更大。

正如上一节所述，无论遗传距离的模糊性如何，人们都可以创造性地决定如何最好地制定策略，以在当前环境中促进他们的遗传利益。在当代世界的新环境中创建适应性族群的推理是一个可以通过领域通用机制解决的问题。一些团体已经有效地组织起来，以追求他们在现代世界的利益。例如，世界各地的犹太团体维持着一个复杂的民族利益组织网络，旨在反对异族通婚，促进以色列的利益，在政教关系、移民等问题上倡导自利立场。（MacDonald 1998/2002，2003） 。当代后工业社会中用于实现种族利益的手段利用了一般领域的问题解决机制——政治进程的知识、如何筹集资金、如何利用社会科学研究来影响媒体信息、如何利用或审查互联网诸如犹太人等具有相对较高智商（一种领域通用能力）的群体能够获得相对较高水平的经济成功；因此，他们有资源资助民族活动组织并影响政党。同样，领域通用能力被用来推进进化目标。

致谢：感谢爱德华·米勒（新奥尔良大学经济与金融系）在回复保罗·鲁宾时提供的帮助。

社会认同研究的实证结果与群体行为的进化基础高度一致。目前的证据表明，最小群体的研究结果可以推广到不同年龄、民族、社会阶层和广泛的因变量的受试者中（Bourhis 1994），而人类学证据表明，将自己的群体视为优越的倾向是普遍存在的。 （藤1987）。此外，社会认同过程发生在生命的早期，在关于外群体的明确知识之前。对这些发现的进化解释也得到了表明社会认同过程发生在高级动物物种（例如黑猩猩）中的结果的支持。 Van der Dennen (1991, 237) 在回顾人类和动物冲突文献的基础上提出，高级物种具有基于情感机制的“超强群体界限”。我同意并认为一种情感机制实际上是社会认同理论家提出的自尊机制。其他可能涉及的情绪机制是社会责任感/内疚机制 创伤后应激障碍 （第 7 章）以及加入高度集体主义、独裁团体的个人获得的心理缓解体验（Galanter 1989a；见下文）。尽管社会认同理论家没有考虑到后一种机制，但它们会导致与群体成员身份相关的强烈积极情绪，以及对脱离群体的前景的内疚感和痛苦感。[18]支持自尊作为社会认同过程动机的重要性的研究并不完全支持（例如，Hogg & Abrams 1993）。 Hogg 和 Abrams（1993）试图通过提出内群体成员身份减少主观不确定性（通过与其他内群体成员达成一致）来阐述社会认同理论的动机基础，同时积极情绪和权力感和控制感、自我效能感、个人意义感、自尊感等。进化方法会强调进化的情感系统作为一般动机的核心的重要性（MacDonald 1991），但可能涉及多种情感系统，包括霍格和艾布拉姆斯。进化的动机系统通常包括积极和消极的情绪（例如，面临危险时的焦虑和解脱后的解脱[MacDonald 1995a]）。我怀疑，对具有高度群体承诺的自然存在的群体（例如犹太教）的研究不仅会揭示与群体成员身份相关的非常强烈的积极情绪，而且还会揭示消极情绪（例如内疚）在激励非群体行为方面的强大作用。脱离团体并遵守团体目标。事实上，鲍迈斯特和利里（Baumeister and Leary，1995）以及特里弗斯（Trivers，1971）强调了情感、亲密和同理心等积极情绪以及内疚等消极情绪对于巩固群体关系和防止叛逃的重要性。

社会认同过程中强大的情感成分很难解释，除非作为人类思维进化机制的一个方面。我注意到社会认同过程的情感后果是该系统的理论原语。正如 Hogg 和 Abrams (1987, 73) 所指出的，这个结果不能用纯粹的认知过程来解释，学习理论似乎是无可救药的临时性和无端的。人类倾向于将自己置于社会类别中，并且这些类别具有强烈的情感和评价色彩（包括内疚、同理心、自尊、获得群体身份时的宽慰以及失去群体身份时的痛苦），这些倾向是参与高度凝聚力的集体主义团体的生物学基础。[19]Freeman (1995, 130ff) 还提出了特定的适应措施，可以使个体形成有凝聚力的群体。他强调音乐在产生强烈情感的群体认同方面的作用，就像在许多前文字社会和福音派教会中一样。

进化论的观点也与许多反犹太主义信仰的虚假性和矛盾性高度兼容。当真相符合那些拥有这些信念和态度的人的利益时，进化只关心确保信念和态度的准确性（Krebs，Denton＆Higgins 1988）。就反犹太主义而言，并不期望特定的反犹太主义信仰是准确的，但从进化论的角度来看，这些信仰可能在促进进化目标方面具有显着的适应性。同样，真相并不是合理化、辩护和自欺欺人的有效性的必要条件，而这些对于在历史上维持犹太人内部群体的积极形象至关重要。这些现象是第 7 章和第 8 章的主题。

最后，在资源竞争和群体受到威胁的时期，社会认同过程和集体主义倾向会增加（见 Hogg & Abrams 1987；Triandis 1990，1991），这一事实与假设这些过程涉及由之间触发的兼性机制高度兼容。群体冲突。正如亚历山大（Alexander，1979）和约翰逊（Johnson，1995）等进化论者所强调的那样，外部威胁往往会减少内部分歧，并最大限度地提高群体成员之间对共同利益的认识。在外部威胁的条件下，人类社会扩大政府，合作甚至利他行为增多。这些变化大概反映了物种范围内的兼性策略，即接受更高水平的外部权威，并在外部威胁的情况下变得更加面向群体。

研究反犹太主义的学者经常指出，在政治和经济不稳定时期，反犹太主义往往会增加。这表明，在感知到外部威胁的时期，外邦人更容易形成有凝聚力的合作团体，针对外群体，尤其是被认为与内群体竞争的外群体。这将是第 3 章至第 5 章的主题。

要尝试发展一种关于群体间竞争机制的进化视角，还有很多工作要做。与许多其他心理适应的情况一样（MacDonald 1991，1995a；Wilson 1994），社会认同过程似乎存在重要的个体差异。因此，Altemeyer（1994）发现了对有凝聚力的群体的吸引力、威权主义、内群体优越感、对外群体的敌意、种族中心主义、对社会身份的高度关注和宗教原教旨主义之间的联系。与目前的观点一致，有证据表明犹太人具有高度的民族中心主义。 Silverman 和 Case（1995）使用一种旨在衡量群体内偏见（种族中心主义指标）的工具发现，在白人盎格鲁撒克逊新教徒（WASP）、亚洲人、意大利人、其他群体中，犹太人对自己的种族群体有最高的偏见。欧洲人和黑人，唯一显着的区别是犹太人和白人新教徒。

与社会认同相关的理论和数据也与个人主义和集体主义的研究高度契合（Triandis 1990，1991）。个人主义/集体主义构成个体差异的一个维度，群体（跨文化）特征的差异导致社会之间的差异，即强调群体内的目标和需要而不是个人权益。对于高度倾向于集体主义的个人来说，群体内的规范以及合作和使个人目标服从群体需求的义务至关重要。集体主义文化对内群体产生了一种“毫无疑问的依恋”，包括“认为内群体规范普遍有效（一种种族中心主义）、自动服从内群体权威[即独裁主义]，以及愿意为内群体而战和牺牲。这些特征通常与对外群体的不信任和不愿意合作有关”（Triandis 1990, 55）。与社会认同过程一样，集体主义倾向在外部威胁时会加剧，这再次表明集体主义倾向是一种兼性反应，是作为群体间冲突机制演变而来的。

用威尔逊和索伯（Wilson and Sober，1994）的话来说，这种机制的存在意味着群体一直是选择的工具。这种群体间竞争的适应是否与个体层面的选择相兼容是一个重要的理论问题。鉴于这些机制似乎对群体面临的外部威胁高度敏感，它们也可能跟踪个人的自身利益，因为在威胁时期，群体和个人的利益越来越一致。人们可以将一个人概念化为在一种自我牺牲行为和一种自私行为之间做出选择：自我牺牲行为可以帮助与自己有显着基因重叠的群体，而自私行为则不太可能帮助面临威胁群体的个人，而且还可能导致整个团体就会失败。这种情况下，挂在一起比单独挂要好。分析的单位是群体，心理机制是群体间冲突的结果。然而，这种机制与假设人们有一种算法相兼容，该算法试图平衡个人继续成为群体成员的成本和收益与放弃群体和采取个人主义策略所获得的成本和收益。

似乎有一些例子表明，有些人是如此极端的集体主义，以至于从心理上来说，叛逃并不是一个可行的选择。尤其引人注目的是，有些人宁愿殉难或集体自杀，也不愿放弃团体。我们在现代周期性地看到这样的例子，历史上的例子也有很多，从古代的基督教殉道者到两千多年来犹太教的殉道者。

毫无疑问，犹太人倾向于集体主义维度的极端，Triandis (1990, 57)将犹太教视为集体主义文化。事实上，回顾一下《圣经》第 8 章中关于犹太人“超级集体主义”的讨论是有启发性的。 PTSDA。 有人指出，即使与其他犹太群体隔绝了几个世纪，甚至在长期强烈的反犹太主义和强制保密的情况下，犹太群体仍然有保留遗传和文化分离主义的倾向。在古代世界，在罗马帝国的所有臣民中，只有犹太人为了获得国家主权而与政府进行了长期的、甚至是自杀性的战争。许多作者都注意到古代世界犹太人的宗教狂热，以及他们宁愿死也不愿容忍对以色列的冒犯或生活在外国统治下。例如，一世纪犹太历史学家和护教家约瑟夫斯（Josephus）指出：

[我们代表我们的法律面对]死亡，其勇气是任何其他国家都无法比拟的。 （反对阿皮翁 2：234）

从我们的这些法律中，没有任何力量可以使我们偏离，既不惧怕我们的主人，也不嫉妒其他国家所尊重的机构。 (反对阿皮翁 2：271）

尽管并非所有犹太人都愿意死也不愿背叛法律，但“一个又一个的故事表明这种概括是正确的”（Sanders 1992, 42）。 “没有其他国家能够如此频繁地为捍卫自己的生活方式而战，犹太人愿意为自己的事业而死，这是一个又一个的例子证明的”（Sanders 1992，239）。犹太人针对罗马人的政治活动常常包括如果罗马统治的外部迹象不从耶路撒冷和圣殿中消除的话，他们就会威胁要殉道（Crossan 1991，103ff）。近年来，为了控制巴勒斯坦而与英国人作战的犹太复国主义斯特恩帮成员“将与英国人的最后一战视为一种世界末日的宣泄，从中他们只能期待死亡”（Biale 1982，101）。

还应该指出的是，哈西德派和其他极端正统派团体 (haredim) 是当代犹太教中的一支突出且日益强大的力量，全世界至少有 650,000 名犹太人（见 Landau 1993，xxi），占以色列选民的 23%。 1996年选举。从历史上看，这些群体所代表的社会组织类型更多地是常态，而不是例外，因此，即使在 19 世纪末的波兰，绝大多数犹太人也被组织成极端正统的哈西德派集会，由他们的乡亲（例如，犹太人）主导。利特曼 1984 年，6）。这些团体在 Triandis（1990，1991）的意义上是极端集体主义的。他们严格遵守传统的排他主义做法，例如饮食和纯洁法，并对局外人（包括更自由倾向的犹太人）抱有非常负面的看法。这些团体的专制性质尤其引人注目：“哈雷迪……” 。 。他会在生活的各个方面咨询他的拉比或哈西德派的雷贝，并会服从他收到的建议，就好像这是一个神圣的裁决一样”（Landau 1993，47）。 “在外界（无论是犹太人还是外邦人）眼中，正统派对拉比的盲目崇拜是正统主义最显着的特征之一”（Landau 1993，45）。著名的雷布几乎受到上帝般的尊敬（扎迪克主义，或对个人的崇拜），事实上，最近关于Lubavitcher Rebbe Schneerson是否声称自己是弥赛亚存在争议。 他的许多追随者认为他是。 Mintz (1992, 348ff) 指出哈西德派犹太人将他们的 rebbe 视为弥赛亚是很常见的。

作为传统东欧犹太人群体情感强烈的一个例子，犹太复国主义领袖阿瑟·鲁平 (Arthur Ruppin, 1971, 69) 讲述了他 1903 年参观加利西亚（波兰）犹太教堂的经历：

没有长凳，成千上万的犹太人紧紧地站在一起，像风中的玉米一样在祈祷中摇曳。 当犹太教徒出现时，服务开始了。 每个人都试图尽可能靠近他。 拉比以微弱的哭泣声带领祈祷。 似乎在听众中引起了一种狂喜。 他们闭上眼睛，猛烈地摇摆。 大声的祈祷听起来像一场大风。 任何在祈祷中看到这些犹太人的人都会得出结论，他们是地球上最虔诚的人。

后来那些与拉比最亲近的人强烈渴望吃任何拉比接触过的食物，鱼骨被他的追随者保存为遗物。

集体主义的另一个衡量标准是社区对个人行为的控制。对个人行为的控制是主流犹太教的一个非常显着的特征，这一点在整个犹太教中都很明显 创伤后应激障碍。 Shaw (1991, 65) 提供了一个关于奥斯曼帝国犹太人的特别详细的例子。社区非常精确地规定了生活的各个方面，包括胡须的形状和长度、公共和私人着装的各个方面、成员所需的慈善数额、社交聚会的人数、坟墓和墓碑的外观，精确的安息日的行为、谈话的精确形式、所有社交聚会的优先顺序等。[20]有趣的是，在集体主义社会中发现的心理特征中，存在真实自我和社会自我的分歧（Triandis 1991）。 在这里，传统社会中犹太人之间仪式化的谈话形式表明，社会自我是完全约定俗成的和社会规定的。 这些规则是通过“某种警察监视”来执行的，不遵守规则可能会导致监禁，或者在极端情况下，被逐出教会。

这表明犹太人倾向于超级集体主义。此外，犹太人愿意殉难而不是抛弃群体的名声表明，在犹太人中存在着相当大的临界群体，无论对个人造成什么后果，抛弃都不是一个选择。例如，考虑一下 1096 年德国第一次十字军东征周围的大屠杀期间，德系犹太人群体对皈依要求的反应。在这种情况下，他们的行为确实非常了不起。[21]。一个现代案例：25年1997月XNUMX日， 洛杉矶时报 (p. A29 OC) 报道称，来自新泽西州哈肯萨克的犹太人阿维·科斯特纳 (Avi Kostner) 声称自己杀死了自己的两个孩子，因为他的前妻打算将他们培养成基督徒，他以精神错乱为由。被告答辩失败，被判处无期徒刑。 一位当代犹太编年史家指出，当犹太人面临皈依或死亡的选择时，他们“伸出脖子，以便以造物主的名义砍下他们的头。” 。 。 。事实上，父亲也和他们的孩子一起倒下了，因为他们一起被屠杀。他们屠杀弟兄、亲戚、妻子和孩子。新郎[屠杀]他们的准妈妈和仁慈的母亲，他们唯一的孩子”（in Chazan 1987, 245）。

很难想象这些人有一种算法可以通过平衡抛弃群体的倾向与继续群体成员身份的预期收益来计算个人的适应度收益。对这种现象的明显解释是，这些人无论如何都有义务留在群体中，甚至杀死自己的家人，以防止成为外群体成员的可能性。这些例子表明，任何可以想象的情况都会导致这些人放弃群体、走自己的路，并被同化为外群体。

我不认为这种极端程度的自我牺牲是一种泛人类的心理适应。[22]Galanter (1989a, 85ff; 另见 Wenegrat 1989) 提出，形成以宗教崇拜为代表的有凝聚力的群体的倾向是人类普遍的、与生俱来的心理适应。虽然我同意群体冲突背后存在一种普遍机制，但我的观点有所不同，因为我也强调性状的个体差异，包括遗传和环境变异来源。该建议认为，犹太人在该系统上的水平高于平均水平，并且总体而言，人们被高度集体主义团体所吸引的程度以及威胁性环境引起加入此类团体的愿望的程度存在个体差异。来自个人主义社会的人们，一般以西方社会为代表（见 创伤后应激障碍，CH。 8），与犹太人相比，在该系统上的预期相对较低。 然而，很可能的情况是，很大一部分犹太人极其倾向于集体主义，以至于他们不计算团体成员身份的个人回报。提出的模型是，随着历史的推移，犹太人中具有集体主义特征的平均群体有所增加，因为这种特征较低的个体（在这种情况下，不符合群体行为预期标准的个体）更有可能自愿叛逃被逐出该群体或被强行排除在该群体之外（参见 创伤后应激障碍，CHS。 7 和 8)。

鉴于遵守犹太教群体规范的重要性，预计集体主义程度较低的个人将不成比例地倾向于放弃犹太教，而成功的犹太人作为社区的支柱并因此体现了犹太教的群体伦理，他们将不成比例地倾向于放弃犹太教。不成比例地可能具有较高的群体一致性并且也可能获得成功的繁殖。例如，Jordan (1989, 138) 指出，在中世纪叛逃的犹太人（然后有时迫害他们以前的同宗者）往往是“无法满足长辈们要求服从的人”。[23]Sephardic的哲学家Baruch Spinoza是一个著名的非循规蹈矩者，他被犹太社区驱逐出境。 自启蒙运动以来，这种趋势很可能加速，因为叛逃的成本变得更低。 Israel (1985, 254) 指出，启蒙运动之后，由于对犹太社区生活的限制性持消极态度，叛逃犹太教的情况非常普遍，对犹太社区的人口统计产生了负面影响。

可能一直存在一个选择性过程，因此那些难以将自己的利益纳入群体利益的人很可能会叛逃犹太教。这些人会对传统犹太社会生活各个方面的无数规定感到恼火。用 Triandis (1990, 55) 的话说，这些人是生活在集体主义文化中的“白痴”人；也就是说，他们不太以群体为导向，不太愿意将群体利益置于个人利益之上。犹太教历史学家经常观察到，该团体中最忠诚的成员决定了该团体的方向（例如，Sacks 1993，ix-x）；这些人也可能获得不成比例的群体成员奖励。因此，犹太人中很可能存在群体内部的选择，因为他们的基因使人们极易陷入集体主义，以至于很大一部分人根本无法计算群体成员身份的个人回报。

这一假设与犹太人在非犹太宗教邪教中所占比例过高的发现高度一致（Marciano 1981；Schwartz 1978）。最近，出现了相当多的关于宗教邪教的文献，其特征说明了社会认同过程的重要性，并明确地将它们置于个人主义/集体主义维度的极端集体主义一端。这些魅力团体具有高度凝聚力、集体主义和独裁性（例如，Galanter 1989a,b；Levine 1989；Deutsch 1989）。团体内部非常和谐，对团体成员有积极的尊重，同时也有对外来者的负面看法。当一个人加入群体时，心理健康感会增加，而经历脱离群体的人会遭受心理困扰。 Galanter（1989a）发现，加入邪教的个人会体验到一种解脱感——我将这一发现解释为由于加入邪教往往能满足一种非常深刻的情感需求。

在加入邪教之前，个人的威胁感可能会增加这种情感动机。许多加入邪教的人对自己的生活不满意，并感到个人受到威胁（Clark et al. 1981）——我将这一发现解释为作为对外部威胁的反应而以兼性方式触发集体主义机制的结果。这些对外部威胁的感知可能只不过是生活中“做得不好”的主观感受。加兰特发现，加入邪教后感受最轻松的人是那些在加入之前最痛苦的人，案例研究材料表明，其中许多人正在经历经济、社会和/或心理压力（例如，改变居住地） 、被解雇、亲戚患病 [Galanter 1989a, 92]）。 Sirkin 和 Grellong（1988）在犹太家庭的邪教成员样本中发现了类似的关联。

Galanter (1989a, 23) 发现，尽管犹太人仅占美国人口的 21% 左右，但神圣之光公社（由 Maharaj Ji 组织）的 2.5% 是犹太人。此外，加兰特的样本中，文鲜明牧师的统一教会成员中有 8% 是犹太人。这一发现与犹太人总体上具有更强的集体主义倾向的说法是一致的。此外，很大一部分犹太人参与了特定的犹太团体，这些团体具有这些宗教邪教的许多特征，我认为包括当今世界的正统派、正统犹太人、保守派犹太人和犹太复国主义团体。当然，在传统社会中，所有犹太人都是东正教徒。

此外，Sirkin 和 Grellong（1988）发现，与对比犹太家庭相比，来自犹太家庭的邪教成员拥有更多虔诚的亲戚。尽管事实相反，犹太家庭实际上比邪教成员的家庭更加虔诚，但这种情况还是发生了。这些发现与邪教成员身份受遗传变异影响的假设高度一致：邪教成员不成比例地来自相对不守规矩的家庭，但他们却具有强烈的家族倾向，倾向于加入高度集体主义团体。这些邪教家庭相对缺乏宗教仪式，可能是因为他们更倾向于从事与传统宗教仪式不相容的知识、文化和政治活动。然而，这些文化活动未能给孩子们带来强烈的群体参与的心理感受，导致孩子们容易加入宗教邪教。

社会认同过程、民族中心主义和集体主义倾向显然是犹太教作为群体进化策略的核心，但它们在反犹太主义现象中也至关重要。在第 3 章至第 5 章中，我将论证反犹太运动的几个历史上重要的例子已经引发了高度集体主义的外邦运动，这些运动在某些关键方面是犹太教的镜像。

让我们去与我们周围的国家立约；因为自从我们与他们分离以来，许多邪恶就临到了我们。 （前哈斯蒙尼时代失败的同化主义运动的纲领：《马可前书》1:11）

每当任何国家的犹太人数量达到饱和点时，该国都会对他们做出反应。 。 。 。 [这个]反应。 。 。不能被视为普通或粗俗意义上的反犹太主义；它是犹太移民的普遍社会和经济伴随物，我们无法摆脱它。 （哈伊姆·魏茨曼， 试验和错误，1949，90）

多年来，[反犹太主义]表现出了非凡的坚持和复兴的能力。 。 。 。 （阿尔伯特·林德曼， 被指控的犹太人，1991，280）

反犹太主义的根源具有普遍性，但又根深蒂固、难以理解。 （亨利·卡门， 西班牙宗教裁判所，1965，15）

最终 。 。 。没有任何其他国家的苦难可以与犹太人经历的独特性相提并论，而且不仅仅是在纳粹时期。确实如此，不仅因为所带来的痛苦数量巨大，而且还因为随着时间的推移，这种痛苦会令人恐惧地反复出现，这使得它具有完全不可避免的特征。 （雅各布·卡茨，“反犹太主义的误读”，1983 年，44）

1936 年，哈伊姆·魏茨曼 (Chaim Weizmann) 观察到，“世界似乎被分为两部分——犹太人无法居住的地方和犹太人无法进入的地方”（Abella & Troper 1981, 51）。魏茨曼的评论说明了大屠杀及其前几年的一个显着方面：反犹太主义在欧洲、北美、北非、中东和拉丁美洲普遍存在（例如，古巴在大屠杀中所扮演的角色）。 圣路易 事件）是谴责犹太人进行纳粹种族灭绝的一个重要因素（Breitman & Kraut 1987）。许多专家认为，公开谴责纳粹暴行不仅在德国，而且在被占领地区（在这些地区，与纳粹合作消灭犹太人的现象很常见）以及中立国家和地区之间，都承担着严重的政治和军事责任。西方盟友。在此期间，美国的反犹太主义“恶毒而普遍”（Breitman & Kraut 1987, 80），是战前和战争期间严格限制犹太移民的一个重要因素。正如 Abella 和 Troper (1982) 在他们的书中所叙述的那样，加拿大也是如此 没有太多——标题来自加拿大一位高级移民官员的一份声明，该声明恰当地总结了加拿大的政策。纳粹在宣传中利用了这种非常普遍的反犹太主义，例如，向北非的穆斯林通报在那里定居犹太难民的计划，并坚持任何允许犹太儿童离开德国势力范围的协议都要求他们去英国，而不是巴勒斯坦，并且该协议必须通过下议院的决议公开批准。犹太压力团体承认反犹太主义在促使拒绝犹太人方面发挥了作用，例如，用普世主义术语宣传支持难民的广告，而不提及难民将是犹太人。

这些事件是反犹太主义普遍存在的相当引人注目的例子。反犹太主义的社会认同理论与反犹太主义将成为人类社会的一个非常普遍的特征的假设高度吻合，原因如下：（1）犹太文化分离主义导致犹太人和外邦人对外群体产生刻板的消极态度成员和外群体的文化； (2) 群体之间的资源和生殖竞争一直是犹太人/外邦人关系的一个共同组成部分； （3）由于犹太人群体内的合作和利他主义，以及优生和文化实践往往导致犹太人具有较高的智力水平和资源获取能力，因此犹太人非常善于与外邦人进行资源竞争（创伤后应激障碍，CH。 5）。此外，他们还擅长其他活动，例如影响文化、发展政治和知识运动以及倡导具体政策，例如移民政策，这些活动会导致与部分外邦人口的利益冲突。

这种反犹太主义观点与犹太史学和护教学的一个重要方面背道而驰，后者试图表明反犹太主义是西方特有的现象。或者它是基督教宗教意识形态某些独特且不幸的方面的结果；或者说它是资本主义社会中犹太人独特的社会阶级形象的结果；甚至认为这是病态亲子关系和性压抑的结果。相反，在西方和非西方社会、基督教和非基督教社会、前资本主义、资本主义和社会主义社会中，都有反犹太主义的证据。即使在最有凝聚力和运作良好的家庭中也会发生这种情况。

《摩西五经》的祭司们很清楚，反犹太主义将成为散居海外的犹太人的普遍特征：

主必将你分散在万族之中，从地的一端直到地的另一端。 。 。 。在这些国家中，你不得安宁，你的脚掌也不得安宁。但主必使你心胆战栗，眼目失明，灵魂衰弱。你的生命将悬而未决；你必昼夜惧怕，生命没有保障。到了早晨，你会说：“要是均匀就好了！”到了晚上你会说：“要是早上就好了！” （申命记 28:64-67）

《申命记》和《以赛亚书》中的仆人段落一直被犹太人解释为流亡中的犹太人所遭受的苦难（Neusner 1965, 27）：“他被人蔑视和拒绝；多受痛苦，常经忧患；他被人藐视，我们也不尊重他”（赛 53:3）。事实上，佩利 (Peli, 1991, 110) 在讨论米德拉什人对历代反犹太主义的看法时指出，“他们将犹太恐惧症视为不可避免的现实，一方面犹太人必须学会忍受而不是绝望地放弃，另一方面试图‘纠正’对方的原因是徒劳的。”

不论其历史真实性如何，《出埃及记》中的事件都表明，《摩西五经》的祭司编纂者强烈意识到，数量众多且强大的寄居团体会激起敌意和对忠诚的担忧。以色列人“生养众多，繁衍增多，极其强盛；那地就充满了他们”（出 1:7）。法老接着说道：“看哪，以色列人比我们强大；来吧，让我们明智地对待他们，以免他们繁殖，结果，当我们发生任何战争时，他们也会加入我们的敌人，与我们作战，并将他们从这片土地上赶走。” （出埃及记 1：9-10）。结果是一系列旨在减少埃及以色列人口的措施，包括对所有男孩进行奴役和杀婴。在《以斯帖记》和《但以理书》中，文化分离主义导致了反犹太行为，但最终上帝通过向敌人复仇或为犹太人提供巨大的物质成功来奖励坚定的犹太人。

从公元前 5 世纪开始在埃及的象殖民地，当犹太人充当塞琉古帝国、托勒密帝国和波斯帝国的外来统治精英与臣民之间的中间人时，流行的反犹太主义发生了许多例子（Bickerman 1988）。正如公元前 87 年的昔兰尼事件一样，外来统治者政治命运的变化常常导致反犹太暴力。

在前基督教罗马帝国期间，官方对散居犹太人的迫害很少见，但在知识分子的著作和公民的行为中都有大量反犹太主义的证据。民众的敌意在埃及尤为明显，尤其是在亚历山大，约瑟夫斯（犹太人的战争，2:487）指出自亚历山大大帝时代（公元前 4 世纪）起，犹太人和外邦人之间就存在“持续的冲突”。紧张局势在公元前 2 世纪下半叶加剧，大概反映了犹太人口的增加，并最终在公元前 1989 世纪达到了稳定状态（Gabba 636, 1975）。 Sevenster (169, XNUMX) 指出，“人们的印象是，通常只需要最轻微的挑衅就可以释放一种始终存在的、潜在的紧张气氛。”

一般来说，罗马政府保护犹太人免受整个帝国民众敌意反复高涨的影响（Schürer 1986, 132）。然而，在公元后的犹太人叛乱期间。 66-70年，政府对反犹太行为的控制暂时失效；叙利亚和巴勒斯坦的一些地区发生了针对犹太人的自发屠杀，其中包括凯撒利亚的非犹太公民杀害了两万名犹太人。在亚历山大，反犹太分子挑起的骚乱导致五万名犹太人死亡（Feldman 1993, 118）。叛乱后，安提阿公民多次提出驱逐犹太人的请求，但均遭到拒绝；亚历山大港公民多次提出剥夺犹太人公民权的请求，但均遭到拒绝。最后，有证据表明，从 4 世纪开始，大众、知识分子、机构和政府支持的反犹太主义急剧增加（见第 3 章）。

反犹太主义也发生在非西方社会。关于古代波斯，Baron (1952 II, 176; 另见 Johnson 1988, 163) 指出，“总的来说，犹太人对波斯比对罗马更有利[在罗马-波斯战争期间]。 。 。 。然而，他们不乏在波斯人的暴行中饱受痛苦的时刻，他们寻求罗马的胜利。” （该评论也反映了下面要讨论的不忠主题的一个方面。）格兰特（1973，288）指出，经过公元 5 世纪初的一段宽容时期，继任的波斯国王对犹太人“非常敌视”，导致大规模移民和犹太学院暂时关闭。

从穆罕默德时代到现代，穆斯林社会中反复出现反犹太态度和行为。犹太人是受到官方认可的 迪米，他们可以生活在穆斯林中间，但处于一种屈辱和从属的地位——“在伊斯兰社会体系中除了二等公民之外什么都不是”(Bosworth 1982, 49)。 “古兰经的话 杜尔 和 迪拉，意思是卑微、屈辱、卑鄙，经常被穆斯林作家用来表示谦卑，这种谦卑被认为适合非穆斯林，尤其是国家的犹太臣民”（Lewis 1984，32）。犹太人遭受大屠杀和骚乱、个人手中不受惩罚的暴力、奢侈法、徭役劳动、穿着特色服装、强制隔离、在帝国城市赤脚行走、没收税、限制犹太房屋和犹太教堂规模的法律、宵禁，在清真寺附近时表现出屈服的迹象，以及“对‘异教徒’无所不在的敌意气氛”的态度（Stillman 1979, 73）。还有几个“高度仪式化地贬低犹太人”的例子（Stillman 1979, 84）。[24]特别参见 Stillman (1979, 368-69; 416-17)，了解阿拉伯地区仪式化的反犹太习俗的例子。仪式化的退化现象在也门和摩洛哥最为常见；前者持续了十三个世纪，没有出现重大中断，直到也门犹太人前往以色列。有关也门犹太人受压迫的讨论，请参阅 Patai (1986)、Ahroni (1986) 和 Nini (1991)，这显然是穆斯林世界最极端的压迫。 总体而言，18世纪中叶至19世纪末这段时期达到了最低点，当时出现了“赤贫、无知和不安全的明显景象”（Lewis 1984，164）。[25]事实上，有一些迹象表明，穆斯林土地上的犹太人在身体上受到穆斯林东道主的恐吓，以至于他们异常恐惧：一位 19 世纪奥斯曼土地上的英国观察家将英国犹太人的大胆与奥斯曼犹太人进行了对比，后者的“胆怯”太过分了，他们会在孩子举起的手面前逃跑”（Lewis 1984, 164）。在摩洛哥和奥斯曼帝国地区，即使是年幼的孩子也可以向犹太人吐口水或用石头打他们，而不必担心遭到报复，一位 1836 年访问土耳其的游客指出，“东方犹太人有一种压抑、无生气的表情。 。 。 。奥斯曼人对犹太人的轻蔑仇恨是无法表达的”（in Lewis 1984, 165）。 在此期间，整个阿拉伯世界发生了多起驱逐和屠杀犹太人的事件。

值得注意的是，刘易斯（Lewis，1984，33）将穆斯林对犹太人的态度描述为蔑视，而不是仇恨、恐惧或嫉妒，大概是因为穆斯林的反犹太习俗通常阻止犹太人获得会导致嫉妒、恐惧的地位。 ，或仇恨。当犹太人“超越自我”（第 53 页）时，就会发生针对犹太人的暴力行为，这表明如果犹太人试图改变他们的二等地位，蔑视很快就会变成仇恨。反犹太暴力通常发生在犹太人在外来统治精英和受压迫的土著居民之间形成中间层的相对短暂时期之后（见 创伤后应激障碍，CH。 5）。例如，除了作为蒙古人和伊朗臣民之间的中间人的优势时期外，犹太人被迫过着完全堕落的生活。当蒙古人皈依伊斯兰教时，犹太人的命运由于本土的敌意而衰落。外群体的仪式不洁的态度得到了回报：“犹太人不仅是异教徒，值得被鄙视和羞辱；他们也是异教徒。”他们在仪式上是不洁净的——他们的触摸就带来了污染”（Lewis 1984, 151）。[26]Stillman (1979) 将犹太人在摩洛哥的待遇描述为介于极端宽容和不宽容之间，其中最好的时期发生在外国统治时期，当时犹太人受到非本土统治阶级的青睐：梅里尼德人（13-15世纪）以及20世纪的法国人。 1465 年，一场民众叛乱结束了梅里尼德王朝。 Mellah假期 非斯（犹太区）几乎被完全消灭。在接下来的时期，在本土穆斯林瓦塔西王朝和沙里凡王朝的统治下，一些享有特权的犹太人受雇于政府，但其余犹太人被迫忍受这里简要描述的极其严酷的“高度仪式化的退化”。直到 1912 年法国征服摩洛哥后，摩洛哥犹太人的地位才发生重大变化。 同样，随着统治精英越来越融入本土人口，犹太人作为外来统治精英和奥斯曼帝国受压迫臣民之间的中间人的命运也随之下降（Shaw 1991）。

此外，近代对犹太人制裁的解除有时会导致犹太人的​​崛起，与解放后欧洲犹太人的崛起并行，并出现相应的反犹太反应。犹太人不再隐藏他们的财富，“过去的仆人和奴隶已经成为阿拉伯人的主人，至少在商业和金融方面是如此。他们曾经受到蔑视，现在却在政府中占据了受人尊敬的职位”（Stillman 1979, 418）。结果是反犹太主义有所增加（Lewis 1984, 171, 184–185）。

因此，尽管穆斯林反犹太主义往往不会以对犹太人的恐惧和仇恨为特征（除了在允许犹太人进行经济竞争的时期），但穆斯林反犹太主义的长期影响远比西方反犹太主义更具破坏性。 。事实上，西方反犹太主义和穆斯林反犹太主义之间很可能存在质的差异（另见 Cohen 1994），因为中东社会往往被组织成不可渗透的群体（例如，Coon 1958, 153；Eickelman 1981， 157–174）。这些社会中的个体具有强烈的群体认同感和群体边界感，通常伴随着发型或服装等外部标记，不同的群体在不同的地区定居，但他们与同样同质的群体保持同质性。[27]Bosworth (1982, 38) 做了一个有趣的评论：犹太人 迪米 在早期伊斯兰时期因其“种族排他性”而受到鄙视，这表明即使在分段社会中，外群体的排他性也受到负面评价。 正如在 创伤后应激障碍 （第 8 章），这些围绕离散群体组织起来的“分段”社会似乎比西方个人主义社会更有效地将犹太人置于不构成竞争威胁的无能为力的地位。有趣的是，Dumont (1982, 223) 描述了 19 世纪末土耳其反犹太主义因资源竞争加剧而增加。在许多城镇中，犹太人、基督徒和穆斯林表面上生活得很和谐，甚至生活在同一地区，“但最轻微的火花就足以点燃导火索”（第222页）。对犹太人来说，基于不可渗透群体的分割社会当然不是田园诗般的地方。

西方社会典型的个人主义是犹太教作为有凝聚力的群体战略的理想环境，但随着犹太人在政治、经济和人口方面日益成功，西方社会倾向于发展集体主义群体结构，将犹太人视为可憎的外群体。创伤后应激障碍，CH。 8).在第3-5章中，我从这个角度讨论了西方反犹太主义的三个重要事件：4世纪罗马帝国反犹太主义的制度化、15世纪开始的伊比利亚宗教裁判所以及德国的国家社会主义运动从 1933 年到 1945 年。

正如第一章所指出的，反犹太著作常常具有夸张和虚假的特点，这一事实与进化论的观点非常一致。一个特别有趣的例子是对外邦人仪式谋杀（“血腥诽谤”）​​的指控，这种指控在犹太历史上的几次独立转世中都曾出现过。血腥诽谤是针对犹太人的一项非常古老的指控，最早发生于公元前 1 世纪。从公元前一世纪开始就变得相当普遍（加巴 2，1989）。加巴合理地认为，这一指控可能是外邦人对犹太人厌世态度的具体表达。例如，这种联系在 644 世纪颇具影响力的反Converso 辩论家阿隆索·德·埃斯皮纳 (Alonso de Espina) 的著作中很明显，他解释了他所声称的犹太人杀害基督徒的普遍做法，其动机是犹太人对基督徒的仇恨 (Netanyahu 15, 1995) ）。此外，出于其他原因反犹太的人可能倾向于相信这一指控。 Lindemann (831, 1991) 认为，在 52 世纪，此类指控往往真正反映了对犹太人经济统治的担忧。

更有趣的是，反犹太著作有着悠久的历史，考虑到上述反犹太主义的理论视角，其主题是完全可以理解的。反犹太主义的显着之处在于，在不同的地方和很长的历史时期对犹太人的抱怨有着压倒性的相似性。这些抱怨可能被视为独立的复制品，它们共同证明了这样一种观点：虽然夸大和谎言很可能会掩盖这些态度，但反犹太主义著作的几个突出主题在犹太教作为一种群体进化策略的现实中有着坚实的基础。 。

因此，反犹太主义的历史是哈里斯（Harris，1994，214）研究结果的扩展版本，尽管德国反犹太主义在 1850 年代至 1920 年代之间在政治组织和加剧或减轻反犹太主义的外部因素方面经历了巨大的变化在特定时期，对犹太人的抱怨却出奇地相似。这些主题，包括犹太人的“异类”、犹太人的经济、政治或文化统治，认为犹太人拥有消极的人格特质，使他们愿意对外邦人进行不择手段的经济剥削，以及犹太人的不忠诚，这些主题继续在反犹太主义运动中占据显着地位。 -世界各地的犹太主义（参见，例如， 全球反犹太主义，1994 年）。尽管这些主题在这里将被单独考虑，但它们经常同时出现，就像在两次世界大战期间的波兰一样，犹太人被广泛认为是“一个‘外国’经济负担、多余的、道德上具有破坏性的因素”（in Hagen 1996, 374） ）。

犹太人经常在侨民社会中作为一个独立的外来群体出现。对分离性和外群体凝聚力的看法往往与反犹太主义联系在一起，这种现象在社会认同理论的基础上是完全可以预料到的。关于群体间接触的研究的一致发现是，使定义群体的社会类别更加突出，有利于群体间的分化，并促进来自不同群体的成员之间的负面社会互动（参见 Brewer & Miller 1984；Doise & Sinclair 1973；Miller、Brewer & Edwards 1985） ）。

从古代世界开始，外邦人一直对犹太人的孤立性和宗派性抱有负面看法。 “由于他们特殊的生活方式，即使在国际化的首都，他们也是一种奇怪的元素。那个时代的文学反映了皇城受教育阶层普遍存在的半轻蔑、半敌视的态度”（Baron 1952，II，103）。

犹太分离主义与希腊罗马社会的同化、普世主义趋势相冲突：

随着希腊关于人类一体性的思想传播开来，犹太人认为非犹太人在仪式上是不洁的，并禁止与他们结婚，这被认为是反人道主义的。 “厌世”这个词经常被使用。 。 。 。希腊人看到了他们的 紫杉烯，即文明宇宙。 。 。在他们的思想盛行的地方，作为一个多种族、多民族的社会，那些拒绝接受它的人就是人类的敌人。 （约翰逊 1988 年，133–134）

从埃及历史学家阿布德拉 (Abdera) 的赫卡泰乌斯 (Hecataeus of Abdera)（公元前三世纪初）（他评论犹太人“厌世且敌视外国人”[in Gabba 1989, 629]）开始，有一长串希腊罗马作家的基本批评尽管一些作家（包括赫卡忒乌斯）以其他方式钦佩犹太人，但它以犹太分离主义、仇外心理和厌世主义为中心，并伴有强烈的内部团结感。

也许古代世界最著名的反犹太著作是塔西佗的著作，他认为犹太教“反对其他人所奉行的一切”（历史，5.4，659）。

尽管他们对其他人类抱有敌人般的仇恨，但他们对自己却非常诚实，并且随时准备表现出同情心。他们吃饭时分开坐，睡觉时分开，虽然作为一个民族，他们特别容易产生淫欲，但他们却避免与外国妇女发生性关系；他们之间没有什么是非法的。[28]我们尚不清楚塔西佗所说的“在它们之间没有任何东西是非法的”的想法是什么。他很可能指的是犹太人的一夫多妻制、娶寡嫂制婚姻和近亲婚姻（叔叔侄女婚姻和与堂兄弟姐妹结婚），这些习俗对罗马公民来说是非法的（见MacDonald 1990； 创伤后应激障碍，Ch。 8）。 割礼被他们视为与其他男人区别的标志。那些皈依其宗教的人接受了这种做法，并首先向他们灌输这一教训：蔑视所有神明，否认自己的国家，蔑视父母、孩子和兄弟。 （历史，5.5， 659-660）[29]另一个著名的引言来自 Philostratus (1980, 341) 提亚纳的阿波罗尼乌斯的生平：“犹太人长期以来不仅反抗罗马人，而且反抗人类；一个使自己的生活变得疏离和不可调和的种族，不能与其他人类分享餐桌上的欢乐，也不能参加他们的奠酒、祈祷或牺牲，他们与我们之间的鸿沟比我们与其他人之间的鸿沟还要大。最遥远的印度群岛的苏萨或巴克特拉。”

宗族主义的主题也出现在西塞罗公元前 59 年的控诉中。在弗拉库斯的审判期间：“看看他们是多么一致地团结在一起，他们在政治上有多大的影响力”（普罗·弗拉科， 66）。尤维纳尔抱怨说，如果徒步旅行者没有自己的信仰，犹太人就不会为他指明道路，也不会引导口渴的人到泉水处。[30]18 世纪的英国历史学家爱德华·吉本 (Edward Gibbon) 在他的著作中反映了这些古老的评估 罗马帝国的衰落 （第 16、78 章）犹太人是“一种不合群的宗教”（第 80 页），“不仅是罗马政府的敌人，也是人类的敌人”。吉本对他所描述的古代世界犹太人的狂热以及他们对他人的敌意感到特别震惊：

不再重复已经提到的罗马王子和总督对耶路撒冷圣殿的崇敬，我们只会注意到圣殿和城市的毁灭伴随着各种可能激怒征服者思想的情况，并以政治正义和公共安全的最似是而非的理由授权宗教迫害。从尼禄统治到安东尼努斯·庇护统治时期，犹太人发现了罗马统治的强烈不耐烦，屡屡爆发最猛烈的屠杀和叛乱。人类对他们在埃及、塞浦路斯和昔兰尼等城市所犯下的可怕暴行感到震惊，他们在那里与毫无戒心的当地人保持着危险的友谊。我们很想赞扬军团的武装对一群狂热分子进行的严厉报复，他们可怕而轻信的迷信似乎使他们不仅成为罗马政府的不共戴天的敌人，而且成为人类的不共戴天的敌人。犹太人的热情得到了这样一种观点的支持：他们向偶像崇拜的主人纳税是违法的。他们从古老的神谕中得到了谄媚的承诺，一位征服者的弥赛亚很快就会出现，注定要打破他们的束缚，将地上的帝国赋予天上的宠儿。正是通过宣布自己是他们期待已久的拯救者，并号召亚伯拉罕的所有后裔维护以色列的希望，著名的巴科切巴斯召集了一支强大的军队，用这支军队在两年的时间里抵抗了以色列的势力。哈德良皇帝。 对于 5 世纪诗人 Rutilius Manatianus 来说，犹太人是“肮脏的种族”（奥布斯卡埃纳人）。 “他们的心比他们的信条更冷酷”（Wilken 1968, 64），这是对犹太人对待外群体成员的另一条评论。

古代犹太作家评论说，犹太人经常因与外邦人“不交往”而受到批评（例如《马可二书》2:14）。斐洛和约瑟夫斯提供了护教著作，旨在说服外邦人以积极的眼光看待犹太分离主义。例如，在 犹太人的古物 约瑟夫斯（Josephus，1989，XVI，174）指出，他会告诉其他人“他们不应该将积极制度的差异视为疏远的充分原因，而应该[与我们一起]追求美德和正直。”

文化分离主义常常与经济剥削的主题相结合，一直是历史上对犹太教批评中反复出现的主题。 15 世纪，宗教裁判所的重要煽动者弗雷·阿隆索 (Fray Alonso) 将西班牙的皈依者描述为“在高利贷方面没有良心，说他们在破坏埃及人”的秘密犹太人（Lea 1906-1907，I，152） ），这一评论指的是以色列人在出埃及期间的行为（出埃及记 12:36），并清楚地表明犹太人自觉地将西班牙人视为外国人。卡门（Kamen，1985）引用了历史学家帕伦西亚在 15 世纪所写的文章，称皈依者“作为‘一个独立的民族’行事，他们在任何地方都不会同意与旧基督徒一起行动”（第 20 页）。 15 世纪历史学家安德烈斯·贝尔纳尔德斯 (Andrés Bernáldez) 补充道，犹太人不仅将基督徒视为可剥削的外来群体，而且对自己的同类也非常慷慨：“他们是一个非常狡猾的民族，通常靠收益和高利贷过活。基督徒的开支，其中许多穷人在短时间内变得富有。他们彼此之间、彼此之间都非常仁慈。如果有需要，他们称之为理事会 睡衣，为他们提供。他们是自己人民的好主人”（Walsh 1930，368）。

在卡尔·马克思的 祖尔·裘德弗雷格（Zur Judenfrage） 犹太人被描绘成一个从事对外邦人经济剥削的宗族、反社会和外来群体。所有这些元素都是整个 19 世纪反犹太主义著作的典型特征（Rose 1990），并且可以在 1870 年至 1933 年期间的德国舆论中找到。例如，哲学家约翰·戈特利布·费希特（Johann Gottleib Fichte）认为犹太分离主义表明“ “无爱”——拒绝融入历史和热爱人类。犹太人“是一个被最牢固的人类纽带——宗教——排除在我们的膳食、快乐和心与心之间甜蜜交流之外的民族”（《Rose》，1992年，第8页）。对于哲学家叔本华来说，犹太人“现在是并且仍然是一个外国的东方种族”（参见 Rose 1992, 92），由于他们的部落血缘关系和团结性，他们无法与其他民族融合（参见 Katz 1986, 11）。尽管通常不是公开的反犹太主义，但从康德开始一直延伸到 19 世纪初期的新教圣经学术研究（见第 20 章）的 7 世纪德国著作的一个主要主题是犹太神之间的对比，其特点是部落主义和民族主义，与普遍主义和爱的基督教上帝相对。[31]相反（1990, 152）指出，克尔凯郭尔和托尔斯泰对于特殊主义犹太教和普世主义基督教之间的对比也有类似的看法。用托尔斯泰的话来说，“在福音中，我们不仅禁止杀人，甚至禁止对任何人怀有恶意； 《摩西五经》中：杀戮、杀戮、杀戮妇女、儿童和牲畜。 。 。 。在福音里，所有人都是兄弟；在摩西五经中，除了犹太人之外，所有人都是敌人”（inrather 1990，152）。 反犹太主义种族理论家，例如柯特·米凯利斯 (Curt Michaelis)，也关注犹太人的氏族主义，并将其归因于犹太人的种族自豪感。拉森斯托尔茨）并通过犹太人选择的概念在心理层面上表现出来。 拉森斯托尔茨 已成为犹太人的遗传特征，并导致反犹太主义：“ 拉森斯托尔茨 以最尖锐的形式促进种族仇恨——其后果是持久的种族战争。 。 。 。犹太人主要是与全世界作战。因此，很自然地，全世界都反对犹太人”（in Efron 1994, 170）。同样，在他的经典作品中 犹太人与现代资本主义德国经济学家维尔纳·桑巴特（Werner Sombart，1913，240）将犹太教总结为“一个独立的群体，因此是分离的——这来自于最早的古代。所有国家都因对他人的仇恨而感到震惊。”

犹太人经常被描述为“国中之国”（例如，Beauvois 1986, 88，专门写了传统的波兰）。德国人保罗·德·拉加德（Paul de LaGarde，1827-1891）指出，“我们根本无法容忍一个国家中的一个国家”（in Krausnick 1968，9）。认为犹太人是居住在德国的外来民族的观点并不仅限于知识分子：20 年至 1,723 年间，来自巴伐利亚社区的 1849 份反对犹太人解放的请愿书中，超过 1850% 强调了这一点。 人民之民 主题，有时将犹太人称为“东方人”或亚洲人，并经常使用“道德、习俗和宗教上的外国”或“血统、言论和宗教上的外国”等短语（Harris 1994，137）。 （在此期间，理查德·瓦格纳（Richard Wagner）将犹太人的讲话描述为“吱吱作响、吱吱作响、嗡嗡作响的鼻烟声”[in Rose 1992, 81]）。哈里斯 (Harris, 1994, 123) 将巴伐利亚请愿书描述为“自发的、基础极其广泛且真诚的”——实际上是对犹太外国人普遍存在的负面态度的独立复制。许多请愿书“直截了当地指出犹太人永远无法被同化”（第 137 页）。在德国，外国人的观念尤其针对来自东欧的犹太移民，他们保留了穿着独特的服装、发型和说希伯来语的分离主义做法。

在德国获得解放后，犹太人继续保持分离状态，尽管存在“以同化换取解放的不成文契约”（Katz 1986b，148），但仍保持着凝聚力。 “犹太人非凡的社会凝聚力和相互团结。 。 。经常被观察和评论，因为保留犹太人的独立性与这样的期望背道而驰，即犹太人至少可以进入某些社会途径，从而分散并失去亚社会、国中之国的特征（正如口号拥有它）”（第 148 页）。[32]在某些情况下，这些看法是基于个人经历。德国反犹太主义者威廉·马尔（Wilhelm Marr，1819-1904 年）在描述他作为唯一的非犹太人在两个不同的犹太金融办公室办公室工作的早期经历时，强调了他的雇主的宗派性。他在父亲的影响下获得了第一份工作，父亲因在剧院扮演犹太人而闻名。马尔表示，他被解雇了，而能力较差的犹太人则被保留。 “我的犹太同事确实是[很棒的人]。但 种族问题 即使对于这些犹太人来说，这一点也具有决定性的重要性。 ‘goi’必须尽可能多地牺牲并纵容他”（Zimmerman 1986，125；文本中的斜体）。马尔还讲述了一个事件，其中一位年轻的革命熟人因受洗和穿得像基督徒而受到他细心的父亲的斥责。该男子不同意马尔拒绝父亲的建议，他说：“你不知道保护孩子的规则。” 我们犹太人之间的联系。 我们谁都无法打破 铁环”。马尔回答说海因里希·海涅已经脱离了，但那人（预言性地）说：“等着瞧吧。海涅也会回归原样 犹太”（Zimmerman 1986，132；文本中斜体）。事实上，海涅在他生命的最后阶段确实发展了一种更大的犹太意识，他说“我毫不掩饰我的犹太教，我没有回归犹太教，因为我没有离开它”(in Rose 1990, 167)。 因此保罗·德·拉加德“带着恐惧和嫉妒”。 。 。认为犹太人是一个骄傲的、不可战胜的民族。 。 。 。犹太人拥有德国人所缺乏的那种团结，这使他们能够“至少在欧洲成为非犹太人的主人”（Stern 1961, 60；内部引用 de LaGarde）。犹太分裂主义和同族婚姻不仅经常受到反犹太主义者的批评，而且还受到受人尊敬的外邦知识分子的批评，包括西奥多·蒙森、海因里希·冯·特雷奇克和威利·赫尔帕奇，以及沃尔特·拉特瑙等著名犹太人（Ragins 1980, 16-17, 77；Niewyk 1980，97）。同样，在奥地利，同化的犹太观察家评论道“[犹太人]顽固地强调种族团结”（Rosenblit 1984，8）。

反犹太主义者通常认为犹太人为了共同的目标而共同努力，这反映了犹太人的群体团结。 1875 年，一位评论员写道：“就目前情况而言，银行、股票和证券交易所的特权都是犹太人的特权。因此，他们受到犹太媒体、犹太学者和犹太代表的全力保护和推动”（Pulzer 1964，88）。德国反犹太主义者西奥多·弗里奇 (Theodor Fritsch) 讲述了第一次世界大战期间一家制造商谈判军事合同的经历：“令他惊讶的是，他遇到了……”。 。 。希伯来人——以及更多的希伯来人。 。 。 。瓦尔特·拉特瑙 (Walther Rathenau) 先生周围坐着他部落的其他人，正在安排事情。 。 。 。犹太企业几乎总是受到优先考虑，这并不奇怪”（Lindemann 1997，404）。

反犹太主义者普遍注意到富有的犹太资本家和犹太激进分子之间的密切关系（Mosse 1970, 48）。事实上，像雅各布·希夫这样的美国犹太资本家确实资助了旨在推翻沙皇的俄罗斯激进运动，并且很可能产生了相当大的影响（Goldstein 1990, 26-27; Szajkowski 1967）。[33]西方犹太社区的领导人高度致力于推翻沙皇。例如，1907年，卢西恩·沃尔夫（Lucien Wolf）写信给AJ委员会的路易斯·马歇尔（Louis Marshall），“在整个俄罗斯-犹太人问题上唯一要做的就是对俄罗斯政府进行持久且不可调和的战争”（Szajowski 1967，8）。 “无论是在革命期间还是在革命垮台之后，西方犹太领导人都积极参与了有利于俄罗斯自由主义和革命运动的一般行动”（Szajkowski 1967，9）。 他们的活动可能更多地是为了结束沙皇的反犹太主义，而不是支持激进的政治意识形态，但对具有如此不同政治观点的犹太人之间勾结的看法取决于他们的可信度取决于犹太人在两个群体中的代表性过高：“从解放开始，犹太人因寻求讨好、进入并统治现有社会而受到指责；同时，也因为试图彻底摧毁它。这两项指控都有一定的真实性”（Johnson 1988, 345）。

在此期间，对犹太人的类似看法在美国和英国很常见。亨利·詹姆斯对纽约市犹太人聚居区的以下精彩描述给人留下了这样的印象：挤在狭小的空间里的人们的强烈能量、迅速增长的儿童数量以及他们有凝聚力的“种族群体意识”，再加上对他们未来影响的模糊担忧：

以色列一旦起步，这里的景象就每一步都令人毛骨悚然，景象和声音无可辩驳，毫无疑问，是一个突破了一切界限的犹太人。 。 。 。孩子们首先蜂拥而至——这里是乘法的复仇； 。 。 。场景中充斥着人类的存在，这是我在寻求提神时从未遇到过的。此外，毫无疑问，产生这种印象的部分原因是强烈的犹太色彩的直接结果。我认为，这使得犹太人个体更加专注，比任何其他随机注意到的人更能节省地拥有他身上的一切——或者更确切地说，这只是种族无与伦比的力量所允许的砍成无数细小的碎片而不损失比赛质量？我相信，自然历史上有一些奇怪的小动物，比如蛇或蠕虫，当它们被切成碎片时，它们会心满意足地蠕动着走开，并像在整体中一样完整地生活在片段中。因此，纽约贫民窟的居民，堆积如玻璃吹制者桌子上的碎片一样厚，每个人都像细小的玻璃颗粒一样，拥有以色列整个坚硬闪光的个人份额。 。 。 。他们都是为了种族，而不是因为理性：那种过度的耸人听闻的含义，尤其是在一些老男人和老女人的脸上。 。 。只能是以色列机械地推进的过去的聚集。与此同时，历史的这一章也是如此。 。 。似乎推动，是一件让“种族”幽灵再次像骷髅一样坐在宴会上的事情。就好像我能看到幽灵的笑容，而当时的谈话则全面地向我提供了希伯来人征服纽约的事实和数据、章节和诗句。 。 。 。谁又能说得清呢。 。 。以色列的天才可能会或可能不会真正“做什么”？ 。 。 。无论我们如何了解[美国的语言]，我们肯定不会了解英语——无论在任何意义上，都存在现有的文学衡量标准。 （詹姆斯 1907, 131–132, 135, 139）

大量犹太人的到来将对美国社会产生深远的变革性影响这一模糊的预感似乎也是其他 19 世纪美国贵族的反犹太主义相当低的背后原因，这些贵族包括亨利·亚当斯和布鲁克斯·亚当斯以及亨利·卡伯特·洛奇 (Cunliffe 1965) ；Higham 1984，109；Podhorez 1986）。美国著名社会学家爱德华·A·罗斯（Edward A. Ross，1914, 143）的担忧或许最为明确，他指出犹太人“因强烈的种族意识而团结在一起”，并且“[他们]已经在各个财富层次上都有了出色的表现，在美国的权力和影响力。”在这句话的反面，罗斯将一张来自印度的印度教徒的照片与一张俄罗斯犹太人移民的照片并置，以强调犹太移民的古怪外表。[34]尽管如此，罗斯还是希望犹太人从长远来看能够完全同化，包括通过通婚。他反对犹太移民源于他的信念，即基于资源竞争和消极的犹太人特质的反犹太主义正在增加，如果允许移民继续不受限制，将会导致暴力的反犹太骚乱和立法。

很久以后，亨利·普拉特·费尔柴尔德 (Henry Pratt Fairchild，1947) 也断言，犹太人未能同化，他们的存在阻碍了美国国籍意识，因为犹太人的习俗不同，比如节日不同。费尔柴尔德还强调了犹太人的优越感，他们对犹太婚姻伴侣的强烈偏好，以及他们对婚姻中的经济考虑的公开担忧，因为这会引起外邦人的敌意。费尔柴尔德强烈地意识到，群体间的竞争和群体内的归属是犹太人和外邦人之间关系的特征：“我们的目的不是问为什么我们渴望优越感和渴望统治，为什么我们喜欢那些与我们相似的人，为什么我们喜欢被别人对待。”与与我们志趣相投的人在一起，为什么我们比我们自己的同胞更讨厌另一个群体成员的经济竞争，为什么对我们自己宗教的要求的奉献被视为虔诚，而不同崇拜者的类似忠诚被称为不宽容”（第 161 页）。

1888 年，英国一份犹太报纸发表社论如下：

如果贫穷的犹太人坚持将整条街道据为己有。 。 。由于他们的衣着、语言和举止的特殊性，他们可能会逃避人们的注意，因此，以他们为对象的庸俗偏见应该继续存在并得到加强，这有什么奇怪的吗？ (Alderman 1992, 138)

1905年，保守党首相A.J.贝尔福总结了这一时期广泛持有的观点如下：

很容易想象一种情况，在这种情况下，如果有大量的人，无论他们多么爱国、有能力和勤奋，无论他们多么投入到国家生活中，这都不会对国家的文明有利。 ，仍然是一个独立的民族，不仅持有与绝大多数同胞不同的宗教信仰，而且只是相互通婚。 (Alderman 1992, 133)[35]在同一时期，保守派政治活动家阿诺德·怀特抱怨说，毫无疑问，东欧犹太移民“属于一个种族，并且坚持一个宁愿远离我们国家生活主流的社区，避免与盎格鲁撒克逊人通婚” （Alderman 1992，123）。

资源竞争和经济统治的主题。 由于犹太人群体内的合作和利他主义，以及优生和文化实践往往导致犹太人具有高水平的智力和资源获取能力，犹太人非常善于与外邦人竞争资源。因此，反犹太主义写作常常关注资源和生殖竞争问题也就不足为奇了。然而，与经济资源竞争相关的问题在古代著作中相对较少出现，事实上，有人认为，至少在四世纪之前，犹太人在古典时期普遍被视为穷人（Kraabel 4, 1983；Sevenster 453, 1975；但是参见 Feldman 88, 1993)。

然而，一些学者认为古代反犹太主义是犹太分裂主义与政治权利要求相结合的结果（特别参见 Gager 1983）。正如 Schürer (1986, 131) 所指出的，“宗教与政治生活领域之间的划分对于古典时代来说是完全陌生的”。希腊人会尊重犹太人对自己的邪教的依恋，但不会容忍犹太人不承认该城市的官方邪教（Hengel 1989, 185–186；另见 Collins 1985, 175；Sevenster 1975, 171；Tcherikover 1959 年，371-377）。政治权利至少也有一些经济影响。因此，Hegermann (1989, 161) 指出，鉴于先前存在的敌对环境，犹太社区试图让其所有成员宣布公民，从而避免对非公民征税，导致了一个“严重的问题”。

此外，这一时期的一些反犹太主义评论可以被解释为涉及经济冲突（Baron 1952，I，383；Feldman 1993，107ff；Kraabel 1983，457）。尽管绝不是压倒性的，费尔德曼最令人信服的证据如下：一个片段暗示了对犹太人的普遍敌意，这与他们作为放债人的角色有关，也与试图摆脱对犹太人债务的人们引发的骚乱的具体实例有关；克劳迪斯·托勒密 (Claudius Ptolemy) 的著作中将犹太人描述为在贸易上成功、不择手段、奸诈的；提及犹太地区犹太人的财富，尤其是圣殿；塔西佗的评论（历史。 5.5）犹太人的财富因他们对其他犹太人的诚实和同情心而增加；塞尔苏斯（Celsus，公元 2 世纪）的评论是，犹太神承诺犹太人将富有、强大、繁衍成功，并将屠杀他们的敌人。[36]费尔德曼认为，知识分子的著作中很大程度上忽略了资源和再生产竞争，因为他们对经济在社会冲突中的作用知之甚少，也因为这一时期的知识分子来自社会阶层，他们很少受到犹太经济的威胁。和繁殖成功。费尔德曼指出，值得注意的是，我们没有听说反犹太主义与托勒密王朝时期犹太人作为收税员的角色联系在一起，因为这种角色在其他时期一直是反犹太主义的潜在根源。同样，尽管这一时期存在种族隔离的行会，但没有提到犹太和外邦工匠行会之间的竞争（Applebaum 1976，479ff）。犹太工匠行会和外邦工匠行会之间的竞争往往是后期反犹太主义的重要根源（例如，驱逐前的西班牙 [Beinart 1981] 和波兰 [Hundert 1992]；参见 创伤后应激障碍：第 5 章）。

生殖竞争也可能在古代反犹太主义中发挥了作用：“最重要的是。 。 。在整个帝国，人们普遍对犹太人的“外来”性格感到不满，这种不满情绪随着犹太人口的增长而达到了顶峰”（Baron 1952，I，191）。 “任何一个地区的犹太人群众越多，他们的自信和自信就越明显，外邦人民的怨恨就越深”（Baron 1952，I，209）。塔西佗还评论了犹太人“传播他们种族的热情”（历史。 5.5，660）。

从公元前 59 年的西塞罗开始，似乎也有人担心犹太人在罗马帝国的政治影响力。并延续至公元三世纪 亚历山大烈士的行为，费尔德曼（Feldman，1993，175）将这本书描述为“恶毒地反犹太人”，因为它描述了犹太人的统治和政治影响。正如第 3 章所讨论的，4 世纪出现了与资源和生殖竞争相关的反犹太著作的高涨。

在西班牙宗教裁判所之前和期间，资源和生殖竞争的主题在反犹太著作中很常见。 14世纪的西班牙历史学家阿亚拉严厉批评国王甚至主教串通允许“准备喝可怜基督徒的血”的犹太人收税（Baer 1961，I，368）。后来，安德烈斯·贝尔纳尔德斯指出，皈依者已经晋升为“学者、医生、主教、教士、牧师和修道院院长、审计师和秘书、拥有皇家收入的农民和显贵。他们的目标只有一个：增加和倍增”（Beinart 1981，21-22）。

导致经济统治指控的一个常见情况是犹太人倾向于向外邦人放贷。尽管放贷现在被视为具有重要的经济功能，但在传统社会（其中很大一部分借款人仅维持生计），反犹太主义写作的一个非常有力的来源是将犹太人与被视为剥削性的职业联系起来。[37]对于西班牙，参见 Baer 1961；利亚（1906-1907，I，96-98）；对于波兰，参见 Weinryb 1972, 58ff；对于中世纪的法国，请参见 Jordan 1989, 28。Beauvois (1986) 在撰写近代早期波兰的著作时指出，犹太人因充当债权人和“奴役”贵族而不受人欢迎（Beauvois 1986, 89）； “一切 。 。 。在犹太人手中”（Beauvois 1986, 89）。 Jordan (1989, 28, 44) 发现，在前现代社会中，即使当事人属于同一种族群体或宗教，人们普遍对利息借贷抱有怨恨。正如根据社会认同理论所预期的那样，乔丹指出，如果像犹太人向基督徒贷款的情况那样，贷款人来自与借款阶层明显分离且成员众多的族裔群体，那么这些怨恨会更加明显。其中从事这一职业的人。

在中世纪，“犹太化”一词的意思是“像局外人一样行事，不将他人视为兄弟，而是遵循一套不同的规则，允许兄弟和朋友圈子禁止的剥削形式”（Jordan 1989） ，45）。关于 13 世纪布列塔尼的犹太人，乔丹指出，“他们从未成功地融入当地社会。他们总是被认为是参与勒索和反常行为的陌生人。”在许多中世纪基督教思想家看来，《圣经》应该被解释为只允许从与之交战的民族（例如亚扪人、迦南人）收取利息，引用安布罗斯的话说：“向他索要高利贷，这不会构成犯罪。杀死。哪里有战争权，哪里就有高利贷权”（Stein 1959，59）。从申命记第 23 章开始，犹太权威著作中也包含了这样一种观点，即收取利息从根本上来说是一种敌对行为——内群体内禁止，但外群体成员允许——也包含在犹太权威著作中。西班牙通常是在没有利息的情况下建立的（Neuman 1969，I，194）。迈蒙尼德（12世纪）指出“内塞克 （“咬”，高利贷）和 马比特 （“增加”、兴趣）是一回事。 。 。 。为什么叫内塞克？因为拿走它的人会咬他的同伴，使他痛苦，并吃他的肉”（迈蒙尼德法典， 预订13 , 民法全书，ch。 IV, 1, 88–89)。一些中世纪犹太权威认为，向外邦人收取利息是犹太人的宗教义务（Johnson 1988, 174；Stein 1955）。[38]因此，列维·本·格肖姆（Levi ben Gershom，14世纪，法国）认为，“让外邦人负担利息是一项积极的诫命，‘因为人们不应该让偶像崇拜者受益……’” 。 。 [应该]在不偏离正义的情况下给他造成尽可能多的伤害”（Johnson 1988, 174）。 Chazan (1973, 116–117) 和 Stein (1955, 1959) 描述了中世纪法国犹太辩论家的观点，他们认为《申命记》中禁止向同胞提供利息贷款的禁令不适用于基督徒，正如当时的一些基督教神学家那样。他们努力为结束犹太人的高利贷找到一个理性的理由。根据他们对圣经​​的解释，犹太护教者认为基督徒确实是外国人，因此可以被收取利息。

按照现代标准衡量，中世纪的典型利率很高。 Roth (1978, 106) 发现中世纪英格兰的典型年增长率在 22% 到 43% 之间。 43 年，法国北部的利率上限为 1206%，并对复利进行了监管，试图降低 65% 加复利的普遍利率（Baldwin 1986, 282；Chazan 1973, 84；Rabinowitz 1938, 44）。[39]犹太人经常被指责超出了利率的法律限制。例如，在卡斯蒂利亚，犹太人被允许获得 33-1/3% 的利息，“不断重复这些限制和规定，反对各种巧妙的手段，通过虚构的销售和其他欺诈手段来获得非法增长，这表明，法律在犹太人对顾客的必需品进行投机的贪婪中得到了尊重”（Lea 1906-1907，I，97）。 1326 年昆卡发生饥荒期间，农民需要钱购买种子，犹太人拒绝借钱，直到他们被允许收取 40% 的利息，而不是之前允许的 33-1/3% (Lea 1906–1907, I, 97) 。 随后对犹太放贷的监管试图保护某些阶层的借款人，特别是“弱势阶层”——没有财产的人和未经上级许可的教会人员，但也有旨在防止土地所有者财产耗尽的法律（鲍德温 1986，232）。

这些税率包括国王或其他贵族在税收中收取的一部分。[40]因此，教会反对犹太人放债的运动也针对的是从这种做法中受益的外邦贵族。例如：“我们注意到，某些王子并没有把目光放在主身上……” 。 。因为，虽然他们自己以高利贷为耻，但他们还是把犹太人接待到他们的村庄和城镇，并任命他们为收取高利贷的代理人。他们并不害怕折磨上帝的教会和压迫基督的穷人（教皇英诺森三世致讷韦尔伯爵的信[1208]；格雷泽尔1933年，127）。

犹太人放贷造成的压迫与外邦精英的压迫相结合的类似主题出现在 19 世纪摩洛哥的叙述中：

作为放债者，犹太人就像蛆虫和寄生虫，加剧并以土地上的疾病为生。就我而言，我不知道苏丹和犹太人哪个施行了最大的暴政和压迫——一个是最邪恶的政府管理不善的化身，另一个是十几个夏洛克的本质，要求，是的，并且得到，不不仅是他的一磅肉，还有血液和神经。苏丹通过他无耻的勒索将摩尔人逼入犹太人手中，犹太人以极其高昂的条件借给他必要的资金，使他暂时得到了缓解。一旦落入放债人的魔掌，他就很难逃脱，直到被榨干为止，那时他要么被扔到一边，被压碎和毁掉，要么被扔进地牢，在那里被束缚和饥饿，他可能会慢慢地、可怕地死去。 。

很难找到与摩洛哥犹太人的处境相提并论的地方。在这里，我们有一个被鄙视和憎恨的外星人，他们实际上生活在这个国家，条件比占主导地位的种族好得多，而他们吸吮或被协助吸吮宿主的生命线。每个犹太人的目标都是不劳作，也不纺织，而是保存作为放债人为缠住他的受害者而编织的线圈。 （史密斯 1894 年，252-253） 然而，在前现代时期，犹太人的放债导致大量资源从外邦人流向犹太社区。同时代人的陈述表明，放贷者自己认为与手工业或农业相比，他们的职业非常有利可图（Rabinowitz 1938, 113）。另一方面，基督徒认为犹太人的高利贷导致犹太人“控制”基督教经济，包括教会机构，事实上，许多教会机构由于欠犹太人的债务而破产并被关闭（Jordan 1989，65） ; Luchaire 1912, 229ff)。[41]在中世纪，欠犹太人的债务总额往往非常高——比 25 年法国普通王室收入高出 1221%。在菲利普·奥古斯都下令没收犹太人财产期间，据说犹太人拥有一半的财产。巴黎；这次没收“为国王的财政带来了巨大的意外之财”（Baldwin 1986，52）。

传统社会反犹太主义的另一个一贯主题源于犹太人对贵族征收农业税的角色。税农向贵族支付固定金额，以获得从基督徒人口中获得尽可能多税收的权利。[42]另请参见 Weinryb (1972, 63–64)，了解关于犹太人在波兰充当税农的类似数据。在波兰，犹太人作为庄园管理者的生态相似角色也导致了这样一种看法：“农奴受到了这个对自己人民来说是陌生的部落的剥削”（Beauvois 1986, 86）。 1449 年托莱多叛乱分子的请愿书指责新基督教税农“造成了[经济]毁灭……”。 。 。许多高贵的女业主（杜尼亚斯、骑士和希霍斯-达尔戈）”以及“压迫、破坏、抢劫和堕落……”。 。 。旧基督徒的大部分房屋和庄园”（in Netanyahu 1995, 959）。

与许多其他传统社会一样，相对于社会其他群体的外群体地位使犹太人成为理想的包税农：让外邦人负责包税，实质上就是将税收的支付置于负责收税的人的控制之下，而犹太人（或者在西班牙，1391年强制皈依之后的新基督徒可以相信将外邦人视为外群体并最大化国王的收入：

主要原因是犹太人在城市地区充当国王的收税人的职能，因此城市将犹太人视为君主的代理，将犹太人视为大规模剥削的对象。 犹太人按照国王的利益行事，似乎在与城市的利益背道而驰。 因此，我们再次谈及我们所提到的现象：国王与人民之间的根本冲突-这种冲突不仅限于金融事务，而且还涉及与人民生活息息相关的所有政府领域。 在某种程度上，由于这种利益冲突，犹太人可以在中世纪的严酷气候中幸存下来，很难相信当他们来到基督教欧洲定居时他们并没有意识到这一点。 确实，自加洛林人时代以来，他们提出的要求在他们安顿下来之前确保保护的要求表明（a）他们意识到国王在许多问题上的立场与普通百姓不同，并且（b）为了他们的利益，国王已准备好与“外来”犹太人共同谋求违反基督教臣民明确意愿的事业。 因此，从某种意义上讲，犹太人与中世纪国王的协议类似于他们与古代世界中外国征服者达成的谅解。 （Netanyahu 1995，71–72）

由于犹太人作为税农的角色（以及他们在传统社会中的所有其他角色）依赖于外邦精英，反犹太作家经常谴责外邦贵族允许犹太人剥削社会下层阶级。 1371 年，托罗议会（卡斯蒂利亚）的恩里克国王收到一份请愿书，抱怨说，由于国王和贵族赋予犹太人权力，犹太人控制了城市，甚至西班牙人的人民（Netanyahu 1995, 118）。在接下来的一个世纪，弗雷·阿隆索·德·埃斯皮纳（Fray Alonso de Espina），这位在建立宗教裁判所中发挥重要作用的法兰西修士，谴责了“基督教王子们令人憎恶的贪婪”和“他们从犹太人那里获得的世俗利益”（in Netanyahu 1995, 731） 。另一方面，埃斯皮纳赞扬国王菲利普·奥古斯都，他不顾贵族和高级教士的请求以及犹太人的贿赂，掠夺犹太人并将他们驱逐出法国，“燃烧着上帝的热情”（内塔尼亚胡1995 年，831）。

解放常常强调资源竞争作为反犹太主义根源的重要性。 Lindemann (1991, 17) 指出，解放前俄罗斯的犹太人“被当局和其他许多人视为外国的、独立的、剥削性的、多产的民族”。[43]该评论反映了对犹太人生育成功作为反犹太主义一个方面的担忧。在 创伤后应激障碍 （第 5 章）我注意到其他几个反犹太言论的例子，表达了对伊比利亚宗教裁判所时期（15-17 世纪）犹太人繁衍成功的担忧。在德国，从中世纪到 19 世纪，对生育的限制是规范犹太人的法律的一个常见组成部分（Goldstein 1981；Lowenstein 1981），以及“Hep！哎呀！ 1819 年的骚乱旨在报复犹太人，“他们生活在我们中间，而且像蝗虫一样不断增加”（Dawidowicz 1975，第 30 页）。 俄罗斯官方的观点是，解放导致了犹太人在经济上统治和剥削斯拉夫农民（Judge 1992, 9, 11）。以下段落摘自俄罗斯驻华盛顿公使馆秘书 M. Pierre Botkine 于 1893 年发表的一篇文章，戈德温·史密斯 (Goldwin Smith, 1894, 248) 在其反犹太著作中也强调了这一点。它将经济统治问题与忠诚问题结合起来，在下面的部分中将对此进行更全面的讨论：

正如我们在俄罗斯所知道的那样，希伯来人是“永恒的犹太人”。由于没有自己的国家，而且通常也没有任何与他当时所继承的国家认同的愿望，他仍然像数百年来一样，在道德上一成不变，并且没有使自己适应同情的能力与他周围的种族的人们。他与我们俄罗斯人并不相同。他不觉得也不希望与我们团结一致。在俄罗斯，他只是一个客人，一个很久以前的客人，而不是社会的一个组成部分。当这些没有亲和力的客人在俄罗斯变得太多时，当在一些地方发现他们的数量对我们整个人民的福祉和繁荣有害时，当他们已经发展成为许多广泛的影响力和权力的分支时，滥用他们作为穷人的商人或贷款人的机会，总之，当他们对我们的人民变得危险和偏见时，我们的政府发现有必要限制他们的活动，这有什么令人反感或令人惊讶的吗？ 。 。 。难道那些从未遭遇过这种情况的人就应该指责我们的这些措施吗？

我们的农民在他们现有的社会关系中只是最近才被组织起来，还没有受过良好的教育，也没有受过良好的训练，无法在他们现有的制度下行使社会权利或义务。 . . . 如果我们考虑到斯拉夫人民的性格，就很容易理解为什么我们温顺、无知、随和的农民会落入犹太人的控制之下，他们作为一个阶级，受过更好的教育，也更加节俭，并且有商业和赚钱的才能，这使他们的种族在任何地方都与众不同——并且在农奴的解放剥夺了他们个人的旧事物制度为他们提供的保障之后，他们很容易意识到并很快滥用了他们在这些方面的优势. 这种犹太人的影响无处不在，有时成为一种难以忍受的枷锁。 一些地方的农民失去耐心，犯下暴行，围攻犹太人，破坏他们的财产。 (Botkine 1893, 613–614)

1881年，一份政府文件谴责了长达1981年的融合俄国人和犹太人的运动的失败，并认为问题是“（犹太人）对土著居民和大多数较贫穷阶级的剥削”（在弗兰克尔 64, 1990)。 这也是美国政府官方观察员的观点（参见 Goldstein 36, 290, 1972），这在犹太革命社会主义者 Hayim Zhitlowski (129, XNUMX) 中也很明显：“每当我将目光转向平凡时，白天——在今天的犹太人生活中，我只看到一件事，即反犹主义者正在鼓动的事情：犹太商人对俄罗斯农民的有害影响。 不管我感觉如何，从社会主义的角度来看，我不仅要对个别犹太人而且要对整个犹太人宣判死刑。 犹太 存在个别犹太人”（斜体字）。[44]以下来自英国副领事 L. Wagstaff 的报告总结了公众对导致 1881 年俄罗斯大屠杀的反犹太主义的社会和经济原因的看法，并反映了本节和上一节的许多主题：

犹太人是如此重要，主要是因为他们是中间人或中间人。 很少有任何类型的商业交易在没有他们干预的情况下发生，他们从双方那里得到补偿。 列举一些他们不断被公众谴责的其他职业：他们是烈酒的主要交易者； “伏特加”（饮料）商店和臭名昭著的房子的经营者； 收货人； 非法典当行和高利贷者。 他们也成功的一个分支是政府承包商。 凭借他们处理金钱的知识，他们与不道德的官员勾结，每年向国家骗取巨额款项。 事实上，一些犹太社区的不当行为对他们接触的人产生了不良影响。 但是，必须指出，俄罗斯有许多受过良好教育，受人尊敬的犹太人，但他们却是少数。 . . . 他们彻底谴责下级兄弟的职业。 . . . 他们自己承认他们自己的一些成员的虐待行为，并建议采取补救措施来缓解工人阶级之间存在的愤怒。

犹太人还被指控的另一件事是，他们之间存在抵制制度。 他们将宗教信仰用于商业目的。 。 。 。 例如，在比萨拉比亚（Bessarabia），葡萄园的产品被抽签出售，然后落到雅各布·列维（Jacob Levy）的手里。 该地区的其他犹太人无法与Levy竞争，后者以自己的价格购买葡萄酒。 在通过政府和省级土地的行动进行租赁的过程中，总是有一个犹太人比其他人出价更高，然后以高昂的价格将土地重新租给农民。 。 。 。

他们作为高利贷者的名声是众所周知的。 假设一名犹太新兵拥有几卢布的资本，可以从数学上计算出他从鼓手到上校成为公司或团的放债人需要多长时间。 以一个农民为例，一旦落入这个阶级的手中，他就无可挽回地迷失了。 业主，反过来，从一笔小额贷款逐渐抵押，最终失去了他的财产。 近年来，俄罗斯南部的大量土地都落入了以色列人的手中，但主要是落入了聪明而清醒的农民手中。

从头到尾，犹太人一臂之力。 他将种子播种，通常以实物形式返还-蒲式耳四分之一。 随着收割时间的到来，需要金钱才能收成农作物。 有时在困难的情况下会提前进行； 但是农民别无选择。 没有人可以借钱给他，而且保护某物总比失去全部好。 犹太人通常会按照自己的意愿购买整地的全部农作物。 因此可以看出，他们自己不生产农产品，但他们却从别人的劳动中受益，并不断地致富，而老板们却逐渐被毁了。 在与俄罗斯的关系中，它们被比作寄生虫，这些寄生虫定居在一种植物上，其活力不足以将其赶走，而这种生命正在被削弱。

副领事还指出，农民看到犹太人的财产时经常说：“那是我的血。” 大屠杀者的投诉还包括指控在犹太家庭服役的俄罗斯女孩受到性剥削。

非犹太人革命者也容易发表反犹太主义言论。[45]同样，在 19 世纪的英国，社会主义宪章运动虽然反对迫害犹太人，但倾向于将他们视为富有的、寄生的压迫者阶级的一部分（Alderman 1983，17）。 1869 年，俄罗斯无政府主义者米哈伊尔·巴枯宁 (Mikhail Bakunin) 在谈到犹太人时表示，“早在基督教时代之前，他们的历史就在他们身上烙下了本质上商业化和资产阶级的特征，这意味着，作为一个民族，他们是 出类拔萃 他们对人民的群众感到恐惧和天生的恐惧，而且，他们公开或暗地憎恨人民”（Rather 1990，178）。 革命党纳罗德尼亚·沃里亚（Narodnaia Volia）对1881年的大屠杀持宽容态度，并向乌克兰人民发表了以下声明：

乌克兰人民受犹太人之苦。 谁从您手中夺走了土地，树林，小酒馆？ 犹太人。 穆济克[农民]经常流泪，向谁求助，才能进入他自己的土地，自己的土地？-犹太人。 无论您在哪里，无论在哪里，犹太人无处不在。 犹太人诅咒你，欺骗你，喝你的血。 。 。 。 但是，当muzhiki站起来像在Elizavetgrad，Kiev，Smela一样从敌人中解放出来时，沙皇立即解救了犹太人：召集了来自俄罗斯的士兵，并且muzhik的鲜血，基督教的血，流淌。 。 。 。 您已经开始反抗犹太人。 你做得很好。 不久，叛乱将在整个俄罗斯针对沙皇， 内裤 [地主]，犹太人。 (在弗兰克尔 1981, 98)[46]这一时期革命者的其他声明指出，“人们不应该攻击犹太人，因为他是犹太人并向自己的上帝祈祷……”。 。 。但因为他掠夺人民，吸干工人的血”；并且，“犹太人拥有酒吧和酒馆，从地主那里租用土地，然后以两到三倍的价格出租给农民，他在田里购买小麦，进行放贷，收取的费用如此之高，以至于人们简称为“意第绪语”汇率”（Frankel 1981，100）。犹太社会主义者帕维尔·鲍里索维奇·阿克塞尔罗德（Pavel Borisovich Akselrod）分析了形势，写道：“无论犹太群众遭受多么严重的贫困和匮乏...... 。 。事实仍然是，总体而言，他们中的大约一半充当非生产性要素，骑在俄罗斯下层阶级的脖子上”（in Frankel 1981, 105）。这些评论与注释21中引用的英国副领事的评估一致。

在后来的几年里，犹太人在俄罗斯的革命运动中发挥了更大的作用。这导致了对 1881 年大屠杀的截然不同的解释。犹太社会主义理论家 Shimen Dubnov 在 1905 年另一个大屠杀时期撰文，将 1881 年的大屠杀归因于“想象中的经济因素”，而最近的大屠杀则是“对犹太人革命活动的报复”的结果（弗兰克尔 1981 年， 136）。工人和农民也是 1905 年大屠杀的积极参与者。

俄罗斯经济和文化统治的主题并没有随着革命和苏联的建立而结束。从第二次世界大战期间开始，高层政府内部就对苏联经济和文化精英的关键领域中俄罗斯族代表性不足和犹太人代表性过高感到担忧。这些担忧最初集中在文化领域（见下文），但它们迅速蔓延到科学和经济机构的所有领域。在新闻、艺术、历史、教育学、哲学、经济学、医学和精神病学等学术部门以及自然科学所有领域的科学研究机构中，对犹太精英进行了不成比例的清洗。整个经济的管理和工程高层也对犹太人进行了广泛的清洗。有时，犹太人被指责部分通过内部群体偏袒而获得统治地位，正如中央委员会 1950 年关于犹太人在飞机生产设施中的活动的以下报告所示：

中央航空流体动力研究所的一些极其重要的部门都有工作人员因政治原因而被撤换。他们将同一国籍的人聚集在自己周围，强加一种互相赞扬的习惯（同时让其他人错误地认为他们是不可或缺的），并强迫自己的门生登上高位。 （参见 Kostyrchenko 1995，237）

欧洲解放后，类似的主题也很明显，限制犹太人经济活动的立法有所减少，但犹太人的财富、政治影响力以及在职业和其他高社会地位职位中的代表人数却显着增加。 Lindemann 1991；Krausnick 1968；Massing 1949；Pulzer 1964）。 19 世纪和 20 世纪初反犹太主义著作的一个共同主题涉及犹太人对外邦人的经济统治以及对厌世的古老指控。这些现代反犹太主义者“指控犹太人剥削和欺骗非犹太人，夺走他们的工作，控制股票市场、媒体，甚至国家本身”（Lindemann 1991，16）。 1880 年向帝国总理俾斯麦提交的“反犹太请愿书”抱怨了经济统治，但也强调了犹太人对德国文化遗产的陌生性：

每当基督徒和犹太人进入社会关系时，我们都将犹太人视为主人，而土著基督徒则处于从属地位。犹太人只在很小的程度上参与了我们国家广大群众的繁重劳动。 。 。 。但他（德国人）的劳动成果主要是由犹太人收获的。到目前为止，民族劳动生产的资本的最大部分集中在犹太人手中。 。 。 。我们大城市中最引以为豪的宫殿不仅属于犹太大师，他们的父亲和祖父通过兜售和兜售跨越国界进入我们的祖国，而且农村土地，作为我们政治结构最重要的保护基础，也越来越多地落入我们的土地。犹太人之手。 。 。 。

我们所追求的只是将德国人民从某种形式的外来统治中解放出来，而这种统治是无法长期忍受的。 （达维多维奇 1976 年，28-29）

请愿书由约 XNUMX 万人签署，要求禁止犹太人担任政府工作和小学教师，并限制犹太人在司法部门和高等教育机构就业。

与本世纪后期的俄罗斯一样，1849-1850 年巴伐利亚人广泛反对犹太人解放的一个主题是担心如果犹太人获得解放，犹太人将获得经济统治（Harris 1994，132ff）。[47]19 世纪的一篇报道将犹太人视为德国农民的掠夺者：“几乎每个村庄里都有一些犹太人，他们自己不耕种土地，而是像蜘蛛一样埋伏在等待失败的鲍尔（即农民）。” ”（巴林-古尔德，114）。一位德国线人告诉巴林-古尔德，“他怀疑只要脱离了犹太人的控制，阳光下是否还有更幸福的人”（in Smith 1894, 252）。 虽然很少有人将犹太教视为一种宗教，但犹太人被视为外国人，他们被明确描述为比外邦人更聪明，在商业和贸易方面比外邦人更好，并且能够利用外邦人。几份请愿书指出，“如果犹太人获得解放，巴伐利亚就会为犹太人服务；如果犹太人获得解放，巴伐利亚就会为犹太人服务。”如果获得解放，犹太人将“扼住我们的喉咙”；如果他们被解放了，我们就会成为奴隶；如果他们被解放了，我们就会成为奴隶。如果获得解放，他们将占据主导地位”（第 142 页）。请愿者常常担心犹太人的财富和在金融事务中的主导地位。犹太人被认为憎恨基督徒，这一点的证据可以从犹太人相对于德国人的“阴暗”、“狡猾”、“肮脏”、“不公平”的经济实践中找到（第 176 页）。[48]经济统治主题的更多例子： 音乐中的犹太教 (1850)，理查德·瓦格纳说：“我们现在发现这位国王要求解放的请求只不过是异常天真的，因为我们认为自己处于为从犹太人手中解放出来而奋斗的立场上。事实上，在当今世界的现状下，犹太人已经获得了更多的解放。 他统治”（由拉瑟翻译，1990 年，163）。土地联盟在 1894 年表示，它是“犹太人的反对者，犹太人在我国已经变得过于强大，并在新闻界、贸易和交流中获得了决定性的发言权”（Pulzer 1964，190）。奥托·格拉高表示：“实际上他们统治着我们。再次像过去的几个世纪一样，一个数量如此之少的外来部落统治着一个真正伟大的国家”（In Levy 1975，15）。格拉高 (Glagau) 指控，对 90 年股市崩盘负责的人中有 1873% 是犹太人，林德曼 (Lindemann, 1997, 120) 认为这一指控可能有些夸张，但反映了犹太人实际参与的比例过高。

许多请愿书都有详细的例子，例如赫肖的以下内容：

如果只有少数犹太家庭在这里定居，那么一切小商店、制革厂、五金店等，按目前的情况，只能为业主提供微薄的生计，很快就会被取代和彻底摧毁。这些[犹太人]使当地至少有十二户人家沦为乞丐，而我们已经陷入困境的济贫基金将在一年之内耗尽。

犹太人通过参与每一项生意，在最短的时间内拥有了所有现金。他们很快成为唯一的金钱拥有者，而他们的基督教邻居则成为他们的债务人。 （哈里斯 1994 年，第 254 页）

反犹太主义在 1870 年代经济萧条期间有所增加，因为犹太人被视为对德国中下阶级的强大竞争威胁（Massing 1949, 47）。尽管反犹太主义在 19 世纪的农民中也很普遍（Harris 1994；Levy 1975），但最恶毒的反犹太主义发生在“教师、学生、白领工人、小官员和最受犹太人威胁的自由职业”中。 （Massing 1949，xiii；另见 Pulzer 1964，279ff）。正如 Hagen (1996, 365) 所指出的，“1939 年之前的德国反犹太主义在很大程度上源于经济竞争的动机以及随之而来的现实生活中对德国犹太人的敌意。” “作为企业团体，尤其是律师和医生，还有教师、工程师和其他训练有素的技术人员，他们或多或少地强烈反对反犹太主义——尤其是在魏玛时代——以改善他们的就业前景和正如他们也平静或热情地接受纳粹的“雅利安化”政策一样”（Hagen 1996, 379；另见 Gordon 1984, 44）。作为这个“非常实用的类型”的一个例子 中坚政治与帝国时期相比，魏玛时期犹太人在公共部门的就业人数急剧增加，但当国家社会主义者上台时，犹太人被驱逐出这些职位。犹太人还被驱逐出职业生涯，一半的犹太人拥有的企业被清算。到 1939 年，犹太人口比 60 年减少了 1933%，剩下的德国犹太人中只有 16% 从事有酬工作，其中大约一半从事低薪工作。

事实上，对反犹太主义所涉及的结构性因素的明确认识是这一时期犹太复国主义著作的特点。西奥多·赫茨尔认为，现代反犹太主义的主要根源是解放使犹太人与外邦中产阶级进行直接的经济竞争。基于资源竞争的反犹太主义是理性的：赫茨尔“坚持认为，人们不能期望大多数人‘让自己被他们刚刚从贫民窟释放出来的、以前被蔑视的外来者所征服’”（Kornberg 1993, 183；内部引用赫茨尔的著作）日记）。 “我发现反犹太分子完全有权利”（in Kornberg 1993, 183）。赫茨尔的言论对于奥匈帝国尤其如此，该国经历了近代以来犹太人最突然、最壮观的崛起。犹太人主宰商业、职业和艺术，而外邦人则过度无产阶级化（Lindemann 1997, 189）。在德国，犹太复国主义者将魏玛时期的反犹太主义分析为“一个民族对另一个民族试图分享其命运的尝试的不可避免且合理的反应。这是一种独立于理性和意志的本能反应，因此对所有民族来说都是共同的，包括犹太人”（Niewyk 1980，94）。

进一步强调经济问题的重要性的是 Mosse (1987, 403) 所说的德国经济的“犹太部门”是一个“明显可感知的实体”。在此期间，关于经济企业“种族”的知识在德国很普遍（Mosse 1987, 321）。[49]犹太经济精英似乎选择外邦人作为董事会成员，试图削弱犹太人在这些企业中的主导地位（Mosse 1987, 284）。莫斯估计，犹太人在控制德国经济中的比例超出了二十倍。 反犹太主义者经常评论经济企业的种族构成和犹太群体的团结：例如，一位作家在 1912 年指出“至少有一定程度的合理性”（Mosse 1987, 398），犹太资本家与外邦资本家不同，似乎构成了一个有凝聚力的内核，周围环绕着依赖它们的同教群体。

最后，尽管德国、波兰、匈牙利和罗马尼亚之间存在巨大的经济和宗教差异，但在 1930 年代，所有这些国家都制定了将犹太人排除在公共部门就业之外的政策，并对犹太人在大学和职业中的代表性进行了配额，政府组织了对犹太企业和工匠的抵制活动。

[反犹太主义是]一种广泛的区域现象，而不是。 . . 一组民族历史。 在这种观点下，德国和波兰的现代反犹太主义意识形态和政治都被视为中产阶级形成的病态，或者在另一种表述中，作为一种环境中资产阶级的伴随，与西欧和南欧不同，在那里相对较大的（或非常大）和经济上非常重要的城市犹太人口似乎构成了基督教进步的障碍。 在这两个国家，反犹太主义为攻击犹太人所有或犹太人占领的商业企业和医疗、法律和其他专业实践以及官僚职位提供了正当理由，这些职位被广泛认为会阻碍向上流动到非犹太人的道路。 - 追求资产阶级尊严和安全的犹太人。 在这两个国家，由激进右翼政治组织煽动的或多或少的零星反犹太暴力，特别是在 1930 年代，引起了相当多的民众支持或接受，反映了普遍但通常主要是潜在的对犹太人的敌意。 . . . 在中欧犹太人的其他主要家园匈牙利和罗马尼亚，也正在实施类似的政策。 (哈根 1996, 360, 361)

犹太人具有消极的人格特征。 经济统治的主题常常与犹太人具有某些消极人格特征的观点结合在一起。我们已经回顾了古人普遍指责犹太人是厌世者。在驱逐之前的中世纪法国，流行的反犹太主义既针对犹太人作为“无情的债权人”，又针对保护他们的统治者（Lucaire 1912, 195）。在西班牙，1241 年赫罗纳议会的语言“充满了对犹太人的仇恨和不信任，并一再指控他们贪婪”（Baer 1961，I，148）。 15 世纪宗教裁判所的捍卫者安德烈斯·贝尔纳尔德斯 (Andrés Bernáldez) 表示，“他们中的许多人通过高利贷和欺骗行为获得了巨额财富”（Beinart 1981，21-22）。一位 15 世纪的西班牙讽刺作家描绘了一位老基督徒请求国王允许他像新基督徒一样行事，并使用“该种族所有人都使用的任何微妙、邪恶行为、欺骗和谎言……”。 。 。在这个世界上不受任何惩罚”（内塔尼亚胡 1995, 513, 515-516）。马科斯·加西亚 (Marcos García) 是 1449 年托莱多反新基督教叛乱的领导人，他在描述他的对手时使用了一长串负面特征，包括对基督徒的经济和性剥削，后者的特点是通奸和对基督教处女和修女的性欲。内塔尼亚胡 1995, 490, 491, 495）。 17 世纪的葡萄牙人文森特·德科斯塔·马托斯 (Vincent de Costa Mattos) 将犹太人描述为“人类的敌人，他们像吉普赛人一样在世界各地流浪，靠别人的汗水为生。他们拥有所有贸易，耕种个人土地和皇家遗产，除了工业之外没有资本，而且缺乏良心”（Lea 1906-1907，III，272-273）。

自启蒙运动以来，类似的指控一直是反犹太主义著作的主要内容。哲学家伊曼纽尔·康德 (Immanual Kant) 指出，犹太人是“一个 国家 高利贷者。 。 。智取他们所庇护的人。 。 。 。他们将“让买家当心”的口号作为与我们打交道的最高原则”（Rose 1992，7；文本中斜体）。 1849-1850 年巴伐利亚反对犹太人解放的请愿书经常强调，犹太人是由他们的宗教任命的，目的是欺骗和欺骗基督徒，或者犹太人因为购买赃物而鼓励盗窃（Harris 1994, 133ff, 254）。在第一次世界大战前的波兰农村，反犹太主义作家声称“犹太人获取财富的方式通常被认为是犯罪”（​​Golczewski 1986, 101）。

从中世纪犹太人和基督徒之间的争论开始（见第 7 章）到 19 世纪初的复兴，《塔木德》和其他犹太宗教著作除了反基督教外，还被谴责为宣扬双重道德标准。 、民族主义和种族中心主义，这一观点得到了相当多的支持（见 Hartung 1995；Shahak 1994； 创伤后应激障碍，CH。 6).例如，历史学家戈德温·史密斯（Goldwin Smith，1894，268）提供了许多《塔木德》段落，说明了“部落道德”和“部落自豪感和对共同人性的蔑视”（第 270 页），他认为这是犹太宗教写作的特征。史密斯提供了以下段落，表明在诉讼中可以对外邦人使用诡计，除非这种行为会损害整个犹太群体的声誉（即“名字的成圣”）：

当以色列人和异教徒之间发生诉讼时，如果你能根据以色列的法律为前者辩护，就为他辩护并说：“这是 我们的 法律';同样，如果你能根据异教徒的法律为他辩护，也可以为他辩护并说[对另一方：]‘这是 选择您 法律';但如果做不到这一点，我们就用诡计来绕开他。这是R.以实玛利的观点，但R.阿基巴说，我们不应该因为圣名的神圣化而试图规避他。现在，根据 R. Akiba 的说法，整个原因[似乎是]因为圣名的神圣化，但如果没有侵犯圣名的神圣化，我们就可以绕过他！ （巴巴卡玛 跟随。 113a)[50]史密斯还提出了《巴巴业力》113b 中的以下段落，作为犹太人对外邦人行为的说明。我提供爱泼斯坦版本的翻译（伦敦：松西诺出版社，1935 年）。

撒母耳说：这是允许的，但是从他的错误中获益，就像撒母耳曾经向一个异教徒买了一个金碗，并假设它是铜的，可供四个人使用。 zuz，也给他留下了负一 祖兹。 R. Kahana 有一次向一个异教徒买了一百二十桶，本来应该是一百桶，但他同样给他留下了负一桶 zuz 对他说：“看我是在依靠你。”拉比娜和一个异教徒一起买了一棵棕榈树来砍伐[和分割]。于是他对侍者说：快，把靠近根部的部分拿来给我，因为异教徒只对数量感兴趣（而不对质量感兴趣）。 R. Ashi 有一次在路上行走，突然注意到葡萄园外的葡萄藤树枝上挂着成熟的葡萄串。他对他的侍者说：“你去看看，如果它们是异教徒的，就把它们带到我这里来，但如果是以色列人，就不要把它们带到我这里来。”当时异教徒正好坐在葡萄园里，因此无意中听到了这段对话。 ，所以他对他说：“如果是异教徒，他们会被允许吗？”——他回答说：“异教徒通常准备[处置他的葡萄并]接受付款，而以色列人通常不准备[这样做”并]接受付款。

史密斯评论说，“犹太教的批评者被指控种族偏见和宗教偏见。奇怪的是，这种指控来自那些自称为“选民”、将种族视为一种宗教、并将除本民族以外的所有种族视为外邦人和不洁种族的人”（第 270 页）。[51]史密斯（Smith，1894，271）指出，将旧约中的以色列人视为道德典范，尽管他们“相信万有之父和正义之神有一个最喜爱的种族……”，这是一个讽刺。 。 。 [并]承诺自己会促进自己的利益，反对其他种族的利益。”史密斯接着指出，在《约书亚记》中描述的埃及逗留之后的入侵期间，以色列的上帝停止了太阳的照射，以便屠杀能够继续，并命令没有任何活着的东西活着。

沃纳·桑巴特（Werner Sombart，1913，244-245）总结了犹太法律的内群体/外群体特征，指出“对[陌生人]的义务从来没有像对你的‘邻居’、你的犹太人同胞那样具有约束力。只有无知或歪曲事实的愿望才会提出相反的观点。 。 。 。基本观念没有改变，即你对陌生人的关心比对自己人的关心要少。 。 。 。对于犹太人来说，他会小心翼翼地确保自己的重量和尺寸是正确的。但在与非犹太人打交道时，即使他可能获得不公平的优势，他的良心也会感到安心。”为了支持他的观点，桑巴特引用了 19 世纪著名犹太历史学家海因里希·格雷茨 (Heinrich Graetz) 的话：

将短语歪曲其含义，使用聪明倡导者的所有技巧，玩弄文字游戏，并谴责他们不知道的事情。 。 。这就是波兰犹太人的特征。 。 。 。他完全失去了诚实和正确的思维，就像简单和诚实一样。他使自己掌握了各流派的所有体操，并运用它们来战胜那些不如他狡猾的人。他以欺骗和过度行为为乐，这给了他一种胜利的喜悦。但他不能这样对待自己的人民：他们和他一样了解情况。令非犹太人感到遗憾的是，他们感受到了波兰犹太人受塔木德训练的思想所带来的后果。 （桑巴特 1913 年，246）

德国社会学家先驱马克斯·韦伯（Max Weber，1922，250）虽然不是以反犹太主义者的身份写作，但也证实了这一看法，指出“作为贱民，[犹太人]保留了道德的双重标准，这是所有国家原始经济实践的特征”。社区：与兄弟有关的禁止行为对于陌生人来说是允许的。”

18 世纪末和 19 世纪德国反犹太主义著作的一个共同主题强调了犹太人道德复兴的必要性——他们的腐败、欺骗和剥削他人的倾向（Rose 1990）。这种观点也出现在路德维希·伯恩和海因里希·海涅（两人都有犹太背景）的著作中，以及克里斯蒂安·威廉·冯·多姆（Christian Wilhelm von Dohm，1751-1820）和卡尔·费迪南德·格鲁茨科（Karl Ferdinand Glutzkow，1811-1878）等外邦知识分子的著作中，他们认为犹太人的不道德行为是犹太人的不道德行为。部分是氏族压迫的结果。西奥多·赫茨尔认为反犹太主义是“对犹太人缺陷的一种可以理解的反应”，最终是由外邦人的迫害造成的：犹太人被教育成“水蛭”，拥有“可怕的经济实力”；他们是“拜金的人，无法理解一个人可以出于金钱以外的其他动机行事”（in Kornberg 1993, 161, 162）。他们的权力驱动和对迫害者的怨恨只能通过在商业交易中智胜外邦人来表达”（Kornberg 1993, 126）。与赫茨尔同时代的维也纳大学语言学教授西奥多·冈佩尔茨 (Theodor Gomperz) 表示，“对利益的贪婪变成了……”。 。 。 [犹太人]的民族缺陷，就像虚荣心一样（原子主义存在的自然结果，回避了对国家和公共利益的关注）”（in Kornberg 1993, 161）。[52]鉴于人们普遍认为，甚至在许多犹太观察家中，犹太人经常与外邦人或“智胜”外邦人进行欺骗性的经济交易，因此不能立即驳回对犹太人具有负面人格特征的指控。 Ruppin (19) 汇编的 20 世纪末和 1913 世纪初的数据显示，在德国、奥匈帝国和荷兰，犹太人参与欺诈和欺骗犯罪的比例过高。犹太人也极有可能因逃避兵役和“传播不道德的文学”而受到起诉。

Katz (1985, 97) 指出，在解放后的德国，对犹太演员的一项常见指控很可能是正确的，那就是他们总是用讽刺来削弱描绘“温柔和敏感情感”的场景。他还指出，这已被认为是海涅诗歌的一个特点，并得出结论：“无论好坏，犹太品质可能很自然地出现在犹太人的艺术创作中，甚至是那些加入非犹太文化的人的艺术创作中。因此，将反犹太主义者口中的所有言论断然驳回为带有偏见的误解是荒谬的。”

同样，林德曼（Lindemann，1991）强调，公众对犹太人残忍和不道德的看法并非完全没有根据。犹太资本家是布尔战争的显着受益者和推动者。犹太人还参与了对罗马尼亚农民起义的残酷镇压，并且大量参与国际卖淫活动。林德曼指出，“犹太人参与这些事务不仅是合理的，而且是真实的”（第 33 页）。

对犹太人性格特征的负面看法在 19 世纪和 20 世纪的美国反犹太主义著作中也很常见。除了日本人（另一个高智商群体 [Lynn 1987]）之外，犹太人是唯一因其实力而不受人喜欢的移民群体：“不利的刻板印象描绘了犹太人在美国生活中获得优势的专横能力”，并且与其他移民群体的对比实际上是基于现实的（Higham 1984, 146）。犹太人被犹太人和外邦人视为“典型的暴发户——佩戴着耀眼而庸俗的珠宝……”。 。 。以喧闹的行为吸引眼球，总是强行闯入上流社会。将这种刻板印象完全视为他人心理挫折的替罪羊，就是过分强调‘偏见’的非理性根源，并给犹太人披上防御性的无辜外衣”（Higham 1984, 125）。

社会学家爱德华·A·罗斯（Edward A. Ross，1914）认为犹太人具有一些道德上值得称赞的特征（例如，聪明才智和缺乏身体上的残忍），但他也评论说，犹太移民在所有交易中都倾向于最大限度地发挥自己的优势，包括犹太人学生们纠缠着老师，要求犹太穷人获得更高的成绩，试图获得比平常更多的慈善拨款。此外，“没有其他移民像希伯来人那样吵闹、咄咄逼人和蔑视他人的权利”（Ross 1914, 150）。

当局抱怨说，东欧希伯来人不尊重法律本身，并且愿意违反他们发现的任何法令。 。 。 。保险公司比其他保险公司更仔细地审视犹太火灾风险。信贷人员表示，犹太商人常常“狡猾”，为了摆脱债务会“失败”。由于撒谎，移民的名声很坏。在波士顿北端，“犹太人作伪证的行为已成为谚语”。 （罗斯 1914 年，150）

同一时期，匈牙利也有人抱怨犹太人作伪证，而在俄罗斯，一位“被广泛认为对犹太人友好的自由派贵族”指出，法官“一致宣布，如果满足以下条件，任何诉讼，无论是刑事还是民事诉讼，都无法妥善进行”犹太人的利益也参与其中”（Lindemann 1997，288-289）。犹太人被指控作伪证以帮助其他犹太人进行欺诈、隐匿财产和高利贷。

Ross (1914, 150) 还指出，“爱好享乐的犹太商人不顾犹太人，却追求外邦女孩，这一事实引起了尖酸刻薄的评论。”在英格兰也有类似的抱怨，称“意第绪大猩猩”剥削外邦女性。一位作家声称，“对于他的部落同胞来说，没有哪个犹太人比一个能够吹嘘自己毁掉了一些没有朋友、不受保护的基督教女孩的人更能称得上英雄了”（in Lindemann 1997, 380）。林德曼指出，“即使在犹太观察家中，犹太男性的性行为及其对非犹太女性的特殊吸引力也一直是永恒的话题”（第 381 页）。对外邦女性进行性剥削的指控也发生在俄罗斯（见注 21）和宗教裁判所时期的西班牙（见上文）；这种担忧也出现在第 3 章至第 5 章讨论的主要反犹太运动中。

负面的刻板印象一直持续到20世纪。 1938 年的一项调查发现，“贪婪”、“不诚实”和“好斗”是美国人最不喜欢犹太人的品质。 1945% 的人认为犹太人“在美国拥有太多的权力”（58 年，这一数字上升到 1994% [Dinnerstein 146, 20]），1987% 的人希望“将犹太人赶出美国，作为一种反抗”。减少他们权力的手段”（Breitman & Kraut 88, 1945）。犹太劳工委员会 XNUMX 年进行的一项调查表明，绝大多数美国工人阶级样本认为

犹太人是作弊的店主、无情的房东或租赁代理人、无良的典当经纪人、分期付款推销员和保险收款员，他们会在第一次拖欠时拿走抵押品或让保险失效。除此之外，还添加了这样的想法：犹太人拥有所有商业，并且至少大多数犹太人都从事商业活动。这一切都是因为犹太人贪财、自私、贪婪、占便宜、欺骗、凿子、谎言、冷酷、不择手段等等。 （见《Wiggershaus》，1994 年，第 368 页）[53]有趣的是，这个工人阶级团体并没有指控犹太人是激进分子和共产主义者——这些指控在当时的保守派圈子里很常见，而且有现实基础。反犹太主义形象以工人阶级个人可能与犹太人进行的接触类型为中心，受到社会认同理论所预测的常见扭曲的影响。事实上，甚至 T. W. Adorno（伯克利反犹太主义研究的第一作者；Adorno 等人，1950）也提出了同样的观点，并指出工人阶级个体不太可能在“伪民主”的外表下隐藏他们的态度，工人阶级的反犹太主义比其他阶级的反犹太主义“不那么非理性”（见 Wiggershaus 1994, 369）。金斯伯格 (Ginsberg, 1993, 198) 在谈到更近的时代时指出，1980 世纪 XNUMX 年代美国用来指代参与内幕交易和股票诈骗的人的负面术语（“贪婪”、“掠夺”）具有反犹太主义色彩，因为犹太人在这个群体中占多数。

文化统治的主题。与经济统治密切相关的是犹太人统治社会文化的观念。人类适应的一个基本特征是操纵文化来实现进化目标（创伤后应激障碍，CH。 1），但是，由于多种原因，不同群体对文化建设有不同的兴趣。社会认同理论预测，作为外群体的犹太人会对外邦文化持消极态度，特别是如果像基督教那样，这种文化被视为反犹太主义或导致有凝聚力的外邦群体。此外，犹太人的优生过程导致了智力和高投资养育的遗传倾向，而且犹太人对高投资养育有自己高度发达的文化支持。因此，犹太人的行为比外邦人的行为更少依赖于传统的宗教和文化支持。一个主题是 批判文化 犹太人对外邦文化的批评导致了外邦人高投资养育文化支持的下降，但对犹太人的行为影响甚微。

文化统治的主题出现在后启蒙时期，随着解放的犹太人进入世俗知识活动的世界，它成为德国、法国和奥地利反犹太主义的一个主要主题。以下是对犹太人在魏玛德国作为文化生产者的角色的描述，当时犹太人占德国人口的 1%：

犹太人创造了德国文化的很大一部分。德国三大报纸出版社的所有者；该杂志的编辑们 东方日报 和 柏林人塔格布拉特;大多数图书出版商；的所有者和编辑 新日报 以及其他著名的文学杂志；德国最伟大的美术馆的所有者都是犹太人。犹太人作为制片人、导演和演员在戏剧和电影业中发挥着重要作用。德国许多最优秀的作曲家、音乐家、艺术家、雕塑家和建筑师都是犹太人。他们对文学批评和文学的参与是巨大的：魏玛德国几乎所有伟大的批评家和许多小说家、诗人、剧作家、散文家都是犹太人。美国最近的一项研究表明，德国 XNUMX 名领先的“表现主义者”和“新客观主义者”中有 XNUMX 人是犹太人。[54]Walter Laqueur (1974, 73) 将这种文化统治与反犹太主义联系起来如下：

没有犹太人，就不会有“魏玛文化”——从这个意义上说，厌恶这种文化的反犹太主义者的主张是有道理的。他们站在每一次新的、大胆的革命运动的最前沿。他们在表现主义诗人、1920 年代的小说家、戏剧制片人中都很出名，甚至一度是电影界的领军人物。他们拥有主要的自由派报纸。 。 。许多编辑也是犹太人。许多领先的自由派和前卫出版社都在犹太人手中。 。 。 。许多主要的戏剧评论家都是犹太人，他们主导了轻娱乐。 （迪克 1968 年，28）

理查德·瓦格纳也许是最著名的知识分子，他的反犹太主义主要集中在犹太人对文化的统治上。[55]另见安德烈·纪德 (André Gide) 在 Johnson 1988, 390–391 中的讨论。卡茨（Katz，1986b）指出，犹太复国主义者阿哈德·哈姆（阿舍·金斯伯格）所持的态度与瓦格纳的态度是镜像的。参见第 5 章。 In 音乐中的犹太教 瓦格纳认为犹太人对文化有很大的影响。由于犹太人没有同化外邦文化，他们没有认同并融入该文化的更深层次，包括宗教和种族的影响—— 大众主义。在瓦格纳看来，高等文化最终源于民间文化。如果没有犹太人的影响，德国音乐将反映德国民间文化的更深层次。

反犹太主义者认为犹太文化的影响完全是负面的，并且破坏了外邦社会的社会纽带。海因里希·海涅被颇具影响力的知识分子海因里希·冯·特雷奇克视为“嘲笑拿破仑战争后德国所遭受的屈辱和耻辱”，并且“没有羞耻感、忠诚感、诚实感或敬畏感”（Mosse 1970, 52-53）。[56]梅特涅坚持将海涅的名字列入对“青年德国”作家运动的禁令中，该运动在禁令中被描述为“一个文学流派……”。 。 。他们的努力倾向于以最无礼的方式公开攻击基督教，诋毁现有的社会关系，并摧毁一切正派和道德”（Sammons 1979，210）。 特雷奇克谴责路德维希·伯恩“厚颜无耻地不敬地谈论祖国，就像一个不属于祖国的局外人”（《Rose》，1992年，第85页），他还谴责海因里希·格雷茨“对祖国最纯粹和最强大的倡导者的致命仇恨”。德国性格，从路德到歌德和费希特”（Lindemann 1997，141）。 （格雷茨还写道，伯尔尼和海涅“放弃了犹太教，但就像穿上敌人制服的战斗人员一样，可以更容易地攻击和消灭他”[in Lindemann 1997, 141]）。此外，“犹太记者所写的针对基督教的嘲讽和讽刺言论是彻头彻尾的令人反感。”另一方面，“关于德国人[或]法国人的缺点，每个人都可以自由地说最糟糕的事情；但如果有人敢用公正和温和的语言谈论犹太人性格中某些不可否认的弱点，他就会立即被几乎所有的报纸贴上野蛮人和宗教迫害者的标签”（in Lindemann 1997, 138-139）。类似的抱怨在奥地利也很常见（Lindemann 1997, 193）。

类似的主题也出现在苏联犹太文化统治的冲突中。至少从 1942 年开始，政府高层内部就开始担心在文化和经济精英的关键领域中俄罗斯族的代表性不足，而犹太人的代表性过高。报告指出，精英文化机构“结果是由非俄罗斯人（主要是犹太人）占据”（Kostyrchenko 1995，15）。例如，苏联最负盛名的文化机构莫斯科大剧院的十名高层管理人员中有八名犹太人和一名俄罗斯人。著名的音乐学院以及精英出版物的艺术和音乐评论家也报告了类似的不平衡现象。犹太人较高的智商似乎不足以解释这些比例失调，这表明群体内的勾结是一个因素。

直到 1953 年斯大林去世为止，有关犹太人在文化精英中代表性过高的报道不断出现。在一场其理由让人想起瓦格纳和特雷奇克指控的运动中，犹太人现在被当作“反爱国的无国籍世界主义者”从文化精英中清除出去。他们被视为不欣赏俄罗斯民族文化，并鼓励对俄罗斯人民的“民族虚无主义”（Kostyrchenko 1995，168）。犹太人在文化机构中的主导地位通常被认为是群体关系促成的。一个主导科学院列宁格勒文学研究所（普希金故居）的团体被其反对者指责为“通过长期的家庭和朋友关系、相互保护、同质（犹太）民族成分和反犹太主义”而团结在一起。爱国（反俄）倾向”（Kostyrchenko 1995，171）。

与反犹太主义的经济根源一样，犹太复国主义者有时指出犹太人参与文化创造是反犹太主义的一个可以理解的根源。因此，小说家阿诺德·茨威格 (Arnold Zweig) 在 1927 年写道：“犹太人同化自己的程度越高，他对民族精神生活的干预就越深、越快；他在诗歌、政治和艺术中的作用得到了广泛认可”（in Niewyk 1980, 127）。茨威格声称，其结果是，尽管犹太人履行了对国家的正式义务，但不信任还是建立起来，在压力时期，这种不信任会演变为暴力的反犹太主义。

反犹太主义者还抱怨犹太人利用他们对媒体的影响力歪曲和夸大反犹太主义。戈德温·史密斯 (Goldwin Smith, 1894) 指责俄罗斯的反犹太分子在犹太人控制的媒体中被描绘成宗教狂热分子，而不是出于经济和社会原因：“反犹太分子应该是狂热分子的政党，他们重新进行迫害，犹太人因其在黑暗时代的信仰而受到暴露，而每一个批判性地处理这个问题，未能对以色列人表现出全心全意同情的人都会被定为宗教迫害者。犹太人自然而然地培养了这种印象。 。 。 。欧洲的媒体掌握在他们手中”（第 241 页）。

文化统治主题的一个重要方面是，犹太人参与更广泛的外邦文化，同时继续强烈地认同自己是犹太人，他们的贡献实际上反映了特定的犹太群体利益。这一主题将成为犹太人参与激进政治活动、博亚斯人类学、精神分析和法兰克福社会学派讨论的一个主要方面。 批判文化，但值得注意的是这种现象的普遍性。 Sorkin (1985, 102) 将解放后德国的犹太知识分子描述为“一个由德国犹太人同化的无形社区，他们在主流文化中延续了独特的文化形式”。因此，犹太文化对更广泛的外邦文化的贡献是从高度特殊的角度完成的，其中犹太群体身份尽管“隐形”，但仍然至关重要。甚至连被同化的犹太知识分子典范贝特霍尔德·奥尔巴赫（Berthold Auerbach，生于 1812 年）也“以德国犹太少数民族特有的方式操纵主流文化的元素”（Sorkin 1985, 107）。[57]索尔金指出，奥尔巴赫成为世俗犹太知识分子的典范，即被同化的犹太人没有放弃犹太教。在大多数情况下，这些世俗犹太知识分子只与其他世俗犹太人交往，并将他们对德国文化的贡献视为犹太教的世俗形式——因此是强烈认同的犹太知识分子的“无形社区”。正如中所讨论的 创伤后应激障碍 （第 8 章），犹太人在其整个历史中形成分离主义文化和亚文化的趋势非常强烈；在 批判文化 这在博亚斯人类学、激进政治意识形态、精神分析和法兰克福社会研究学院中被视为一种趋势。 这种为群体利益服务的文化操纵是反犹太主义著作的共同主题。因此，海因里希·海涅对德国文化的批判被认为是为了追求其群体的权力，而牺牲了非犹太人社会的凝聚力（见Mosse 1970，52）。[58]沃纳·莫斯（Werner Mosse，1985）表明，除了犹太人在激进、前卫的知识文化中的代表性过高之外，还存在以马克斯·利伯曼（Max Liebermann）和“凯撒青年，”保留了强烈的民族色彩，其成员保留了犹太人的心理认同。这两种以犹太教为主的“反文化”与新教知识文化共存，其中的英雄是反犹太主义者理查德·瓦格纳和休斯顿·斯图尔特·张伯伦。因此，文化运动与双方的种族认同密切相关。

在美国，公开或几乎不加掩饰的反犹太主义也由来已久，这些反犹太主义针对的是所谓的犹太人对媒体和娱乐业的统治。 国际犹太人，由亨利·福特报纸出版 迪尔伯恩独立报，指控媒体和娱乐行业的犹太人颠覆了外邦道德，并将犹太媒体的参与视为精心策划的犹太阴谋的一部分。 锡安长老的礼节.

不仅是所谓的“合法”舞台，电影业——所有产业中的第五大产业——也完全由犹太人控制。自然的结果是，文明世界越来越反对目前管理的这种娱乐形式的琐碎和令人沮丧的影响。 。 。 。一旦犹太人控制了“电影”，我们就遇到了电影问题，其后果是显而易见的。这个种族有一种独特的天赋，无论他们在什么行业取得了多数席位，他们都会制造道德品质问题。 （福特 1920 年，48）

1930 世纪 1988 年代末，孤立主义者指责犹太人控制的电影业试图将美国推入对德战争。查尔斯·林德伯格 (Charles Lindbergh) 表示，犹太人“对这个国家最大的危险在于他们对我们的电影、媒体、广播和政府的巨大所有权和影响力”（in Gabler 345, 1992）。在麦卡锡时代，人们担心娱乐业会影响美国文化，用密西西比州国会议员约翰·R·兰金（John R. Rankin）的话说，“阴险地试图传播颠覆性的宣传，毒害孩子的思想”。 ，歪曲我们国家的历史并抹黑基督教”（in Sachar 624, XNUMX）。[59]兰金对歪曲历史的评论让人想起美国历史协会主席卡尔·布里登鲍的著名演讲“大突变”。 Bridenbaugh (1963, 322–323) 在被广泛认为是针对犹太人的评论中担心：

今天，我们必须面对令人沮丧的前景，即我们所有人，无论是教师还是学生，都已经失去了前一代人所拥有的大部分东西，即共同文化的无价资产。 。 。 。我们这一行的许多年轻从业者，以及那些仍然是学徒的人，都是中下阶层或外国血统的产物，他们的情感常常妨碍历史的重建。他们发现自己实际上是我们过去的局外人，感觉自己被排除在外。这当然不是他们的错，但却是事实。他们没有经验来帮助他们，他们与遥远的过去之间的鸿沟每小时都在扩大。 。 。 。我担心的是，当代人的背景和训练的变化将使他们无法与后代沟通和重建过去。

众议院非美活动委员会 (HUAC) 污蔑的绝大多数是犹太人，其中许多人从事娱乐业（例如，Sachar 1992，623ff；Navasky 1980，109ff）。认为“犹太好莱坞”正在宣扬颠覆性思想，包括左翼政治信仰，是二战后反犹太主义的一个常见组成部分，事实上，推动 HUAC 调查的就是这些著名的反犹太主义人士。 - 闪米特人如杰拉尔德·L·K·史密斯和国会议员兰金（Platt 1978）。[60]当犹太共产主义者路易斯·哈鲁普（Louis Harup，1978）在委员会谴责 HUAC 作为证人时提出了他的犹太身份问题时，AJ 委员会迅速采取了行动，这反映了围绕委员会的犹太问题的敏感性。哈鲁普表示，“作为一名犹太人…… 。 。我有义务不与该委员会合作，因为在我看来，该委员会的活动正在使这个国家陷入六百万犹太人被谋杀的境地。” AJ委员会的反应是谴责该证词没有反映美国犹太社区的态度。 例如，史密斯表示，“人们普遍认为俄罗斯犹太人控制了过多的好莱坞宣传，他们试图通过这种手段在美国推广俄罗斯共产主义。我个人认为情况确实如此”（in Gabler 1988, 360）。

兰金和其他人观点的实质基础是，从 1930 世纪 1988 年代开始，好莱坞编剧主要是犹太人，政治上是自由派或激进派（Gabler 322，20ff）——这是 XNUMX 世纪犹太思想史的典型普遍联系（见 批判文化）。当时受苏联控制的美国共产党（CPUUSA）派出犹太人杰罗姆（V. J. Jerome）和斯坦利·劳伦斯（Stanley Lawrence）前往好莱坞组织作家并利用他们的政治情绪。杰罗姆认为，“鼓动宣传实际上是更好的戏剧，因为马克思主义者更好地理解塑造人类的力量，因此可以写出更好的人物”（Gabler 1988，329）。编剧们的回应是，自觉地认为自己通过剧本写作为“事业”（第 329 页）做出了贡献。 “尽管好莱坞共产党是一个作家的政党，但它也是……。 。 。一个犹太政党。 （事实上​​，成为前者也意味着成为后者）”（第 330 页）。

然而，在此期间，激进作家对最终产品的影响微乎其微，尽管有充分的证据表明他们尽了最大努力按照他们的政治观点影响电影内容（参见，例如，Ceplair & Englund 1980；琼斯 1972）。他们的失败至少部分是由于保守派、非犹太人为主的政治力量对好莱坞施加的压力，导致电影业进行了大量的自我审查。[61]加布勒（Gabler，1988，195）指出了这种概括的一个部分例外，他发现 1930 世纪 196 年代华纳兄弟电影的总体趋势是“弥漫着一种模糊的失败者自由主义，如果他们的电影缺乏精致和魅力，那么它们确实有良心——故意如此。”华纳兄弟的电影“比任何其他电影公司对美国传统价值观更加矛盾，就像华纳兄弟本身比任何其他电影公司的负责人更加矛盾一样”（第 195 页）。该工作室制作了几部描绘“犹太人的贡献和受害”的电影（第 XNUMX 页）。 1922 年，为了响应 1980 多个州立法机构颁布严格审查法的运动，以威尔·H·海斯 (Will H. Hays) 为首的美国电影制片人和发行商协会成立，并成立了以约瑟夫·I·布林 (Joseph I. Breen) 为首的制作规范管理局响应天主教正派军团的运动。结果是，制片人被迫“沿着标准好莱坞类型的路线开发项目，同时避开海斯和布林办公室以及可能被分配到该项目的激进作家”（Ceplair & Englund 303, 304- XNUMX）。[62]编剧们继续为电影写作，用一位密切观察者的话说，“他们相信对社会负责的作家属于电影行业，因为故事片是世界人民接受教育的最重要方式。到目前为止，任何胜利都是重要的”（Ceplair & Englund 1980, 321）。

此外，HUAC 对 1940 世纪 1950 年代末和 1950 年代初的调查以及宗教团体（正派军团、哥伦布骑士团）、爱国团体（美国革命女儿会 [DAR]）和教育团体（家长和教师协会）的积极活动影响了 1980 世纪 340 年代的电影内容，包括作为对 HUAC 调查的直接回应而制作的大量反共电影。用一位制片厂高管的话说，结果是“我现在通过 DAR 的视角来阅读剧本，而以前我是通过老板的视角来阅读剧本”（Ceplair & Englund 1972, 118）。特别值得一提的是美国军团，Cogley (1950, XNUMX) 将其描述为 XNUMX 世纪 XNUMX 年代试图根除电影业“共产主义影响”的“主要推动者”。据称与共产主义有关的六十六位电影人物名单发表在 美国军团杂志 引起了好莱坞的恐慌和一系列长期的调查、解雇和列入黑名单。

从各方面来看，犹太人仍然不成比例地参与美国媒体，尤其是电影业。例如，在撰写本文时，犹太人领导着每个主要工作室，这种情况六十多年来一直没有改变（见 Ginsberg 1993, 1; Kotkin 1993, 61; Silberman 1985, 147）。在 1980 世纪 60 年代进行的一项调查中，1996% 的电影精英代表性样本具有犹太背景（Powers et al. 79, 13n1996）。 Medved (37, XNUMX) 指出，“试图否认犹太人的权力和在流行文化中的突出地位的现实是毫无意义的。任何一家主要电影制片厂最有影响力的制作主管的名单都会产生绝大多数可识别的犹太名字。对于任何关注闪亮镇新闻报道，甚至费心阅读主要电影或电视节目的制作人员的人来说，这个突出的犹太人角色都是显而易见的。”

反犹太主义指控不再关注孤立主义者和反共主义者的抱怨，而是反映出对广泛文化问题的持续关注。最近媒体评论家威廉·卡什（William Cash，1994）将犹太媒体精英描述为“文化虚无主义者”，这表明他认为犹太媒体的影响力反映了犹太人对传统文化价值观的缺乏关注。[63]如上所述，反犹太主义的另一个主要主题是经济活动中对犹太人的排他性做法。卡什提供了轶事证据，表明犹太人将外邦人排除在媒体影响之外，包括那些伪装成犹太人（加密外邦人？）以试图获得行业认可的个人。加布勒似乎承认犹太人的排斥做法，他指出卡什的文章“是无能为力的精英主义者总是如何应对排斥的另一个例子。如果他们被禁止进入一种形式的当权派，他们最终会喷出反犹太主义的胆汁。”

与此相关的是，Medved (1996, 39) 认为“行业领导者可能会本能地感觉与拥有相同观点、价值观和背景的人一起工作更舒服。”作为这一现象的例证，一位年轻的编剧 Adam Kulakow (1996, 43) 指出，“最近我与一位年轻的高管会面，讨论可能的剧本任务。我们的谈话首先讨论了我姓氏的东欧起源，然后讨论了我的祖父母来到美国，我父母决定在马里兰州郊区定居，以及我进入密歇根大学的决定。不久之后我们就开始玩‘犹太地理学’。当我们开始讨论会议的事务时，我们已经基于我们的共同点达到了舒适的程度。”然而，尽管库拉科夫同意犹太人身份是一种优势，但他引用了一些否认犹太身份重要的人的轶事。

在加布勒文章的回复中，卡什表示，存在双重标准，像加布勒这样的犹太作家能够提到“犹太阴谋集团”，而他自己使用这个词被描述为反犹太主义。他还指出，虽然电影经常描绘对其他种族群体的负面刻板印象，但卡什对犹太人“激烈竞争”的描述被视为反犹太主义。最近，马龙·白兰度在全国电视采访节目中重复了 1979 年最初发表的言论，大意是“好莱坞是由犹太人经营的。它是犹太人所有的。”投诉的焦点是好莱坞经常描绘其他种族群体的负面刻板印象，但不包括犹太人。白兰度的言论被反诽谤联盟和犹太保卫联盟视为反犹太主义（洛杉矶时报，9 年 1996 月 4 日，FXNUMX）。

卡什和白兰度都为自己的言论道歉，并作为道歉的一部分，参观了洛杉矶的西蒙·维森塔尔中心（向前，26 年 1996 月 XNUMX 日）。 （卡什的道歉发生在他的言论发表大约两年后。） 向前 文章表明，事件发生后，卡什在出版他的作品时遇到了麻烦。此外，同样的问题 向前 报道称，卡什评论的发布者、伦敦《金融时报》编辑多米尼克·劳森(Dominic Lawson) 旁观者，被禁止发表一篇关于他患有唐氏综合症的女儿出生的文章 “新共和” 当店主马丁·佩雷茨（Martin Peretz）和文学编辑莱昂·维塞尔蒂尔（Leon Wieseltier）抱怨劳森出版卡什的文章时。戈德堡 (Goldberg, 1996, 299) 描述了佩雷茨强烈的犹太身份，以及他毫不掩饰地将杂志倾向有利于以色列的立场的政策。 帕特·罗伯逊（Pat Robertson，1994，257）领导的基督教联盟已成为共和党的重要力量，他表示“犹太知识分子和媒体活动家在攻击基督教中所扮演的角色很可能被证明是一个严重的错误” 。 。 。 。几个世纪以来，基督徒一直支持犹太人建立民族家园的梦想。但美国犹太人投入了大量精力来攻击这些盟友。这项投资可能会带来可怕的红利。”[64]Pat Robertson（1991；另见 Lind 1995a、1995b 和 Heilbrun 1995）接受 Nesta Webster（1944）提出的非常详尽的阴谋论的一般前提，其中犹太人在 18 世纪开始的颠覆运动中发挥了重要作用。韦伯斯特的反犹太主义包括20世纪反犹太主义写作的几个经典主题：犹太人寻求世界统治（卡巴拉著作尤其表明了这一点）；犹太人不忠诚（从犹太国际主义和他们作为传统社会中统治土著民族的中间人的角色就可以看出）；犹太人是“基督教公开的、顽固的敌人”（第 378 页）；犹太人在俄罗斯和匈牙利的革命运动中发挥了主导作用，旨在使犹太人在革命后时期统治这些国家；犹太人负责精神分析，“精神分析，尤其是对性的坚持，往往使意志服从于有害的冲动”（第345页）；犹太人不成比例地参与了旨在破坏外邦基督教文化的其他文化影响，包括“现代艺术”、毒品交易和电影（“其中……历史被系统地歪曲，以达到阶级仇恨的利益，并且一切可以在遵守现行法律的同时，往往会损害公众的爱国主义或道德”[第 394 页]）。 Podhoretz (1995, 30) 为罗伯逊辩护，反对因这些评论而产生的反犹太主义指控，并指出，事实上，犹太知识分子、美国犹太人大会等犹太组织以及美国公民自由组织等犹太人主导的组织联盟[65]Goldberg (1996, 46) 指出，“在美国公民自由联盟和美国之路人民组织等自由组织的世界里，犹太人的影响是如此深远，以至于非犹太人有时模糊了他们与正式犹太社区之间的区别。”美国公民自由联盟经常成为文化保守派从非宗教角度写作的目标。例如，参见 Robert Bork 的 (1996) 懒洋洋地走向戈莫拉。博克指出，美国公民自由联盟“通过诉讼和游说，对美国法律和文化产生了非常大的影响”（1996，97）。博克也是众多强调媒体集团时代华纳的产品具有特别破坏性的文化保守派之一（第 130-132 页）。结果是，虽然博克等书中从未提及犹太人和犹太教，但书中的许多抱怨都是针对犹太人的活动和组织。我个人与文化保守派私下交谈的印象是，他们不会提出犹太人问题，因为担心被指控为反犹太主义。 （我从未与罗伯特·博克交谈过，也不知道他对犹太问题的态度。）他们的态度构成了一种地下反犹太主义，他们说明了犹太人打击反犹太主义策略的有效性（另见第 6 章） ）。 嘲笑基督教信仰，试图削弱基督教的公共力量，或者领导了对不受限制的色情内容的斗争。[66]另请参见 Cohen (1972, 433ff) 对 AJ 委员会试图削弱基督教在公立学校中的影响力的描述，这一努力引起了新教和天主教圈子以及政治家和广大公众的不满。 1960 世纪 1972 年代初，耶稣会刊物上的一位作家问道：“如果我们的犹太朋友赢得了他们所寻求的所有法律豁免权，但却因此将自己陷入了社会和文化疏远的角落，那会取得什么成就呢？” （科恩 444 年，XNUMX）。

在让人想起海因里希·冯·特雷奇克（Heinrich von Treitschke）的评论中，专栏作家约瑟夫·索布兰（Joseph Sobran）也提出了犹太媒体控制的问题，以及它如何影响犹太人利益与基督教右翼利益的讨论：

只要像讨论基督教右派的利益一样自由地讨论犹太人的利益是一种禁忌，[帕特·布坎南 1996 年总统]竞选的全部故事就不可能讲述。谈论美国政治而不提及犹太人有点像谈论 NBA 而不提及芝加哥公牛队。并不是说犹太人是全能的，更不是说全都是坏人。但他们是成功的，因此也足够强大：而且他们的力量是独一无二的，即使在高度可见的情况下，他们也不受正常批评的限制。他们自己的表现就好像他们的成功是一个有罪的秘密，一旦这个话题被提出，他们就会惊慌失措，并诉诸指控。媒体时代犹太人对主要媒体的控制使得强制沉默既矛盾又令人瘫痪。在公共生活中生存需要你了解一切，但永远不要提及它。虚伪的礼仪迫使我们假装犹太人是无能为力的受害者；如果你不尊重他们的受害者身份，他们就会毁掉你。这实际上不是邪恶的显着表现，而是强烈的种族中心主义，一种偷偷摸摸的种族超级爱国主义。 （索布兰 1996a，3）[67]在另一篇专栏中，Sobran (1996b) 引用了一篇文章，转载于 27 月 XNUMX 日的《 “纽约时报”以色列专栏作家阿里·沙维特 (Ari Shavit) 描述了他对黎巴嫩南部一场军事冲突中一百名平民被杀的感受。沙维特写道：“我们出于某种天真的傲慢而杀死了他们。我们绝对确信，现在白宫、参议院和大部分美国媒体都掌握在我们手中，其他人的生命并不像我们自己的生命那么重要。”索布兰评论道，“用一句话——‘在我们手中’——沙维特像一道闪电一样照亮了美国的政治格局。请注意，沙维特将我们美国人只能公开表达的观点视为显而易见的事实，但风险由我们自己承担。”索布兰失去了他的位置 国家评论 因为他对美国犹太人对美国对以色列政策影响的看法。

同样，英国《每日邮报》专栏作家凯文·迈尔斯 (Kevin Myers) 星期日电讯报 （5 年 1997 月 XNUMX 日）写道，“我们真的应该能够像讨论任何其他可识别的群体一样讨论犹太人和他们的犹太身份、他们的美德或罪恶，而不会被称为反犹太主义。坦率不会助长反犹太主义；然而，保密却可以。同情谨慎的沉默很容易被误解为阴谋。现在是对犹太人坦白的时候了。”迈尔斯继续指出 旁观者 当它发表上述威廉·卡什（William Cash，1994）的文章时，被指控反犹太主义。迈尔斯强调，卡什的冒犯之处在于，他写道美国的文化领袖是犹太人，而他们的犹太身份仍然超出了公众的讨论范围。

与媒体控制问题相关的反犹太主义写作的一个特别引人注目的例子最近出现在《 全国先锋图书服务目录 （16 年 1995 月第 XNUMX 期），威廉·皮尔斯的国家联盟的出版物。这篇文章将反犹太主义主题与犹太人对美国电视、流行音乐、印刷媒体、主要报纸和小型报纸连锁店、新闻杂志和图书出版的所有权或管理控制权进行了详细分类。[68]根据该文章，犹太人拥有和/或管理的主要主流媒体的部分列表包括：华特迪士尼公司（包括首都城市/ABC、华特迪士尼电视台、试金石电视台、布埃纳维斯塔电视台、华特迪士尼电影集团、 Touchstone Pictures、Hollywood Pictures、Caravan Pictures、Miramax、迪士尼相关主题公园、ESPN、Lifetime Television、Arts & Entertainment Network、ABC Radio、七份日报、Fairchild Publications [每日女装]、奇尔顿出版社和多元化出版集团）；时代华纳公司（家庭票房有线电视网络、华纳音乐[世界上最大的音乐唱片公司]、华纳兄弟工作室[故事片]，一个出版部门，包括 时间、体育画报、人物、 和 运气）；文章还提到了时代华纳收购特纳广播公司（包括有线电视新闻网）的拟议交易，该交易现已完成）； Viacom, Inc.（电视制作、派拉蒙电影、十二家电视台和十二家广播电台、出版 [Simon & Schuster、Prentice Hall、Pocket Books]、Nickelodeon 有线频道、音乐电视 [MTV]）；鲁珀特·默多克电影制片厂、哥伦比亚广播公司电视台和美国索尼公司的高层管理人员；梦工厂（史蒂文·斯皮尔伯格、大卫·格芬和杰弗里·卡森伯格）； MCA 和环球影业（由世界犹太人大会主席埃德加·布朗夫曼所有）；塞缪尔·纽豪斯的印刷媒体帝国，包括 纽约客 和其他康泰纳仕杂志，以及二十六份日报，其中一些在大城市；国家最有影响力的报纸（纽约时报，华盛顿邮报，并 “华尔街日报”）和新闻杂志（《时代》、《新闻周刊》、《美国新闻与世界报道》), 大西洋月刊 （由 Mortimer B. Zuckerman 所有，他也是 美国新闻与世界报道）；六大图书出版商中的三家，包括兰登书屋、西蒙与舒斯特和时代华纳贸易集团（包括华纳图书和利特尔布朗）。文章指出，提到的前五家电影制作公司（迪士尼、维亚康姆[派拉蒙]、华纳兄弟、索尼和环球）占 74 年前 1995 个月美国电影总收入的 XNUMX%。 文章强调了媒体创造适当讨论界限的能力，例如对以色列的态度，并指责媒体促进种族平等以及移民和多元文化主义的好处。文章的结论是

通过允许犹太人控制我们的新闻和娱乐媒体，我们所做的不仅仅是让他们对我们的政治制度产生决定性影响并实际上控制我们的政府；我们还让他们控制我们孩子的思想和灵魂，他们的态度和想法更多地受到犹太电视和犹太电影的影响，而不是父母、学校或任何其他影响。 。 。 。

从古埃及到俄罗斯，拥有 3,000 年民族破坏历史的犹太人对我们拥有这样的权力，无异于种族自杀。事实上，今天如此多的美国白人充满了种族内疚感和自我仇恨，以至于他们积极寻求自己种族的灭亡，这是一个事实 商榷 犹太媒体控制的后果。 （第 22 页；文本中斜体）

在不强调犹太人参与媒体的情况下，对媒体精英在文化生产中的作用的批评已成为近年来国家政治的一个共同主题。 1992 年总统竞选期间，副总统丹·奎尔 (Dan Quayle) 批评了电视节目《墨菲·布朗》中对单亲家庭的正面描述。[69]参见 Whitehead (1993) 关于单亲养育的科学文献的讨论，表明单亲养育是一种低投资的养育形式，会带来毁灭性的社会后果。 这个问题在 1996 年总统竞选中也出现了，因为鲍勃·多尔 (Bob Dole) 指控娱乐业制造了“堕落的噩梦”，威胁“损害我们作为一个国家的性格”。 Newt Gingrich (1995) 抱怨说，“自 1965 年以来…… 。 。文化精英蓄意抹黑[传统的美国]文明，并用一种​​不负责任的文化取而代之，这种文化与我们所知的美国自由不相容。”

因此，有证据表明人们持续关注媒体精英发出的文化信息。这种担忧往往带有反犹太主义的色彩，因为具有犹太背景的人过多地参与了文化的创造。尽管人们对媒体影响行为的程度仍然存在疑问，但 Lichter 等人。 (1994, 433) 指出，“许多人对电视的不安源于这样一种感觉，即媒体正在以我们无法衡量、甚至可能没有注意到的方式改变我们的生活。”

精英理论家经常认为，文化符号的创造和传播在近代以来具有越来越大的权力和影响力（Powers et al. 1996, 2）。精英之间存在冲突，这种冲突的结果是信息精英（国家媒体记者、电视作家、制片人和导演）相对主导地位的增强，以及以宗教、商业、文化等为中心的传统精英的相对衰落。和军队。 “好莱坞电影是受过高等教育、富裕且强大的领导群体的产物，他们正在与其他更传统的群体争夺在美国的影响力。好莱坞精英（在大多数情况下）并不将权力本身作为目的。相反，他们试图说服美国人创建他们认为公正和/或良好的社会。简而言之，他们试图传播一种他们认为所有正派人都应该持有的意识形态”（Powers et al. 1996, 2-3）。

从历史上看，以宗教和爱国团体为中心的文化保守主义势力在 1940 世纪 1950 年代末和 1960 年代初影响力达到顶峰后失去了权力。自 1994 世纪 1996 年代以来，好莱坞创意界传播的关于性、婚姻和家庭等问题的观点与大多数美国人和传统美国精英所持有的观点截然不同（Lichter et al. 1979；Powers et al. XNUMX；Stein XNUMX） 。正如将在以下几个点讨论的 批判文化1960世纪XNUMX年代是美国文化和政治史上的一个分水岭。一个中心主题是，此时开始的变革与犹太人权力和影响力的崛起密切相关。美国媒体的特点只是这种转变的一个例子。

好莱坞创意界的很大一部分（现在包括对电影内容的更高级别的控制，而不仅仅是剧本创作的过程）自觉地致力于向左翼/自由主义方向彻底重组美国的基本制度（利希特等人，1994 年；Powers 等人，1996 年）。 “精英们（自 1960 世纪 1996 年代以来）在其社会和政治观点上一直并且仍然不成比例地反对当权派。 。 。即使很大一部分美国公众仍然持矛盾态度或反对新的社会范式”（Powers et al. 48, 1994）。此外，好莱坞发出的社会和政治信息不受选举结果的影响，“如果说有什么不同的话，那就是华盛顿保守派政治的崛起可能通过警告和动员占主导地位的自由派好莱坞社区而加速了电视的左倾倾向”（Lichter等，418）。 XNUMX 年，XNUMX）。

好莱坞精英与传统精英和普通大众之间的区别在鲍尔斯等人的著作中最为明显。 “表达性个人主义”一词——一个涉及性解放思想（包括对同性恋的认可）、道德相对主义和对宗教机构的蔑视的维度。[70]同样，迈克尔·梅德韦德 (Michael Medved，1996，42) 承认大多数有影响力的制作主管都是犹太人，他将好莱坞发出的信息描述为强调“即时满足而不是延迟满足；肤浅的魅力而非道德实质；以及情感、本能和暴力，而不是自律和自我控制。”他还指出，民意调查显示“绝大多数美国人认为电影和电视鼓励犯罪暴力、滥交和其他形式的破坏性行为。”梅德韦德还表达了他的担忧，即犹太自卫组织对犹太人在这些现象中所扮演的角色保持沉默只会鼓励反犹太主义。 电影精英们对“系统异化”的看法也高得多，包括相信“我们社会的结构本身就导致了异化”（Powers et al. 1996, 64）。电影精英对不寻常或异常的生活方式以及少数宗教和种族群体也更加宽容（Prindle & Endersby 1993）。 Lichter 等人在电视和印刷新闻精英中获得了大致相似的发现。 （1986）。[71]在新闻媒体精英的代表性样本中，14% 是有宗教信仰的犹太人，23% 在犹太家庭中长大，这表明犹太背景的人在精英记者中所占比例大约高出十倍。

这些发现与几个历史时期犹太知识分子运动的总体基调是一致的： 批判文化 审查数据表明，以犹太教为主的知识分子运动使西方文化受到激进的批评，其动机至少部分是由于社会认同过程涉及对外群体文化的反感。这些犹太知识分子和政治运动，就像媒体精英一样，通常与政治和文化左派联系在一起。正如鲍尔斯等人。 (1996, 211) 注意到，媒体精英的敏感性源自1960世纪1960年代的反文化革命。其价值观包括“对政治制度的有效性和合法性失去信心，以及对西方文化价值观失去信心。西方文化充其量只是被视为人类状况的众多表现之一，尽管是一种失败的表现。在最坏的情况下，它被认为是病态的，在道德上不如其他观点。”此外，虽然这种世界观在流行文化中的传播恰逢1960世纪1996年代的反文化革命，但这些价值观实际上早在这个时期之前就已经是好莱坞媒体精英的特征。与老左派一样，直到 213 世纪 XNUMX 年代，媒体精英才成功地受到文化保守主义势力的抑制（Powers et al. XNUMX, XNUMX）。

关于特定的犹太人利益，一个主要主题 批判文化 文化多元化一直是 20 世纪西方社会犹太知识分子和政治努力的主要焦点。[72]加布勒（Gabler，1994）否认媒体反映了犹太人的利益，更倾向于将犹太媒体影响力的特征归因于犹太人的“边缘性”。对犹太人边缘性和排斥的归因也是加布勒 1988 年著作的一个主要主题 自己的帝国，但是，尽管加布勒清楚地记录了主要工作室大亨的强烈犹太身份（例如，第 279-280 页），但没有任何文件表明这些犹太企业家认为自己被边缘化，或者认为犹太人被边缘化或被排除在美国其他领域之外。经济是进入电影行业的首要动机。边缘性解释同时“归咎于”犹太人对假定的外邦排斥活动的任何负面影响，并忽略了犹太人在所有财富指数以及政治和文化影响力中所占比例过高的程度。正如 Goldberg (1996, 283) 指出的那样，由于犹太人的接受程度很高，局外人的地位更不能解释当代犹太人在媒体中的代表性过高。在第八章中，我认为犹太人对边缘化的看法是关于他们在美国的地位的自欺欺人的一个方面。

鲍尔斯等人。 (1996, 79n.13) 反对犹太人因为电影业的风险而被吸引的理论。他们指出，即使是最成功的电影精英也是文化和社会左派的激进分子，但这个群体的经济信仰并不是特别激进。 鲍尔斯等人。 (1996, 207) 将电视描述为宣扬自由主义、世界主义价值观，而 Lichter 等人。 (1994, 251) 发现电视以积极的方式描绘了文化多元化，并且除了少数无知或偏执的恶棍的活动之外，电视很容易实现。另一方面，鲍尔斯等人。 （1996）发现，由白人种族主义引起的种族冲突主题在电影中更为典型：“今天，电影制片人似乎全神贯注于揭露和纠正种族主义的罪恶，因此倾向于传达对种族关系相当悲观的看法”（p .173）。

上文指出，表现性个人主义的维度将电影精英与传统精英和普通大众明显区分开来。一个主题是 批判文化 就是犹太人和外邦人在文化建设上存在利益冲突。由于犹太人受遗传因素影响，倾向于智力和高投入养育，相对而言，他们免受西方传统文化对高投入养育的支持（包括宗教机构和信仰以及对性行为和性表达的控制）侵蚀的影响。 ）。结果是，由于外邦人高投资养育的文化支持受到侵蚀，犹太人和外邦人之间非常显着的竞争差异预计将急剧增加。[73]此外，正如我们将在 批判文化犹太知识分子一直处于发展弥赛亚社会和知识运动（特别是精神分析及其分支）的最前沿，这些运动提出放松对外邦人性行为的社会控制将导致反犹太主义的下降。从这个角度来看，一种普遍的观点认为，反犹太主义是由病态的亲子关系和对孩子自然性欲的压抑造成的。鉴于这些理论在犹太文化中普遍存在的影响，媒体中的犹太人可能会认为创造一个超性化的媒体环境会将外邦人从神经质的压抑中解放出来，并结束反犹太主义和其他类型的暴力。

政治统治的主题。 与犹太文化影响密切相关的一个主题是犹太人行使不成比例的政治影响。最近，金斯伯格（Ginsberg，1993）汇集了来自历史和当代社会的广泛数据，说明了犹太人在建立或维持促进犹太人利益的政府方面的影响力，从传统社会的专制政府到自由主义、激进主义甚至法西斯主义政府（在意大利的情况）在最近的时期。犹太人的影响力通常是通过财政捐助、通过控制媒体操纵公众舆论以及政治活动（见第 6 章）来获得的，但这些活动随后成为外邦人中反犹太运动的焦点，他们广泛反对政府。各种原因。反犹太主义运动常常强调犹太教的一些方面，例如分离主义和异类、可疑的忠诚度以及不成比例的经济、文化和政治影响力，这些都被视为损害了外邦人的利益。

现代世界的一个常见模式是，外邦人认为犹太人控制着自由主义和激进的政治运动——这种看法并非没有充分的历史证据。在 1912 年德国选举中，犹太人对汉萨联盟的杰出参与“促成了左翼空前的胜利，激起了右翼媒体的愤怒。在那里，这次选举被视为“犹太人，更广泛地说，犹太精神对我们国家和民间生活基础的攻击”，其结果使“犹太人有权将自己视为我们的新领导人”（Pulzer 1979） ，95）。因此，认为犹太人过度参与控制自由主义和激进政治运动的观点与犹太人实际上成为外邦人的统治者的观点相结合，而外邦人的数量远远超过他们。正如反犹太主义者朱利叶斯·兰本（Julius Langbehn）在 1880 年代一本非常受欢迎的著作中所写，“只有德国血统才能统治德国人；只有德国血统才能统治德国人；只有德国血统才能统治德国人。”这是我们人民的首要和基本权利”（Stern 1961，142）。[74]约翰·贝蒂 (1951) 美国的铁幕 和雷维洛·P·奥利弗 (Revilo P. Oliver) (1981) 美国的衰落：保守主义者的教育 是德国反犹太主义文学的美国同行。这些作者强调犹太人参与布尔什维克革命、美国共产主义，并通过他们对美国民主党的影响参与政府职位。尽管他们的著作并不像许多反犹太主义文学那样假定所有美国犹太人都参与其中，但他们倾向于看到一个巨大的、环环相扣的犹太阴谋，在这种情况下，其目的是使美国成为一个由犹太官僚管理的共产主义社会。

从 19 世纪开始，“无论他们的处境如何...... 。 。在我们掌握信息的几乎每个国家，犹太社区的一部分在旨在破坏现有秩序的运动中发挥了非常重要的作用”（Rothman & Lichter 1982, 110）。犹太人是布尔什维克革命中的主导力量的观点是反犹太主义的广泛根源，特别是在两次世界大战期间，并一直延续至今。突出的例子包括希特勒和国家社会主义理论家阿尔弗雷德·罗森伯格、伍德罗·威尔逊、法国小说家路易斯·斐迪南·塞琳和英国小说家希莱尔·贝洛克。温斯顿·丘吉尔（Winston Churchill，1920）写道，犹太人是“世界范围内推翻文明的阴谋”的幕后黑手。犹太人在革命中的作用“无疑是非常伟大的；它可能比其他所有的都重要。”丘吉尔指出，犹太人不仅在布尔什维克领导人（托洛茨基、季诺维也夫、利特维诺夫、克拉辛、拉狄克以及那些对“[国家]恐怖主义体系”负责的人）中占主导地位，而且在匈牙利的革命运动中也占主导地位（贝拉·库恩），德国（罗莎·卢森堡）和美国（艾玛·戈德曼）。在俄罗斯，犹太人主导革命的观念导致了大屠杀，而革命后的反犹太主义至少部分是由于认为只有犹太人受益的观点而产生的（Pipes 1993, 101）。 Pipes (1993, 258) 将大屠杀最终与这样一种看法联系起来：布尔什维克革命是由犹太人主导的，并且是犹太人世界霸权计划的一部分：“因此，犹太人大屠杀被证明是许多意想不到的后果之一。俄国革命”。[75]德国历史学家恩斯特·诺尔特（Ernst Nolte，1987）在一部有争议的著作中指出，布尔什维克对敌人进行大规模屠杀的倾向，以及 1917 年之后欧洲右翼人士认为布尔什维克政权由犹太人主导的倾向，是导致布尔什维克政权被犹太人统治的重要因素。纳粹走向种族灭绝。据估计，苏联造成的死亡人数在 1918 至 1989 万人之间，早在 1988 年，著名的犹太布尔什维克格里戈里·季诺维也夫就公开表示需要消灭 XNUMX 万俄罗斯人。诺尔特被指控“相对化”大屠杀并质疑其独特性。有关诺尔特事件的概述，请参阅 Raico (XNUMX)。有关欧洲右翼分子将苏联政权等同于犹太人的倾向的总结，请参见 Mayer (XNUMX)。

最近，犹太人参与革命再次成为俄罗斯反犹太主义的主题。例如，著名的美国国家科学院院士、数学家伊戈尔·沙法列维奇（Igor Shafarevich，1989）认为，犹太人在布尔什维克革命期间占据了许多高层领导职位，他们在这一时期及之后的活动是出于敌意俄罗斯人和他们的文化。[76]国家科学院要求沙法列维奇辞去学院职务，但他拒绝了（参见 科学257，1992，743； 科学家 6(19) 1992，1）。 沙法列维奇声称，犹太人严重参与了破坏俄罗斯传统机构的行动，特别是他们在控制秘密警察和国家政治局（OGPU）方面的作用。他强调犹太人在消灭俄罗斯民族主义者、破坏俄罗斯爱国主义、谋杀沙皇及其家人、剥夺富农和摧毁东正教教会方面所发挥的作用。他认为犹太人的“恐俄症”并不是一种独特的现象，而是源于犹太人对被认为是异教徒世界的传统敌意。 引用 （不洁的）以及被视为非人类和值得毁灭的外邦人——上面讨论的反犹太主义的分离主义和厌世主题的另一个例子。沙法列维奇回顾了苏联和后苏联时期的犹太文学作品，表明了对俄罗斯及其文化的仇恨与强烈的复仇欲望。沙法列维奇反映了反犹太主义的文化统治主题，声称犹太人对俄罗斯的影响可能比任何其他国家都大，但在当代俄罗斯，甚至在理论上更开放的美国，讨论犹太人的角色是被禁止的。原则。事实上，沙法列维奇指出，犹太人的利益与其他人的利益发生冲突的任何可能性都不能作为假设提出。

反犹太主义写作的第三个主题是不忠诚问题。正如卡茨（Katz，1986b，151）指出的，忠诚问题与国际犹太人凝聚力的理念有关。犹太人在世界范围内的分散所具有的心理和实际重要性可以从各个时期广泛分散的犹太家庭和其他同宗教者网络之间保持的密切的商业和家庭联系中看出（见 创伤后应激障碍，CH。 6).这里特别能说明问题的是，家庭婚姻策略在寻找合适的犹太伴侣时往往不考虑国界（例如，Mosse 1989, 170）。在相当大的程度上，犹太社会世界一直是一个国际社会，由犹太人组成，无论他们当时生活在哪里。

鉴于犹太人中遗传和文化分离主义的重要性，以及他们往往与其他广泛分散的犹太群体的关系比与他们生活在其中的外邦人的关系更密切这一事实，从进化的角度来看，这并不奇怪。忠诚度问题被提出。

此外，犹太人和外邦人社区内的社会认同过程往往会导致这样一种看法，即犹太人与遥远的犹太人群体比与他们的外邦同胞有更多相似的利益，即使在没有大量利益的情况下，情况也会如此。分布广泛的犹太人群体之间的遗传共性。在犹太社区内，分散的犹太人民团结的传统意识形态强化了这些看法。因此，遗传共性并不是假设忠诚问题是犹太人与外邦人关系的一个重要方面的必要条件。

此外，政府更迭可能会给犹太人带来非常具体的好处，特别是如果犹太人认为他们目前的处境是受压迫的。鉴于反犹太主义的普遍存在，犹太人常常认为自己的处境是受压迫的，如果犹太人相信在政府更迭后他们将能够统治他们以前的压迫者，那么犹太人的不忠诚就会增加。例如，在8世纪，西班牙的犹太人将穆斯林视为“摆脱难以忍受的压迫的救世主”（Netanyahu 1995，56），帮助他们进行军事行动，并在入侵后充当穆斯林和被征服的西班牙人之间的中间人。 。而且，如下文所示，犹太人积极援助拜占庭帝国和西班牙的穆斯林入侵者，他们在基督教统治时期遭受了反犹太主义，随后充当了新的外来统治精英和西班牙人之间的中间阶级。征服了外邦人口。

类似的例子在现代也曾发生过。第一次世界大战期间，俄罗斯怀疑犹太人在战争中支持德国，导致将犹太人驱逐出战区（Pipes 1990, 231）。犹太人对德国的同情至少部分源于沙皇政权的官方反犹太政策。波兰犹太人也对 1939 年苏联入侵波兰表示欢迎，因为人们对波兰反犹太主义的看法，加上对犹太人在苏联的待遇以及犹太人在苏联担任重要职务的看法。战后，由于许多波兰民族主义者的反犹太主义，犹太人支持苏联占领和镇压波兰民族主义势力（Checinski 1982；Schatz 1991）。

另一方面，从古代世界开始，犹太人经常充当压迫性统治精英（尤其是外来统治精英）和土著居民之间的中间人。在这种情况下，犹太人通常会因为这种地位而被招募，因为他们对政权毫无疑问的忠诚——这种忠诚源于他们的地位完全依赖于外邦精英这一事实。 19 世纪关于犹太人进入英国的记载对威廉二世进行了非常负面的描述，部分原因是他和他的父亲征服者威廉利用犹太人作为精英与其他人之间的中间人的地位人口数量：

在征服者威廉一世之后，鲁昂的犹太人找到了前往伦敦的道路，不久我们就在英格兰的主要城市和行政区找到了定居点：约克、温彻斯特、林肯、布里斯托尔、牛津，甚至在圣埃德蒙兹和圣奥尔本斯修道院院长的大门。他们是国王的特殊人员，或者更确切地说，是国王的特殊动产，对教会和联邦来说都是陌生人，但他们受到主人的强烈保护，而主人通常认为保护他们免受所有其他人的伤害是他的利益。他们被憎恨、恐惧和厌恶，但又太害怕被蔑视或压迫，他们挑衅地在这片土地上的人民中徘徊，他们依靠人民的需要而繁衍生息，免受伤害或侮辱，除了时不时地，当民众的愤怒爆发时当他们骄傲的宅邸和坚固的住所不再能让他们免受愤怒的人群的侵害时，这些人群渴望用债权人的鲜血来洗刷他们的债务。在英国历史的任何时代，被鄙视、颤抖的犹太人在他遇到的每一个基督徒面前都感到畏缩的浪漫画面，只是一幅浪漫的画面。 （弗里曼 1882，I，160–161）

最后，不忠诚问题与犹太人相对于可能的外邦群体策略的作用密切相关。有时，外邦人试图将以民族或宗教为中心的高度凝聚力的团体聚集在一起。[77]由于俄罗斯对待犹太人而对俄罗斯的敌意也出现在另一起著名事件中，雅各布·希夫承认，政治考虑是他在 1904 年至 1905 年资助日本对俄罗斯战争的努力中的一个重要因素（Sachar 1992， 226ff；谢尔曼 1983，68）。包括希夫在内的 AJ 委员会的德国犹太人领导人继续对俄罗斯进行经济抵制，直到沙皇垮台为止，他们对俄罗斯犹太人的担忧导致整个时期试图以与俄罗斯相反的方式制定美国对俄罗斯政策。感知到的美国利益（Goldstein 1990，284ff）。希夫试图让英国和法国承诺不使用他的贷款援助俄罗斯；由于没有得到这样的承诺，他的公司 Kuhn, Loeb & Co. 没有参与对盟军战争的资助——导致大量负面新闻报道（Goldstein 1990, 286; Sachar 1992, 239ff）。 1916 年，希夫斥责波士顿一家投资公司的合伙人参与俄罗斯贷款，“他们更关心自己的利润，而不是美国公民的荣誉”（Goldstein 1990，285）。在提出这一论点时，希夫实际上对俄罗斯犹太人的公民权利感兴趣，他将极少数美国犹太人在俄罗斯自由旅行的利益置于美国官方外交政策利益之上。以及其他西方盟友的利益。同期美国驻俄罗斯大使戴维·R·弗朗西斯 (David R. Francis) 尖锐地指出，犹太人只占俄罗斯人口的 3% (Goldstein 1990, 288)，这意味着美国的政策旨在援助绝大多数俄罗斯人，而 AJ 委员会却提倡只符合少数人利益的政策。 因此，在六世纪和七世纪的西班牙，西哥特国王对犹太人的迫害是由于国王渴望在西哥特人和以前占主导地位的西班牙罗马人民之间持续发生冲突时建立一个种族和宗教上统一的王国。内塔尼亚胡 6 年，7ff）。在 1995 年至 37 年间的德国，海因里希·冯·特雷奇克 (Heinrich von Treitschke) 等非犹太人知识分子提出了基于基督教的统一德国文化的理念 (Ragins 1870, 1914；另见 Carlebach 1980, 16)。犹太人要么毫无保留地加入这种文化，要么离开并试图建立自己的国家，但他们不应该被允许作为一个未被同化的民族群体在德国境内持续存在。即使是自由派知识分子西奥多·蒙森（Theodor Mommsen）虽然是冯·特雷奇克的批评者并普遍反对反犹太主义，但仍然担心持续的犹太分离主义会阻碍国家统一。这种普遍态度代表了德国自由派新教圈子，而自由派犹太人对这一时期反犹太主义的主要反应就是维护他们的爱国主义。犹太人还试图与犹太复国主义者和更传统的同宗教主义者划清界限，后者缺乏爱国主义被视为反犹太主义的主要根源（Ragins 1978, 77）。

不忠的问题绝不是犹太人所独有的。 Zenner (1991, 24) 指出，生活在散居环境中的少数群体，包括作为少数群体生活在国外的华人和印度群体，常常被人口占主导地位的群体指控为不忠诚。第一次世界大战期间，许多德裔美国人由于与祖国的联系而不愿支持盟军对抗德国的事业。

在这方面，美国犹太委员会（AJCommittee）的德裔美国人犹太人移民领导人在第一次世界大战中也支持德国，但直到俄罗斯革命成功为止。他们采取这一立场不是因为他们与德国的关系，而是因为他们与俄罗斯犹太人的关系，他们认为这些犹太人受到沙皇的压迫，而且因为德国正在与俄罗斯交战（见下文）。他们主要关心的是其他犹太人，而不是他们出生的国家。

对于缺乏发达的侨民意识形态或强烈的群体认同感或民族中心主义的群体来说，与祖国的联系逐渐减弱，并且存在文化和基因同化的趋势，至少在西方同化主义国家是如此。因此，德裔美国人逐渐更多地融入美国文化，并与其他欧洲种族背景的人通婚，因此到第二次世界大战时，双重忠诚不再是大多数人的问题。然而，鉴于侨民状况的持久性，犹太人一再陷入这样的境地：他们与其他国家的犹太人的关系与他们所生活的社会中绝大多数其他成员的利益相冲突，或者至少是独立的。在。

《出埃及记》和《以斯帖记》中的记载表明，人们意识到强大的寄居团体会招致不忠的指控——担心“当我们发生任何战争时，他们……”。 。 。他们与我们的仇敌联合起来，攻击我们”（出 1:10）。 Bickerman (1988, 243) 还指出，在《禧年书》中，据说法老迫害犹太人，因为他们忠于迦南地； 《托比特之书》的作者“发现西尼基里布（亚述国王）自然会因为他在耶路撒冷的失败而向尼尼微（亚述首都）的犹太人报仇。”

约瑟夫斯认为亚历山大人民对犹太人的敌意源于该地区的犹太人协助亚历山大大帝对抗埃及人（弗拉维乌斯·约瑟夫斯， 犹太人的战争 2:487–488）。 Feldman (1993, 89-90) 描述了希腊和罗马时期的另外四个例子，其中散居犹太人对犹太地犹太人的忠诚与政府的利益发生冲突，其中包括劝阻埃及统治者不要试图俘获犹太人的例子。犹太，因为它会与埃及犹太人为敌。

“罗马人长期以来不信任犹太人的忠诚”（Baron 1952，II，179）。犹太人对罗马人的态度比任何其他学科群体都要消极得多，从彻底的敌意（大多数时候）到在巴尔·科赫巴（公元 140 年）战败后逐渐出现的顺从接受（Alon 1989， 698）。最后，“只有[犹太人]为帝国的灾难而欢欣鼓舞，并迎来了它的灭亡”（Jones 1964, 950）。

缺乏信任的根源之一是散居海外的犹太人的同情心仍然集中在祖国的福祉上。例如，在公元后的叛乱期间。 66-70 年，散居在外的几个城市发生了犹太人起义，在巴尔·科赫巴战争期间，散居在外的犹太人对巴勒斯坦同教者的命运仍然表示同情，尽管他们没有积极参加叛乱（Alon 1989， 617–618）。当卡利古拉皇帝威胁要在耶路撒冷的圣殿中放置一尊自己的雕像时，斐洛威胁整个帝国的犹太人反抗，他指出“世界各地的每个人，即使他天生对犹太人不好，也不敢参与破坏”我们的任何机构”（Sanders 1992，144）。

后来，拜占庭人在国家危机时期寻求团结时，有时采取了强制皈依等反犹太政策。拜占庭当局正确地担心犹太人会积极协助波斯人和后来的穆斯林入侵者（Alon 1989, 16; Avi-Yonah 1976, 261ff）。 Parkes (1934, 263) 描述了这一时期犹太人的“一长串背叛和叛国、敌意和屠杀”，最终与拜占庭反犹太主义背景下犹太人对波斯的党派偏见有关。 5世纪初，犹太人企图向波斯人出卖一座城市，结果被发现后，犹太人遭到屠杀（Parkes 1934, 257-258）。 7世纪，犹太人援助波斯侵略者，据说在撒玛利亚人的帮助下屠杀了十万基督徒（Grant 1973, 288）。该地区被拜占庭人夺回后，阿拉伯人在犹太人的“热情支持”下征服了该地区（Grant 1973, 289；另见 Jones 1964, 950）。 12世纪初，拜占庭犹太人“迅速崛起，援助”入侵的塞尔柱土耳其军队（Shaw 1991，25）。从 14 世纪开始，犹太人支持奥斯曼土耳其人的入侵——1453 年，在犹太人的帮助下，最终通过犹太区进入君士坦丁堡 (Shaw 1991, 26)。为了感谢他们的支持，苏丹对他的基督教臣民实行了犹太人的经济统治，犹太人从各地散居各地移民到该地区（Shaw 1991, 77）。

在 16 世纪，犹太人作为土耳其政权和本土臣民之间中间人的地位上升，引起了基督教国家的担忧，担心犹太人会将他们背叛给土耳其人（Pullan 1983, 19；另见 Davidson 1987）。土耳其人在此期间向以前的基督教地区扩张，人们担心他们的努力得到了伊比利亚半岛和其他地方的犹太人和秘密犹太人的帮助。在威尼斯，这些担忧集中在土耳其对塞浦路斯的进攻中，颇具影响力的前基督教公爵 J. 米克斯·门德斯 (J. Miquez Mendes) 所扮演的重要角色，他是苏丹的高级顾问，在威尼斯马拉诺社区拥有强大的家庭和个人关系。 。人们还担心犹太人在基督教国家获得的财富会被移民的犹太人转移到奥斯曼帝国。

宗教裁判所期间西班牙反犹太主义作家的一个主题是，犹太人密谋让穆斯林入侵西班牙，向征服的军队打开城市大门，并在入侵后为新的穆斯林统治精英统治基督徒提供服务。 （Amador de los Rios 1875-1876，I；Castro 1954；Stillman 1979；Netanyahu [1995, 56-57]，他必须被视为辩护者[见第 227-240 页]，拒绝将犹太人的阴谋故事视为神话。 ，但指出犹太人对穆斯林的入侵感到高兴，并帮助穆斯林管理被征服的国家。）此外，他们这样做不仅是因为先前存在的基督教反犹太主义，而且还因为在这个时期穆斯林仍在扩张，而犹太人有机会与似乎即将征服基督教欧洲的势力结盟。即使在 19 世纪历史学家何塞·阿马多尔·德洛斯·里奥斯 (José Amador de los Rios) 看来，人们也能感受到这种行为所激起的敌意，他写道：“没有对他们所居住的土地的任何热爱，没有任何使一个民族变得高贵的感情，最后没有情感出于慷慨，他们只想满足自己的贪婪并完成哥特人的毁灭。借此机会表达他们的怨恨，并吹嘘他们积攒了几个世纪的仇恨”（Walsh 1930，196）。

宗教裁判所时期也出现了忠诚问题。 “作为一个‘分离的民族’，尽管马拉诺人皈依了伊斯兰教，但作为一个因共同起源或种族而联合起来的国家，马拉诺人因此受到了他们群体的评价： 外国国民实体，他与 全国人民 必须受到质疑，甚至温和的对手也可能认为他们准备背叛它”（Netanyahu 1995，996；文本中的斜体）。对 1620 年代新基督教商人的一种批评是，前者是秘密犹太人，他们“被证明是葡萄牙犹太人在阿姆斯特丹的代理人，也是西班牙和天主教的敌人”（Boyajian 1983，20）。 1640 年代，西班牙君主政体的葡萄牙新基督教金融家被指控故意阻碍付款，并因此对军事失败和叛变负责。这些指控因几起秘密犹太金融家潜逃然后公开居住在犹太社区的事例而得到强化。 Lea (1906–1907, III, 280) 指出，尽管有些夸张，但关于犹太化葡萄牙人在 17 世纪积极帮助西班牙和葡萄牙的敌人，特别是荷兰人的指控，有“毫无疑问的事实基础”（另见卡斯特罗） 1971 年，244；Contraras 1991 年，133）。事实上，反对允许皈依者移民的一个主要理由是，他们会损害西班牙和葡萄牙在海外的利益。

欧洲启蒙运动之后，“开始解放的国家准备吸收生活在自己境内的犹太人；他们不准备承认具有宗教以外共同利益的跨国犹太人的存在”（Katz 1986b，81）。戈德温·史密斯 (Goldwin Smith) 在他的文章《犹太问题》(1894) 中提出了如下问题：

只要不存在国家利益冲突，[犹太人]就可以是他所居住的社区的顺从和尽职的公民。但当国家利益发生冲突时，他对自己国籍的依恋就会占上风。 。 。 。我们看到欧洲各国政府相互竞争，争取反国家货币权力的青睐和支持，而该权力本身在道义上不受任何效忠的约束，随时准备为了自己的目标而背叛和秘密瘫痪欧洲政府。其成员赖以生存的保护，当然总是会以牺牲分裂和屈从的世界为代价来获得力量和优势。 (史密斯 1894, 279–280)

1807 年，在后启蒙运动政治世界的开端，犹太人的忠诚是拿破仑在犹太名人会议上提出的几个问题之一。拿破仑确信法国犹太人只忠于法国，但卡茨（Katz，1986b，81）指出，犹太人“继续保持强烈的群体意识和凝聚力，超越了各自欧洲国家的国界”。德国哲学家约翰·费希特表达了外邦人的共同恐惧，他写道：“有一个巨大的国家几乎遍及欧洲所有国家……。 。 。与所有其他人进行着一场永恒的战争。 。 。 。 [I]这当然是，犹太人”（Katz 1986b，120）。

1840 年的大马士革事件标志着启蒙运动后对犹太人忠诚问题的关注的一个里程碑。法国犹太人成功说服政府放弃支持针对叙利亚犹太社区的仪式谋杀指控，结果领土从法国归还给奥斯曼帝国。富有的犹太人与其他国家的犹太社区以及被视为法国敌人的国家的外邦政客合作，“许多法国人认为，他们的一方在这场特殊的竞赛中输给了犹太人的利益，输给了与国际上有联系的强大犹太人团体” ” (Lindemann 1991, 38)，而犹太观察家则将其视为犹太人团结的胜利。 “这被称为犹太人的新团结…… 。 。对其他观察者来说，这似乎是一个非常古老且不祥的事物的重申或重新出现。对他们来说，犹太人仍然是一个遍布欧洲各国的特殊民族，几个世纪以来一直如此。但现在，与过去形成鲜明而令人不安的对比的是，这个特殊的国家能够在这些国家内部行使强大的权力”（Lindemann 1991，38-39）。

19世纪期间，法国成立了以色列世界联盟，英国成立了众议院委员会和英国犹太人协会，美国以色列人代表委员会和AJ委员会（1906年）在美国成立，这些社团都促进了利益的发展世界各地犹太人的情况也被视为犹太人利益不一定与国家利益相同的证据。因此，关于该联盟，“几乎没有其他犹太活动或现象在全欧洲反犹太主义者的思想和想象中发挥了如此显着的作用。 。 。 。该联盟的作用是唤起犹太世界阴谋的幽灵，该阴谋是从一个秘密中心进行的——后来成为了焦点主题 锡安长老的议定书（Katz 1979，50）。 强烈怀疑俄国犹太人与联盟保持联系，1880年代的反犹太出版物从对经济剥削的指控转变为围绕联盟的国际阴谋的指控（Frankel 1981）。[78]Mosse (1989, 250) 指出，在非犹太人中产阶级放弃这种意识形态很久之后，德国犹太企业家精英就倾向于支持自由贸易政策，他们这样做不仅是出于经济自身利益，而且是因为一种意识形态的国际主义。在威廉时代，这一阶层的犹太资本家“比外邦人更少沙文主义，更具国际视野，是泛德意志人和反犹太主义超级爱国者不断抱怨的根源”（Mosse 1989，256）。反犹太主义者的一个特别明显的目标是西奥多·沃尔夫，他是《纽约时报》的编辑。 柏林人塔格布拉特被反犹太主义者视为积极反对德国地缘政治利益的“世界主义者”：“没有一个民族主义者、沙文主义者、军国主义者， 伏尔基施，或反犹太主义谩骂，其中不包括提及自由派“犹太媒体”和“犹太”共和国”（犹太共和国）并且没有提到 柏林人塔格布拉特 通常是其主编”（Mosse 1989, 285–286）。

从 19 世纪末到俄国革命，犹太人改善俄罗斯犹太人恶劣待遇的愿望与一些国家的国家利益发生冲突，特别是法国，法国在二战失败后急于发展反德联盟。普法战争。意识到这些深深的怀疑，犹太社区公开努力表达对沙皇亚历山大三世的喜爱，尽管他迫害犹太人，但反犹太主义者的怀疑仍然存在（Johnson 1988, 384; Lindemann 1991）。这个问题还导致美国犹太人成功地试图让他们的政府废除《俄美通商和航海条约》，尽管国务卿和总统告诉他们，这种行动将“损害美国的重要贸易利益”（戈德斯坦） 1990 年，135ff；另见 Sachar 1992，229ff）。

第一次世界大战期间，在英国，从俄罗斯移民过来的犹太人经常拒绝服兵役，因为英国与俄罗斯结盟。在利兹，向内政部提交的一份报告表明，26 名犹太外国人中有 1,400 人加入了武装部队，还有更多人逃往爱尔兰以避免服兵役（Alderman 1992, 236）：

不管英国与德国的争吵看起来如何，在移民圈子里，这并不被视为犹太人的争吵；犹太人杀犹太人显得特别亵渎。 。 。 。需要征兵的犹太人在军事法庭上请求免除他们的义务，因为他们不想为沙皇而战，或者因为他们担心自己无法在武装部队中信奉自己的宗教，这显然给人留下了不好的印象。人们发起了一场针对他们的新闻运动，进而针对整个“外国”犹太人。 （阿尔德曼 1992 年，237）

由于对忠诚度的担忧，一些拒绝入伍的俄罗斯裔犹太移民被遣返回俄罗斯。然而，阿尔德曼（Alderman，1992，239）指出，此时俄罗斯革命正如火如荼地进行，许多人自愿或非自愿地返回俄罗斯，与旧政权的残余势力作斗争。

犹太人对俄罗斯的态度也反映在 1870 年代犹太人对巴尔干独立的反应中。土耳其对保加利亚基督徒犯下暴行，导致英国反对党自由党掀起反土耳其政治运动。除了对犹太人在土耳其的金融投资感到担忧之外，英国犹太人与奥匈帝国、德国、法国和美国的同教信徒一样，从巴尔干犹太人的角度看待这一局势。与东正教统治下的情况相比，土耳其的统治给予了这些犹太人更大程度的宽容。

犹太人的影响最终推迟了巴尔干地区从土耳其的独立，直到犹太人的权利得到保障并且俄罗斯的影响最小化。这场运动表明，由于犹太教的国际结构，犹太人有能力在其他国家发挥影响力——这始终是忠诚问题的一个因素。不仅犹太人在英国发挥了政治影响力来支持迪斯雷利首相的政策，维也纳媒体也被迫支持土耳其，罗斯柴尔德家族的维也纳分支也向奥匈帝国政府施压。英国人莱昂内尔·德·罗斯柴尔德也让他的德国银行业合伙人格森·冯·布莱希罗德来影响俾斯麦。因此，对犹太人权利的保障被纳入条约中（Alderman 1983, 38）。其结果是自由党内许多人出现了相当大的反犹太情绪，而在此之前自由党已经得到了绝大多数英国犹太人的支持。反对者利用了保守党领袖本杰明·迪斯雷利和自由党领袖 W·E·格拉德斯通的种族血统，谴责“我所谓的犹太同情心，在自称犹太教的圈子之外和内部，现在正在以这种方式发挥作用”。东方问题”（Alderman 1983，39）。

当犹太人面临日益影响力的犹太复国主义运动时，不忠诚的问题也随之出现。也许具有讽刺意味的是，犹太复国主义者和反犹太复国主义者因忠诚相关问题而互相指责对方煽动反犹太主义。犹太复国主义者经常认为，德国犹太人实际上确实有不同的忠诚度，这证明了反犹太主义者的指控是合理的（例如，Mosse 1989，60），而非犹太复国主义者则担心散居海外的犹太复国主义者的侵略性犹太民族主义会导致人们普遍认为犹太人并不效忠德国。随着更成熟的德裔美国犹太人面临东欧移民犹太人在美国的崛起，这些问题继续引起人们的关注（Frommer 1978）。创立美国犹太人大会的东欧犹太人比他们更成熟的同教者更有可能成为犹太复国主义者，并且对犹太人作为一个国家和一个与外国犹太人有密切联系的种族有着深入的看法。[79]1950 世纪 1972 年代，北非各国政府质疑犹太人对民族主义的承诺 (Cohen 522, 1979)。突尼斯政府的一份报告称，犹太人在民族主义事业中“没有充分合作”。犹太人也普遍被视为亲法国，至少部分是因为他们在法国统治下繁荣起来。 （法国人积极鼓励犹太人充当统治本土穆斯林人口的“中间人少数派”[Stillman 1991, 1972]。）同样，大多数犹太人在阿尔及利亚民族主义斗争中积极支持法国；阿尔及利亚领导人表示，如果犹太人在法国统治垮台后保留法国公民身份，他们会遭到怨恨。正如积极寻求强大民族认同的国家所常见的那样，突尼斯也将犹太分离主义的所有要素视为分裂，包括国际犹太机构试图将财政资源输送给犹太人而不是整个社会：“政府不会允许他们[犹太人]生活在他们自己的封闭圈子里”（in Cohen 523, XNUMX）。

事实上，犹太复国主义确实导致外邦人认为犹太人不忠诚。在 我的奋斗，希特勒（1943, 56）利用犹太复国主义和其他犹太人并不拒绝犹太复国主义者作为（可能是误导的）犹太人同胞的事实来论证犹太人实际上是一个统一的国家而不仅仅是一种宗教。在苏联，斯大林认为犹太人在政治上不可靠，因为他们对以色列表达了“压倒性的热情”并试图移民到以色列，特别是因为以色列在冷战期间倾向于西方(Schatz 1991, 375n.13)。 1948 年的战争期间，苏联犹太人试图组织一支军队去以色列作战，苏联犹太人对以色列的声援还有很多其他表现，特别是果尔达·梅厄访问苏联期间犹太人的热情高涨。斯大林认为“志愿者在心理上做好了接受两个国家管辖的准备——所有工人的祖国和所有犹太人的祖国——这在他看来是绝对不可能的”(Vaksberg 1994, 197) 。还有一些迹象表明，冷战最激烈的时候，斯大林怀疑苏联犹太人在与美国的战争中不会忠于苏联，因为他们中的许多人在美国有亲戚（Rubenstein 1996，260）。

在此期间，对犹太人忠诚度的担忧非常严重。 Kostyrchenko (1995, 144, 149) 指出，斯大林开始镇压犹太文化的原因之一是他担心苏联远东边境犹太自治区（比罗比詹）犹太人的忠诚度，特别是担心与美国的可能接触。犹太组织。结果是苏联针对犹太民族和文化机构的运动蔓延到整个东欧，直到斯大林去世才结束。同样，1967 年至 1968 年，由于犹太人对以色列在六日战争中取得胜利而欢欣鼓舞，波兰爆发了一场反犹运动。苏联集团在这场冲突中支持了阿拉伯人。总统瓦迪斯瓦夫·哥穆尔卡 (Wladyslaw Gomulka) 谴责该国的犹太人“第五纵队”，强调以色列与波兰的主要敌人西德的密切关系（Rozenbaum 1978；Schatz 1991, 304）。

在 1917 年《贝尔福宣言》谈判期间及此后，犹太复国主义思想也与美国外交政策利益相冲突。美国国务院担心英国在巴勒斯坦的保护国会损害该地区的商业利益，并且无论如何，冒犯土耳其或其他中东国家都不符合美国的利益（Sachar 1992，256ff）。虽然伍德罗·威尔逊总统同情国务院的立场，但他最终被美国犹太复国主义者说服支持该宣言；随后很快得到了英国人的批准。[80]威尔逊的批准是“随意的”（Sachar 1992, 260），并且国务院没有得到通知，这强烈表明对犹太复国主义计划的支持不够热情。当国务院意识到这一情况后，国务卿敦促总统宣布不支持该宣言；威尔逊对这个想法越来越冷淡，直到 1920 年最终批准，这显然是美国最高法院法官和犹太复国主义领袖路易斯·D·布兰迪斯 (Louis D. Brandeis) 私下请求的结果 (Sachar 1992, 268)。

同样，在 1920 年代的英国，保守党媒体发起反对《贝尔福宣言》的运动，理由是英国代表犹太人的利益征税，这对英国不利，因为这会导致穆斯林世界的疏远 (Alderman 1983, 103) 。 1936 年，众议院主席内森·拉斯基 (Nathan Laski) 对一位犹太复国主义候选人的竞选风格表示遗憾，因为他是犹太人，因此敦促选民投票给他。这“造成了很大的伤害。它仍然被人们铭记和谈论，据说犹太人首先是犹太人，很久以后才是英国人”（in Alderman 1983, 114）。

也许犹太人利益和英国利益之间最明显的冲突出现在第二次世界大战之后，当时工党政府未能支持建立犹太国家。许多英国犹太人慷慨解囊，资助英国保护地的非法活动，包括武器和难民走私以及资助犹太人针对英国军队的军事行动（Alderman 1983, 129）。这些活动导致了英格兰各地广泛的反犹太骚乱，工党政府在此期间明确拒绝取缔反犹太主义。在 1960 世纪 1970 年代末和 1983 年代，下议院工党议员中出现了双重忠诚的指控，其中一位议员评论道：“不可否认的是，许多议员都拥有我只能称之为双重忠诚的东西，即对另一个国家和另一个国家的忠诚”。利益”（Alderman 151，1983）。 Alderman (151, XNUMX) 评论说，双重忠诚的指控“当组织或个人...... 。 。试图说服犹太选民根据对以色列的忠诚度来投票。如果此类呼吁取得哪怕部分成功，就像他们不时所做的那样，那么‘双重忠诚’的指控似乎是有道理的。”

总统、国务院、国会或美国公众对犹太复国主义家园的想法，从冷漠的矛盾心理到彻底的敌意，一直持续到 1948 年以色列建国及以后。例如，在第二次世界大战后时期，国务院仍然有这样一种看法，即美国在该地区的利益不会由犹太人的祖国服务，而应该旨在确保石油和军事基地的安全，以对抗苏联。人们还担心，由于阿拉伯人的敌意，这样一个家园将在未来几年内产生不稳定的影响（Goldmann 1978, 31; Lilienthal 1978, 50, 61; Sachar 1992, 580）。杜鲁门的国防部长詹姆斯·福莱斯特“几乎被他在犹太复国主义野心中发现的对[美国利益]的威胁所困扰。国务院，特别是近东部门也表达了他的担忧”（Sachar 1992, 597）。 1960 年，参议院外交关系委员会主席、参议员 J. 威廉·富布赖特 (J. William Fulbright) 在回应强迫埃及同意以色列使用苏伊士运河的企图时宣称，“近年来，我们看到了明显不致力于美国的组织的兴起”。 ，但针对外国国家和团体。美国外交政策的实施已因这一事态发展而受到严重损害”（in Cohen 1972, 325）。

以色列一直积极寻求将其利益置于美国犹太人的首要地位，这可能会导致不忠诚的指控。 Elazar (1980, 81) 在 1970 世纪 1980 年代末撰文指出，“迄今为止，有组织的美国犹太人默许了这些要求，而没有真正审视其影响，其中一些可能会彻底改变犹太人与其美国同胞之间的关系。”不支持以色列主张的个人“或多或少会被犹太社区抛弃，并且肯定被排除在任何重要的决策角色之外”（Elazar 91, 1992）。在这种情况下，人们对犹太人不忠诚的看法是显而易见的，事实上，最近针对美国左翼和右翼作家和政治人物的反犹太主义指控中，确实出现了对以色列支持的忠诚问题。 （参见巴克利 1995；林德 1995a，1986b；波德霍雷兹 1966；维达尔 XNUMX）。[81]Goldberg (1996, 229ff) 指出了犹太身份影响美国官员对以色列行为的一种模式。例如，国务卿亨利·基辛格开始大幅增加对以色列的财政支持，但他担心以色列在六日战争期间的安全。 “‘随着以色列开始分崩离析，亨利也开始分崩离析，’国防部长施莱辛格后来说道”（Goldberg 1996, 248-249）。 1992 年，基辛格在一个犹太团体的演讲中表示：“我作为一名犹太人，一直在执行超级大国的外交政策。我从来没有掩盖过这样一个事实：我的十二位家人在大屠杀中丧生，因此犹太人的命运始终是我深切关注的问题。与此同时，命运将我置于一个必须从其他角度看待的境地”（in Goldberg 1996, 249）。

最后，忠诚问题有时与外邦人的信念有关，即犹太人正在积极破坏社会制度。 1849-1850 年巴伐利亚反对犹太人解放的请愿书的一个主要组成部分是认为犹太人是 1848 年革命活动的主要参与者，而基督教农民则保持忠诚（Harris 1994, 131）。在革命前的俄罗斯 (Goldstein 1990, 36) 和 1920 年代的德国，犹太人在左翼革命者中所占比例过高，这是反犹太主义的一个重要根源，尽管在后一种情况下，至少大多数犹太人不支持革命活动 (Gordon 1984) , 22–23, 52)。 Gordon (1984, 14) 将这种左翼知识分子活动与反犹太主义联系起来，指出“反犹太主义增加的一个更普遍的原因是持不同政见的犹太人攻击社会主义和社会主义国家的国家机构和习俗的非常强烈和不幸的倾向。非社会主义出版物”（Gordon 1984, 51）。这些作家“猛烈地攻击了德国社会的一切。他们普遍鄙视军队、司法部门和中产阶级”（Rothman & Lichter 1982, 85）。左翼媒体是一种特殊的犹太现象：

除了以非犹太人为主的正统共产主义文学之外，犹太人在德国的左翼文学中也占据了很大一部分。 世界舞台 在这方面并不是独一无二的；犹太人出版、编辑并在很大程度上撰写了其他左翼知识分子杂志。犹太人在和平主义和女权主义运动以及性启蒙运动中发挥了决定性作用。

左翼知识分子并不像一些虔诚的史学让我们相信的那样“碰巧主要是犹太人”，而是犹太人在德国创造了左翼知识分子运动。 （迪克 1968，28-29）

戈登还回顾了一些证据，表明社会保守主义意识形态在 1870 年至 1933 年期间德国反犹太主义的发展中具有一定的重要性，因为这一运动认为犹太人的影响与德国文化格格不入，并且犹太人本身被视为“不良预兆”。变化”（Gordon 1984，26）。犹太人拥有的报纸因缺乏对德国事业的忠诚而受到严厉批评。因此，德国民族主义媒体和极具影响力的反犹太分子休斯顿·斯图尔特·张伯伦（Houston Stewart Chamberlain）严厉指责犹太人拥有的报纸，尤其是 法兰克福邮报代表英美金融和政治利益，损害德国国家利益（Field 1981, 392）。张伯伦因诽谤罪被成功起诉 法兰克福邮报，但这个问题仍然是反犹太主义者的一个重要原因（Field 1981, 392）。

讨论反犹太主义相对温和的案例也很有趣。 Lindemann (1991, 273; 另见 Lipset & Raab 1995; Sachar 1992, passim) 发现美国的反犹太主义相对温和且非意识形态，尽管存在“急剧的起伏”。林德曼还指出美国的以下特征不利于反犹太主义：犹太人数量少；事实上，绝大多数美国犹太人不是东正教或哈西德教派的成员，这些教派强调分离主义的外在迹象；事实上，美国已经拥有成功的、受过教育的中产阶级、专业人士、知识分子和企业家，他们个人并未受到犹太人崛起的威胁，因此群体之间的资源竞争不再那么重要；以及源自欧洲启蒙运动（尤其是英国）的政治和宗教宽容传统。

所有这些原因都与当前基于社会认同理论的进化解释的理论观点高度兼容。美国主流犹太群体普遍回避群体身份的外在标志，从而降低了犹太人的存在引发外邦人之间的社会认同过程的可能性，从而导致对犹太人的敌意。我还认为，由于美国一些犹太团体（例如哈西德派）的分离主义做法，基于社会认同理论所预期的反犹太主义会因这些犹太人往往在经济上并不成功这一事实而得到缓解。 （参见 Sachar 1992, 697）。

Meyer (1988, 226) 提出了一个相关的观点，即改革犹太教在美国比在欧洲更为成功，部分原因是在欧洲存在着反对变革的巨大惯性，这种惯性源于犹太教的高度组织化的社区结构，这种结构在欧洲持续了几个世纪。欧洲。即使在德国， 字体和原始 在改革运动中，美国的激进改革特征仅限于柏林的一处犹太教堂，其余的都被描述为“温和”。在欧洲，鉴于犹太教与外邦人社会和经济关系的实际历史以及犹太教本质上是中世纪的社区结构，将犹太教概念化为对外邦人具有特殊的普遍伦理使命（见第 7 章）的整个改革计划似乎是不现实的。 。此外，这种高度凝聚力的分离主义结构显然在相当大比例的犹太人中仍然存在，而不仅仅是在来自东欧的新移民中（Lowenstein 1992）。在德国，犹太教的这种伦理、人文主义概念被迫与强大的、先前存在的态度竞争，即犹太人是一个在经济上剥削外邦人的令人憎恨和恐惧的外群体（Harris 1994）。另一方面，美国的自由派犹太教受到其自身过去的负担要小得多。

关于资源竞争，历史学家经常指出，经济衰退往往与反犹太主义的增加有关，而经济繁荣则与反犹太主义的下降有关（例如，参见 Mosse [1989, 223] 关于反犹太主义的波动） 1800 年至 1933 年在德国）。第 3 章至第 5 章的一个主要主题是外邦人形成反对犹太教的有凝聚力的群体策略的趋势，特别是在与犹太人进行资源竞争的时期。根据社会认同理论，外邦人口中的经济或社会逆境预计会导致外邦人越来越愿意将自己淹没在群体策略中。犹太教作为一个非常突出且常常在经济、政治和文化上取得成功的外群体，可能会被视为外邦问题的一个重要原因。

历史上也有一些例子，由于强有力的社会控制规范了犹太人的经济活动，反犹太主义得到了显着改善（例如，在现代早期的威尼斯[Pullan 1983]）。此外，犹太人对美国的经济统治相对较少。例如，1930 世纪 XNUMX 年代的数据表明，尽管犹太人在零售业、服装业、化妆品、娱乐、大众媒体和出版、投资银行以及专业领域的代表性相当高，但在美国的许多行业和行业中的代表性却很少。即使在银行业（除了投资银行业），他们的代表性也不足（编辑 运气 1936；萨查尔 1992 年，341）。 1952年，犹太家庭的平均收入仍然低于长老会和圣公会的家庭。[82]为了打击反犹太主义，至少在某些历史时期，犹太人的收入可能被低估。 Hertzberg (1989, 248) 认为，出于这个原因，犹太社区领袖在 1920 年代试图降低对犹太人收入的估计。另见夏皮罗 (1992, 116)。 此外，尽管到 1972 年，犹太人确实实现了所有宗教团体中最高的平均家庭收入，并且尽管其在各种商业领域的影响力不断增加（Sachar 1992, 647, 652ff），但犹太人在美国的经济实力程度并没有达到美国的最高水平。这是东欧、德国和伊比利亚半岛最恶毒的反犹太主义典型的情况。

然而，美国绝不缺乏基于对犹太人向上流动的担忧的反犹太主义——“犹太人作为一个异常雄心勃勃的移民民族，对社会阶梯上一些更拥挤的阶层施加了紧迫的压力”（海厄姆 1984 年，141）。从 19 世纪开始，由于犹太人的快速向上流动和他们的竞争动力，贵族中存在相当高水平的隐蔽和公开的反犹太主义。在第一次世界大战之前的时期，氏族权力结构的反应是建立社会登记册并强调家谱作为排斥机制——“仅靠金钱无法满足的标准”（Higham 1984，104ff，127）。罗斯 (Ross, 1914, 164) 写道，外邦人的怨恨是“为了让他的生意或他的客户免受犹太入侵者的侵害，被迫参与一场羞辱性和有损尊严的争夺”——这表明了对犹太经济竞争的相当广泛的担忧。同一时期，精英大学和职业学校也开始实行犹太人代表配额。 1920 年代，许多领域的排斥尝试有所增加，并在大萧条的困难经济形势期间达到顶峰（Higham 1984，131ff）。总的来说，美国的反犹太主义正是在犹太人的竞争扰乱现有社会秩序的时候发生的（Higham 1984, 127, 144）。

Ginsberg (1993) 指出，自 1960 年以来，犹太人的经济地位和文化影响力在美国急剧上升，因此基于这些问题的反犹太主义很可能会增加。到 1988 年，犹太人的收入至少是外邦人的两倍。夏皮罗（Shapiro，1992，116）表明，在财富指数上，犹太人的比例至少高出九倍，但这是一个保守的估计，因为犹太人的大部分财富都在房地产中，而房地产很难确定，也很容易隐藏。犹太人约占美国人口的 2.4%，但他们占华尔街 40 名高管的一半，并占常春藤联盟大学录取人数的约 1995%。 Lipset 和 Raab（XNUMX）指出，犹太人的政治捐款占美国所有政治捐款的四分之一到三分之一，其中包括民主党捐款的二分之一和共和党捐款的四分之一。

作为最近强调这些问题的反犹太主义著作的一个例子，威尔莫特·罗伯逊（Wilmot Robertson，1973）重点关注了犹太人在财富指数中所占比例过高的主题，以及自 1970 世纪 1973 年代初以来他们在美国的政治和文化影响力。这表明犹太人在这些指数中的比例过高尚未达到稳定水平。与夏皮罗（他不是反犹太主义者）一样，罗伯逊强调犹太人努力防止犹太人在这些地区代表性过高的问题被公开讨论，并利用反犹太主义的指控来阻止对这些问题的审查：“而不是犹太人及其自由派支持者没有将反犹太主义置于思想自由发挥的范围内，而是组织了一场调查，对所有批评犹太人的行为、著作甚至思想进行了审查，而不是让其成为所有人都可以参与的辩论话题。是对人类道德秩序的威胁。” （罗伯逊 180，1995）。最近 Joseph Sobran（4 年，XNUMX；文本中斜体）指出：

讨论从黑人穆斯林到基督教右翼等其他所有群体的权力是允许的，但犹太机构的更大权力是禁区。其实这才是主要的 衡量 它的力量：它能够在打破他人禁忌的同时强加自己的禁忌——你几乎可以说它具有冒犯的特权。您可以阅读犹太人控制的出版物中的文章 时 至 评论 将大屠杀归咎于基督教，或指责教皇庇护十二世漠不关心，但不要在任何想要继续从事商业活动的主要出版物中寻找文章，以审视犹太人在共产主义和自由主义中的角色，无论多么温和。

社会认同理论也与这样一种观点相一致，即美国的反犹太主义已经被压制，因为犹太教被许多人认为只是美国所容忍的众多宗教中的另一种。 “犹太人并不是一个孤立的不墨守成规的群体（Higham 1984, 156）。正如Elazar (1980, 9)指出的，当代美国宗教犹太教是一种“保护性色彩”，它淡化了犹太教的种族/民族特征。结果是一个分类过程，犹太教被视为一个良性的、高度渗透的宗教（非种族）群体，其与其他群体的差异仅仅是个人信仰而非种族。通过这种分类过程，犹太社区作为一个战略族群与其他群体的利益之间的利益冲突被最小化。从社会认同的角度来看，这些属性有望减少群体冲突、对外群体的负面刻板印象等。

由此可见，种族和宗教多元化的社会比外邦人群体中种族和宗教同质的社会更有可能满足犹太人的利益。在 批判文化 我查阅的数据表明，犹太组织大力宣扬美国应该成为一个种族和文化多元化社会的意识形态，并奉行开放的移民政策，旨在防止美国的宗教和种族同质化。在一个多元文化社会中，犹太人只是众多被容忍的群体之一，这很可能符合犹太人的利益，因为不同群体之间的权力分散，不可能发展出同质的外邦内群体来反对犹太人作为一个高度引人注目的外群体。

虽然上述情况表明犹太人可能受益于多元化、多民族社会，但犹太教也在个人主义、原子化社会中蓬勃发展。美国的政治自由主义传统对于理解美国反犹太主义相对缺乏具有重要意义。的一大主题是 批判文化 （另见 创伤后应激障碍，CH。 8）社会认同理论和对个人主义/集体主义的研究支持这样一种观点，即个人主义社会的反犹太主义可能较低，因为个人主义文化中的人们不太了解内群体/外群体的界限，也不太可能形成负面的刻板印象整个群体基于某些群体成员的行为。这意味着，与中世纪基督教世界等集体主义社会或 19 世纪德国等社会相比，西方个人主义社会，包括当代自由民主国家以及古代希腊罗马世界，不太可能对犹太人作为一个群体产生负面信念个人主义和政治自由主义相对较弱的俄罗斯：“犹太人只能在西欧存在的、十九世纪末引入中欧的那种古典自由社会中繁荣发展”（Pulzer 1964, 327）。正如 Higham (1984, 156) 指出的那样，“美国传统将人视为个体……” 。 。对“针对犹太人的新群体排斥”的建立构成了重大障碍。

个人主义社会也无法发展反犹太主义运动，因为在不同的、往往是对立的利益集团之间建立联盟很困难。 1870年至1914年期间，德国保守派对反犹太主义政党的反对源于保守派认为反犹太主义者是威胁现有财产安排的革命者，因此类似于自由主义者和社会民主党（Levy 1975，130ff）。保守派经常持有反犹太态度并从事其他类型的反犹太政治活动，例如将犹太人排除在公共行政职位之外。利维认为，反犹太政党在此期间未能组建民族团结政府的主要原因是各个反犹太选区之间的利益冲突；在我看来，这些冲突尤其包括德国保守派重要部分的个人主义倾向。同样，1910年后美国国会对移民限制的主要支持来自相对农村的西部和南部，而这些努力往往伴随着或多或少的公开的反犹太主义。然而，至少在 1924 年之前的时期，这些努力并没有得到需要廉价劳动力的工业利益的支持，尽管许多非犹太人精英在社会上歧视犹太人。

[犹太人]是主的谋杀者、先知的暗杀者、反抗上帝的人、憎恨上帝的人……。 。 。魔鬼的拥护者、毒蛇族、诽谤者、诽谤者、阴暗的人、法利赛人的酵、魔鬼公会、罪人、恶人、石头人、以及仇恨正义的人。 （尼萨的圣额我略；载于 Lazar 1991a，47）

如果你称[犹太教堂]为妓院、罪恶的巢穴、魔鬼的避难所、撒旦的堡垒、堕落灵魂的地方、各种可想象的灾难的深渊或其他任何你想要的东西，你仍然说得不够充分。 （圣杰罗姆；迈克尔 1994 年，120）

[犹太教]永远都是。 。 。邪恶势力强大。 。 。当它咒骂摩西时；当它憎恨上帝时；当它向恶魔发誓要生下儿子时；当它杀害先知时，最后当它背叛执政官并将我们的上帝和主钉死在十字架上时。 。 。 。并如此夸耀其一切存在的罪孽。 （普瓦捷的希拉里；迈克尔 1994 年，110）

虽然这些野兽[犹太人]不适合工作，但他们适合杀戮。 。 。适合屠宰。 （一、二、5）

[犹太教堂]不仅是强盗和骗子的住所，也是恶魔的住所。这不仅适用于犹太教堂，也适用于犹太人的灵魂。 （一、四、2）

我要告诉你他们的掠夺、他们的贪婪、他们对穷人的抛弃、他们的盗窃、他们在贸易中的欺骗吗？ (I.VII.1)（圣金口约翰， 犹太ju)

这些假定的外邦群体策略中的第一个是最有问题的。然而，值得考虑的是，反犹太主义在罗马帝国晚期霸权、团体天主教的发展中发挥了重要作用。由于历史记录的匮乏，这一证据绝不是压倒性的，但它有助于描述伴随着晚期罗马帝国特有的企业集体主义社会结构的建立而产生的反犹太主义的强烈暗示。

这里提出的观点与几位历史学家的观点高度一致，即基督教会的建立代表了古代世界典型的反犹太主义的质变。古代世界犹太人和外邦人之间的相互敌对涉及不同利益群体之间“正常”的相互敌意（Parkes 1976, 5; Ruether 1974）。正如个人主义社会所预期的那样，古代世界的反犹太暴力是零星的、分散的，是由特定地区的特定情况造成的。然而，随着基督教会的出现，反犹太主义成为一种强大的、在情感上令人信服的意识形态的基础，并在一个渴望并往往拥有大量政治权力的组织中制度化。我认为，古代晚期的基督教会本质上是一场强大的反犹太运动的体现，该运动的兴起是由于外邦人对资源的关注以及与犹太人的生殖竞争。

还提出了其他观点。 Feldman (1993, 383ff) 和 Simon (1986, 232) 将 4 世纪和 5 世纪教会教父中强烈的反犹太主义解释为两个普世宗教之间纯粹制度性竞争的结果，它们争夺皈依者和社会统治地位——我将称之为“制度竞争”假说。这些作者认为文化和基因隔离群体之间的资源和生殖竞争完全无关。这意味着，如果没有完全无法解释的命运转变（君士坦丁的皈依），犹太教而不是基督教可能会在罗马帝国内部制度化。

制度竞争论点取决于两个高度成问题的命题之一：（1）四世纪有大规模的外邦人皈依犹太教，因此犹太教被教会视为“一个真正而危险的竞争对手”（西蒙4, 1986); （271）教会的反犹太主义针对的是大量基督教“犹太教徒”，尽管他们不一定成为犹太人，但他们表现出“犹太信仰，特别是犹太仪式的力量，吸引了重要的少数基督徒”来自教会的怀抱”（Simon 2，1986）。

关于第一个命题，古代世界的压倒性景象是犹太人对改宗者的矛盾心理和实际改宗者的数量很少（见 创伤后应激障碍，CH。 4).西蒙（Simon，1986，279-280）本人在从公元 135 年到 4 年的整个时期内只提出了八个外邦皈依者的名字（其中七人是学者）。从 279 世纪到 XNUMX 世纪末，他无法提及任何一位犹太传教士或传教士小册子的名字。他还承认，犹太传教活动的强度和效率远低于基督教传教活动（第 XNUMX 页）。此外，下面总结的材料表明，认为犹太人是一个生物血统群体而不仅仅是一种宗教的观念似乎在教父中很常见，并且在帝国立法的措辞中也很明显。因此，在此期间，犹太教不太可能被外邦人视为普世宗教。

Pakter (1992, 716) 指出，在基督教作为国教兴起之前，正是基督教，而不是犹太教，被视为对古典罗马文化的威胁（从而引发了戴克里先的迫害），因为前者的传教活动非常积极，而后者的传教活动则非常有限。只有在帝国基督教化之后，犹太教才被视为对国家的威胁——这一发现与目前的解释一致，即反犹太主义是帝国晚期出现的基督教的基础。犹太教是基督教的侵略性的、普遍主义的竞争对手这一说法必须说明，在基督教成为国教之后，犹太教突然以这种方式发生了转变。没有证据支持这种观点。

Feldman (1993) 更新了这一论点。关于这一时期大规模皈依的可能性，他最有说服力的数据是帝国立法中对犹太人皈依和外邦奴隶割礼的“持续和重复”的关注（第442页）。毫无疑问，犹太人在这一时期拥有外邦奴隶——事实上，犹太人主导了奴隶贸易（Juster 1914）。费尔德曼指出，对奴隶进行割礼是犹太宗教法，至少部分是出于仪式原因（割礼使奴隶能够以符合犹太宗教法的方式履行其职责，例如处理食物），但接受这一程序并不意味着奴隶已皈依犹太教。

有趣的是，法律的语言显示出一种担忧，即外邦人不应处于从属于犹太人的地位，对于女性来说，或许还可能遭受性剥削。根据狄奥多西法典 (16.9.5)（公元 423 年），“任何犹太人都不得胆敢购买基督教奴隶。因为我们认为这是可憎的[85]这个单词 ”内法斯《狄奥多西法典》中使用的“”是一个极具贬义的术语。 Feldman (1993) 将其翻译为“可恶的”（第 394 页）或“无法形容的可憎”（第 90 页）。 非常虔诚的奴隶应该因非常不虔诚的购买者的所有权而受到玷污。”在他的 康斯坦丁的生活 （第 547 页），尤西比乌斯从未提及奴隶的皈依问题，但强调“那些被救主赎回的人，竟然被一个杀害了先知和先知的民族所奴役，这是不正确的”。主本人。”明显的担忧是基督徒受到不同民族的统治，而不是基督徒因普世犹太教而流失。在谈到晚期罗马立法时，科恩（Cohen，1994，65）指出，“基督教的资料中充满了对犹太势力对基督徒的根深蒂固的恐惧，以及对异教徒犹太化或基督徒为犹太人服务的恐惧。”

此外，犹太人的外邦奴隶将不被允许为犹太基因库做出贡献（见 创伤后应激障碍，CHS。 2, 4）并且实际上并不是犹太社区的正式成员。根据犹太宗教法，奴隶将被从外邦社区中驱逐出去，并接受各种犹太宗教习俗，包括割礼，但没有真正进入犹太社区。[86]根据迈蒙尼德的说法（迈蒙尼德法典， 书五 , 圣书，I. 有关禁止性交的法律，第 12 章83），所有奴隶都接受浸泡并接受基本的宗教教育；男性奴隶必须受割礼。奴隶被视为离开了偶像崇拜者的社区，“但没有进入以色列的社区”（第89页）。奴隶要成为以色列社会的一员，他或她必须首先被释放，然后与以色列人或以色列人的女儿结婚。然后，被释放的奴隶将经历另一次浸泡，从而成为一名皈依者和一个完整的以色列人（第2页）。如果奴隶拒绝成为正式的“以色列奴隶”，从而避免割礼、浸礼和宗教教育，主人将在一年后将他或她卖给异教徒。犹太奴隶制法的基本逻辑在《密西拿》（4世纪）和《巴勒斯坦塔木德》（3.3世纪）中显而易见，因为奴隶被要求说某些犹太祈祷词，并具有某些宗教义务和能力，但没有其他义务和能力（例如，Ber.2.5）。 3.12）。奴隶始终被视为与外邦人和以色列人不同的一个类别。如果兄弟是外邦人或奴隶的后代，则妇女没有义务缔结娶寡嫂制婚姻（Yeb. XNUMX），并且女奴隶无权与以色列男性订婚（Qidd. XNUMX）。这样一个女人的后代就取得了母亲的奴隶地位。 因此，基督徒对犹太人奴役基督徒的敌意不能合理地解释为担心这些基督徒实际上会成为犹太人。犹太人关于奴隶的做法并不表明犹太教是一种普世宗教，旨在将这些外邦人加入犹太社区。事实上，奴隶制为基因单向流动提供了理想的机会，即从犹太人流向非犹太人群体，但反之则不然。

4世纪和5世纪出现的对奴隶割礼和拥有基督教奴隶的禁令很容易被视为是由于资源和生殖竞争增加而导致犹太人和外邦人之间隔离墙不断上升的一个方面，而不是作为一个标志整个外邦世界正面临皈依犹太教的危险。同样，在后来的时期，犹太人被禁止雇用基督徒作为家庭仆人或奶妈是很常见的，至少部分是因为性剥削的可能性，但也因为这种情况会导致犹太人对外邦人的统治地位。禁止犹太人拥有穆斯林奴隶，特别是女性穆斯林奴隶的法律在穆斯林世界也很常见（Patai & Patai 1989, 126），并且有一些迹象表明，宗教裁判所时期群体敌意的一个根源是异邦人的怨恨，犹太人和皈依者可以接触外邦妇女作为仆人、情妇或妾（见第七章附录）。事实上，对犹太人控制外邦女性的担忧是历史上犹太与外邦群体冲突中反复出现的主题，也发生在基督教中世纪（见第 7 章）、国家社会主义德国（见第 4 章）和 5 世纪的俄罗斯（史密斯19）。考虑到以下所述的犹太人相对于外邦社会的经济实力大大增强以及犹太人在这一时期对奴隶贸易的统治的证据，可以合理地假设这项立法是由于越来越多的基督徒被犹太人奴役而促成的。

对奴隶制法律的这种解释与同一时期反对异族通婚的法规非常吻合。西班牙埃尔维拉会议（约公元 300 年）和尼西亚会议（公元 325 年）[87]尼西亚禁止异族通婚的规定仅包含在阿拉伯文版理事会的规范中（见 Pakter 1992, 732n.86）。后来的两次西班牙教会理事会（589 年和 633 年）重申了这一不对称的禁令。 禁止犹太男性与基督教女性之间的婚姻（DeClercq 1954, 42; Pakter 1992, 722）。考虑到这些规定的性别不对称性，以及这一时期犹太人拥有基督教奴隶的可能性远高于相反的事实，有人认为这些法律的目的是防止富有的犹太男子拥有基督教奴隶，因此他们可能会成为奴隶。被视为这一时期犹太人/外邦人资源竞争的一个方面。正如 Synan (1965, 26) 指出的那样，“在基督教罗马法中，人们对基督教妇女的信仰表现出关注，给人的印象是，妇女被认为无法抵抗其丈夫所持有的信仰的威望。不管怎样，奴隶的低下地位无疑是立法反对基督徒受犹太主人奴役的动机。”根据犹太宗教法，纳妾并不违法，并且在中世纪时期常见于穆斯林女性奴隶中（Friedman 1989，39），尽管犹太宗教当局经常劝阻这种做法。外邦女性没有权利与以色列人结婚，孩子们享有母亲的地位（Mishna Qidd. 3.12）。这种结合的后代将无法在犹太社区内结婚（见注释 4，第 111 页）。

有人认为，立法者试图阻止富有的犹太男性与基督教女性纳妾。由于这些妇女的后代不会是犹太人，因此这一时期立法的总体主旨最好解释为一种手段，不是阻止基督徒大规模皈依犹太教，而是阻止犹太人与基督教男性竞争获得基督教信仰的机会。女性，并防止基因从犹太人到基督徒的单向流动。这些数据与这样的说法完全一致，即富有的犹太男性与犹太女性生育了犹太继承人，但也与女奴隶纳妾，这些结合的孩子被犹太社区流失。[88]388年，罗马政府禁止基督徒和犹太人之间的所有通婚，违者处以死刑（CTh 9.7.5）。帕克特认为，当犹太人的地位如此低下以至于基督徒男子与犹太女子结婚是不可想象的时候，就会出现不对称的法律，而当犹太人的地位较高并因此成为理想的伴侣时，就会出现对称的法律。我的立场是，不对称法律旨在纠正一个不对称的现实，即犹太男性娶外邦女性为妾，但犹太裔女性很少（如果有的话）成为外邦男性的妾。这些法律源于对犹太人统治的担忧，这种担忧肯定存在于同一时期与奴隶制有关的法律中，并且有充分的理由认为，在埃尔维拉会议召开期间，犹太人在西班牙相当繁荣且数量众多（ DeClercq 1954, 41–42, 117；见下文）以及这一时期帝国的其他地区。 Pakter (1992, 722) 在 388 年的对称立法中暗示了圣安布罗斯（St. Ambrose），一位尖锐的反犹太分子。我认为，对称禁令的作用不仅是为了防止犹太人拥有基督教妾，而且还普遍加强了犹太人之间的隔离墙。基督徒和犹太人——这一时期犹太/外邦群体冲突加剧所带来的社会认同进程加剧的结果，这一点在圣安布罗斯和圣约翰金口等著名反犹太主义者的行为中表现得很明显。另一种情况是，当犹太人将女儿嫁给基督教贵族，同时阻止任何基因从外邦人流入其干系家庭时，外邦人开始担心基督教男性与犹太人结婚（见第 4 章、第 5 章和第 7 章的附录）。 。没有证据表明这在四世纪和五世纪是一个问题，但这可能只是反映了历史资料的缺乏。

解释这一时期基督教反犹太主义的第二个假设是，它针对的是外邦“犹太主义者”，即与犹太人有联系并被犹太仪式所吸引的外邦人。同样，所提出的动机纯粹是制度性的，目的是最大限度地增加虔诚的基督徒数量并减少犹太人对社会的影响。犹太化在这一时期可能相当普遍，毫无疑问，犹太化者引起了教父们的敌意，特别是圣约翰·金口，他是一位狂热的反犹太主义者。

尝试了解这些外邦犹太教徒的动机具有重要意义。西蒙的治疗表明，由于基督徒和犹太人有相似的宗教节日，基督徒参与融合主义的情况并不少见，例如，在犹太安息日休息或在逾越节庆祝，但实际上并未皈依。威尔肯的处理（1983, 67；另见 Feldman 1993, 389）也表明，推动力可能是诸如逾越节之类的犹太仪式的庆祝性质。虽然圣约翰金口的叙述很难冷静，但他暗示犹太庆祝活动吸引了对舞蹈、戏剧、魔术和这些庆祝活动的聚会气氛感兴趣的基督徒（犹太ju 1.2：846–847）。与这种解释一致，Feldman (1993, 376, 403) 提到了一项禁止在犹太节日向基督徒赠送礼物或与犹太人一起庆祝的法律，并且有迹象表明，非犹太人被邀请与犹太人一起吃饭，并在这些庆祝活动期间收到无酵面包。教会法最终禁止基督徒进入犹太教堂或庆祝犹太节日（Wilken 1968, 62）。

如果非组织成员参加庆祝活动，他们会收到礼物和免费食物，并且可能会受到舞蹈和其他娱乐活动的欢迎，这并不奇怪。犹太人很可能鼓励外邦人参与犹太庆祝活动（但不是真正的皈依），以此作为在外邦社区中培养善意的一种手段——就像当代组织生活中的“开放日”一样。事实上，考虑到古代世界的外邦知识分子一直批评犹太人憎恨其他人类——他们的祖先，这种做法可能被视为明智的政策。 人性化的钠 （见第 2 章）。斐洛和约瑟夫斯等古代犹太作家很清楚“不与外邦人交往”的指控及其在古代反犹太主义中的作用，如果后来犹太社区试图改善这种批评，也就不足为奇了。

在这方面，值得注意的是，阿弗洛迪西亚斯（最清楚地表明犹太化普遍性的考古遗址）的 1989 名犹太教徒中有 177 人是市议会成员——正是这种富有、有影响力的外邦人的利益所在与犹太人建立友谊。事实上，这些人因其地位而不得不参加公共崇拜。因此，正如古德曼（Goodman，1993，441）所做的那样，这一发现最好被解释为表明犹太人认可崇拜其他神的外邦人，而不是支持外邦精英大规模皈依。此外，正如 Feldman (XNUMX, XNUMX) 指出的那样，与非常繁荣和有影响力的犹太社区保持良好关系也符合富有、有权势的外邦人的利益。无论如何，没有理由认为犹太化代表了完全皈依道路上的一个重要的中间位置：费尔德曼的讨论基于阿芙罗狄西亚网站，那里显然有三个改宗者和五十四个犹太化者。

犹太人在这一时期引起一些外邦人的同情可能还有其他原因。[89]Simon (1986, 358；另见 Wilken 1983, 83ff) 指出，由于犹太人作为医生和治疗师的角色，一些外邦人可能对犹太人有积极的印象。 （金口告诫基督徒不要去犹太人那里寻求治疗。）在古代世界，治疗与魔法、巫术和占星术密切相关。许多外邦人，尤其是来自下层阶级的外邦人，可能对犹太人着迷，因为他们在这些领域享有很高的声誉——他们被誉为“抵御强权”的能力（Simon 1986, 341）。犹太人如此明显地被认为拥有魔法力量，以至于“古代世界在很大程度上是通过犹太教的作用而充满了[融合魔法]。犹太人在这一过程中如此突出，以至于异教观点认为魔法是以色列宗教的一个组成部分和特征元素”（Simon 1986，342）。事实上，威尔肯（Wilken，1983，86）指出，“可以想象的是，那些欢迎基督徒参加犹太节日的犹太人也用魔法治愈了他们的疾病。”鉴于这种情况，人们很容易理解犹太宗教庆祝活动可能在一些外邦人中引起的好奇、兴趣和钦佩，以及反犹太领导人为改变外邦人对犹太人的观念所做的努力。 然而，从各方面来看，这种外邦人对犹太教的同情是在外邦社会各个层面的反犹太主义日益强烈的时期发生的。人们可以很容易地将这一时期基督教对犹太教的反应解释为一种新兴群体进化策略的一个方面，其本质是与犹太教相对立的。我认为，圣金口约翰和其他人所看到的基督徒对犹太化的强烈反对可能被视为对外邦人之间对抗的反应过程，以及以犹太资源和生殖竞争为代表的日益成功和突出的威胁。金口强烈的反犹太主义可以被视为犹太人和外邦人之间普遍竖起的隔离墙的一个方面，这是这一时期的特征，也是基于社会认同理论在群体竞争加剧时期所预期的。像圣金口约翰这样的教士的行动的结果将是，越来越多的人将基督徒视为一个群体的成员，对于这个群体的成员来说，反犹太主义是个人身份的一个重要方面。

这里的建议是，在这个群体冲突加剧的时期，像金口这样的反犹太领导人试图传达对犹太人非常负面的看法。犹太人不应被视为异国情调、娱乐性宗教活动的无害实践者，也不是魔术师、算命师或治疗师，而是邪恶的化身。这一时期出现的立法的全部主旨是在犹太人和外邦人之间竖起隔离墙，巩固外邦人群体，并让所有外邦人知道谁是“敌人”。虽然这些墙以前只有犹太人建立和维护，但在这个群体间冲突的新时期，外邦人在自己和犹太人之间筑起了墙。尽管犹太人可能很乐意通过鼓励犹太化来吸引外邦精英的同情，但犹太化将是反犹太领导人的憎恶，他们坚持认为群体之间的墙很高，每个人只属于一个群体。在这段群体冲突期间，任何一方都不能做出半途而废的承诺。正如金口本人所说：“‘互相扶持。’如果慕道者患有这种疾病，就让他被留在教堂门外。如果病人是信徒并且已经入会，就应当将他赶出圣餐桌。 。 。 。那些已经溃烂无法治愈的伤口，那些正在吞噬身体其他部分的伤口，需要用钢尖烧灼”（犹太ju II.III.6)。团体之间的战斗必须开始。从长远来看，这种基督教团体策略的后果将是犹太社区的经济和生育前景普遍下降。

所有反犹太运动可能都必须与外邦人作斗争，这些外邦人被认为反犹太主义不够热情，而且对反犹太团体战略的承诺不冷不热甚至充满敌意。这并不意味着试图打击犹太人和外邦人之间的友好关系仅仅是出于担心后者可能皈依犹太教或犹太教会对社会产生过大的影响。因此，埃尔维拉议会（约 300 年）禁止与犹太人饮食和交往，但也禁止犹太男性与基督教女性之间的婚姻。禁止犹太人和外邦人之间积极的社会关系与一种更深层次的担忧相吻合，即犹太男性与基督教男性竞争接近女性的机会。

纵观犹太历史，富有、有权势的外邦人一直有与犹太人结盟的趋势（见 创伤后应激障碍，CH。 5）。 （事实上​​，这很可能解释费尔德曼 [1993, 441] 的观点，即犹太教徒往往是富有的、有影响力的外邦人。）就个人主义/集体主义的社会心理学而言（Triandis 1990），这些外邦精英是特立独行的个人主义者，他们不是倾向于加入一个高度凝聚力的独裁团体。其他反犹太运动，例如国家社会主义，将这些人排除在权力地位之外，并严厉对待违反旨在分离犹太人和外邦人的法律的外邦人。

此外，“关注传教和犹太化”假说不足以解释这一时期教会反犹太主义的其他突出例子。圣金口约翰对犹太教徒的谴责在其他几个著名的反犹太主义者中并不明显，犹太化的明显例子只出现在安提阿和近东的其他地区。在亚历山大，教会对犹太化的担忧和对犹太人过于积极的外邦人态度显然不存在，在那里，强烈反犹太的圣西里尔占主导地位（Simon 1986, 373; Wilken 1971, 68）。西里尔的著作主要是对犹太教的关注：“西里尔永远不会忘记犹太人”（Wilken 1971, 159-160）； “几乎每一页他都猛烈抨击犹太人对上帝的不忠。他总是利用最轻微的暗示，这些暗示很容易被扭曲成对基督和教会的敌意的描述”（Kerrigan 1952, 385）。

西里尔不仅写了关于犹太人的负面文章，而且在犹太人袭击基督徒的事件后，在将犹太人驱逐出亚历山大并允许暴徒抢劫他们的财产方面发挥了重要作用。事实上，当代对该事件的描述称，当犹太人袭击一名因赞扬西里尔的反犹太布道而脱颖而出的男子时，就促成了这一事件（见 Wilken 1971, 55）。因此，西里尔的布道并不是针对外邦犹太教徒，而是针对犹太人，而且它的煽动性很强，以至于导致了骚乱。

这里提出的解释是，犹太人和外邦人之间的群体冲突在4世纪进入了一个新阶段。相当有趣的是，正是在这一时期，对犹太人贪婪、财富、热爱奢侈和餐桌上的享乐的指控变得普遍（Simon 1986，213）。此类指控在早期并没有发生，当时反犹太著作主要集中在犹太分裂主义上。这些新的指控表明，犹太人越来越享有富有的声誉，反过来又表明，古代世界的反犹太主义已经进入了一个新阶段，这一阶段的中心是资源竞争以及对犹太人经济成功、外邦人统治和宗教信仰的担忧。相对繁殖成功率。

资源竞争假说提出，随着时间的推移，犹太教越来越被视为对外邦人的竞争威胁，原因如下之一或两者。首先，犹太人的教育实践和经济合作使犹太人成为与外邦人日益有效的经济竞争对手。这一假设将得到有关犹太人财富的证据的直接支持，并得到教育和高投资养育是当时希腊罗马社会向上流动的途径的证据的间接支持。其次，犹太人的数量之所以变得越来越多，是因为以下原因：财富的增加导致生育率的提高——这在传统社会中是常见的现象；与高投入养育相关的米什纳实践导致犹太儿童的生存率增加（这种现象在其他时期得到了充分证明，并且也被载入《米什纳》和《塔木德》）；禁止堕胎和暴露儿童（后者在前基督教罗马帝国很常见）；一种意识形态，其中“生养众多”的诫命导致了婚姻和子女的宗教义务；对贫穷犹太人的慈善事业，使犹太社区的各个阶层都能繁衍；以及性生活的时机，以最大限度地提高生育能力。

假设到了三世纪末，犹太教已被视为外邦人的强大竞争对手。虽然犹太人的经济成功和与生育相关的做法会导致犹太人相对较高的生育率，但个人主义社会，例如罗马帝国，相对不太关心生育率，家庭关系不太稳定，并且往往表现出较高程度的虐待儿童和遗弃（见 Triandis 3）。[90]自奥古斯都时代以来，罗马政府就采取措施提高贵族的生育率。这些努力收效甚微，直到君士坦丁废除了这些法律。与个人主义和低生育率之间的关系一致，Garnsey 和 Saller (1987, 143–144; 另见 Hopkins 1983, 79–81) 认为，“许多罗马人似乎开始对生活采取更加个人主义的看法，相应地给予确保家庭和血统成功的努力更少。”在个人主义社会中，性快感本身往往成为一个目标，与其生殖后果无关，而犹太教仍然致力于生育和父母的高度投资作为宗教戒律。 此外，整个帝国的人口在此期间正在下降（Jones 1964, 1042）。更准确地说，后来的帝国在人类能源金字塔顶端的人口（军队、公务员和神职人员）不断扩大，而农村农民的人口却在减少，因为农民的大量生产被征用，以至于他们无法取代自己（Jones 1964, 1043）。琼斯引用了对农民征收极高税收的证据，并且有迹象表明，农村和城市下层阶级都在犯下杀婴罪，因为他们太穷而无法抚养孩子。公元 4 世纪初，生殖竞争激烈的另一个迹象是，东帝国——反犹太主义最强烈、犹太人比例最大的地区——的男性结婚得很晚。

这种情况不仅表明了高度的生殖竞争，而且还表明了生态的不稳定，因为初级生产的基础正在缩小，而金字塔顶端却在扩大：“太少的生产者养活了太多的闲人”（Jones 1964，1045）。这往往会导致人类能量金字塔高层内部的竞争更加激烈。纵观历史，犹太人在人类能源金字塔的顶端所占比例过高（创伤后应激障碍，CH。 5），有人认为这一时期社会这一阶层对资源的竞争大大加剧。事实上，琼斯（Jones，1964，947-948）指出，在 4 世纪，犹太人越来越多地进入帝国和市政部门，直到在 5 世纪被排除在这些职业之外——这是广泛的经济、社会和法律禁令的一个方面关于这一时期的犹太人（见下文）。这些因素，再加上传统的外邦人对犹太教的敌意（因为犹太教的分离主义做法和对犹太人厌世的看法，也许还有对犹太人财富的看法），为一场重大的反犹太运动奠定了基础。这里的建议是，这场反犹太运动在基督教会中具体化。[91]Simon (1986, 214) 认为，4 世纪反犹太主义者（例如金口）对犹太人财富的指控是虚幻的，因为（1）它们发生在犹太人被限制放债的时代之前，而且实际上没有人提到犹太人的高利贷行为。副; (2) 异教徒也被指控有类似的恶习； (3) 犹太人也被描述为慈善家； (4)基督徒是禁欲主义者，因此即使是正常的人力资源获取行为也会被视为有罪。

然而，这一时期基督教反犹太主义的一个重要根源涉及对犹太人财富的消极态度，这一说法与前三个论点非常一致。西蒙的第一个理由暗示，外邦人对犹太人财富的不满只能源于犹太人的高利贷。正如第二章中的材料所示，这远非事实。此外，反犹太主义者经常承认，犹太人中不成比例地发现的负面特征在一些外邦人身上也有，无论如何，社会认同理论意味着外邦人会优先参加犹太人参与放债是因为犹太人是一个不受欢迎的外群体。最后，关于犹太人的慈善事业，金口确实指责犹太人抛弃穷人”（犹太ju I.VII.1)，大概指的是非犹太人穷人；他对犹太慈善事业的其他评论可能反映了他对犹太群体内慈善事业的消极态度。

西蒙基于基督教禁欲主义的论点无疑是推测性的，特别是因为许多基督徒，包括许多神职人员，在这一时期经济上相当富裕（Wilken 1983，6）。修辞教育是向上流动的途径，这表明，正如在现代社会中一样（Lynn 1992），语言智力至关重要。当然，这些正是犹太人在其整个历史中所擅长的技能类型，也是犹太人教育和优生实践的预期后果（创伤后应激障碍，CH。 7).从第二圣殿被毁到三世纪末，这些习俗至少已经延续了九代人的时间。四世纪的犹太人为他们的孩子提供希腊教育，这将使他们能够在希腊世界竞争（Wilken 3, 4）。

自科恩（Cohen，1976）的著作以来，历史学家越来越强调四、五世纪犹太社区在整个社会经济和人口衰退时期的经济繁荣。在一世纪和二世纪的叛乱失败之后，犹太人口以及犹太人在帝国的经济和社会存在急剧下降（Wilken 4，5-1）。然而，三、四世纪是犹太社区“新的生机和活力”的时期，在此期间，宗主教区富裕而强大。 Wilken (2, 1983) 认为犹太社区在这一时期可能变得更大、更繁荣，而 Feldman (46, 47) 将证据解释为表明犹太人口正在扩张，尽管犹太人的经济和人口财富不断增长。帝国正在衰落。 Juster (3, 4) 描述了“种族的繁衍”以及犹太人进入一系列非常多样化的职业。[92]关于亚历山大，犹太人在 2 世纪初的叛乱失败后几乎消失了，但到 5 世纪初（415 年他们被驱逐时），那里出现了一个“庞大且有影响力的”犹太社区（Wilken 1971， 57）。 Wilken (1971, 46) 指出，早在驱逐之前，4 世纪亚历山大的基督徒与犹太人的关系就已经恶化为日益加剧的敌意，而且，与资源竞争的观点相一致，有证据表明，一些犹太人是富有的商人和造船商，参与了向罗马供应粮食（Wilken 1971, 49）。与安提阿的情况不同，没有证据表明亚历山大有大量犹太化的外邦人。相反，西里尔可能会煽动一群暴徒驱逐犹太人并掠夺他们的财产。

Wilken (1983, 43; 另见 Ruether 1974, 172) 将 4 世纪末安提阿的犹太社区（金口反犹太主义长篇大论的地点）描述为“规模庞大、地位稳固、备受尊敬且有影响力”。 Parkes (1934, 163) 将其称为“富有而强大”。在安提阿，犹太人拥有大型建筑物，并将其装饰得时尚，以作为文化中心。附近地区的发掘表明，四世纪是犹太物质文化的鼎盛时期（Wilken 4, 1983；另见 Feldman 54, 1993, 73ff）。在此期间，犹太人在整个帝国建造了“大型且令人印象深刻”的犹太教堂，证明了他们的经济富裕和犹太文化的普遍繁荣（Wilken 364，1971）。 在《狄奥多西法典》中，犹太人被称为“瘟疫和传染病，如果它出现并在国外更广泛地传播的话”（CTh 16.5.44），表明对犹太人人口增长的恐惧。

最后，贾斯特（Juster，1914，305ff）指出，犹太人在罗马经济的某些领域非常突出，包括奴隶贸易、银行业、国内和国际贸易以及法律。犹太人还发展了特定行业的垄断，包括丝绸、服装、玻璃器皿和奢侈品贸易。[93]贾斯特还指出，从事青铜和其他金属加工的犹太工匠专门为奢侈品贸易制造物品，这表明犹太经济的垂直一体化包括制造、运输和零售，就像东欧后来几个世纪发生的那样（见 创伤后应激障碍，Ch。 6）。 此外，贾斯特（Juster，第 312 页）将 4 世纪这些经济发展的加剧与流行的反犹太主义的增加以及这一时期教父们对犹太人的贪婪和贪婪的指责直接联系起来。 。事实上，尽管在这一时期开始对犹太人进行限制，贾斯特指出，犹太人完全主导了国内和国际贸易，尤其是五世纪和六世纪的奴隶贸易。

这种关于犹太人在 5 世纪和 6 世纪持续保持经济实力的观点与 Bachrach（1985）的观点高度一致，即犹太人是如此富有、强大且具有侵略性，以至于直到 5 世纪中叶左右，政府都认为强烈反对犹太人。 - 犹太政策在政治上不可行，尽管教会不断向这个方向施加压力。在 150 号宽容法令颁布后的 313 年里，政府的反犹太行动相当有限，被解释为“试图保护基督徒免受充满活力、强大且经常具有侵略性的犹太人的侵害”。 一族”（巴克拉赫 1985，408）。犹太人本身被皇帝、政府和教父视为“一个好斗的、组织良好的、富有的、有权势的少数群体”（第 408 页）。特别能说明问题的是，市政当局的偿付能力取决于犹太人缴纳税款，并且担心冒犯犹太人可能会引发广泛且代价高昂的叛乱，例如 351 年帕特里修斯领导的叛乱。

此外，正如贾斯特所说，流行的反犹太主义不仅仅是教会为了服务机构目标而操纵的问题。教父们强烈的反犹太主义言论引起了民众的强烈共鸣。事实上，Simon (1986, 231–232; 另见 Avi-Yonah 1976, 223; Jones 1964, 948–949) 指出，“如果基督徒民众如此多次地投入到对一座又一座犹太教堂的攻击中，那并不是因为它被动地接受上面下达的命令。大批出身为外邦人的信徒在皈依后并没有摆脱对犹太人的异教感情。如果反犹太论战如此成功，那是因为它唤醒了潜在的仇恨并唤起了已经存在的情感。”

根据我们对其他社会的了解（见第二章和 创伤后应激障碍，CH。 5），如果基于资源和生殖竞争的反犹太主义在这种情况下没有增加，那就值得注意了。这种情况很可能类似于 19 世纪的东欧，尽管犹太人相当贫困，而且犹太人从事广泛的职业，但犹太人口数量却大幅增加，而且犹太人在各行各业中所占比例过高。经济实力、贸易垄断以及需要教育和智力的职位。众所周知，这种情况与东欧强烈的反犹太主义有关。

事实上，作为一般观点，最好记住犹太人是“人口中非常明显且重要的组成部分”（deLange 1991, 33），占帝国人口的 7% 到 12%，也许占 20%在东帝国（Baron 1952，I，170；Feldman 1993，92；Wilken 1971，9）。当人们想到，强烈的反犹太主义发生在犹太人仅占人口 1% 的社会（即 1870 年至 1933 年的德国），而且即使在罗马帝国内部，反犹太主义也与犹太人的集中程度成正比（Simon 1986） ，206），如果认为这一新的反犹太主义浪潮的根源比古代知识分子对犹太分离主义的传统抱怨或新胜利的教会的制度关切要深刻得多，那就不足为奇了。

还有一些迹象表明，这一时期神职人员和其他人普遍持有的负面观点是由于对与犹太人的资源和生殖竞争的看法造成的。这些态度的强烈程度强烈表明，其中涉及的不仅仅是神学。君士坦丁皇帝（将基督教定为国教）是一位“热情的”反犹太主义者（MacMullen 1969, 175；另见 Hollerich 1992, 594）。

[犹太人]是一个因极其令人发指的暴行[即杀害基督]而沾染了双手的民族，因此污染了他们的灵魂，理所应当地盲目了。 。 。 。因此，我们与最敌对的犹太人没有任何共同之处。我们从救主那里得到了另一种方式。 。 。我们神圣的宗教：一致追求这一点，让我们。 。 。退出这种可憎的交往。因为他们夸口说，如果没有他们的指导，我们就无法正确遵守这些事情（即宗教圣日），这确实是荒谬的。因为他们在谋杀他们的主之后，失去了理智，不再受任何理性动机的引导，而是受无法控制的冲动的引导，无论他们与生俱来的愤怒可能驱使他们去往何处，他们能够对什么问题做出正确的判断？ ？ （君士坦丁皇帝；威尔肯 1968 年，58）

在当时的帝国立法中，被翻译为“邪恶”和“野性”的词语被用来描述犹太人（Hollerich 1992, 594；Wilken 1983, 50）。这代表了与犹太人有关的帝国立法基调的显着变化，事实上，这些变化标志着“明显背离了以前帝国对犹太宗教的宽容政策”（Barnes 1981，252）。

此外，君士坦丁的反犹太主义纯粹出于神学原因也是值得怀疑的。君士坦丁直到去世前不久才受洗，大多数评论家认为他对异教相当宽容（例如，S. G. Wilson 1985, 368）。 Bachrach (1985, 416) 将这些数据解释为表明君士坦丁认为犹太人是一个富有、强大且具有侵略性的群体；格兰特（Grant，1973，284）认为君士坦丁相信犹太人试图统治罗马帝国，并且他们认为自己比其他人优越。犹太人的经济和政治统治以及犹太人的优越性并不是基督教特有的主题，它们表明仅靠神学信仰不足以概念化那个时期的反犹太主义。所谓的犹太人的优越态度可能源于犹太人作为一个群体在经济和社会上的成功；安条克的艾萨克在五世纪中叶重复了这一指控（Feldman 5, 1993）。

虽然君士坦丁建立基督教的动机尚不清楚，但一些人认为他认为基督教对帝国有利——“恢复和增强而不是削弱希腊罗马文化中所有有价值的东西”（Barnes 1992, 647；另见 Sordi 1986, 141）。虽然犹太人的命运可能不是君士坦丁最关心的问题，但他一定已经意识到教会中反犹太主义的明显暗示。除了“传统基督教 敌意 以及尤西比乌斯等当代神学家中基督教神学反犹太色彩的强化，埃尔维拉会议（公元 300 年）——早在君士坦丁将基督教确立为国教之前——就通过了三项反犹太教法案。犹太人的禁令：禁止犹太男子和基督教妇女之间的婚姻，禁止犹太人祝福基督教的土地和水果，禁止与犹太人一起吃饭和交往（参见 DeClercq 1954, 41–42; Feldman 1993, 373, 380, 398）。

事实上，埃尔维拉议会和君士坦丁之间有着直接的联系。科尔多瓦主教（西班牙省最重要的主教座堂）奥修斯是埃尔维拉会议的主要参与者，或许也是其背后的推动力量（DeClercq 1954, 105）。奥西乌斯很可能在君士坦丁的皈依中发挥了主导作用，或者至少增加了君士坦丁对基督教的承诺，因为正是他在米尔维安桥之战之前用基督教术语解释了君士坦丁的梦想（Wilken 1992, 740）。在君士坦丁统治的大部分时间里，奥西乌斯仍然是君士坦丁随从中最重要的宗教顾问，君士坦丁个人也非常尊重他（DeClercq 1954，152ff）。 DeClercq (1954, 41–42, 117) 将铭文证据和埃尔维拉委员会的反犹太教规解释为表明科尔多瓦（贝蒂卡）地区有大型犹太社区，并基于奥西乌斯的大量犹太人存在主教期间，他建议奥西乌斯提出议会的反犹太教规。无论如何，埃尔韦拉的反犹太教规，特别是禁止犹太男性和基督教女性之间的婚姻，强烈表明犹太人和基督徒之间的资源竞争是埃尔韦拉委员会的一个非常突出的问题。奥西乌斯还主持了尼西亚会议（公元 325 年），根据阿拉伯版本，该会议通过了一项措辞类似的措施，反对犹太男性与基督教女性之间的婚姻（Pakter 1992, 722）。

君士坦丁的反犹太主义很可能与他在皈依基督教之前已经独立形成的态度相吻合。或者，在他皈依基督教后，由于奥西乌斯等高级教士的影响，他的反犹太主义可能有所增加。无论如何，这一时期教会明显的反犹太主义色彩显然并没有阻止君士坦丁将基督教定为国教的决定。

必须强调的是，四世纪的基督教辩论家对犹太人是多么的敌视。这一时期最强烈的反犹分子是圣约翰·金口（St. John Chrysostom，生于 4 年），他的著作和演讲“充满了暴力，有时语言粗俗得无与伦比”（Simon 349，1986） 。犹太人被描绘成“一个可怕的、邪恶的人物，旨在激发所有看到它的人真正的恐惧”（Simon 217，1986）。

虽然金口的绝大多数评论都从基督教神学中得出了犹太邪恶，但他也描述了犹太人数量众多且富有，并且他抱怨犹太族长的财富（反对贾德。等先生。 16； 48.834–5)。他指出，族长并不是履行纯粹宗教职能的牧师，而是店主和商人（Cohen 1976, 4），这表明金口更多地将犹太教视为一个经济实体，而不是一个宗教组织。犹太人经常被比作掠夺性的野兽，并被指控犯有几乎所有的罪恶，包括牟取暴利等经济犯罪。强烈反犹太的圣杰罗姆也称犹太人包围基督徒并试图分裂他们（Feldman 1993, 407）。[94]Feldman (1993, 407) 将这些段落解释为对犹太人旨在改变犹太人信仰的侵略措施的抱怨；我建议他们指控犹太人对基督徒进行掠夺性的经济和社会行为。 杰罗姆在几个段落中谴责犹太人对金钱的热爱（Parkes 1934, 191），并抱怨犹太人“像害虫一样”繁殖（Baron 1952, II, 220）——这一评论清楚地表明了对犹太人繁衍成功的担忧。[95]杰罗姆还评论说，犹太人常常年老。因此，在这一时期，与外邦人相比，犹太人的生存率可能很高——就像对现代人群的研究一样（创伤后应激障碍，Ch。 7）。

事实上，这一时期的绝大多数反犹太言论都是用宗教术语表达的，这可能是由于缺乏更复杂的修辞。正如 Feldman (1993, 107) 指出的那样，那个时期的知识分子还没有发展出一种语言，能够以一种在智力上受到尊重的方式阐明与经济（或种族）冲突相关的问题。也许在没有这样的修辞的情况下，群体冲突主要是用宗教术语来概念化的，尽管如下所示，尤西比乌斯和其他人将犹太人视为一个种族/族裔群体。

虽然金口是最极端的，但他的方法和态度是那个时期的典型（Simon 1986，222）。直言不讳的反犹太主义是许多在教会等级中崛起的人以及 4 世纪和 5 世纪许多著名基督教作家的特征（例如尤西比乌斯、圣约翰·金口、圣奥古斯丁、圣杰罗姆、圣安布罗斯、亚历山大的圣西里尔、尼萨的圣额我略）。在这一时期的东方教会中，修道士是“激进的反犹太分子”，他们在教会等级制度中具有相当大的影响力（Simon 1986，213）。有人认为，反犹太主义对于这一时期在教会中获得权力和影响力的地位至关重要。个人公开表现出反犹太主义，作为荣誉徽章，并在死后被封为教会的圣人。

事实上，威尔肯 (Wilken, 1971, 21) 指出，这一时期的所有基督教著作中，很大一部分本质上是关于这一时期的著作。 反对犹太人。与当前的理论一致，即这是一个在犹太人和外邦人之间竖起墙的时期，在这些文献中几乎没有试图改变犹太人的信仰，当然在圣约翰·金口的著作中也没有任何尝试（Ruether 1974， 148）。这些著作并不是试图接触犹太人，而是试图定义一个从根本上反对犹太人的内部群体。此外， 反对犹太教 传统是所有基督教释经的基础：

反对犹太人 传统代表了基督教注释旧约的总体方法。 。 。 。基督教传教士或释经家实际上不可能在不提及反犹太教论点的情况下根据圣经进行教导。基督教的圣经教导和讲道本身是基于一种方法，其中反犹太教的争论作为其基督教解释学的左手而存在。 (鲁瑟 1974, 121)

这种修辞不仅适用于旧约中的犹太人，也适用于他们在当代世界的后裔。根据金口的说法，犹太人杀害基督的责任以及他们的许多其他恶行已作为遗传特征传递给古代犹太人的后裔（Ruether 1974, 130; Lazar 1991a, 77n）。

此外，西蒙（另见 Wilson 1985）指出，基督教礼拜仪式和仪式中出现了反犹太主义的内容，特别是围绕圣周的那些强调犹太人在基督受难中所扮演的角色的仪式。供广大基督徒使用的祈祷和讲道包含了对犹太人的谴责（Wilken 1971, 30）。基督教节日和禁食期的设立与犹太教节日和禁食期直接相反，并作为反犹太纪念活动。因此，基督教圣周最初与犹太人的逾越节重合，但礼拜仪式强调基督徒在犹太人欢乐之际对犹太人的杀戮行为表示哀悼（Ruether 1974, 171）。星期五成为纪念受难日，而对于犹太人来说，星期五是安息日之前的欢乐时光。反犹太态度在该宗教的重要文件中根深蒂固，并与基督教信仰的表达密切相关（Baum 1974，2）。

事实上，拉扎尔（Lazar，1991a）指出了中世纪时期教会宣传的一个普遍趋势，即犹太人在二元分类体系中成为邪恶的化身，其中基督教的本质是由其与犹太教的对立面来定义的。犹太人是兽（掠夺性的类比），而基督徒是羔羊（潜在的猎物）。犹太人是敌基督者，他们的后代是魔鬼与犹太妓女所生的。他们的使命是摧毁基督教并统治世界——这是对犹太人统治的恐惧的明确表达。这种世界观随后被传播给不识字的外邦人，他们无疑倾向于以消极的方式看待犹太人，这给犹太教带来了毁灭性的后果。这再次有力地表明，晚期罗马基督教从根本上通过反对犹太教来定义自己。

至少对于一些教父来说，有理由认为，他们反犹太主义的最初动力不是来自神学，而是来自种族冲突，正如上面奥修斯主教所建议的那样。在二世纪，萨迪斯的梅利托著作中的反犹太语气表明了对萨迪斯当代富裕和众多犹太人社区的敌意，而不是对旧约中早已去世的以色列人的敌意（Wilson 2）。尤西比乌斯（Eusebius，约 1985-260 年）是一位极具影响力的基督教护教家，与君士坦丁同时代，居住在巴勒斯坦的凯撒利亚市，在那里，犹太人和希腊人之间的冲突已经持续了 339 多年——早于基督教的影响力。公元 66 年战争期间，两万犹太人全部被希腊城镇居民消灭殆尽。 70-1989，但不久之后就被重建，犹太人继续作为少数群体与希腊人和撒玛利亚人一起生活在城里（Alon 139, 140-1992）。这些群体（其中没有一个占多数）之间的“持续摩擦”影响了尤西比乌斯护教著作的反犹太语气（Attridge & Hata 29, 2）。正如第二章所讨论的，犹太人和希腊人之间的冲突在古代世界很常见，特别是在亚历山大，它源于犹太分离主义，至少在某些情况下源于资源竞争。

圣金口约翰的反犹太言论发生在安提阿，该地犹太人和外邦人之间也有长期的摩擦历史，包括在 1 世纪多次要求驱逐犹太人（见第二章）。 “这样的布道给予了教会最伟大传教士的祝福。 。 。现在政府批准了对犹太人公民地位的破坏，并且宗教日益成为针对犹太人的民众暴力的工具”（Ruether 2, 1974）。公元 180 世纪的安提阿，肢体暴力事件屡屡发生，其中还包括仪式谋杀的指控。犹太教堂被毁。六世纪，有人试图大规模改变犹太人的信仰，随后进行了屠杀并将其驱逐出城市。

反犹太主义似乎不仅仅是优西比乌构建基督教历史观这一更大目标的一个附属方面。相反，他构建了一种从根本上反犹太人的历史观，不遗余力地强调犹太人的邪恶和灾难的神圣正义（例如第二圣殿的毁灭），这些灾难降临在犹太人身上，因为他们拒绝上帝和最终是为了杀害基督。 “在某些方面，尤西比乌斯写历史似乎主要是为了为救世主基督辩护，反对犹太人的卑鄙行为”（Horsley 1992, 53）。优西比乌经常利用旧约中多次提及以色列人的罪恶和未能遵守圣约来表明犹太人普遍的邪恶。依靠先知对以色列人不道德行为（例如贪婪、对寡妇和孤儿缺乏仁爱）的许多谴责，尤西比乌斯也谴责犹太教发展成为一套没有道德内容的仪式。

当然，这种被认为是犹太人邪恶的顶峰是对基督的拒绝和杀害。通过拒绝基督作为弥赛亚，犹太人拒绝了上帝并丧失了他们作为选民的地位。他们对这种拒绝的惩罚已经可以从他们在罗马人手中的失败、世俗权力的丧失以及祭司职分的丧失中看出。以赛亚甚至预言过这种惩罚：“但你们若不肯听从，反倒悖逆，必被刀剑吞灭”（以赛亚书 1:20）。由于其罪孽，以色列的命运是永恒的惩罚，正如以赛亚所预言的那样（34:9-10）：“其中的溪流必变成沥青，尘土必变成硫磺。”

其结果是产生了一种非常有力的反犹太主义意识形态。异教反犹太主义是“世俗和流行的”（Simon 1986, 208），异教知识分子的反犹太著作是“精英主义和文学的”（Wilson 1985, 354），而基督教反犹太主义不仅在思想上受到尊重，而且在学术上也受到尊重。制定了一种情感上引人注目的反犹太仪式。[96]Gager (1983, 7; 另见 deLange 1991) 提出了一个有趣的建议，即早期教会的现存文献是故意选择的，以强调反犹太主义主题并排除其他声音，就像牧师对摩西五经的修订仅保留了早期著作一样什么与犹太教作为散居国外的意识形态相容。可以想象，这些早期作品甚至被编辑或精心制作以强调反犹太主题。加格尔的建议与目前的观点高度一致，即这一时期发生了质的转变，有意识地构建了根本上反犹太主义的历史版本。 事实上，基督教神学从一开始就带有反犹太主义的色彩——Hollerich (1992, 594) 称之为“传统基督教”。 敌意 反对犹太人”集中于犹太人拒绝耶稣为弥赛亚。[97]迈克尔（Michael，1994）提供了几位 2 世纪和 3 世纪教父（尤其是德尔图良）的高度情绪化的反犹太言论。德尔图良的著作表明，反犹太教所定义的基督教社会身份在这一时期已经建立。德尔图良“需要犹太人和犹太教作为一种原型来定义他的几乎一切和所代表的一切。 。 。 。他在修辞上使用[反犹太教]来赢得反对他的对手的论据，并在神学上使用它。 。 。构建一种基督教，一种基督教社会身份，其核心、关键是非犹太教、反犹太教”（Wilken 1971，x）。这表明基督教作为一种反犹太团体策略起源于四世纪之前，尽管它只是在那时才掌权。内塔尼亚胡（Netanyahu，4）提出了一个不可能的论点，即反犹太教从新约圣经的起源开始就是基督教的核心。然而，基督教传统的反犹太主义色彩，例如在公元 2 世纪殉道者贾斯汀和萨迪斯的梅利托的著作中所看到的，被这些 4 世纪和 5 世纪的作家所利用和扩展。随着教会在政治上的成功，整个社会围绕着一个统一的、霸权的、集体主义的社会制度而组织起来，这个社会制度是由它对犹太教的反对所定义的：尤西比乌斯的“一个上帝，一个皇帝，一个教会”的梦想（Wilken 1983，129） 。

然而，尽管存在这种集体主义、威权主义的社会结构，西方社会传统的普世主义和同化主义也被纳入了新的意识形态中：对于尤西比乌斯来说，弥赛亚的到来导致了一个普世主义的基督教社区，最终将包括全人类。优西比乌非常自觉地不再强调旧约中明显的种族排他性的强烈暗示。基督教是人类的“原始宗教”（Barnes 1981, 126；另见 Ruether 1974, 141）。族长是最早的基督徒。他们代表了人类的普遍种族，他们的宗教现在已为全人类宣布。

尤西比乌斯认为，亚伯拉罕一定是想为全人类而不仅仅是犹太人建立一种宗教——这表明，与西蒙（1986）和费尔德曼（1993）的主张相反，尤西比乌斯绝对不认为他的犹太教是犹太教。作为普世主义者的一天。与普遍的、原始的族长宗教不同，摩西律法“与犹太种族和以色列土地息息相关”（Barnes 1981, 185）。事实上，重要的是要记住，犹太教在古代世界通常被视为一种民族/种族宗教（见 创伤后应激障碍，CH。 4）：“犹太教实际上与其说是祖国的宗教，不如说是犹太民族的宗教；它是一种民族宗教，不是在政治意义上而是在谱系意义上”（Moore 1927-1930，I，225）。在 福音的证明尤西比乌斯（Eusebius，1920）反复将基督教的普世主义信息与“犹太种族”的宗教进行对比。新约“不仅仅为犹太民族”（I.4.7.d），而是“召唤所有人平等地分享同样的美好事物”（I.4.8.c）。巴恩斯 (Barnes, 1981, 172) 翻译了尤西比乌斯的另一段话，大意是上帝应许外邦人将“来自东方和西方，他们将变得与亚伯拉罕和其他有福的人平等，因为他们同样有良好的生活方式。这些人的后代和继承人是如何的。 。 。他们的城市被洗劫，圣殿被围困，他们被分散到人类的各个种族中，这清楚地表明了他们被剥夺了应许的祝福”（Barnes 1981，172）。因此，尤西比乌斯将犹太人视为亚伯拉罕的血统后裔，他们拒绝了基督教的普遍信息，只要他们愿意看到光明，基督教就会向他们敞开。

犹太人是一个生物血统群体而不仅仅是某种宗教的信徒的观点在这一时期似乎很普遍，并且在帝国立法的措辞中也很明显。塞维利亚的伊西多尔引用耶利米的话写道，犹太人的邪恶性格是无法改变的：“埃塞俄比亚人能改变他的颜色吗？豹子能改变他的斑点吗？” （迈克尔 1994，115）。圣奥古斯丁（St. Augustine，1959）对犹太人作为一个生物血统群体有着清晰的认识，并且防止基因混合是犹太教的一个重要组成部分：“即使在失去了他们的圣殿、他们的祭祀、他们的祭司和他们的王国之后，他们仍然坚持在一些古老的仪式中，他们以自己的名字和种族命名，以免他们不分青红皂白地与外邦人混在一起，从而灭亡并失去真理的见证。”犹太人永远无法摆脱杀害基督的耻辱，因为他们在生物学上与他们的祖先有联系：“犹太人的邪恶‘在他们的父母身上导致了死亡’”（Michael 1994, 115）。

同样，金口认为犹太人杀害基督的责任以及他们的许多其他恶行被作为遗传特征传递给古代犹太人的后裔（Ruether 1974, 130；另见 Lazar 1991a, 77n；Michael 1994, 114）。另一方面，上帝通过制定禁止近亲结婚的禁忌，“通过婚姻将我们重新联系在一起，通过新娘将整个家庭重新团结在一起，并将整个种族融合在一起”（哥林多前书第 34 章；格里尔 1 年） ，1986）。教皇加拉修斯一世（Pope Galasius I，138-492）也用种族术语来称呼犹太人（一族）（参见 Synan 1965, 32, 174n.3）。 《狄奥多西法典》提到“这个种族的邪恶”（CTh 16.8.24），并在其他几个地方将犹太人称为一个种族。对于犹太人的朋友和基督教的敌人朱利安皇帝来说，犹太人的“部落神”完美地融入了他的从属于至高神灵的民族神灵体系中”（Bowder 1978，111）。

此外，基督教神学的一贯主线是谴责犹太人按字面解释旧约。即“在肉体和身体的意义上”（Barnes 1981, 98；另见 Boyarin 1993, 6），指的是犹太人对家谱的关注以及对生殖成功和世俗财富的许多承诺。[98]如所示 创伤后应激障碍 （第8章），教会采用了罗马帝国的异族通婚做法，并随后将其扩展到包括更广泛的精神和血缘亲属。教会也将独身理想化，因此君士坦丁废除了促进婚姻和生育的奥古斯丁法律。 对于尤西比乌斯来说，犹太教具有强烈的种族/民族色彩，并错误地将其神圣著作解释为强制生殖成功、控制资源和强调遗传相关性。基督教则相反：它是全人类的普遍宗教，是一种颂扬精神成就和独身的宗教，而不是犹太教的核心进化目标。[99]这种对犹太教的解释在后来的时期仍然是基督教神学的主要内容。例如，在 13 世纪教皇权力和影响力的鼎盛时期，教皇英诺森三世指责犹太人遵循摩西律法，该律法许诺了尘世的财富和繁衍的成功：“这就是肉欲的犹太人，他们只寻求感官所感知的东西，他们只享受物质感官”（Synan 1965, 88）。英诺森将基督教解释为团结犹太人和外邦人的一种尝试，以便“以前将异教徒及其偶像崇拜与希伯来人及其仪式分开的围墙现在已经被打破”（Synan 1965, 88）。

事实上，犹太教的这种概念化对于拉比思想来说并不陌生。正如 Boyarin (1993, 231) 所指出的，以及我试图广泛记录的（参见 创伤后应激障碍，CH。 4），犹太教的种族、家谱组成部分及其对资源控制和繁衍成功的强调不仅在拉比思想中得到了非常明确的阐述，而且也反映在整个时期犹太人的实际行为中。

这种基督教反犹太主义意识形态伴随着教会认可甚至鼓励的反犹太行为的增加。在此期间，人们对异端信仰也非常关注，导致对异教和基督教异端的迫害。鉴于教会致力于创造一个集体主义、普世主义和同质社会，这种行为是可以预料的。狂热的僧侣“煽动基督徒暴徒抢劫犹太教堂、墓地和其他财产，夺取或烧毁犹太宗教建筑，并在犹太区引发骚乱”（Ruether 1974，192）。公元五世纪，主教们在大规模强迫洗礼以及将犹太人驱逐出亚历山大和安条克的过程中发挥了重要作用，最终东罗马帝国的犹太社区“陷入耻辱，向波斯帝国和穆斯林帝国寻求拯救”（鲁瑟） 1974 年，194）。

基督徒能够在教会默许或公开的批准下摧毁犹太教堂而几乎不受惩罚。有几起事件表明教会向政府施压，要求其宽恕反犹太主义行为，其中最著名的是 388 年的事件，圣安布罗斯成功地让狄奥多西皇帝撤销了一项命令，要求主教重建被反犹太主义破坏的犹太教堂。 - 犹太人的行动。帝国立法逐渐对破坏犹太教堂的惩罚越来越弱，因此最终没有必要进行归还。最后，到了 423 年，建造新犹太教堂甚至修复旧犹太教堂都被禁止。

康斯坦丁还“将基督教对犹太人的偏见转化为法律上的无能”（Barnes 1981, 252；另见 Bachrach 1984；Cohen 1976；Feldman 1993；Jones 1964, 948ff；Pakter 1992）。法律上的无能最初反映了罗马对犹太人的传统政策，现在以更加消极的语言表达出来。正如我们所看到的，帝国立法的这种相对温和很可能反映了四、五世纪犹太社区的巨大权力和财富。如上所述，禁止拥有基督教奴隶以及寻求或接受犹太教皈依者。试图阻止犹太教皈依基督教的犹太人将被活活烧死。后来，禁止拥有基督教奴隶的禁令屡屡颁布，后来的法律也禁止社会交往并禁止异族通婚。犹太人被禁止从事法律职业和政府服务，也被禁止对基督徒提出指控，甚至被禁止在民事或刑事诉讼中作证反对他们。官方的犹太流亡政府（宗主教区）于五世纪初被废除，犹太人要缴纳特别税。犹太教堂的会费被政府没收（Jones 4, 5）。 Wilken (5, 1964) 指出，《狄奥多西法典》还规范了犹太人和外邦人之间的经济关系，包括犹太商品的价格——这再次表明经济问题潜伏在群体冲突的背景下。 “令读者印象深刻的是四世纪末五世纪初涉及犹太事务的大量立法”（Wilken 947，1971）。

然而，尽管有这些官方政府行为，有证据表明政府往往不愿意推行这些反犹太限制，并且只有在面对教会和民众压力时才这样做（Jones 1964, 948；另见 Bachrach 1985, 421；Cohen 1991 年，87）。 Simon (1986, 227) 指出，教会在改变有关犹太人的帝国立法方面积极且具有影响力，而法律的措辞常常暴露出对犹太人的极端敌意。正是在这一时期，教会发展了一种高于皇帝的意识形态（Schimmelpfennig 1992, 261）——如果教会要成为反犹太主义的工具而不仅仅是具有精神功能，这显然是一个必要条件。[100]圣安布罗斯于 388 年说服狄奥多西皇帝撤销对主教重建被反犹太行动摧毁的犹太教堂的命令，他似乎提出了皇帝应该服从教会的想法，而不是相反（见厄尔曼 1970，13）。为了有效实现其政治目标，反犹太运动必须控制政府。这一学说在后来的时期得到了阐述，最终的结果是教会成为“中世纪时期[欧洲]最有影响力和最重要的政府机构”（Ullman 1970，1）。 此外，犹太人自己也非常清楚教会作为反犹太主义工具的作用。当波斯人入侵东帝国时，犹太人烧毁了教堂，并威胁基督徒如果不放弃信仰就进行屠杀（Jones 1964, 950）。

与穆斯林的官方立场一样，犹太人被允许存在于基督教社会中，但作为一个被谴责的民族，他们的生活是悲惨的。通过这种类型的意识形态，很容易看出基督教的宗教意识形态与犹太人的财富、政治权力和繁衍成功完全不一致，穆斯林意识形态认为犹太人必须保持羞辱和从属地位（Braude＆Lewis 1982， 7).这里的建议是，这就是一开始的意图。

法国大革命之前对犹太人实施的大部分限制都是在尤西比乌到查士丁尼时期（4-6世纪初）开始的，这表明这是欧洲犹太人与外邦人关系的分水岭时期，也表明了犹太人与外邦人关系的中心地位。教会作为西方反犹太主义的一个机构：“在 1550 年第一个强制隔离区出现之前一千年，教规和罗马法开始在经济、社会和司法上将犹太人排除在基督教社会之外”（Pakter 1992, 727；另见 Ruether 1964 年，183）。

这些事态发展表明，以前仅由犹太人建立和维护的隔离墙现在已在分界线的两侧竖立起来，并且表明到了 4 世纪，罗马帝国的犹太人和外邦人已经进入了一个新时代，其中群体冲突升级。正如西蒙（Simon，1986，223）指出的那样，基督教“加强了犹太宗教仪式在以色列和外部世界之间已经建立的障碍”。

最后，值得将基督教视为一种进化的意识形态。尤西比乌斯和这一时期其他基督教理论家的著作本质上将基督教与犹太教进行了对比，后者被概念化为一个与族长有谱系联系的民族中心主义群体，并对当代世界的物质和生殖成功感兴趣。我认为造成这组对比的原因是，用休斯顿·斯图尔特·张伯伦的话来说，帝国已经成为一个通晓多种语言、种族多样化的“混乱的民族”（见第五章）。因此，反对犹太教的群体策略必然不再强调种族（家谱血统）作为群体内认同的基础。世界被分为犹太人和非犹太人，后者没有种族共性，但仍然具有强烈的基督徒身份。

结果是种族在基督教宗教意识形态中没有正式的地位，这反过来又在后来的几个世纪中产生了许多重要的后果。一方面，毫无疑问，基督教在其他历史时期，尤其是中世纪，能够成为一种可行的反犹太主义意识形态。另一方面，基督教在其整个历史中一直保留着一种强烈的意识，即其使命是全人类的皈依，这可能会导致基督徒的种族利益受到损害。在第七章中，我讨论了西班牙宗教裁判所期间的皈依者理论家如何根据官方基督教宗教意识形态主张，基督徒应该忽视皈依者作为西班牙社会中未被同化的族群的延续，而应关注他们的顺从性（至少在表面）到共同的基督教信仰。在当代美国，致力于改变所有人信仰的基督教宗教团体有时会支持所有群体的移民，不分种族。

因此，晚期罗马基督教的特征不仅在于与犹太教的镜像特征（即其集体主义群体结构及其对内群体和外群体的深刻认识）；而且还具有犹太教的镜像特征。它还具有与犹太教完全相反的特征（即普遍主义和不强调种族、物质和生殖成功的倾向）。在西班牙基督教中也可以看到普遍主义的倾向和不再强调种族作为群体认同的基础。在第四章中，我强调了这一点：在宗教裁判所时期，基督教与血统纯洁性的种族主义意识形态同时出现。然而，这种种族主义意识形态并没有阻止西班牙人试图从基因上同化新基督徒。它也没有阻止他们使西班牙美洲的原住民皈依天主教，并最终通过通婚产生混血文化，其中种族分歧大大减弱。然而，我们将看到，随着德国国家社会主义运动的兴起，西方基督教的普世主义主题被彻底推翻，取而代之的是全面的内群体种族主义意识形态。在第五章中，我将论证国家社会主义是犹太教的真实镜像。毫不奇怪，它也是犹太教在其整个历史上遇到的最危险的敌人。

尽管晚期罗马基督教文明发展起来的集体主义社会结构确实与古典罗马文明有重大背离，但教会保留了古典罗马文明的几个对进化论者至关重要的基本特征：社会强加的一夫一妻制、外婚制和普遍主义理想和同化主义（见第五章，第 5-165 页，以及 创伤后应激障碍，CH。 8；麦克唐纳 1990，1995b)。社会强加的一夫一妻制尤其重要，因为它保留了西方社会对生殖行为控制的基本平等性质。因此，基督教社会中心的等级制、独裁制度的发展并没有导致东方和中东社会（包括《塔纳赫》中描绘的社会）的生殖剥削特征。

最后，犹太人在基督教神学中的官方地位——犹太人应该被容忍处于屈从的、无能为力的角色，因为他们可以作为基督教真理的见证——有时会导致教会向政府施加压力，要求他们不要彻底消灭犹太人或试图试图消灭犹太人。强制转换（例如，Bowman 1985, 9）。事实上，犹太教的官方神学地位可能是犹太教在西方生存的最重要的原因（例如，Neusner 1987, 146）。正如犹太领导人经常欢迎低水平的反犹太主义，因为它往往会增强群体团结（见第四章和 创伤后应激障碍，CH。 7），教会的传播可能受益于犹太人作为大众仇恨对象的持续存在，“向大众传授基督教的完美陪衬”（Bowman 1985，10）。因此，教会在维持相对弱势和无权的犹太人少数群体方面可能具有非常现实的制度利益。

我在这里提出的观点是，西班牙宗教裁判所从根本上来说是一场独裁、集体主义和排他性运动，是由于与犹太人，特别是冒充基督徒的加密犹太人的资源和生殖竞争而产生的。在西班牙，经过 1391 年的强制皈依和 15 世纪初的进一步大规模皈依之后，皈依者及其后代（称为新基督徒、Conversos 或 Marranos）迅速成为法律、金融、外交领域的主导力量、各级公共行政以及广泛的经济活动（参见 创伤后应激障碍，CH。 5）。富有的皈依者为他们的孩子购买并授予教会圣职，因此许多高级主教都是犹太血统。新基督教高级官员（如国王胡安二世的秘书费尔南迪亚斯）在政府官僚机构的较低级别任命了新基督教徒（Netanyahu 1995，962）。这些新基督徒的确切群体地位问题仍然存在争议，但我的观点是他们必须被视为历史上的犹太群体（见第 6 章和第 7 章）。

在15世纪，新基督徒被统治的外邦精英以一种非常传统的方式利用，作为他们与广大外邦基督徒之间的一个非常有能力的中介团体。胡安二世的首席部长阿尔瓦罗·德卢纳（Alvaro de Luna）推动了犹太人和新基督教徒的命运，作为一支忠于君主制的力量，在与贵族的斗争中优先于外邦城市贵族（Netanyahu 1995，217ff）。除了表面宗教外，几乎没有什么变化：“许多新基督徒保留了他们作为犹太人所扮演的经济角色。小商人、工匠、税农，他们仍然住在同一个社区，实行同族通婚，住在与犹太人相同的房屋和环境中”（Freund & Ruiz 1994, 177）。然而，新基督徒甚至比犹太人更有价值，因为他们至少在名义上是基督徒，因此他们的活动（例如包税）具有某种理论上的合法性，而这是犹太人履行这些职能时所缺乏的（Netanyahu 1995， 217ff）。

Baroja (1966, 101) 指出，“作为这种渗透的对抗者，联谊会、学校、修道院等开始建立，被谴责的叛教者的后裔，甚至没有进一步资格的‘新基督徒’都被排除在外。 ”换句话说，西班牙人的反应是通过创建一种将犹太人排除在外的平行制度体系，采取一项或一系列的集团战略。老基督教徒建立了广泛的专业协会、行会、宗教和军事团体以及大教堂，其会员资格需要证明 limpieza de sangre （血液的纯度）。宗教裁判所的一个主要职能是强制执行 清洁的 法规并审查其管辖范围内的个人的遗传血统。

关注 清洁的 它于 15 世纪中叶的西班牙发展起来，与加密犹太教的发展同时发生。在教会废除了一项旨在阻止新基督徒担任公职的法律之后，严格排除新基督徒并从事针对他们的政治活动的兄弟会有所增长。最终，在宗教裁判所时期，各种法律障碍针对新基督徒及其血统后裔。[104]Beinart (1981, 28) 报道说，伊莎贝拉对因宗教裁判所而积累财富没有兴趣，甚至用一些没收的钱为父母成为宗教裁判所受害者的孩子提供嫁妆。这表明宗教裁判所早期不太关心将生物学相关性作为迫害标准。 渐渐地，到了 16 世纪中叶，“公共生活和教会中的显赫地位，甚至生计途径，都迅速向所有承受致命命运的人关闭”。 满茶 或污点”（Lea 1906-1907，II，290）。这种限制的必要性通常是合理的，因为新基督徒在机构内形成派系，目的是控制机构并最终重新引入犹太教。人们常常暗示犹太人拥有卓越的智力和能力。因此，认为冒充新基督徒的犹太人继续采取群体策略，而老基督徒则采取了镜像排他性群体策略。

在接下来的几年里，“西班牙社会中公开的种族主义”有所增加（Haliczer 1987），其中 清洁的，而不是表面宗教，成为反犹太行动的焦点。[105]宗教裁判所这种公然的种族主义与内塔尼亚胡（1966）的论点非常吻合，即宗教裁判所的目的是“不是要从马拉诺群体中根除犹太异端，而是要从西班牙人民中根除马拉诺群体” （第 4 页；文本中为斜体）。因此，尽管内塔尼亚胡关于大多数新基督徒本质上并不是真正的犹太人的解释在我看来是有歉意的（见第七章附录），但他的论点无疑与种族在评估宗教裁判所目标时的重要性是一致的。 尽管需要证明没有犹太血统的世代数量存在一定差异 清洁的，规范进入更好的大学、教会和军队的法律禁止任何犹太血统，无论多么遥远（Kamen 1985）。至少在 19 世纪之前，血统的纯洁性一直是一种荣誉的标志，在整个这段时期，有时甚至更长时间，教堂不断地恢复或取代了 桑贝尼托斯 （即在教堂中悬挂的横幅，标明受宗教裁判所惩罚的人）以及受宗教裁判所惩罚的人的名单（Baroja 1966, 104）。这 清洁的 直到 1860 年代，法律才被完全废除。

宗教裁判所关注的是 清洁的 这是对犹太人之前对种族纯洁性担忧的反应。卡斯特罗（1954 年、1971 年；另见 创伤后应激障碍，CH。 4）发现犹太种族主义早于西班牙人对犹太教的关注 清洁的 宗教裁判所时期的特征；在 13 世纪或 14 世纪的基督徒中，不会出现对血统纯洁性的类似关注。 “真正对血统纯洁性有所顾忌的人是西班牙犹太人”（Castro 1954, 525）。 “只有当我们看到历史现实同时具有两个极端时，我们才能理解历史现实：天主教西班牙的排他主义是对西班牙的封闭主义的回应。 睡衣 [犹太社区]。 。 。 。血统的纯洁性是一个因反犹愤怒而激起的社会对犹太人种族封闭主义的回应”（第 531 页）。[106]内塔尼亚胡（1979-1980）反对卡斯特罗观点的论点在第七章附录中讨论。 因此，宗教裁判所对血统的关注是先前存在的犹太人关注的镜像。

直到 14 世纪末，犹太人通过嫁妆与基督教贵族联姻的情况一直没有得到评论，而且天主教徒斐迪南的母亲确实有犹太血统。然而，随着 14 世纪末的强迫皈依和 15 世纪新基督徒同族通婚群体（其中许多人是秘密犹太人）的持续存在，群体冲突加剧，异族通婚成为一个高度不稳定的问题。

犹太人的种族自豪感在 15 世纪很常见。新基督徒公开承认他们的祖先，并普遍声称他们的祖先优于外邦人（Faur 1992, 72）。例如，布尔戈斯的新基督教主教写了一本书，题为 血统的起源和高贵”，他在其中宣称：“不要以为你称我的祖先为犹太人就可以侮辱我。确实如此，我很高兴事实如此。如果伟大的岁月就是高贵，那么谁能回到那么远呢？” （卡斯特罗 1971 年，73）。这些种族自豪感的表达遭到了外邦人的敌意：卡斯特罗（Castro，1971，71）引用了 15 世纪编年史家安德烈斯·贝尔纳尔德斯（Andrés Bernáldez）的话说，“犹太人民的狂热敌人”，“他们有傲慢自大的态度；他们是犹太人的敌人”。 [他们认为]世界上没有人比他们更好、更谨慎、更精明、更杰出，因为他们是以色列的血统和状况。”

这种对犹太种族主义的负面反应最终导致了宗教裁判所对其管辖范围内的群体成员身份和个人遗传血统的强烈关注。我认为宗教裁判所对家谱的关注有两个原因。首先，有充分的证据表明存在一群新基督徒，其中许多人是隐秘的犹太人，无论他们的主观宗教信仰如何，他们在伊比利亚社会中作为一个有凝聚力的同族通婚群体在伊比利亚社会爆发两百多年后继续存在。宗教裁判所（见第六章和第七章）。由于这个群体通过模仿东道国社会的宗教来进行隐秘活动，因此，一个人在这个战略群体中保持成员身份的最可靠线索就是犹太遗传血统。

其次，随着群体冲突的加剧，群体之间的隔离墙越来越高。虽然以前犹太人建立并严格维护隔离墙，但群体冲突的加剧导致外邦人也建立了这些隔离墙。正如罗马帝国晚期和德国国家社会主义时期所发生的那样，种族鸿沟的双方都产生了对种族混合的恐惧。此外，与国家社会主义时期一样，制裁不仅针对“种族纯正”的新基督徒的同族通婚群体，而且还针对任何具有犹太血统的人，无论血统多么遥远。如下文所示，这种扩展到所有有犹太血统的家庭有利于伊比利亚社会的下层阶级，并受到这些阶级的积极倡导，因为犹太与异教徒的通婚只发生在贵族中。

清洁的 法律使西班牙社会的下层社会阶层受益匪浅，因为这些人被认为是种族纯洁的。由于新基督教徒成功地与贵族通婚，“除了北部和东部的偏远山区之外，没有一个上层或中产阶级可以放心，调查可能不会揭露一些不幸的事情”。 联盟 远祖的”（Lea 1906-1907，II，299）。结果，下层贵族和绅士受到这些限制的影响最大，上层贵族权力太大，而农民的出身太不起眼，以至于他们无法受到这些限制。

有趣的是，那些能够证明自己在 1391 年强制皈依之前已经皈依基督教的人被认为是老基督徒（Lea 1906-1907，II，298）。这表明 清洁的 人们认为1391年的强制皈依未能产生基因同化，并减少了基于群体的冲突，这些法律是其失败的结果，事实上它们也失败了。

这是整个宗教裁判所的一个重要观点。宗教裁判所从根本上来说是对强制基因和群体同化失败尝试的回应。在伊比利亚人眼中，真正的罪行是，1391年之后皈依基督教的犹太人是伪装的种族主义者，即使他们真诚地信仰基督教，但仍然继续同族通婚，并在内部进行政治和经济合作，情况也是如此。群组。 1391 年之前自愿同化的人不是宗教裁判所的目标，因为这些人被隐含地视为没有种族主义罪行。犹太血统的程度并不构成犯罪，而是故意参与群体进化策略。从这个意义上说，宗教裁判所完全是非种族主义的。相反，它涉及惩罚种族主义。

Lea (1906–1907, I, 111, 126) 指出，1391 年西班牙最初的反犹太起义具有强烈的宗教（而非种族）方面，因为犹太人总是有机会皈依，而且没有社会或经济障碍强加给皈依者，直到 1449 年新旧基督徒之间出现公开冲突，并指责后者在宗教信仰上不真诚。在强制皈依之后，许多人认为通婚是保存信仰的最佳手段（即巴塞尔法令；参见 Lea 1906-1907 I, 120）。然而，贝纳特（Beinart，1971a）指出，老基督徒对新基督徒的批评之一是，他们继续通婚，并且是在教会禁止的亲属关系范围内这样做的。例如，Lea (1906–1907, III, 309) 提供了一个 18 世纪西班牙的案例，其中一名新基督徒被指控“根据摩西律法”与堂兄妹结婚，而堂兄妹婚姻继续普遍发生。 17 世纪伊比利亚的新基督徒（Boyajian 1983）。叔侄女婚姻也发生在Conversos 家族中（Roth 1995, 131）。一位 15 世纪的讽刺作家反映了这种看法，称国王曾许诺“作为马拉诺人……”。 。 。贵族将“装饰托拉的殿堂并崇拜其形象”，只与他的亲戚结婚，并且“不相信，正如他们不相信的那样，神圣的母亲教会所相信、持有和宣扬的东西”（Roth 1995， 164）。犹太婚姻习俗的延续是旧基督徒如何看待皈依者的一个重要方面——这是皈依者不接受信仰的其他方面的明显行为迹象。

因此，证据表明，无论新基督徒的宗教信仰如何，也无论这些信仰是否真诚，老基督徒都认为新基督徒在西班牙社会中仍然是一个在基因上未被同化的群体。犹太人近亲结婚习俗的延续很可能构成了一个非常显着的暗示，即尽管表面上（或者在某些情况下，现实中）宗教一致，但犹太种族封闭主义仍在继续。事实上，在宗教裁判所的早期，新基督徒中同族婚姻、家庭和亲属关系以及群体内赞助的延续导致了一种明确和公开表达的共同命运感（Beinart 1983, 268; Contraras 1991, 127） ）。

宗教裁判所的一个令人着迷的方面是，它被迫遵守自己的意识形态，即至少在官方上，新基督徒的不当行为应在偏离宗教正统的情况下进行追究。换句话说，宗教裁判所并没有试图阻止新基督徒与其他新基督徒结婚（违反教会法的近亲结婚除外），正式强制实施异族通婚。宗教裁判所也没有正式阻止新基督教家庭之间的经济和政治赞助与合作。相反，它通过试图提供新基督徒秘密信奉犹太教的证据来回应新基督教同族通婚以及政治和经济权力——人们可以称之为他们持续的“群体性”。正如许多新基督教的辩护者所指出的（见第七章），官方的基督教意识形态是普世主义的，不考虑种族、民族或民族差异。仅仅成为新基督徒并不会受到惩罚，事实上，费迪南国王（他建立了宗教裁判所）的许多朝臣都是新基督徒。即使在 7 世纪中叶，宗教裁判所开始七十年后，皈依者虽然被排除在高级教会职位和政府高层之外，但仍然从事他们的传统职业（包税、商业、银行、法律专业）和医学以及较低级别的政府职位）（Netanyahu 16, 1995）。

结果是，宗教裁判所是一种相当尴尬的群体间冲突机制，因为它被迫通过执行法律来对抗群体战略，而这些法律对于新基督教保持同族通婚、经济和政治合作群体的战略来说根本不是核心。对宗教异端的指控往往只是群体之间更深层次冲突的表面表现。鉴于 16 世纪新基督教徒迅速向上的社会流动性以及他们购买贵族头衔的能力，“只有宗教原因才足以令人信服地阻止金钱使之成为可能和法律禁止的事物”（Contraras 1992, 95）。结果是，宗教裁判所带着明显的政治、经济甚至性动机，试图通过强迫认罪和诱导对宗教异端的指控来实现他们的个人和团体目标，而这些指控有时可能至少是部分错误的。[107]双方都存在控制宗教裁判所的政治阴谋。 Contraras (1992)描述了一个案例，成功抹杀了他们的背景或至少他们目前的同情心的皈依者能够获得审判官的职位，并利用他们的职位来对付老基督徒，或者改善被带到法庭的新基督徒的命运。

西班牙和葡萄牙的新基督徒和旧基督徒之间的通婚程度是一个棘手的历史问题。然而，下面审查的证据至少表明，在整个宗教裁判所期间，相当大一部分新基督徒继续只在他们自己之间结婚，至少直到新基督徒的权力在18世纪最终被打破为止，即使在这个时期之后，仍有一些小型的、同族通婚的秘密犹太人群体一直持续到 20 世纪。

新基督教团体，无论其宗教信仰如何，从根本上来说都是一个种族实体，并且被伊比利亚人视为这样的实体。因此葡萄牙人使用了这个词 纳索之家——“民族之人”——指生活在他们中间的犹太民族。 “不需要更多雄辩的证词来向我们证明，我们正在处理的主要类别是种族类别。 。 。 。由于中世纪的犹太社区代表了流亡国家的“民族”单位，因此皈依的社区不仅仅是个人的聚集。在葡萄牙人眼中，它仍然具有民族[即群体]特征”（Yerushalmi 1971，20）。同样，内塔尼亚胡（Netanyahu，1995，995ff）表明，15世纪西班牙的新基督徒保留了一个群体的外在标志，并被他们自己和他们的对手视为一个种族和一个独立于旧基督徒的国家。

数据表明，在宗教裁判所时期，西班牙社会中至少存在两个具有犹太血统的群体：种族纯正的新基督教家庭，他们自始至终都继续同族通婚；以及只有一个或很少犹太祖先的古老基督教家庭，其中与犹太人的婚姻是出于经济考虑（通常是嫁妆）。此外，可能还有一个单独的内婚群体，主要是犹太血统的家庭，他们有一些来自旧基督教贵族的血统。下面描述的证据表明，犹太人对血统纯洁性的担忧不仅早于伊比利亚人的类似担忧，而且尽管宗教裁判所竭尽全力消灭犹太人，但在许多秘密犹太人中，这种担忧仍持续了几个世纪。宗教裁判所的持续关注 清洁的 因此，相当准确地反映了至少一大部分新基督徒中持续存在的同族通婚做法。

关于社会最高层的通婚，人们普遍认为，15世纪西班牙富有的新基督徒迅速与西班牙贵族通婚（例如，Lea 1906-1907；Netanyahu 1966；Roth 1974；Roth XNUMX）。 创伤后应激障碍，CH。 5）。不过，从贵族的基因库来看，通婚的程度恐怕并不高。 Kamen（1965）估计 1482 年卡斯蒂利亚和阿拉贡的总人口为 1.65 万，其中 0.8% 是高级贵族（0.85%）或城镇贵族（XNUMX%）。假设每个家庭有六人，这表明这样的家庭总数约为两万五千个。[108]Hillgarth (1978) 给出了 1528 年至 1536 年卡斯蒂利亚人口不足 1.5 万的数据，并断言 1482 年卡斯蒂利亚 1954 万个壁炉的数字值得怀疑。 Castro（108,338）给出了 1541 年卡斯蒂利亚和莱昂有 XNUMX 名伊达尔戈人的数字。即使数字低得多，也不会影响外加剂百分比低的结论。 新基督教作者写于 15 世纪中叶 关系器说明其辩护目的是强调通婚的程度，提到总共有“四十多个”具有新基督教血统的贵族家庭，它们源自八个新基督教创始人的家庭（1969年、295年、314年）。 埃尔蒂松·德·诺布莱萨 （Baroja 1961 年重印）写于 1560 年左右，表明许多西班牙贵族都有犹太祖先，但这些人的祖先只有少数新基督徒。[109] 阿拉贡绿书， 该书写于 1507 年，也很少记录异族通婚——主要信息是新基督教家庭中同族通婚的程度。 此外，从新基督徒的总数来看，异族通婚的数量微乎其微，据估计，新基督徒的人数在数万至1995万之间（Netanyahu 1095，1978）。与这些发现一致的是，现代群体遗传学研究没有为异族通婚很常见的观点提供支持：Mourant 等人。 （44 年，XNUMX；另见 创伤后应激障碍，CH。 2）得出结论：“血型数据表明，与土著西班牙人的通婚相对较少。”因此，数据并未表明与犹太人的通婚在贵族婚姻总数中占很大比例，尽管随着时间的推移并假设该群体内继续存在内婚制，相当大比例的贵族可能确实拥有新基督教祖先。

看来，通婚的主要途径是新基督教妇女嫁给旧基督教贵族。 1628年，当葡萄牙主教试图阻止新基督徒与贵族通婚时，建议的方法是将异族通婚中的嫁妆限制在固定金额（2,000克鲁扎多）（Lea 1906–1907, III, 277; Baron 1973, 23, 244 ），这表明绝大多数通婚涉及犹太妇女由于嫁妆而嫁给外邦家庭。该法律对旧基督教妇女与新基督教男子结婚没有类似的担忧，尽管这种情况至少偶尔发生过。这种将犹太妇女嫁给外邦贵族以换取嫁妆的模式早在 14 世纪末和 15 世纪群体冲突加剧之前就开始于中世纪时期了（Castro 1971, 72）。这样的政策将导致新基督教主干家庭保持其种族纯洁性，而基督教贵族的基因库将发展出犹太基因的混合体。犹太复国主义种族科学家埃利亚斯·奥尔巴赫 (Elias Auerbach) 很可能就是这么想的，他在 1907 年指出，在西班牙，犹太人与基督徒和穆斯林有相当多的通婚，但“犹太人没有表现出放弃种族隔离的倾向”（《埃夫隆》） 1994 年，131）。在奥尔巴赫看来，西班牙犹太人“在所有前现代犹太社区中拥有最高度发展的民族独特性和生物命运意识”（Efron 1994，131）。奥尔巴赫指出，“在整个种族历史进程中，推动对种族混合最强烈抵制的是犹太人本身，而不是其他民族”（Efron 1994，131）。

事实上，如果允许一些儿子嫁给外邦贵族，只要主要继承人仍然是犹太人并继续实行同族通婚，那么干系家庭的种族纯洁性也可以得到维持。如下所示，安德烈斯·贝尔纳尔德斯评论了新基督教儿女与旧基督教贵族的婚姻（Castro 1971，71）。根据犹太宗教法，这些婚姻所生的孩子不会被视为犹太人，并且会被归入Converso基因库。同样，Yerushalmi (1971, 20n.29) 指出，新基督徒仍然是一个内婚群体，但经常有基督徒情人——这种做法再次保留了犹太干系家庭的遗传纯度，同时也导致了来自犹太教的基因的单向流动。到外邦社区。正如第 2 章（第 46 页）所述，对外邦妇女进行性剥削的指控是 15 世纪反converso 情绪的一个常见组成部分。

因此，有证据表明，新基督教主干家庭保留了其种族纯洁性，但在一定程度上渗透到了外邦贵族的基因库中。还有证据表明，有凝聚力的新基督教家庭群体继续只在自己内部通婚。 “在大多数情况下，他们只在自己内部结婚”（Roth 1937, 26；另见 Yerushalmi 1971, 20）。 Round（1969；另见Contraras 1991、1992）指出新基督教担任公职的家族之间高度同族通婚，以及这些联盟在促进专业团结和追求赞助方面的作用。

事实上，没有任何证据表明伊比利亚社会的中下层发生过异族通婚。卡斯特罗 (Castro, 1971, 71) 引用了 15 世纪反Converso 编年史家安德烈斯·贝尔纳尔德斯 (Andrés Bernáldez) 的话说，犹太人和新基督徒“有些人与极其富有的基督教骑士的子女混在一起”——这意味着异族通婚并不存在。发生在社会底层。[110]Guilds segregated along racial lines occurred prior to the Inquisition in Spain, indicating that ethnic segregation at this level of society had remained intact long after the forced conversions of 1391 (Kamen (1965, 33). Also consistent with a general lack of intermarriage among the lower classes of Conversos, Roth (1995, 225) notes that at the beginning of the Inquisition in Castile it was the lower class of Conversos that was most suspected of religious heresy.

Moreover, descent from the non-nobility was considered proof of purity of blood, strongly suggesting that segregation was far more commonly practiced at the lower levels of society. Thus, when it became known that many noble families had some Jewish ancestry, “only membership of non-noble classes provided any guarantee against Jewish descent” (Kamen 1985, 23; see also Longhurst 1964, 46; Roth 1937, 29). When Archbishop Siliceo, who was of humble origin, argued for the establishment of 清洁的 statutes, “he was obviously claiming for his own class a racial purity which the tainted nobility could not boast” (Kamen 1965, 124). Intermarriage of some New Christians into the nobility did not therefore prevent the existence of an endogamous core of Conversos at the lower levels of society.

Further indication of continued endogamy at the lower levels of society is the existence of charitable societies founded to provide dowries for poor Sephardi women in the early 17th century (Israel 1985, 203; see also Baron 1952, XIII, 100, 124–125, 149–150). These societies made no distinction between those who had lived in Spain or Portugal, where Judaism was forbidden, and those who came from areas where Judaism could be practiced openly. These women had gone abroad to “places of Judaism” in order to contract a Jewish marriage. Shortly after the Expulsion of 1492, Rabbi Simon ben Solomon Duran wrote that “there is an established presumption that 没有 的 阿努西姆 [i.e., converts] marry Gentile women, and this is known to be their practice generation after generation. . . . [E]very 肛门 who comes to repent, just as we presume that his father was a Jew so we presume about his mother that she is not a Gentile . . . and even though some of them have been intermingled with Gentiles and take wives of their daughters, only a 很少 do so” (in Roth 1995, 70; italics in text).

Because of the genetic taint of the nobility, being able to prove one came from peasant stock (“de todas partes de linaje de labradores”) was a social asset, while intelligence and education were liabilities (Silverman 1976, 148). The ingroup created by the purity of blood criterion facilitated the upward mobility of the Old Christians by allowing them to obtain a competitive edge against the ingroup ties of economic cooperation and patronage among the Conversos:

Rich laborers often found themselves displaced by the commercially competitive and financially astute New Christians, who were equally wealthy and supported by strong family and clan ties. Wealth alone, therefore, could not be the deciding factor. Lineage . . . was revived along with concurrent legal and religious stipulations, all notoriously segregationist, and soon became the means of dividing New Christians from rich peasants of Old Christian lineage. (Contraras 1992, 96)

The triumph of the Inquisition was thus fundamentally a triumph of the lower orders of Spanish society, and indeed it was the populo menudo that was mainly responsible for the anti-New Christian disturbances in the period leading up to the Inquisition (Netanyahu 1995, 808; Rodríguez-Puértolas 1976, 127).

Finally, there also appears to have been a loosely defined group descended predominantly from New Christians but with some Old Christian ancestry. Boyajian (1983; see also Benardete 1953; 创伤后应激障碍, Ch. 6) describes an elite, highly visible group of wealthy merchants and financiers who practiced endogamy and consanguinity, including first-cousin marriage, which was outlawed by the Church. Some of these families included Old Christian ancestors (e.g., the financier Jorge de Paz, descended from mixed New and Old Christians on both maternal and paternal sides), while others descended from New Christians on both sides. Boyajian considers de Paz “the most Catholic” (p. 119) of the New Christian financiers, but he also notes that his brother was tried for Judaizing by the Spanish Inquisition and that his niece’s family lived in a Jewish community abroad. There is some indication that the Inquisition itself motivated this type of genetic assimilation and was instrumental in achieving some level of racial admixture between the New and Old Christians: in 1548 Cardinal Siliceo complained that intermarriage was motivated by the desire to avoid the Inquisition (Netanyahu 1995, 1070).

It is possible that this elite group of highly endogamous New Christians had self-consciously become a unique gene pool consisting predominantly of genes of Jewish descent but with enough admixture from the Iberian Old Christian nobility to render them less suspect in the eyes of the Inquisition. Consistent with this proposal, Benardete (1953) distinguishes a group of New Christians having a somewhat different physical appearance and “hidalgoism” from the other Sephardim who emigrated rather than accept conversion, although they nevertheless viewed themselves as coreligionists with these other Sephardim.

The proposals of the New Christian Duarte Gomez (1622) for ending the racial conflict between the New and Old Christians are also consistent with this hypothesis. Citing the decline of Iberian society, Gomez wrote that “it was necessary to seek solutions through which all Spaniards might become brothers” (in Castro 1954, 586; italics in text). These proposals included a ban on further honors for New Christians, because of the resentment they caused, and freedom to intermarry with nobility who had some New Christian ancestry. However, he recommended that “true hidalgos” (i.e., thosewithout Jewish blood) not be allowed to intermarry with the New Christians. Children of the New Christians would then be eligible for all offices and occupations.

It should be noted that Gomez’s proposal clearly falls far short of complete genetic assimilation and would be quite consistent with continued resource competition between three groups: racially pure Old Christians, racially pure New Christians, and a group with mixed, predominantly Old Christian, ancestry into which the New Christians would be able to marry their daughters by providing dowries.

结果 清洁的 laws may well have been lower fitness for genes of Jewish descent. A writer in 1629 noted that women entered nunneries and men remained celibate rather than pass on their taint (Roth 1974). Lope de Vega, in a play written prior to 1604, has a character say he would give all his inheritance and “a thousand loads of Doroteas [i.e., pretty, young girls]” in exchange for pure blood (Castro 1971, 352). Converts often changed their names to avoid the implication of Jewish ancestry (Castro 1954, 565). Wealthy individuals with a small amount of Jewish ancestry “could expunge dubious ancestry and create ancient and time-honored lineages. . . . [Y]et one error, one small, barely perceptible but intentional indiscretion was sufficient to destroy the entire achievement. When this occurred, the affected individual suffered immediate exclusion” (Contraras 1991, 130). Similarly in Portugal, Jewish ancestry was a liability on the marriage market (Roth 1974).[111] 清洁的 laws therefore created external pressure reinforcing New Christian endogamy. As Yerushalmi (1971, 41) notes, however, this cannot be the entire explanation for New Christian endogamy. (See the discussion in the Appendix to Chapter 7.) Nevertheless, wealthy individuals with tainted ancestry, including individuals who were clearly crypto-Jews, were able to obtain honors and generally avoid the opprobrium resulting from their genetic ancestry (Baroja 1966, 105–106; Contraras 1992, 98). Baroja (1966, 131n.29) provides the example of Manuel Cortizos and his family. Despite the fact that his family was genetically entirely Jewish, he, his sons, his sons-in-law, and his brothers received titles and became Knights of Calatrava while his wife and aunt were being prosecuted by the Inquisition. Another family member died in London as an openly practising Jew.

Nevertheless, although the 清洁的 laws may have dampened the population growth of the New Christians, they did not prevent a high rate of population growth. Baron (1973, 186, 241) refers to widespread concern about the reproductive success of the New Christians throughout the period of the Inquisition at least into the early 17th century. Andrés Bernáldez, a defender of the Inquisition and self-conscious spokesman for the viewpoint of the masses, noted that the Conversos “had one aim: to increase and multiply” (in Beinart 1981, 21–22; see also Longhurst 1964). The bull of Pope Sixtus IV of 1478 establishing the authority for the Inquisition noted that the number of crypto-Jews “increase not a little” (in Walsh 1940, 149). Even in 1629—nearly 150 years after the beginning of the Inquisition—the descendants of Jews were described by a conference of theologians as proliferating like “the sands of the sea” (Baron 1973, 186, 241).

“Let us not forget whence we spring. No more talk of ‘German,’ or of ‘Portuguese’ Jews. Though scattered over the earth we are nevertheless a single people”—Rabbi Salomon Lipmann-Cerfberr in the opening speech delivered on July 26, 1806, at the meeting preparatory to the Sanhedrin of 1807, convened by Napoleon. (Epigraph from Houston Stewart Chamberlain’s [1899, I, 329] 十九世纪的基础 at the beginning of the chapter entitled “The Entrance of the Jews into the History of the West”)

While popular German anti-Semitism appears to have been largely autonomous and based on real conflicts of interest rather than the result of the manipulation by an exploitative or demagogic elite (Hagen 1996; Harris 1994, 225–227; Pulzer 1988, xviii, 321),[113]Harris (1994, 227) notes that propagandists like Stoecker “made the anti-Semitism of the common man intelligible to the educated, not vice versa. Their anti-Semitic activities show the gradual acceptance of anti-Semitism by polite society rather than the injection of those ideas into mass culture by either fanatic zealots or Machiavellian politicians.” Indeed, it was the educated elites who were most supportive of Jewish emancipation (p. 230)—a finding that is highly compatible with the general tendency throughout Jewish history for Jewish alliances with gentile elites in the context of popular anti-Semitism (see Chapter 2 and 创伤后应激障碍, Ch. 5). Nevertheless, Field (1981, 227) notes that aristocrats “hard pressed by declining land revenues and higher property taxes, resentful of the purchase of Berlin’s sumptuous palaces by Jews, and eager to share the Kaiser’s new fads” familiarized themselves with the writings of Houston Stewart Chamberlain. the intense anti-Semitism characteristic of the NSDAP (National Socialist German Workers’ Party) leadership was not shared by the majority of the population (see Field 1981, 457; Friedländer 1997, 4).[114]Harris (1994, 227) notes the high degree of personal popularity of Hitler and the substantial support for the NSDAP and its highly salient anti-Semitism in the elections of 1932. He makes the interesting point that the National Socialists were the only party to draw substantial support from all social classes—suggesting that National Socialism transcended class divisions and was perceived as the political embodiment of the ideal of hierarchical harmony long held as an ideal in the 沃尔基舍 intellectual tradition. If indeed German anti-Semitism was to a considerable extent a “top-down” phenomenon in which the NSDAP and government played an indispensable leadership role, it becomes crucial to probe the beliefs of these National Socialist leaders, and in particular of Hitler himself, for whom anti-Semitism was at the very center of his world view (Dawidowicz 1975; Friedländer 1997, 102; Gordon 1984, 312; Johnson 1988, 489). The point here will be that Hitler viewed both Judaism and National Socialism as group evolutionary strategies.

However, the perception of group conflict between Jews and gentiles as a central feature of German society long predates Hitler. The literature on 19th-century German anti-Semitism indicates a perception among gentiles that Jews and gentiles were engaged in group conflict. There are also detailed proposals for gentile group strategies in opposition to Judaism. German anti-Semitism in the course of the 19th century shifted from demands for Jewish assimilation by intellectuals such as Kant and the young Hegelians in the early part of the century, to an increasing emphasis on the ethnic divide separating Germans and Jews (Wistrich 1990, 35ff). Throughout this period the consistent belief of German liberals combating anti-Semitism was that Judaism would eventually disappear as a result of assimilation and that emancipation would “hasten the trip to the baptismal font” and result in national unity (Schorsch 1972, 99).

The predominant attitude among German intellectuals at the beginning of the century was that granting Jews civil rights was contingent on complete Jewish assimilation. Jews would cooperate in becoming completely assimilated in exchange for their political and economic emancipation. In the minds of their early 19th-century critics, Jews constituted a nation—an atypical nation to be sure, since it was not confined to a particular territory and its criterion of citizenship was birth by a Jewish mother. But it was a nation nonetheless, and such a conceptualization was entirely congruent with Jewish self-conceptions at least since the Middle Ages and widespread among Zionists later in the century (Katz 1979, 48). Jews would have to give up this condition in order to be Germans.

In the event, however, many Germans believed that Jews had not lived up to their end of the bargain, and eventually it became common among anti-Semites to believe that Jews were “by nature incapable of honoring the contract, of becoming good Germans” (Levy 1975, 22). For example, the anti-Semite Paul Förster stated that “emancipation in the true sense of the word means full assimilation into the foreign body politic. Have the Jews really done this? Have they changed from Jews into Germans?” (in Levy 1975, 22).

On the other hand, for Jews the main concern was the continued existence of Jewish identity (Schorsch 1972, 100). Concerns about the continuation of Jewish identity became more common later in the century. As Katz (1985) notes, the 19th century began with the official blessing of the Jewish assimilationists at the Parisian Sanhedrin convened by Napoleon in 1807 and ended with the first Zionist Congress in Zurich in 1897.

Assimilation did not occur at any level of the Jewish community, including the movement of Reform Judaism, and it was never intended by any significant segment of the Jewish community (创伤后应激障碍，Ch。 4）。

The predicament of emancipated Jewry, and ultimately the cause of its tragic end, was rooted not in one or another ideology but in the fact that Jewish Emancipation had been tacitly tied to an illusory expectation—the disappearance of the Jewish community of its own volition. When this failed to happen, and the Jews, despite Emancipation and acculturation, continued to be conspicuously evident, a certain uneasiness, not to say a sense of outright scandal, was experienced by Gentiles. . . . If gaining civil rights meant an enormous improvement in Jewish prospects, at the same time it carried with it a precariously ill-defined status which was bound to elicit antagonism from the Gentile world. (Katz 1983, 43)

除了来自东欧的非常明显的东正教移民群体之外，改革派犹太人普遍反对异族通婚，而世俗犹太人则建立了一系列广泛的制度，有效地切断了他们与外邦人的交往。 “世俗犹太人所依恋的东西很难界定，但对于参与其中的犹太人来说，也不容易放弃：有家庭纽带、经济利益，也许最重要的是情感和思维习惯，这些都是无法被忽视的。”测量且无法根除”（Katz 1996, 33）。 此外，相当数量的德国犹太人，特别是在农村地区和某些地理区域（尤其是巴伐利亚），直到 20 世纪仍然信仰东正教（Lowenstein 1992, 18）。 传统分离主义做法的痕迹，例如意第绪语，在整个时期持续存在。

19 世纪，犹太人和德国人之间的通婚可以忽略不计。 尽管通婚后来有所增加，但这些人和他们的孩子“几乎总是”消失在犹太社区中（Katz 1985, 86；另见 Levenson 1989, 321n）。 “反对异族通婚确实构成了犹太人同化的底线”（G. Mosse 1985, 9）。 在国家社会主义兴起之前的整个时期，这些同族通婚和群体内联合的模式构成了德国社会中犹太群体分离主义持续存在的最明显迹象。 Levenson (1989, 321)指出，这一时期犹太人对同族通婚的辩护“总是在敌对的非犹太人看来是厌世和忘恩负义的”，这再次表明犹太同族通婚是这一时期反犹太主义的重要组成部分。[115]The data provided by Lowenstein (1992, 24) indicate that in 1901–1905 in Germany 8.8 percent of Jewish men and 7.6 percent of Jewish women intermarried. These percentages increased in the following years so that by 1926–1930, 25.6 percent of Jewish men and 16.6 percent of Jewish women had intermarried. These figures include Jews who married other secular and converted Jews and who remained part of the Jewish community and hence are useless for conceptualizing the extent to which Judaism had continued as a genetically closed group evolutionary strategy. Moreover, defections from Judaism, as measured by conversions to Christianity, remained low. Lowenstein (1992, 24) finds that conversions averaged 168 per year in the period from 1800 to 1924 and 256 per year in the period from 1880 to 1899. These figures are also overestimates of true defection, however, since many of these conversions were conversions of convenience by individuals who continued to identify as Jews and continued their associations with the Jewish community (see also Chapter 6). Patai and Patai (1989) note that intermarried couples in Germany during this period, at least in the earlier surveys, tended to have fewer children and not to raise them as Jews with the result that only 4.05 percent of the children born to Jewish mothers were children of intermarried couples who raised their children as Jews or were children born out of wedlock to Jewish women with Christian fathers.

此外，犹太皈依者通常会与其他犹太皈依者结婚，并继续与犹太人一起生活和交往（Levenson 1989, 321n），实际上表现为加密犹太人。 家谱比表面宗教的重要性也可以看出，虽然受洗的犹太人 高级资产阶级 被犹太人视为可接受的婚姻伴侣 高级资产阶级, 外邦人 高级资产阶级 were not (Mosse 1989, 335). These patterns may well have fed into the perception among Germans that even overt signs of assimilation were little more than window dressing masking a strong sense of Jewish ethnic identity and a desire for endogamy. Indeed, the general pattern was that complete loss of Jewishness was confined to females from a “handful” of families who had married into the gentile aristocracy (Mosse 1989, 181).

Although there were ups and downs in the intensity of anti-Semitism, the general trend over the course of the 19th and early 20th centuries was that calls for assimilation were increasingly replaced by calls for cohesive, collectivist gentile groups that would enable Germans to compete with Jews and even exclude them entirely from German economic and social life. Reflecting social identity processes, anti-Semitic beliefs became increasingly important as a means of self-identification among Germans:

Professing anti-Semitism became a sign of cultural identity, of one’s belonging to a specific cultural camp. It was a way of communicating an acceptance of a particular set of ideas, and a preference for specific social, political, and moral norms. Contemporaries living and acting in Imperial Germany learned to decode the message. It became part of their language, a familiar and convenient symbol. (Volkov 1978, 34–35)

Anti-Semitic rhetoric increasingly emphasized the desirability of a unified German political entity that was above political and religious differences and which would exclude Jews. This is essentially a prescription for a specifically German group strategy in opposition to Judaism, that is, the development of “a united front against the alleged domination of an ‘alien race’ ” (Wistrich 1990, 38). As Dawidowicz (1975, 47) notes (derisively), “The Germans were in search of a mysterious wholeness that would restore them to primeval happiness.” Commenting on attitudes in the period 1900–1914, Field (1981, 313) describes pervasive complaints of a lack of “shared ideals” and dissatisfaction with an intellectual life that was “chaotic, spinning off in all directions at once and lacking a common ideological focus.” Even German liberals who actively opposed anti-Semitism desired a society centered around the Christian religion: “Though they repudiated the Conservative’s notion of the Christian state and fought for a separation of church and state, they had every intention of strengthening the exclusively Christian character of Germany” (Schorsch 1972, 100).

The influential anti-Semitic historian and political activist Heinrich von Treitschke viewed Germany’s self-conception as a Christian civilization as a critical component of his overarching goal of producing a politically and culturally unified Germany. Treitschke stated that although many Germans had ceased being active Christians, “the time will come, and is perhaps not so far off, when necessity will teach us once more to pray. . . . The German Jewish Question will not come to rest . . . before our Hebrew fellow-citizens have become convinced, by our attitude, that we are a Christian people and want to remain one” (in Pulzer 1988, 242). Unity was perceived as necessary for a militarily strong Germany able to compete as a world power with other Western powers—clearly a conception that Germany must develop a cohesive group strategy vis-à-vis other societies. Treitschke therefore strongly opposed what he perceived as “alien” Jewish cultural influence on German life, because of Jewish tendencies to mock and belittle German nationalistic aspirations.

Christianity as a unifying force was also central to another important late- 19th-century anti-Semitic leader, Adolf Stoecker:

I found Berlin in the hands of Progressives—who were hostile to the Church—and the Social Democrats—who were hostile to God; Judaism ruled in both parties. The Reich’s capital city was in danger of being de-Christianized and de-Germanized. Christianity was dead as a public force; with it went loyalty to the King and love of the Fatherland. It seemed as if the great war had been fought so that Judaism could rule in Berlin. . . . It was like the end of the world. Unrighteousness had won the upper hand, love had turned cold. (In Telman 1995, 97)

National unification was a component of the “沃尔基舍” intellectual tradition. Rather than accepting the pan-national, universalist ideology that characterized the Christian Middle Ages, the 沃尔基舍 ideal of social cohesion was often combined with nationalistic versions of a peculiarly Germanic form of Christianity, as in the writings of Treitschke, Paul de LaGarde, and Houston Stewart Chamberlain. Thus for Chamberlain, “Christianity was an indispensable cohesive force in a class-torn nation; religious rebirth alone . . . could renew the spiritual basis of society, reaffirming the principles of monarchy, social hierarchy, loyalty, discipline, and race. . . . [R]eligion, not politics, was the basis of a new Germany” (Field 1981, 302).

This tradition idealized the Middle Ages as a period of 民族共同体, a sense of social cohesion, organic unity, cooperation, and hierarchical harmony among all social classes. This tradition can be traced to Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803; see Herder 1774, 189ff), and it attracted the majority of German intellectuals during the period spanning the 19th century to the rise of National Socialism (Mosse 1970, 8). This tradition is exemplified by Richard Wagner’s comment that “the particular atmosphere which my 罗恩格林 should produce is that here we see before us an ancient 德语 kingdom in its finest, most ideal aspect. . . . Here there is no despotic pomp with its bodyguards pushing back the people to make way for the high nobility. Simple boys make up the escort for the young woman, and to them everyone yields gladly and quite voluntarily” (in Rose 1992, 28; italics in text).

而 沃尔基舍 ideology could easily be fused with racialist or exclusionary thinking regarding minority groups within the society, there was only gradual development in this direction, and it was not until the end of the 19th century that such linkages became common among anti-Semites. The gradual shift in 沃尔基舍 ideology from an ideology of assimilation of the entire society into a cohesive group to an ideology of racism and exclusion thus paralleled the general shift from assimilationism toward separatism as a solution to the Jewish question. However, even during the Weimar period some 沃尔基舍 thinkers—by then a distinct minority—advocated the complete assimilation of Jews within German society.

This ideal of “hierarchic harmony” and group cohesion apparent among these intellectuals therefore did not originate as an aspect of group conflict between Germans and Jews but predated the escalation of this conflict in the late 19th century.[116]The phrase “hierarchic harmony” comes from Américo Castro’s (1954, 497) description of the social structure of the Western Middle Ages. Not coincidentally, many 沃尔基舍 thinkers idealized the Middle Ages. In 批判文化 I suggest that the ideals of hierarchic harmony and muted individualism are primitive features of prototypical Western social organization.[117]沃尔基舍 ideology was compatible with a strong but muted role for individualism. The anti-Semite Paul de LaGarde emphasized that individuals should be able to maximize their unique potentials within the cohesive group (Stern 1961, 28). On the other hand, he was greatly concerned that the working classes had become alienated from German society because of the individualistic behavior of capitalists. This Western ideal of hierarchic harmony can be and often has been a powerful force favoring assimilation, and intellectuals advocating hierarchic harmony could also be advocates of Jewish assimilation. For example, Treitschke proposed that Jews become completely assimilated to Germany and that Germany itself be organized as a harmonious hierarchy led by an aristocratic elite (Dorpalen 1967, 242–243). Nevertheless, 沃尔基施 ideology can easily be transformed into an ideology of intergroup conflict in the event that parts of the society remain unassimilable.

It is noteworthy that German anti-Semitism in no way depended at any time on racial theory (Katz 1983, 41–42). For example, the National Socialists regarded Paul de LaGarde as an important forerunner despite the complete absence of race in his theorizing. Moreover, the National Socialists’ opposition to Jews went well beyond their denigration of other races and their attempts to dominate other racial groups. They focused on the same alleged Jewish traits (“moral insensitivity, acquisitiveness, xenophobia, and the like”) that had been characteristic of anti-Semitic attitudes since the beginnings of the diaspora, the only difference being that the traits were now attributed to racial differences. “It could therefore be argued that the notion of race, far from being the source of anti-Semitism, only acquired its force as a political weapon through contact with an already existing anti-Semitic tradition” (Katz 1983, 42–43).

In the event, Jews remained as an unassimilated outgroup, and certain real differences between Jews and gentiles developed into a variety of negative stereotypes expected on the basis of social identity theory. Indeed, anti-Semitism based on these issues was a broad regional phenomenon, occurring throughout much of Eastern Europe, Austria, and France (Friedländer 1997; Hagen 1996). Jews not only continued as an ethnically unassimilated group but were, “in their majority, not carried away by the ‘hurrah patriotism’ of the exuberant nationalists. They inclined, their devotion to Germany notwithstanding, to humanism, reasonableness, moderation, and a measure of internationalism, influenced also by the fact of Jewish dispersion across national frontiers” (Mosse 1989, 43–44). Jews were thus less enthusiastic about creating a highly cohesive, unitary German society than were gentile Germans, and this general tendency among Jews would, in the minds of gentiles, be exacerbated by such salient examples as Jewish-owned publishing companies that were opposed to German nationalism. The disproportionate, high-profile involvement of Jews in leftist, anti-nationalist revolutionary movements in Germany, Hungary, the Soviet Union, and Poland (e.g., Friedländer 1997, 91–93) would also feed into these stereotypes. The presence of an increasingly prominent movement of Jewish nationalism (i.e., Zionism) would have similar effects, as would the presence of a significant number of foreign-looking Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe. On the basis of social identity theory, given the salience of Jewish-gentile group membership during this period these real group differences would become exaggerated. Gentile Germans would come to define their ingroup as patriotic and loyal, while Jews would be stereotyped as the opposite.

Also tending to exacerbate these social identity processes was the heightened level of resource competition between Germans and Jews as Jewish upward mobility, especially in the period after 1870, resulted in very large Jewish overrepresentation in all of the markers of economic and professional success as well as in the production of culture, the latter viewed as a highly deleterious influence (see Chapter 2; 创伤后应激障碍,Ch. 5). Indeed, an important component of anti-Semitism in the late 19th century appears to have been the desire of many Germans to participate in a cohesive group in order to compete with Jews economically and socially (Massing 1949, 79). Interestingly, the powerful cohesion of the Jews was viewed as their “most sinister” attribute (Massing 1949, 79; see also Pulzer 1979, 78), a comment that suggests that anti-Semitism was partly a reaction to the perception that the Jews constituted a highly cohesive group—“a political, social and business alliance for the purpose of exploiting and subjugating the non-Jewish peoples” (from a 19th-century anti-Semitic publication; in Massing [1949, 79]).

Many anti-Semitic leaders envisaged uniting the German people in an effective group strategy against the Jews. For example, the Catholic newspaper 日耳曼尼亚 combined advocacy of economic cooperation among gentiles and gentile credit institutions with admonitions against buying or borrowing from Jews. Theodor Fritsch’s “Ten German Commandments of Lawful Self-Defense” (reprinted in Massing 1949, 306) combined exhortations to ethnic pride and within-group cooperation with a program of economic and social boycott of Jews: “Be proud of being a German and strive earnestly and steadily to practice the inherited virtues of our people, courage, faithfulness and veracity.” “Thou shalt be helpful to thy fellow German and further him in all matters not counter to the German conscience, the more so if he be pressed by the Jew” (in Massing 1949, 306–307).[118]The tract also contains the following exhortations: “Thou shalt have no social intercourse with the Jew”; “Thou shalt have no business relations with the Jew”; “Thou shalt not entrust thy rights to a Jewish lawyer, nor thy body to a Jewish physician, nor thy children to a Jewish teacher. . . .”; “Keep away all Jewish writings from the German home and hearth lest their lingering poison may unnerve and corrupt thyself and thy family” (in Massing 1949, 306–307).

Massing provides several other examples of anti-Semitic programs calling for German group solidarity combined with exclusion of Jews from public life, cessation of all contact with Jews, and boycotts of Jewish economic enterprises. Wilhelm Marr conceptualized Jews as “not a small, weak group, they are a world power! They are much stronger than the Germans” (in Massing 1949, 8). Marr viewed Jews as having superior powers and as engaging in a war on Germans and their culture in which each person must choose sides between clearly demarcated groups. Similarly, the anti-Semite Otto Glegau advocated organization of politically powerless gentile groups of artisans, small entrepreneurs, and merchants “whose livelihood and status were in jeopardy” (p. 10) and who were most affected by Jewish competition. After citing statistics on the percentages of Jews among employers and among students in institutions of higher education, Adolf Stoecker stated that “Should Israel grow further in this direction, it will completely overcome us. One should not doubt it; on this ground, race stands against race and carries on—not in the sense of hatred but in the sense of competition—a racial struggle” (in Telman 1995, 107). The view that the Jews were a stronger group than the Germans was common among anti-Semites of the period (see Zimmerman 1986, 100).

The perception that Jews themselves were greatly concerned with racial purity was recognized as early as the 1840s by Jews attempting to combat anti-Semitism (Schorsch 1972, 8). The racial anti-Semites of the post-1880 period were greatly concerned with racial purity. Fritsch’s third commandment was “Thou must keep thy blood pure. Consider it a crime to soil the noble Aryan breed of thy people by mingling it with the Jewish breed. For thou must know that Jewish blood is everlasting, putting the Jewish stamp on body and soul unto the farthest generations.” Similarly, Wilhelm Marr’s 犹太明镜 (published in 1862) conceptualized Judaism as a racially pure group. Marr emphasized the racial gulf between Germans and Jews and advocated intermarriage as a way of assimilating Germans and Jews (Zimmerman 1986, 47).[119]Marr later repudiated the idea of genetic assimilation via intermarriage in his 1879 book 犹太教战胜日耳曼主义.

This concern with group competition and racial purity is also evident among racialist thinkers who based their ideas on evolutionary thinking. There is evidence for the development in Germany during this period of a conceptualization of human evolution as fundamentally involving group rather than individual competition. Some of the most strident anti-Semites in the twenty years prior to World War I were ultra-nationalist groups “preaching a racially-based integral nationalism and a Social Darwinist view of the world” (Pulzer 1988, xx; Gordon 1984, 25–26). From the present perspective, the important point is the idea that the races were in competition with each other and that they should remain separate in order to maintain racial purity.

Houston Stewart Chamberlain is of particular interest in this regard, both because he was a prime influence on Hitler[120]See Krausnick (1968, 10); Field (1981, 447). Beginning in 1923, Chamberlain’s and Hitler’s circles increasingly intersected. Chamberlain met Hitler on more than one occasion, and there was a mutual admiration between the two, including highly laudatory letters from Chamberlain to Hitler which Hitler greatly appreciated (Field 1981, 436–438). By the end of Chamberlain’s life, Hitler seems to have developed a great deal of affection for him, and he personally attended his funeral. Another high-ranking National Socialist closely associated with Chamberlain was Alfred Rosenberg. Rosenberg was ecstatic about Chamberlain’s Foundations when he first read it in 1909 as a seventeen-year-old, and he became a fervent disciple (Cecil 1972, 12–14; Field 1981, 232). Other National Socialists who had read Chamberlain and claimed to be influenced by him include Hess, Geobbels, Eckart, Himmler, and von Shirach (Field 1981, 452). Geobbels met Chamberlain and declared that Chamberlain was “the pathbreaker,” “the preparer of our way,” “the father of our spirit” (in Reuth 1993, 53). and because of his interpretation of Judaism as a group evolutionary strategy. Indeed, Chamberlain, and especially his 十九世纪的基础 (1899), was highly influential among German educated classes generally (Field 1981, 225ff). Chamberlain notes that this “alien people has become precisely in the course of the nineteenth century disproportionately important and in many spheres actually dominant constituent of our life” (Chamberlain 1899, I, 330). Clearly Chamberlain believed that Jews and gentiles were in competition in Germany.

Chamberlain exhibits a strong concern with the importance of racial purity, but it is important to note that his exemplar of racial purity is the Jews, and especially the Sephardic Jews. Chamberlain regarded the Jews as having preserved their racial purity over the millennia—a point of view that had been expressed originally by Benjamin Disraeli (see below) and later by the French Count Arthur de Gobineau. His reaction to observing Sephardic Jews is nothing less than ecstatic: “This is nobility in the fullest sense of the word, genuine nobility of race. Beautiful figures, noble heads, dignity in speech and bearing” (I, 273). “The Jews deserve admiration, for they have acted with absolute consistency according to the logic and truth of their own individuality, and never for a moment have they allowed themselves to forget the sacredness of physical laws because of foolish humanitarian day-dreams which they shared only when such a policy was to their advantage” (I, 331).

Chamberlain was thus one of many anti-Semites for whom “the perception that Jews maintained their cohesiveness and sense of identity under all conceivable circumstances was a source of both fear and envy. Indeed, for many antisemites this racial perseverance and historical continuity provided a kind of mirror-image model worthy of emulation” (Aschheim 1985, 239). The attitudes of the anti-Semites on racial purity are therefore mirror-images of previously occurring Jewish practices. Evidence in this chapter(see also Chapter 4 and 创伤后应激障碍,Chs. 2–4) indicates that there is far more than a grain of truth to the idea that the Jews have been concerned to prevent significant influx of gentile genes into the Jewish gene pool.

However, Chamberlain goes beyond this to assert that Jews have gone to great lengths to maintain their own racial purity and at the same time have consciously attempted to enter the gentile gene pool. In support of his argument, Chamberlain states (I, 332–333) that in 1807 the Jewish leaders accepted all of Napoleon’s articles aimed at ending Jewish separatism with the exception of complete freedom of intermarriage with Christians; while accepting marriage of daughters with Christians, they rejected the marriage of sons with Christians (a claim I have not been able to verify). He also asserts that the Rothschilds married daughters to the nobility of Europe but had never married a son into it; also, in an earlier section (I, 274) he states that the Sephardic Jews excluded the bastard offspring of Jewish females from the community.

The possibility that an aspect of Judaism as an evolutionary strategy has been to enter the gentile gene pool without admitting gentile genes to their own group is an important empirical proposition, especially given the role of consanguinity and endogamy in facilitating group solidarity and altruism among Jews (see 创伤后应激障碍, Chs. 6, 8). It may well have been the case in traditional societies that intermarriage was mainly accomplished by wealthy Jews providing dowries for their daughters to marry gentiles in the nobility rather than by bringing a gentile woman into the family as the future mother of Jewish children and heirs to the estate. I have noted some evidence for this proposition in the material on Spain and Portugal beginning in the medieval period and extending through at least the 15th century, as well as some indication that this was also a concern in the late Roman Empire (see Chs. 3–4).

It was indeed common for German aristocratic families to restore their fortunes by accepting wealthy Jewish daughters-in-law in the late 19th century (Massing 1949, 106–107). (One publication listed more than a thousand families where Jewish women had been married into the gentile aristocracy [Pulzer 1964, 281]). As Chamberlain asserted, the marriage policy of the Rothschilds was that “boys must choose other Rothschilds, or at least other Jews, for their brides; the girls were sometimes allowed Christian aristocrats” (Morton 1961, 98).[121]See also Derek Wilson (1988, 286). It is interesting that the marriage of the only child of Salomon and Adele Rothschild (of the French branch of the family) to a Christian resulted in a complete excision of the daughter from her mother’s life, without any inheritance. This is compatible with supposing that only-daughters were in a different category than daughters with brothers, quite possibly because the marriage of the only-daughter outside the group would, in practical effect if not according to Jewish law, place all of the family’s descendants outside the Jewish community. The consequences of a male attempting to marry outside the group were severe: When a male in the Austrian branch of the family fell passionately in love with the daughter of an American boardinghouse keeper, his father was inflexible in his opposition, and the son, in despair, committed suicide in 1909 (Derek Wilson 1988, 276). Moreover, many of the descendants of the 18th-century German court Jews converted to Christianity but continued to marry among themselves, although daughters were commonly married into the gentile nobility (W. E. Mosse 1987, 37). Such behavior by a nominally converted group of Jews (who are in effect crypto-Jews from the standpoint of the evolutionary strategy) is exactly analogous to the marriage practices of wealthy New Christians discussed in Chapter 4.

Traditional Jewish law traces descent through the mother, not the father. Thus the offspring of a Jewish male and a gentile female would not be considered Jews and would be lost to the Jewish gene pool. However, the offspring of a Jewish female married into the gentile nobility might be technically eligible to be Jews, but if their children then married into the gentile gene pool, as would normally be the case, they too would be lost to the Jewish gene pool. “Jewish women . . . who married Gentiles would join Gentile lines and, Talmudic law notwithstanding, would normally produce ‘Gentile’ offspring. A Jewish woman ‘marrying out’ would almost invariably abandon her formal Jewish identity” (Mosse 1989, 334).[122]Moreover, it is worth noting that there was considerable doubt expressed in the Palestinian Talmud (Y. Qidd. 3.12) about the status of the offspring of an Israelite female married to a gentile, with some authorities pronouncing the offspring 马泽斯 (bastards) following the (non-Israelite) status of the father. It is therefore highly doubtful that such individuals would have been welcomed in the Jewish community even had they attempted to remain.

This functional interpretation of tracing Jewish descent through the mother can also be seen in Jewish religious writings. Epstein (1942, 166) notes that Ezra’s racialist motivation can be seen by his exclusive concern with Israelite men marrying foreign women because the children of unions with Israelite men would be brought up in the Israelite community while those of an Israelite female marrying a foreigner would be lost to the community. Moreover, as indicated by 迈蒙尼德法典 （见 创伤后应激障碍, Ch. 4), despite the concentration on investigating female relatives to assure family purity, the goal was to maintain the purity of the male line, and especially so in the case of priests. Females could marry men of invalid descent, but men could not. This emphasis on the purity of the male line combined with tracing Jewish descent through the mother would then function in practice as Chamberlain suggests: Jewish stem families could remain “racially pure,” while the gene pool of the gentile aristocracy would contain some Jewish admixture.

Although not mentioned by Chamberlain, consanguineous marriages among highly visible and immensely wealthy Jewish families may also, via social identity processes, have sharpened gentile perceptions of Jews as highly concerned with racial purity. There was a relatively high level of consanguineous marriage among Jews generally (see 创伤后应激障碍, Ch. 4, 6, 8), and the highly visible Rothschild family practiced consanguineous marriage even more intensively than Jewish families generally during the period, including a highly visible example of uncle-niece marriage and a great many first cousin marriages: “No other family was to practise it [consanguinity] to the same extent as the Rothschilds” (Derek Wilson 1988, 81). Consanguineous marriages continued to be a prominent trend among the Jewish 高级资产阶级 throughout the 19th century and into the 20th (Mosse 1989, 161ff).[123]Consanguinity often overlapped with economic interests among these families. Mosse (1989, 97) notes that a “distinctive form of economic co-operation involving close kinship links was that between members of allied families, the Ellingers, Mertons, and Hochschilds in the Frankfurt Metallgesellschaft, for example, the Oppenheims, Warschauers, and Mendelssohn-Bartholdys in the AG für Anilinfabrikation (Agfa) in Treptow, or the Ganses and Weinbergs in Leopold Cassella. In all, the cases of joint economic activity by close kin are so numerous that the family rather than the individual could almost be regarded as the typical Jewish entrepreneur.”

Chamberlain (as well as other racialist “Social Darwinist” thinkers—see Krausnick 1968) developed the view that competition between racial groups rather than between individuals was central to human evolution: “The struggle which means destruction of the weak race steels the strong; the same struggle, moreover, by eliminating the weaker elements, tends still further to strengthen the strong” (1899, I, 276). Chamberlain (1899, I, 277) also proposed that the Jews had engaged in artificial selection within their gene pool in order to produce a more competitive group, suggesting that Chamberlain recognized the importance of eugenic practices among Jews.

The emphasis on group competition in these writings is striking. Interestingly, Darwin (1874) himself believed that altruism and the social emotions, such as sympathy and conscientiousness, were restricted to one’s own group and were quite compatible with hostility directed toward outsiders, indicating that he had a keen sense of the importance of intergroup competition in human evolution. However, for Darwin this intergroup competition was not necessarily competition between ethnic groups, much less races. Instead, Darwin’s perspective appears to be much more compatible with the social identity perspective developed in Chapter 1, that hostility is directed at other groups, whatever their origin, and typically these other groups will be neighboring tribes and therefore of similar racial/ethnic composition.

The belief that competition between groups is an important aspect of human evolution has therefore a long history in evolutionary thought. In the hands of these German racial theorists, this thought was transformed in two fundamental ways. First, the competition was conceptualized as occurring between well-defined, genetically segregated racial/ethnic groups; second, the racial/ethnic purity of a group became a critical factor in the success of the group. Both of these points, particularly the latter, are foreign to mainstream Darwinism, and indeed seem to have originated with these thinkers.

One might speculate that these German thinkers emphasized these ideas because intrasocietal group-level resource competition between Jews and gentiles was so salient to them, and in addition because the Jews themselves were highly concerned about racial purity. In the British-American tradition, where this divisive intrasocietal form of ethnically based resource competition and concern with ethnic purity by sub-groups were far less salient, the dominant theoretical tradition ultimately rejected entirely the notion of group selection.[124]As discussed in several sections of 创伤后应激障碍, group selection has made a resurgence in evolutionary thinking, most notably as a result of the work of David S. Wilson (see Wilson & Sober 1994).

It is interesting in this regard that while in Germany eugenic ideas tended to be bound up with 沃尔基舍 nationalism and strong currents of anti-individualism (see Gasman 1971), eugenic beliefs in Britain were much less associated with racialist views, were more often held by social radicals with utopian visions,[125]Degler (1991, 46) notes that despite the opposition of socialist newspapers, four of five socialist representatives in the Wisconsin legislature voted for a eugenic law mandating sterilization of certain criminals, and Edward A. Ross, the prominent progressive sociologist from the University of Wisconsin, testified in favor of the law. Such laws were much more characteristic of the reformist North and West than the conservative South. and were more often motivated by individualistic concern that dysgenic practices would result in increasing burdens to society (Kevles 1985, 76, 85).[126]Neither Francis Galton nor Karl Pearson, the guiding lights of British eugenics, emphasized race as a variable in their publications on eugenics. During the 1880s Pearson became attracted to German ideas and became a strong advocate of the idea that eugenic practices should be a component of competition among groups rather than among individuals, but he conceptualized the group as the nation, not a race (Kevles 1985, 23). Earlier, Alfred Russel Wallace and W. R. Greg (but not Darwin) emphasized the need for eugenic practices to make the group more competitive, but again, the group was conceptualized as the nation (Farrall 1985, 17). Nevertheless, the beliefs that eugenics would improve the ability of the race and that Caucasians were a superior race were probably common among British eugenicists, including Galton and Pearson (Farrall 1985, 51). During the 1920s, Pearson opposed Jewish immigration on the grounds that Jewish girls were inferior and Jewish boys did not possess “markedly superior” intelligence compared to the native English (Pearson & Moul 1925, 126). This is a group-based argument, but it is certainly not the type of argument based on competition between well-defined racial groups that Chamberlain would have made. Pearson and Moul also wrote of Jews that “for men with no special ability—above all for such men as religion, social habits, or language keep as a caste apart, there should be no place. They will not be absorbed by, and at the same time strengthen the existing population; they will develop into a parasitic race, a position neither tending to the welfare of their host, nor wholesome for themselves” (pp. 124–125). The argument, then, is that if Jews did have markedly higher IQs, there would be no objection to immigration. Clearly Pearson is not casting his argument in a racialist manner. Similarly, while racial science in Germany was deeply concerned with developing ideas on differences between Germans and Jews as distinct races, British race scientists devoted only a “passing and exemplary discussions” to Jews, a phenomenon that “mirrored in some respects the unobtrusive character of Anglo-Jewry as a whole and the somewhat lackadaisical English attitude towards the country’s Jewish subjects” (Efron 1994, 45).

Jews did not represent a competitive threat in England during this period. Israel (1985, 242) notes that Jews played a remarkably small role in the economic development of England—amounting to little more than dominating the diamond and coral trades. They also represented only a minute percentage of the population, 0.01 percent in the nineteenth century (Sorkin 1987, 175). Throughout this period England remained an ethnically homogeneous society, without ethnically-based resource conflict. However, even in England there was anti-Semitism, directed both at the “cousinhood” of wealthy Jewish families and, later in the century, Orthodox immigrants from Eastern Europe (Bermant 1971).

Such a relativist perspective on the nature of scientific theory development is highly compatible with Gould’s (1992) perspective on extra-scientific influences on the development of evolutionary theory: He proposes that evolutionary theory is influenced by the beliefs and interests of its practitioners. This, of course, does not imply that these beliefs were not based on reality; in the present case there is in fact evidence that Jews were concerned about racial purity, and also for group-based resource competition between Jews and gentiles.

Chamberlain is viewed as a major influence on Hitler, and indeed it would appear that Hitler’s basic beliefs about Jews are almost exact replicas of Chamberlain’s. Hitler viewed himself as a unique combination of intellectual and politician—a politician with a 世界观 (Jäckel 1972, 13). Many historians have dismissed the view that Hitler had a consistent ideology, but I agree with Jäckel (1972), Gordon (1984), and others that in fact Hitler was extraordinarily consistent in his beliefs and in his behavior in pursuit of those beliefs. Anti-Semitism was “the center of both his personal and his political career” (Jäckel 1972, 53); “[T]he Jewish question [was] the central motivating force of his political mission” (p. 53). The centrality of Jewish issues for Hitler is apparent throughout his career up to the very end (see Maser 1974). The sections of 我的奋斗 relevant to anti-Semitism are entirely straightforward and are consistent with an evolutionary perspective in which group strategies are a central notion.

Hitler believed that races, including the Jews, are in a struggle for world domination, and he had a very great respect for the ability of Jews to carry on their struggle. In 我的奋斗 (1943)he writes that he sometimes asked himself “whether inscrutable Destiny . . . did not with eternal and immutable resolve, desire the final victory of this little nation” (p. 64); later he characterizes Jews as “the mightiest counterpart to the Aryan” (p. 300).

Hitler had a clear conceptualization of Jews as a strategizing ethnic group in competition with the Germans. Like Chamberlain, Hitler emphasized the ethnic nature of Judaism. In 我的奋斗 he describes his realization that the Jews were “not Germans of a special religion, but a people in themselves” (p. 56). He makes this point very forcefully at the beginning of his comments on Jews and presents it as the instigating factor in his own anti-Semitism. His negative response when first observing a Jew in Vienna reflects the theme of cultural separatism so central to the long history of anti-Semitic writing: “I suddenly encountered an apparition in a black caftan and black hair locks. Is this a Jew? . . . [B]ut the longer I stared at this foreign face, scrutinizing feature for feature, the more my first question assumed a new form: Is this a German?” (p. 56).

His attitude that Jews were an ethnic group and not a religion was confirmed by his discovery that “among them was a great movement . . . which came out sharply in confirmation of the national character of the Jews: this was the 犹太复国主义” (p. 56; italics in text). Hitler goes on to remark that although one might suppose that Zionism was characterized by only a subset of Jews and condemned by the great majority, “the so-called liberal Jews did not reject Zionists as non-Jews, but only as Jews with an impractical, perhaps even dangerous, way of publicly avowing their Jewishness. Intrinsically they remained unalterably of one piece” (p. 57).

These comments by Hitler indicate the reality of the worst fears of the German Reform movement during this period, that continued existence of Jewish cultural separatism characteristic of Orthodox Jews would result in anti-Semitism because Jews would be viewed as aliens (Aschheim 1982; Volkov 1985; Wertheimer 1987),[127]Despite their dislike of the 奥斯朱登 and their concerns that the 奥斯朱登 increased anti-Semitism, the German Jewish community provided aid to the immigrants and strongly opposed official discrimination against them, especially after 1890. Moreover, Volkov (1985, 211) notes that many Westjuden eventually developed positive attitudes toward their highly observant coreligionists from the East—an aspect of the increasing sense of Jewish identification among them. and that the publicly expressed ethnocentric nationalism of the Zionists would increase anti-Semitism because Jews would be perceived not as a religious group but as an ethnic/national entity. As Katz (1986, 149) points out, Zionism, international Jewish organizations such as the Alliance Israélite Universelle, and continued Jewish cultural separatism were important sources of German anti-Semitism beginning in the late 19th century.

Further, Hitler, like Chamberlain, believed that Jews were concerned about retaining their own racial purity while consciously attempting to “pollute” that of others.

While he seems to overflow with “enlightenment,” “progress,” “freedom,” “humanity,” etc., he himself practices the severest segregation of his race. To be sure, he sometimes palms off his women on influential Christians, but as a matter of principle he always keeps his male line pure. He poisons the blood of others, but preserves his own. The Jew almost never marries a Christian woman; it is the Christian who marries a Jewess. . . . Especially a part of the high nobility degenerates completely. The Jew . . . systematically carries on this mode of “disarming” the intellectual leader class of his racial adversaries. In order to mask his activity and lull his victims, however, he talks more and more of the equality of all men without regard to race and color. The fools begin to believe him. (pp. 315–316)

His ultimate goal is the denationalization, the promiscuous bastardization of other peoples, the lowering of the racial level of the highest peoples as well as the domination of this racial mishmash through the extirpation of the folkish intelligentsia and its replacement by members of its own people. (p. 84)

Hitler, like Chamberlain, emphasized group-level competition and the importance of racial purity in making the group more competitive. Hitler detailed his beliefs regarding the course of Jewish/gentile resource competition over historical time. Within this struggle, purity of blood was of prime importance. Hitler viewed the Germans as a unique, distinctive and superior ethnic group. There was an emphasis on Germanic prehistory and the inculcation of ethnic pride—themes that are clearly present in the 沃尔基舍 literature of 19th-century Germany—as well as the idea of the 沃尔克 as a mystical collective entity which bound its members into deep association with each other (see Mosse 1964, 1970). Comparisons between the noble, spiritual, inventive Germans and the parasitic, nomadic, materialistic, unassimilable Jews were common in the 沃尔基舍 文学。

Interestingly, Hitler believed that the greatest strength of the “Aryan” race was not in its intelligence but in its willingness to sacrifice individual interests to group goals—clearly an indication of his belief that the Aryans constituted an altruistic group and undoubtedly a reflection of the National Socialists’ strong emphasis on the inculcation of self-sacrifice and a group orientation in the Hitler Youth. “In [the Aryan] the instinct of self-preservation has reached its noblest form, since he willingly subordinates his own ego to the life of the community and, if the hour demands, even sacrifices it” (p. 297).

[The German soul was] determined by the soil and air of this land, determined by the blood and destiny of its people, eternally closed to us. We can grasp it faintly, but our productive stock comes from other provinces, is supplied from different depths, watered from different springs. (Comments of a Zionist during the Weimar period; in Niewyk 1980, 129)

An important thesis of Chapters 3–5 is that anti-Semitic movements and their enemies come to resemble each other in important ways, so that, for example, in the case of German racial anti-Semitism, a Western anti-Semitic movement developed a strong concern with endogamy, anti-individualism, and racial purity despite general Western tendencies toward exogamy, individualism, and assimilation. In the following, I will explore from this perspective Jewish involvement in 沃尔基舍 ideologies and attitudes of racial superiority. Like their mirror-image enemies, there is evidence that many Jewish intellectuals in the pre-National Socialist period had a strong racial conceptualization of the Jewish people and believed in the superiority of the Jewish “race.”

Such ideologies and attitudes are also important because social identity theory predicts that even a few examples of well-known Jewish theorists who viewed Jews as a superior race would be likely to be very influential in shaping gentile attitudes on how Jews perceived themselves. Given the context of between-group conflict that characterized the period under discussion (roughly 1850 to 1933), gentiles would be likely to suppose that attitudes of Jewish superiority characterized the Jewish community as a whole, either overtly or covertly. It is also easy to see that because of the salience of this type of racialist rhetoric, gentiles would attempt to avoid making a Type II error even if in fact the great majority of Jews refrained from an openly stated racialism: If one knows that a prominent subset of Jews conceptualizes Judaism as a race and places a high value on racial purity, and even views Jews as a racially superior group, the best strategy is to assume the worst about most Jews. Gentiles should prevent the error of rejecting the proposition “Jews are an ethnic group and view themselves as an ethnic group, not a religion; they are intent on retaining their racial purity and dominating gentiles by virtue of their superior intellectual abilities,” when it could be true. Therefore, a gentile would assume it is true.

These attitudes of gentiles would also be facilitated by the fact that these beliefs were highly compatible with contemporary scientific perspectives on race—the modern arbiter of intellectual respectability. Moreover, we shall see that racialist comments occurred throughout the spectrum of Jewish identification, from liberal Reform Jews to Zionists, and that as time went on, there was an increasing rapprochement between liberal Jews and Zionists among whom racialist ideas were quite common. This rapprochement may well have contributed to gentiles perceiving Zionist attitudes on Jewish racial separateness and racial superiority as well within the Jewish mainstream. Zionism was highly salient to the National Socialists and other anti-Semites, many of whom agreed with the Zionists’ racial interpretations of Judaism and with their desire for Jews to leave Germany and build a community in Palestine. (Niewyk [1980, 142] points out that Zionists did not expect all Jews to go to Palestine but aimed rather at preparing Jews to live as an unassimilated minority in Germany.)

Benjamin Disraeli, although baptized, developed views on the importance of racial purity and the superiority of Jewish heredity, in such works as Coningsby or the New Generation （1844） 坦克雷德，或新十字军 (1847), and the non-fictional 乔治·本丁克勋爵：政治传记 (1852). As Rather (1990, 141ff; see also Field 1981, 215) points out, Disraeli’s views on the importance of racial purity and the role of racial intermixture in the decline of race and culture antedated the writings of Gobineau and were sufficiently well known to have been quoted approvingly by Chamberlain in his Foundations (I, 271): “Let Disraeli teach us that the whole significance of Judaism lies in its purity of race, that this alone gives it power and duration.” “Disraeli rather than Gobineau—still less Chamberlain—is entitled to be called the father of nineteenth-century racist ideology ” (Rather 1990, 146).[128]The quotation from Rather is completed as follows: “ . . . if we are foolish enough to bestow such titles on people who are merely repeating what they take to be the wisdom of their own fathers. Sidonia [the hero of 坦克雷德] was in fact repeating the post-exilic doctrines of Ezra and Ezekiel when he warned against racial intermarriage, and these same doctrines gave biblical authority to Old Testament Christians in North America and South Africa to pursue their policies of segregation and apartheid, respectively.” Rose (1992, 234) states that Rather’s book “verges on veiled antisemitism,” but, minimally, I see no reason to question Rather’s scholarship on Disraeli. As Rather notes, the racialism of Disraeli and Moses Hess have been severely downplayed by Jewish scholars attempting to link National Socialism with gentile racialist thinkers of the 19th century such as Gobineau and Chamberlain. (Similarly, Lindemann [1997, 77n.76] notes that George Mosse “devotes only a few lines in a single paragraph to Disraeli, yet he devotes pages of dense description and analysis to scores of anti-Semitic writers and theorists, many of whom attracted a limited readership and obviously exercised little influence on their contemporaries.”) As noted below (see note 21 below), Rose has been a prominent apologist for 19th-century Jewish racialist thought. Disraeli “may have been, both as a writer and even more as a personal symbol, the most influential propagator of the concept of race in the nineteenth century, particularly publicizing the Jews’ alleged taste for power, their sense of superiority, their mysteriousness, their clandestine international connections, and their arrogant pride in being a pure race” (Lindemann 1997, 77).

Disraeli noted that Jews have risen quickly to positions of prominence in a wide range of societies despite anti-Semitism. He viewed Jews as a separate race and believed that the key to their superiority was that, unlike the other Caucasian nations, they had retained their racial purity. The inferior races persecute the Jews, but inevitably “the other degraded races wear out and disappear; the Jew remains, as determined, as expert, as persevering, as full of resource and resolution as ever. . . . All which proves, that it is in vain for man to attempt to baffle the inexorable law of nature which has decreed that a superior race shall never by destroyed or absorbed by an inferior” (Disraeli 1852, 490, 495).[129]Disraeli’s assertions of Jewish superiority were quite unsettling to Richard Wagner, especially since Disraeli was the prime minister of England. After reading 坦克雷德, Wagner referred to himself as a “tatooed savage,” presumably a reference to Disraeli’s low estimation of the Franks in 坦克雷德. Disraeli’s views were well known in England and were the subject of a negative contemporary commentary by George Eliot (although she appears to have approved eventually of Jewish racialism, as indicated by her novel 丹尼尔·德龙达). Disraeli’s views were ridiculed by Thackeray and in the satirical journal 冲床. In his satirical novel 科林斯比, Thackeray derided Disraeli’s tendency in 康斯比 to suppose that everyone of genius was a Jew, including Mozart and Rossini. In 1915, the prime minister of England, Herbert Asquith, recalled Disraeli’s words in his reaction to a proposal to turn Palestine into a Jewish state: “It reads almost like a new edition of 坦克雷德 brought up to date . . . , a curious illustration of Dizzy’s favourite maxim that ‘race is everything,’ etc.” (in Rather 1986, 122). Disraeli’s comments on the importance of race for understanding history were also quoted extensively by German racialist writers in the 1920s (Mosse 1970, 56; Rather 1986, 122). See also Johnson (1987, 323ff) and Salbstein (1982, 97ff) for discussions of Disraeli’s racialist views. Salbstein terms Disraeli a “Marrano Englishman,” because of evidence that Disraeli had a strong Jewish identity.

Disraeli believed that Jews were responsible for virtually all the advances of civilization, including the moral advances of Christianity as well as the accomplishments of prominent businessmen, philosophers, diplomats, and musicians (including Mozart!). Jews were behind the great European intellectual movements: “You never observe a great intellectual movement in Europe in which the Jews do not greatly participate. The first Jesuits were Jews; that mysterious Russian Diplomacy which so alarms Western Europe is organized and principally carried on by Jews; that mighty revolution which is at this moment preparing in Germany . . . is entirely developing under the auspices of Jews, who almost monopolize the professorial chairs of Germany” (Disraeli 1844, 232). The Franks, on the other hand, are a “flat-nosed” group (坦克雷德, 223) descended from a horde of pirates. They are “full of bustle and puffed up with self-conceit (a race spawned perhaps in the morasses of some Northern forest hardly yet cleared)” (坦克雷德，223）。

Heinrich Heine was another baptized Jewish intellectual racialist who conceptualized the Jews as a racial/ethnic group that had made great moral and ethical contributions to European culture. Beginning in the 1840s, Heine developed a biological conception of Judaism, as indicated by his using the German word 斯塔姆 (tribe, with the implication of descent from common ancestors) and Rasse (race) to refer to Jews (Prawer 1983, 766–767). Moreover, during this period Heine increasingly stressed the “universal validity of Jewish ethics and the universal message of Jewish Messianism,” and he made “repeated assertions that through its absorption of Old Testament ethics and history, modern Europe had become, in a sense, Jewish” (Prawer 1983, 765, 769).

Although Disraeli and Heine pioneered views of Jews as an intellectually and morally superior, racially pure ethnic group, Jewish racialist thinking was most closely associated with Zionism. Katz (1986b, 149) makes the important point that Jewish nationalism in the post-Emancipation period, including Zionism, was not a reaction to gentile anti-Semitism.[130]There was disagreement among Zionists as to whether anti-Semitism caused Jewish nationalism or Jewish nationalism was intrinsic to the nature of Judaism. Theodor Herzl took the former position, while Ahad Ha-Am took the latter point of view (Simon 1960, 103). Rather, Jewish nationalism provoked anti-Semitism as a gentile reaction—a critical example of the reactive anti-Semitism theme of Chapters 3–5:

Modern anti-Semitism was itself a reaction to Jewish proto-nationalism, to the incapacity and unwillingness of Jewry to divest itself of all the characteristics of national life except that of religion. True, once anti-Semitism—until then a mere undercurrent—erupted as a full-fledged movement in the 1870s and eighties, it gave a tremendous push to Jewish national aspirations. Yet this was already the second phase of a dialectical process. The starting point of the process was not anti-Semitism, but the perseverance of Jewish qualities.

In support of this argument, Katz (1979, 50) notes that in Eastern Europe Jewish nationalism emerged concurrently with the secularization of society and was in no way dependent on the processes of emancipation and cultural assimilation characteristic of the German situation. Eastern European Jewish nationalism, complete with ideological and literary expressions, appeared long before the anti-Semitic pogroms of the 1880s.

Important Jewish intellectuals developed 沃尔基舍 ideologies as well as racialist, exclusivist views, which, like those of their adversaries, were no longer phrased in religious terms but rather in a primitive language of evolutionary biology. These intellectuals had a very clear conception of themselves as racially distinct and as a superior race (intellectually and especially morally), one that had a redemptive mission to the German people and other gentiles. As expected by social identity theory, while the Germans tended to emphasize negative traits of the Jewish outgroup, the Jewish intellectuals often conceptualized their continued separatism in moral and altruistic terms. As indicated in Chapter 7, Jewish self-conceptualizations as a moral and altruistic group with a redemptive mission to gentiles have been the pre-eminent pose of Jewish intellectuals in the post-Enlightenment intellectual world.

The result was that anti-Semites and zealous Jews, including Zionists, often had very similar racialist, nationalist views of Judaism toward the end of the 19th century and thereafter (Katz 1986b, 144). Zionism and anti-Semitism were mirror-images: “in the course of their histories up to the present day it has looked as if they might not only be reacting to one another but be capable of evolving identical objectives and even cooperating in their realization” (Katz 1979, 51). Nicosia (1985) provides a long list of German intellectuals and anti-Semitic leaders from the early 19th century through the Weimar period who accepted Zionism as a possible solution to the Jewish question in Germany, including Johann Gottleib Fichte, Konstantin Frantz, Wilhelm Marr, Adolf Stoecker. All conceptualized Judaism as a nation apart and as a separate “race.”

Efron (1994, 126) notes that the idea of essential racial differences between groups pervaded the cultural landscape of 去世界 Europe, and Jews, including especially the Zionist racial scientists, were no exception to this trend. While the anti-Semites stressed the moral inferiority of Jews, the Jewish racial scientists stressed Jewish contributions to civilization and looked forward to a national rebirth of Jewish culture in a Zionist state.

The influential proto-Zionist Moses Hess (1862) whose major work, 罗马和耶路撒冷, was published in 1862, had well-developed racialist ideas about Jews. Although his book was published prior to the intensification of anti-Semitism consequent to complete Jewish emancipation in 1870, it has strong overtones of racial superiority. Hess believed that the different races had enduring psychological and physiological traits, and that the Indo-European traits (embodied by the ancient Greeks) were fundamentally opposed to the Semitic traits (embodied by the ancient Israelites). Like Disraeli and Chamberlain, Hess believed that history is primarily a struggle between races, not social classes, and like these thinkers, Hess (p. 27) believed that a Jew is a Jew “by virtue of his racial origin, even though his ancestors may have become apostates.” Judaism in that view, is at its essence the nationalistic aspirations of the Jewish “race,” but while other races attempt to gain territory, the role of the Jews is to function as a moral beacon to the rest of humanity. Hess states that Jewish racial characteristics predominate over Indo-Germanic characteristics in intermarriage and that they have survived intact since the sojourn in Egypt (p. 60).[131]正如在讨论中 创伤后应激障碍 (Ch. 8), one theory of the evolution of recessive genes in northern Caucasian populations is Salter’s (1996) “blank slate hypothesis” in which recessive genes act as an individualist anti-cuckoldry mechanism. Because of the commonness among the “Aryans” of recessive genes affecting physical appearance, the offspring of Jews and non-Jews in Germany therefore would tend to resemble the Jewish partner, thus leading to beliefs on both sides of the “indelibility” of the Jewish character. The racial type comes through even in individuals whose ancestors became apostates (p. 98), and even converted Jews retain interest in Jewish affairs and have strong beliefs in the importance of Jewish nationality (p. 98).

According to Hess, Jews have what Rose (1990, 332) terms a “primal-racial mission” to the rest of humanity:[132]Rose terms the racialist views of Hess as “positive and humane” (1990, 321) (apparently because of Hess’s stated belief that the Jews had originated as a racially mixed group) while condemning the racialist views of 19th-century German anti-Semites. In a bit of self-deception, Rose notes the parallels between Hess’s and Wagner’s racialist views, “but how opposed were their ethics! Wagner insisted that his racial idea was based on love. But that was merely idealistic garb for the instinct of racial domination that Hess so bitingly descried everywhere in German revolutionary thought. Wagner ran true to revolutionary form in excluding the Jews from the festival of redemption; they could only be redeemed by destruction. Hess, on the other hand, cast them in the role of protagonists in the drama of cosmic redemption” (1990, 335). Klein (1981, 147–149) makes a similar argument regarding the racialism of the psychoanalytic movement.

The idea that Judaism has a genetically based, altruistic role to play in human evolution may be more ethical. However, it would appear to be equally plausible to suppose that Hess’s and Klein’s comments are also an “idealistic garb” for self-serving rationalization of the type that has been common in Jewish intellectual history (see Chapter 7); that is, they legitimize Jewish ethnocentrism as motivated by the loftiest of moral goals and ignore real conflicts of interest between Germans and Jews that were at least partly the result of Jewish ethnocentrism while condemning the ethnocentrism of the Germans.

Rose also illustrates the tendency of many theorists of anti-Semitism to view the phenomenon as a fundamentally irrational construction of gentiles—a major theme of Jewish theories of anti-Semitism discussed extensively in 批判文化. Rose repeatedly condemns as immoral the attitudes of anti-Semites that Jews were an ethnically distinct and unassimilable group within German society, that they hated gentiles, and that they were bent on the economic and cultural domination of gentiles, and he does so without ever considering the evidence for or against these propositions. Because of his complete lack of interest in actual Jewish behavior, one infers that Rose believes that data on the actual behavior of Jews are irrelevant to the rationality of these attitudes. “It is through Judaism that the history of mankind has become a sacred history. I mean by that, that process of unified organic development which has its origin in the love of the family and which will not be completed until the whole of humanity becomes one family” (Hess 1862, 120).

However, this single family of mankind does not imply assimilation. At the end of history, all of the different races will “live on in friendly fashion with one another, but live each for the other, preserving, at the same time, their particular identity” (p. 121; italics in text). Jewish particularism is thus transformed into a genetically mediated messianic universalism in which Judaism will persist as a racial type in a utopian world it has altruistically led to universal harmony. In this future world, the German is faulted for desiring to possess their “fatherlands and dominions for himself. He lacks the primary condition of every chemical assimilative process, namely warmth” (p. 78). Hess also castigated the Reform Jew because of “the beautiful phrases about humanity and enlightenment which he employs as a cloak to hide his treason, his fear of being identified with his unfortunate brethren” (p. 75)—an indication that he viewed Reform Jews as attempting to deceive Germans into believing that they had no interest in Jewish nationalism or the fate of Jews in other countries.

There were also parallels between the views of the anti-Semite Richard Wagner and the Zionist Ahad Ha-Am (pseudonym of Asher Ginsberg) (Katz 1986b).[133]Wagner believed that the Jewish spirit was able to dominate the German spirit in art because Jewish influence in Germany had begun before the nation had a well-developed culture of its own—the result of political fragmentation since the Thirty Years’ War. According to the diary of Cosima Wagner, Wagner stated in 1878 that “if ever I were to write again about the Jews, I should say I have nothing against them, it is just that they descended on us Germans too soon, we were not yet steady enough to absorb them” (see Rather 1990, 212). Both developed the idea that Jews could not have their own artistic spirit because they failed to identify completely with the surrounding culture. In an essay originally published in 1889, Ha-Am (1922, 3) claimed Judaism was not merely a religion but a nation bound together with deeply felt emotional bonds. Like many anti-Semites, Ha-Am also had a well-developed anti-individualist perspective, in which Jews must view themselves as a part of the larger corporate group and sacrifice their personal interests for the good of the group: “For the people is one people throughout all its generations, and the individuals who come and go in each generation are but as those minute parts of the living body which change every day, without affecting in any degree the character of that organic unity which is the whole body” (p. 8).[134]Ha-Am (in Simon 1960, 102) condemned “enlightened” Western Jews who had “sold their souls” for civil rights: “I can proclaim my feeling of kinship with my fellow-Jews, wherever they may be, without having to defend it by far-fetched and unsatisfactory excuses”—an implicit rebuke of the Reform project of rejecting the language of kinship and nationalism in developing elaborate rationales for continued Jewish group cohesion in the post-Enlightenment world. Like the German 沃尔基舍 thinkers, Ha-Am believed that each nation, like each person, has a unique character and personality. Moreover, he had pronounced ideas on what constituted the national spirit of his people and believed that it was profoundly different from the German spirit.

Racialist views were especially common among what Ragins (1980, 132ff) terms the second generation of Zionists, many of whom came to maturity in the 1890s.[135]Similarly, in the United States Zionists raised a “storm of protest” when Judge Julian Mack of the American Jewish Committee testified before the Dillingham Commission on immigration in 1909 that Jews were not a race (Cohen 1972, 47). Szajowski (1967, 7) cites the following statement by Lucien Wolf, secretary of the Conjoint Foreign Committee of the Board of Deputies and the Anglo-Jewish Association, as typical of Jewish leaders of the period, including Jacob Schiff of the American Jewish Committee and Dr. Paul Nathan, leader of the German Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden: “I, too, am for assimilation, but I want it mechanical and not chemical. I want the race preserved but the spirit merged.” Goldstein (1997) shows that American Jews in the late 19th century commonly identified themselves as a racial group, at least partly as an image-management strategy (see Chapter 7). The Zionist journal 世界 published several articles with a racialist, 沃尔基舍 ideology in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. A writer argued that the Jews were a race with distinctive physical features and had retained their racial purity over four thousand years. Another contributorargued that this racial distinctiveness precluded assimilation: “Those who demand assimilation of us either do not yet know that a man cannot get out of his skin . . . or else they know this and then expect of us shameful, daily humiliation, which consists in feigning Aryanism, suppressing our instincts, and squeezing into the skin of the Aryan, which does not fit us at all” (in Ragins 1980, 150). Another author agreed with the racialist writings of Gobineau, who emphasized the high level of racial purity among the Jews and the incompatibility of Jews with other races (Ragins 1980, 151).

All of the Zionist racial scientists studied by Efron (1994; see also Endelman 1991, 196), including Elias Auerbach, Aron Sandler, Felix Theilhaber, and Ignaz Zollschan, were motivated by a perceived need to end Jewish intermarriage and preserve Jewish racial purity.[136]Theilhaber is interesting because of his deep concern with Jewish fertility and at the same time with developing organizations that would facilitate abortion and birth control among gentile Germans. Theilhaber was very concerned about the declining Jewish birth rate and was politically active in attempting to increase Jewish fertility (going so far as to propose to tax “child-poor” families to support “child-rich” families). At the same time, he was also instrumental in creation of the Gesellschaft für Sexualreform, whose aims were to legalize abortion and make contraceptives available to the German public (Efron 1994, 142, 144, 152). As indicated below, the National Socialists encouraged fertility and enacted laws that restricted abortion and discouraged birth control. Only by creating a Jewish homeland and leaving the assimilatory influences of the diaspora could Jews preserve their unique racial heritage.

Thus, for Auerbach, Zionism would return Jews “back into the position they enjoyed before the nineteenth century—politically autonomous, culturally whole, and racially pure” (Efron 1994, 136). Zollschan, whose book on “the Jewish racial question” went through five editions and was well known to both Jewish and gentile anthropologists (Efron 1994, 155), praised Houston Stewart Chamberlain and advocated Zionism as the only way to retain Jewish racial purity from the threat of mixed marriages and assimilation (Gilman 1993, 109; Nicosia 1985, 18).[137]Zollschan comments on the light pigmentation to be found in all Jewish groups despite the predominance of dark pigmentation. The fin de siécle race scientists made some interesting speculations on the origins of blond hair and blue eyes among Jews. The German Felix von Luschan proposed that the ancient Jews had intermarried with the non-Semitic Hittites and the blond Amorites. The Jewish racial scientist Elias Auerbach rejected this idea because it conflicted with the abhorrence of exogamy that is so apparent in the Tanakh. He proposed that when Jews settled in lands with a high percentage of blondes they have an unconscious preference to marry blondes in their own group, so that there is selection in the diaspora environment for phenotypic resemblance to the non-Jewish population (see Efron 1994, 139–140). The German Fritz Lenz (1931, 667–668) (a professor of “racial hygiene” in the National Socialist era) made a proposal similar to that of Auerbach. Zollschan’s description of the phenotypic, and by implication genetic commonality of Jews around the world is striking. He notes that the same Jewish faces can be seen throughout the Jewish world among Ashkenazi, Sephardic, and Oriental Jews. He also remarked on the same mix of body types, head shapes, skin, and hair and eye pigmentation in these widely separated groups (see Efron 1994, 158).

Arthur Ruppin, the German Zionist and demographer, was an important historical figure who “represented and symbolized the second era in Zionism” (Bein 1971, xix) and whose writings were sufficiently well known to merit comment by American leaders of the Reform movement (Levenson 1989, 327). (Werner Sombart [1913, 285] cited Ruppin and Elias Auerbach to support his impression that “to-day, so far as I can make out, the . . . view prevails that from the days of Ezra to these the Jews have kept strictly apart” and that as a result they constituted a distinct racial group.) Ruppin consistently advocated the view that there was an ethical imperative to retain Jewish racial purity. Ruppin had a clear conception of the importance of Jewish “racial types” as central to historical Judaism.[138]In Jews in the Modern World, Ruppin (1934) asserts that Jews are not a racially pure group, because of widespread intermarriage and illicit sexual relationships in the diaspora. Nevertheless, he describes three “racial types” of Jews, one (the Oriental Jews) genetically identical to the ancient Jews, and two others (Sephardic and Ashkenazic) resulting from an influx of gentile genes in the diaspora. Although these racial types are not racially pure, because they originated as a result of cross-breeding, they represent racial types because they have been genetically isolated for centuries in particular areas. Ruppin therefore conceptualizes the Ashkenazic and Sephardic Jewish populations as originating from a high level of cross-breeding followed by prolonged periods of genetic isolation, with the result that contemporary Jewish populations have a high degree of genetic homogeneity and phenotypic resemblance.

In a section entitled “Disruptive Forces in Jewry,” Ruppin decries the assimilative forces of modern societies, including the decline of religious belief and family ties, and the weakening of a sense of common fate among Jews.

Intermarriage marks the end of Judaism. Mixed marriage is regarded as destructive of Judaism even where the non-Jewish side adopts the Jewish religion, for it is understood, be it merely subconsciously, that Judaism is something more than a religion—a common descent and a common fate. Were it only a religious communion, assimilated Jews would actually have to welcome a mixed marriage which gains a proselyte for Judaism, but even among them this view is conspicuously absent. (p. 318)

Ruppin also regretted that “the feeling of unity resulting from consanguinity is being lost” (p. 277). Ruppin himself married his first cousin, suggesting he also placed a high value on the common Jewish practice of consanguineous marriage, which has resulted in relatively high levels of genetic relatedness within historical Jewish societies (see 创伤后应激障碍，Ch。 4）。 In an argument reminiscent of the long history of conceptualizing Judaism as a “light unto the nations,” Ruppin (1913, 218) stressed that the Jewish intellectual ability was utilized for humanity as a whole, “for the common good.” In Ruppin’s view, Jews have had an immense positive influence on civilization, one that has benefited all humans. But racial admixture would destroy the unique Jewish contribution to civilization—an argument which, apart from its assertion of Jewish ethical altruism vis-à-vis the gentiles, is reminiscent of those presented by many theorists of Aryan racial superiority.[139]While Ruppin stated that “other nations may have points of superiority” (1913, 217), he countenanced rather negative views of Germans. In his introduction to Ruppin’s (1934) book, the prominent historian Sir Louis B. Namier (1934, xx–xxi) presented the following view of Germans: “The German is methodical, crude, constructive mainly in the mechanical sense, extremely submissive to authority, a rebel or a fighter only by order from above; he gladly remains all his life a tiny cog in a machine.” He goes on to refer to German “political and social ineptitude.” As expected by social identity theory, positive attributions regarding one’s ingroup tend to be associated with negative evaluations of the outgroup.

We can thus accept the high intellectuality of the Jews without reserve, and are justified in desiring to preserve this high human type . . . as a separate entity, unmixed, because this is the only possible way to preserve and develop the race-character. Any highly cultivated race deteriorates rapidly when its members mate with a less cultivated race, and the Jew naturally finds his equal and match most easily within the Jewish people. We cannot absolutely assert that the mixture of Jews with other races invariably produces a degenerate posterity. . . . It is certain, however, that by intermarriage the race-character is lost, and the descendants of a mixed marriage are not likely to have any remarkable gifts. . . . Intermarriage being clearly detrimental to the preservation of the high qualities of the race, it follows that it is necessary to try to prevent it and to preserve Jewish separatism. (Ruppin 1913, 227–228)

Another noteworthy Jewish racialist thinker was Martin Buber, the prominent Zionist and theologian, who wrote of the Jewish Volkgeist and advocated greater pride in the distinctive Jewish racial features: “A Volk is held together by primary elements: blood, fate—insofar, as it rests upon the development of blood—and culturally creative power—insofar as it is conditioned by the individuality which arises from the blood” (in Ragins 1980, 157). Buber idealized the hyper-collectivist Jewish Hasidim as a basis for contemporary Judaism because of their intensely emotional commitment to the group and their mystical love for the Volk (Mosse 1970, 85). “Just as the Germans attempted to root this mystical tradition in their national mystique, so Buber eventually attempted to embody this 神话 in the Jewish Volk, exemplified by the Hasidim” (Mosse 1970, 87). As a result of Buber’s influence, Zionist publications during the Weimar years “were replete with favorable references to ‘the mysticism of blood,’ ‘racial genius,’ and the ‘Jewish people’s soul’ ” (Niewyk 1980, 131).[140]Buber’s close friend Gustav Landauer developed similar ideas, in which “the individual . . . rediscovers the community to which he is linked through his blood and learns that he is merely an ‘electric spark’ in a larger unity” (Mosse 1970, 91). Nevertheless, the Jewish God was the God of all humanity, implying some sort of coexistence of different peoples. As noted in Chapter 7, Buber and Landauer argued that Jewish pursuit of their ethnic interests was in the service of all mankind. As Mosse (1970, 89) notes in his comments on Buber and another Jewish 沃尔基舍 thinker, Robert Weltsch, “only by first becoming a member of the Volk could the individual Jew truly become part of humanity.” Mosse comments that it is not at all clear how this Jewish 沃尔基舍 ideology would be compatible with the idea that all of humanity would “flow together,” but the attitude was typical of many Zionists of the period. In my terms, such ideologies are examples of rationalization, deception and/or self-deception that have been typical of Jewish theories of Judaism throughout history (see Chapters 7 and 8).

本篇 沃尔基施 idea of a membership in a highly cohesive group was pursued by a great many Jewish youth who, by World War I and thereafter, “found an answer to their Jewishness through a deepening of the experience that bound them together, with their own age and kind, in a meaningful community” by joining the Jewish Bund (Mosse 1970, 98–99). The concurrent German Youth Movement satisfied similar desires for membership in cohesive groups among gentile Germans. Although the German Youth Movement tended to not fuse 沃尔基舍 thinking with racism and exclusivism even into the Weimar period (Mosse 1970, 20), many Jewish and gentile German youth were in fact members of mirror-image, emotionally compelling, cohesive groups: “Once again one is struck by the common strivings of Jewish and German youth” (Mosse 1970, 99).

Interestingly, Franz Oppenheimer decried the racialist tendencies of some of his fellow Zionists, noting that “a racial pride swaggered which was nothing other than the photographic negative of anti-Semitism” (in Ragins 1980, 124)—a comment that reinforces the “mirror-image” theme of this chapter and indicates that for many Jewish Zionists, Jewish racialism went beyond merely asserting and shoring up the ethnic basis of Judaism, to embrace the idea of racial superiority. Consistent with the anti-assimilationist thrust of Zionism, very few Zionists intermarried, and those who did, such as Martin Buber, found that their marriages were problematic within the wider Zionist community (Norden 1995). In 1929 the Zionist leaders of the Berlin Jewish community condemned intermarriage as a threat to the “racial purity of stock” and asserted its belief that “consanguinity of the flesh and solidarity of the soul” were essential for developing a Jewish nation, as was the “will to establish a closed brotherhood over against all other communities on earth” (in Niewyk 1980, 129–130).

Jewish assertions of racial superiority may have been tempered somewhat by the anti-Semitic climate of Central Europe. For example, Ignaz Zollschan argued that Jewish intellectual superiority was the result of heredity resulting from eugenic practices within the Jewish community—a view for which there is ample empirical support (创伤后应激障碍, Ch. 7): Jews who were not adept at religious study lost out in the “struggle for existence” (see Efron 1994, 106). However, Zollschan’s lauding of Jewish achievements and Jewish racial superiority had a “defensive” ring that Efron (1994, 162) attributes to the anti-Semitic climate surrounding him. On the other hand, Joseph Jacobs, writing in a much less anti-Semitic England, could freely discuss his views on the intellectual and moral superiority of Jews in the most respectable academic circles, including those frequented by his mentor, Sir Francis Galton (Darwin’s cousin and the founder of biometrical genetics and the eugenics movement).

Assertions of Zionist racialism continued into the National Socialist period, where they dovetailed with National Socialist attitudes. Joachim Prinz, a German Jew who later became the head of the American Jewish Congress, celebrated Hitler’s ascent to power because it signaled the end of the Enlightenment values which had resulted in assimilation and mixed marriage among Jews:

We want assimilation to be replaced by a new law: the declaration of belonging to the Jewish nation and the Jewish race. A state built upon the principle of the purity of nation and race can only be honoured and respected by a Jew who declares his belonging to his own kind. . . . For only he who honours his 己 品种和他的 己 blood can have an attitude of honour towards the 其他国家的民族意志. (From J. Prinz, 朱登 [We Jews] [1934]; in Shahak 1994, 71–72; italics in text)

In 1938, Stephen S. Wise, president of the American Jewish Congress and the World Jewish Congress, stated that “I am not an American citizen of the Jewish faith, I am a Jew. . . . Hitler was right in one thing. He calls the Jewish people a race and we are a race.”[141]“博士。 智者敦促犹太人宣称自己是这样的，“ 纽约先驱论坛报，6月13，1938，12。

The common ground of the racial Zionists and their gentile counterparts included the exclusion of Jews from the German 民族共同体 (Nicosia 1985, 19). Indeed, shortly after Hitler came to power, the Zionist Federation of Germany submitted a memorandum to the German government outlining a solution to the Jewish question and containing the following remarkable statement. The Federation declared that the Enlightenment view that Jews should be absorbed into the nation state

discerned only the individual, the single human being freely suspended in space, without regarding the ties of blood and history or spiritual distinctiveness. Accordingly, the liberal state demanded of the Jews assimilation [via baptism and mixed marriage] into the non-Jewish environment. . . . Thus it happened that innumerable persons of Jewish origin had the chance to occupy important positions and to come forward as representatives of German culture and German life, without having their belonging to Jewry become visible. Thus arose a state of affairs which in political discussion today is termed “debasement of Germandom,” or “Jewification.” . . . Zionism has no illusions about the difficulty of the Jewish condition, which consists above all in an abnormal occupational pattern and in the fault of an intellectual and moral posture not rooted in one’s own tradition. (In Dawidowicz 1976, 150–152)

Most Jews did not openly espouse racialist views in the period we are discussing—at least partly because they were aware of the ultimate danger of racialist thinking to Judaism (Ragins 1980, 137). Racialist rhetoric by Jews was publicly condemned by some Jewish leaders because of fears of anti-Semitism (Ragins 1980, 137). Recognizing this danger, a major focus of the Zentralverein deutscher Staatsbürger jüdischen Glaubens (Central Association of German Citizens of Jewish Faith)—the main self-defense organ of German liberal Judaism—was to combat what it termed “racial Semitism” (Levy 1975, 156).

However, it is quite possible that racialist views were more often expressed privately than publicly. Lindemann (1997, 91) notes that “even within those universalistic convictions were nuances with racist undertones” and cites the French-Jewish writer Julian Benda who observed that there “were certain magnates, financiers rather than literary men, with whom the belief in the superiority of their race and in the natural subjection of those who did not belong to it, was visibly sovereign.” A number of Jewish leftist politicians in France “harbored a sense of their special merit or destiny as Jews to be political leaders, what they considered their “right to rule.’ ” There is considerable evidence that German Jews during this period were engaged in deception and self-deception regarding their behavior and motivations (see Chapters 6–8), so it would not be at all surprising to find Jews who sincerely believed Judaism had no ethnic connotations and nevertheless opposed intermarriage and conversion, as well as others who believed it privately but denied it publicly for political reasons.

Ragins (1980, 85) notes the tension between the statements of liberal Jews that Judaism was nothing more than a religion and their recognition that traditional Judaism had been far more than that. The claim that Judaism was nothing more than a religion conflicted with the reality that “there was a sense of relatedness and cohesiveness among Jews which seemed to extend beyond the lines drawn by religious factions, uniting Orthodox and Reform” (Ragins 1980, 85). Recognizing this, the Zentralvereinat times acknowledged that Judaism was more than simply a religion and should be defined by a “consciousness of common descent [禁欲]” (Ragins 1980, 85), or race (p. 86). Thus in 1928 the director of the Zentralverein asserted that Jews had been a race since biblical times and concluded that “extraction remains, that is, the racial characteristics are still present, albeit diminished by the centuries; they are still present in external as well as mental features” (in Friedländer 1997, 119).[142]Niewyk also includes among the liberal Jewish voices the novelists Georg Hermann and Kurt Münzer, both of whom believed that racial differences divided Jews and Germans. In attempting to understand Jewish uniqueness, another liberal, Rabbi Caesar Seligmann of Frankfurt-am-Main, attributed it to “Jewish sentiment, the instinctive, call it what you will, call it the community of blood, call it tribal consciousness, call it the ethnic soul, but best of all call it: the Jewish heart” (in Niewyk 1980, 106).

The vacillation and ambivalence surrounding racial conceptualizations of Judaism were also present in American Reform circles in the late 19th century:

It was not uncommon for a rabbi to make bold pronouncements about his desire for a universalistic society and then, in moments of frustration or doubt, revert to a racial understanding of the Jews. . . . While willing to stretch the definition of Judaism to its limits, it was clear that most Reformers were not willing to break the historical continuity of the Jewish “race.” Even Solomon Schindler, . . . one of the most radical of Reform rabbis, felt compelled to acknowledge the racial aspect of Jewish identity. Despite the high universal task of Judaism, wrote Schindler, “it remains a fact that we spring from a different branch of humanity, that different blood flows in our veins, that our temperament, our tastes, our humor is different from yours; that, in a word, we differ in our views and in our mode of thinking in many cases as much as we differ in our features.” (Goldstein 1997, 50–51)

Besides the Zionists and a vacillating body of liberal Jewish opinion, there are several other important Jewish intellectuals who are not associated with Zionism but nevertheless had strongly racialist views. Heinrich Graetz (1817–1891), the prominent historian of Judaism, was enthusiastic about the proto-Zionist ideas of Moses Hess, whose work, as we have seen, has strong overtones of attitudes of racial superiority. Graetz believed that Jews could solve the world’s problems and “sometimes seemed to think Jews would provide actual world leadership. At others it was to be merely an ethical example. But in either event he presented the Jews as a superior people” (Johnson 1988, 331). Graetz’s sense of Jewish racial superiority was repulsive to gentiles, and there was an exchange with Heinrich von Treitschke in which the latter characterized Graetz as an exemplar of the “boasting spirit which, he alleged, was in the ascendant in Jewish circles and was to be regarded as a menace to the German empire” (in Bloch 1898, 77). Graetz’s work provoked a negative reaction not only in Treitschke but the German academic establishment as a whole (Levenson 1989, 329). While intellectuals like Treitschke saw Christianity as a unifying force for the German nation, Graetz wrote to his friend Moses Hess that Christianity was a “religion of death,” and Hess wrote to Graetz of his delight in “scourging Germans.” Graetz perceived Jews as battling to destroy Christian culture: “we must above all work to shatter Christianity” (in Lindemann 1997, 91). These attitudes among prominent Jewish intellectuals exemplify the theme of cultural conflict between Jews and gentiles as a theme of anti-Semitism (p. 50ff).

There is a sense of Jewish racial superiority in Graetz’s writings as well as hints that he believed in the importance of racial purity.

There were but two nations of creative mind who originated [high] culture and raised humanity from the slough of barbarity and savagery. These two were the Hellenic and the Israelite people. There was no third race of coadjutors. . . . If the modern Roman, German, and Sclavonicnations, both on this side and on the other side of the ocean, could be despoiled of what they received from the Greeks and the Israelites, they would be utterly destitute. (Graetz 1898, VI, 706)

However, the Jews have continued as a creative race into the present, while the Greeks gradually merged with the barbarians and lost their distinctiveness—a point remarkably similar to Houston Stewart Chamberlain’s “chaos of peoples” idea described above, in which the decline of the ancient world is attributed to loss of racial purity:

[The Greeks] despaired of their bright Olympus, and at best only retained sufficient courage to resort to suicide. The Greeks were not gifted with the power of living down their evil fortune, or of remaining true to themselves when dispossessed of their territories; and whether in a foreign country or in their own land they lost their mental balance, and became merged in the medley of barbaric nations.[143]Graetz’s work is replete with ingroup glorification and denigration of outgroups. While other nations had sunk into debauchery and violence, the Jews had remained true to their historical mission: “In the midst of a debauched and sinful world and amid vices with which, in its beginnings, the Jews were also infected, they yet freed themselves, they raised on high an exalted standard of moral purity, and thus formed a striking contrast to other nations” (Graetz 1898, VI, 706). Their allegiance to high moral standards required them to separate themselves entirely from the “heathen world” (p. 721)—a common rationalization for Jewish separatism (see Chapter 7).

The psychoanalytic movement was also characterized by ideas of Jewish intellectual superiority, racial consciousness, national pride, and Jewish solidarity (Klein 1981, 143).[144]This Jewish intellectual racialism among psychoanalysts was highly compatible with a firm commitment to Jewish group continuity. Indeed, Klein (1981) notes that Freud passionately implored his associate Max Graf not to abandon his Jewish commitment by baptizing his son. A theme of 批判文化 is that a major component of Jewish intellectual movements in the 20th century has been a commitment to messianic universalist movements, which propose to lead humanity to a higher moral plane while nevertheless retaining Jewish group continuity. These movements are thus compatible with continued genetic segregation between Jews and gentiles and continued group-based resource competition between Jews and gentiles. Freud and his colleagues felt a sense of “racial kinship” with their Jewish colleagues and a “racial strangeness” to others (Klein 1981, 142; see also Gilman 1993, 12ff, and 批判文化, Ch. 4). Commenting on Ernest Jones, one of his disciples, Freud wrote that “the racial mixture in our band is very interesting to me. He [Jones] is a Celt and hence not quite accessible to us, the Teuton [i.e., C. G. Jung] and the Mediterranean man [himself as a Jew]” (in Gay 1988, 186).

Perhaps the clearest indication of Freud’s racialist thinking is his comment to a Jewish woman who had previously intended to have a child by C. G. Jung in order to reconcile the Aryan/Jewish split in psychoanalysis at the time. Freud observed “I must confess . . . that your fantasy about the birth of the Savior to a mixed union did not appeal to me at all. The Lord, in that anti-Jewish period, had him born from the superior Jewish race. But I know these are my prejudices” (in Yerushalmi 1991, 45).

A year later after the woman had given birth to a child by a Jewish father, Freud wrote,

I am, as you know, cured of the last shred of my predilection for the Aryan cause, and would like to take it that if the child turned out to be a boy he will develop into a stalwart Zionist. He or she must be dark in any case, no more towheads. Let us banish all these will-o’-the-wisps!

I shall not present my compliments to Jung in Munich. . . . We are and remain Jews. The others will only exploit us and will never understand and appreciate us. (In Yerushalmi 1991, 45)

In the following passage from 摩西与一神教，犹太人被提议将自己塑造成一个道德和智力优越的人：

两千多年来，犹太人对精神追求的偏爱当然产生了影响。 它帮助建立了一个防暴和暴力倾向的堤防，而这些通常在体育发展成为人们理想的地方发现。 犹太人否认了希腊人实现的精神和身体活动的和谐发展。 在这场冲突中，他们的决定至少是支持文化上更重要的。 (弗洛伊德 1939, 147)[145]Before their rupture, Jung is described as a “strong independent personality, as a Teuton” (in Gay 1988, 201). After Jung was made head of the International Psychoanalytic Association, a colleague of Freud was concerned because, “taken as a race,” Jung and his gentile colleagues were “completely different from us Viennese” (in Gay 1988, 219). In 1908 Freud wrote a letter to the psychoanalyst Karl Abraham in which Abraham is described as keen, while Jung is described as having a great deal of 势头—which, as Yerushalmi (1991, 43) notes, indicates a tendency to stereotype individuals on the basis of group membership (the intellectually sharp Jew and the energetic Aryan).

Freud’s sense of Jewish superiority can also be seen in his statement that “ruthless egoism” is more characteristic of gentiles than of Jews, while Jewish family life and intellectual life are superior. Freud pointed to Jewish achievement in the arts and sciences to support his claim that Jews were superior (see Cuddihy 1974, 36).

Further, Freud viewed these differences as unchangeable. In a 1933 letter Freud decried the upsurge in anti-Semitism, stating that “my judgment of human nature, especially the Christian-Aryan variety, has had little reason to change” (in Yerushalmi 1991, 48). Nor, in Freud’s opinion, would the Jewish character change. In 摩西与一神教, Freud (1939, 51n) states that “it is historically certain that the Jewish type was finally fixed as a result of the reforms of Ezra and Nehemiah in the fifth century before Christ.” As Yerushalmi (1991, 52) notes, “Freud was thoroughly convinced that once the Jewish character was created in ancient times it had remained constant, immutable, its quintessential qualities indelible.”

Viewed in this manner the obvious racialism and the clear statement of Jewish ethical, spiritual, and intellectual superiority contained in Freud’s last work, 摩西与一神教, must be seen not as an aberration of Freud’s thinking but as central to his attitudes, if not his published work dating from a much earlier period. These issues are discussed more fully in 批判文化. Here they merely serve as an indication of the deeply held racialist views of individuals on both sides of the ethnic divide during the period.

Freud’s attitudes were fully mirrored by non-Jewish theorists (Gilman 1993, 12ff).[146]As discussed by Yerushalmi (1991, 46), in 1921 Wilhelm Dolles published a book Das Jüdische als Geistesrichtung [The Jewish and the Christian as Spiritual Direction] which argued that Jews were attracted to psychoanalysis because they had a “hysterical” character because they had striven throughout their history for unattainable goals. Dolles did not reject psychoanalysis but advocated a different form of psychoanalysis for Christians, such as that of Jung, more attuned to the morally superior Christian character. Jung’s ideas on racial archetypes differ from Freud’s views only in the type of traits emphasized as characteristic of the two groups. While Freud emphasized the brutality, violence, and enslavement to the senses of the gentiles versus the spirituality, intellectuality, and moral superiority of the Jews, Jung held the view that the advantage of the “Aryans” was in their energy and untapped potential resulting from their relatively recent rise from barbarism. On the other hand, Jews, required to exist as a minority in a host society, could create no genuine culture of their own. After the National Socialists assumed power, Jung became a prominent spokesman for the view that there were differences between Jewish and Aryan psychology.[147]Yerushalmi (1991, 54) also notes that Ernest Jones, a self described “Shabbes-goy among the Viennese” and someone whose worshipful compliance made him very useful to psychoanalysis as a Jewish ethnic movement, also had the view that Jews had certain physical features that caused gentiles to have unconscious hostility toward them. In a 1934 article Jung emphasized that psychoanalysis had developed a very negative conception of the German character:

In my opinion it has been a grave error in medical psychology up till now to apply Jewish categories . . . indiscriminately to Germanic and Slavic Christendom. Because of this the most precious secret of the Germanic peoples—their creative and intuitive depth of soul—has been explained by a morass of banal infantilism, while my own warning voice has for decades been suspected of anti-Semitism. (In Yerushalmi 1991, 48–49)

Indeed, as elaborated in 批判文化, a central function of Freud’s 图腾与禁忌 appears to have been to combat “everything that is Aryan-religious” (in Gay 1988, 331), a comment that illustrates the extent to which Freud, like Hess and Graetz, viewed his work as an aspect of competition between ethnic groups. The early psychoanalytic movement self-consciously perceived itself as representing a Jewish intellectual offensive against “Aryan-Christian” culture in which religion and race overlapped entirely.

Even in the absence of an explicitly racialist conceptualization of the differences between Germans and Jews, there was a feeling of estrangement and of being different peoples on both sides of the ethnic divide. Such attitudes were common in anti-Semitic writings throughout the 19th century (Rose 1990) and continued in the 20th century. In the correspondence of the early 1930s between Hannah Arendt and Karl Jaspers, Arendt fails to identify with Max Weber’s “imposing patriotism.” “For me Germany means my mother tongue, philosophy, and literature” (in Kohler & Saner 1992). Jaspers replies, “I find it odd that you as a Jew want to set yourself apart from what is German. . . . When you speak of mother tongue, philosophy, and literature, all you need add is historical-political destiny, and there is no difference left at all” (in Kohler & Saner 1992). Arendt, however, self-consciously rejects being part of this destiny of the German people. The concept of a “historico-political destiny of a people” clearly conceptualizes separate “peoples,” but in Weber’s view membership in the German people is open to Jews. Arendt is rejecting such membership and implicitly accepting the idea of a single culture but two separate peoples.[148]After becoming a refugee, Arendt lived her life in an almost exclusively Jewish milieu, working for a Jewish refugee relief organization, for Jewish Cultural Reconstruction, Inc., and for a publisher of Judaica, Schocken Books. Her theory of anti-Semitism, as expressed in 极权主义的起源, like many other theories of anti-Semitism developed by Jewish intellectuals such as those discussed in 批判文化, provides no role for resource competition between impermeable ethnic groups. Katz (1983, 83) presents Arendt as an example of a theorist of anti-Semitism who unrealistically and apologetically ignores the contribution of Jewish behavior to anti-Semitism.

General feelings of peoplehood and thinking in terms of racial essences and racial differences were thus part of the 时代精神 of the period—characteristic of Jewish as well as gentile intellectuals.

The breakdown of the liberal order during the closing decades of the nineteenth century [in Austria] brought back to the surface the opposing assumptions about social integration that had distinguished the Jewish from the non-Jewish sensibility. Annoyed by the parochial attachments of other people, and unreceptive to the idea of a pluralistic state, many non-Jews interpreted the Jewish assertion of pride as a subversion of the “enlightened” or egalitarian state. The Jewish stress on national or racial pride reinforced the non-Jewish perception of the Jew as a disruptive social force. (Klein 1981, 146)

From the perspective developed here, the acceptance of the ideology of an anti-Semitic group strategy among the NSDAP elite may well have been caused or at least greatly facilitated by the presence of Judaism as a very salient and successful racially exclusive antithetical group strategy within German society. In 1905, well before the National Socialists came to power, the anti-Semitic racial theorist Curt Michaelis asserted a relationship between Jewish racial pride (拉森斯托尔茨) and anti-Semitism: “The 拉森斯托尔茨 promotedrace hatred in its sharpest form—the consequence of which is lasting race war. . . . The Jewish people stands principally in battle against the whole world; naturally, therefore, the whole world [is] against the Jews” (in Efron 1994, 170).

There is an eerie sense in which National Socialist ideology was a mirror image of traditional Jewish ideology. As in the case of Judaism, there was a strong emphasis on racial purity and on the primacy of group ethnic interests rather than individual interests. Like the Jews, the National Socialists were greatly concerned with eugenics. Like the Jews, there was a powerful concern with socializing group members into accepting group goals and with the importance of within-group altruism and cooperation in attaining these goals.

Both groups had very powerful internal social controls that punished individuals who violated group goals or attempted to exploit the group by freeloading. The National Socialists enacted a broad range of measures against Jews as a group, including laws against intermarriage and sexual contact, as well as laws preventing socialization between groups and restricting the economic and political opportunities of Jews. These laws were analogous to the elaborate social controls within the Jewish community to prevent social contact with gentiles and to produce high levels of economic and political cooperation.

Corresponding to the religious obligation to reproduce and multiply enshrined in the 塔纳赫, the National Socialists placed a strong emphasis on fertility and enacted laws that restricted abortion and discouraged birth control. In a manner analogous to the traditional Jewish religious obligation to provide dowries for poor girls, the National Socialists enacted laws that enabled needy young couples to marry by providing them loans repayable by having children.

As in the society depicted in the 塔纳赫 and throughout Jewish history, the National Socialists regarded people who could not prove the genetic purity of their ancestry as aliens with fewer rights than Germans, with the result that the position of Jews in National Socialist society was analogous to the position of the 净心 or the Samaritans in ancient Israelite society, or converts in historical Jewish societies, or the Palestinians in contemporary Israel.[149] 净心 were members of a foreign ethnic group living as slaves in ancient Israelite society and thought to be descendants of the peoples displaced by the Israelites in the post-Exodus conquest. As indicated in 创伤后应激障碍 (Chs. 3 and 4), the Samaritans were excluded by the Israelites in the post-Exilic period because of their doubtful racial purity. As with Israel, the state had become the embodiment of an exclusivist ethnic group.

Both groups had a well-developed ideology of historical struggle involving the group. Jewish resistance during the period “was founded on militant movements for Zionism, socialism, or Communism—movements that had always provided their members with a strong sense of historical struggle and an identification with group goals rather than individual satisfaction” (Kren & Rappaport 1980, 114)—clearly a statement that could apply not only to Zionism but to traditional Judaism as a whole. We have seen that the National Socialists had a similar ideology of historical struggle and self-sacrifice. Gordon (1984, 114) states that “it was clearly Hitler’s conception that he was working for group goals—those of the ‘Aryan people’ and that his individual fate mattered little.”

In this regard, Hitler’s attitude that death was the only honorable fate for himself and his followers was entirely similar to that of the Jewish resistors of the period (Gordon 1984, 115). Kren and Rappaport (1980, 217) describe a situation in which “the youth—the best, the most beautiful, the finest that the Jewish people possessed—spoke and thought only about an honorable death . . . befitting an ancient people with a history stretching back over several thousand years.”

The most important common thread of Western anti-Semitism is the development of cohesive groups that mimic in critical ways the features of Judaism as a group evolutionary strategy. A related common thread has been that there is a tendency to shift away from attempts at complete cultural and genetic assimilation of Jews in the early states of group conflict, followed eventually by the rise of collectivist, authoritarian anti-Semitic group strategies aimed at exclusion, expulsion, or genocide when it is clear that efforts at assimilation have failed. I have noted this phenomenon in the case of Germany during the 19th century, and this certainly appears to have been the case in Spain prior to the expulsion of 1492, following the failure of the forced conversions of 1391 and the consequent turmoil of the 15th century. In 12th–13th-century France there was a shift from a policy of toleration combined with attempts to convert Jews under Louis IX to a policy of “convert or depart” during the reign of Philip IV, and finally the expulsion of Jews in 1306 (Jordan 1989, 180). The final expulsion order is also a last plea for Jewish assimilation: “Every Jew must leave my land, taking none of his possessions with him; or, let him choose a new God for himself, and we will become 一个人” (in Jordan 1989, 214; italics in text).

As expected by an evolutionist, a third common thread has been that each Western anti-Semitic movement shows indications of a concern with one-way gene flow from the Jewish to the gentile population. Anti-Jewish writers have often emphasized Jewish males exploiting gentile females (see, e.g., pp. 49, 80n.21, 228). As an elite group, Jewish males in the absence of social controls would tend to have access to gentile females as concubines. There was deep concern in the ancient world regarding Jewish ownership of gentile female slaves. In areas where polygyny and concubinage were legal, there were typically restrictions on Jews being able to have concubines from the dominant religious or ethnic group (e.g., restrictions in Muslim areas preventing Jews from having Muslim but not Christian concubines). Concern about Jewish males exploiting gentile females also figures in laws dating from the period of the Inquisition (see pp. 237–238). In the medieval and early modern world, extending into the 20th century, there was concern in widely separated times and places about Jews employing Christian female domestics. And in late medieval Spain and 19th- and 20th-century Germany there was also concern that elite Jews were marrying their daughters into the gentile nobility while nevertheless retaining the genetic purity of their stem families. In all of these cases, Jewish stem families were able to retain genetic segregation.

The fact that Western societies have typically attempted to convert and assimilate Jews before excluding them indicates that Western societies, unlike prototypical Jewish cultures, do not have a primitive concern with racial purity. Rather, concern about racial purity emerges only in the late stages of Jewish-gentile group conflict and only in the context of a concern about the asymmetrical gene flow from the Jewish to the gentile gene pool.

On the other hand, despite a great deal of commonality among Western anti-Semitic movements, there was a great difference between the universalistic, assimilatory tendencies of traditional Western Christianity and the exclusivistic, racialist program of National Socialism. Indeed, we have seen that beginning in the 19th century an important aspect of German anti-Semitic ideology was a criticism of Western universalism and the development of peculiarly Germanic conceptions of Christianity. A critical component of official National Socialist ideology, as represented in the thought of Alfred Rosenberg, was the idea that “the twin forces of disintegration, namely universalism and individualism, act in perpetual conflict with the Germanic concept of race” (Cecil 1972, 89). In this regard, National Socialism was indeed profoundly anti-Western. In rejecting both universalism and individualism, National Socialism resembled, much more closely than did medieval Western collectivist Christianity, its mirror image rival, Judaism.

While intra-societal conflict between Jews and gentiles tends to be associated with the development of anti-individualist Western societies, the absence of conflict between powerful and impermeable ethnic groups may be a necessary condition for the development of the relatively individualistic Western societies of the post-Enlightenment world. This proposal is highly congruent with the social identity perspective of group conflict: as societies become structured around competing groups, people form strong group allegiances incompatible with individualism. Such a society is incompatible with the notion of individual rights because group interests become paramount: Within the ingroup, individual rights and interests must be sharply curtailed in the interests of group cohesion and the attainment of group interests. The context of between-group competition results in group membership rather than individual behavior or merit becoming the most important criterion of personal assessment. A Manichean morality of ingroup favoritism and outgroup hostility develops that is completely incompatible with individualism.

This hypothesis is consistent with the fact that the Enlightenment and the reemergence of individualism in Western Europe occurred most prominently in England and France, from which Jews had been almost completely excluded, while “the basic fact about German history since the eighteenth century has been the failure of the Enlightenment to take root” (Mosse 1964, 21–22).

It was a failure that was undoubtedly made the more likely by the fact that throughout the entire era, liberal political views were strongly supported by Jews and were perceived as benefiting Jews—a fact that the opponents of these ideas never failed to emphasize. Indeed, a social identity perspective would expect that initially minor differences between the groups (e.g., Jews tending toward liberal internationalism, gentiles toward conservative nationalism) would become increasingly polarized as group conflict escalated. Personal identity would eventually become increasingly demarcated not only by ethnicity but also by political attitudes, with the result that the political beliefs of the opposition become an important, negatively evaluated marker of outgroup membership. For a German, to be a liberal would eventually be tantamount to favoring a negatively perceived outgroup.

Political liberalism was the antithesis of the strong desire of many Germans to develop a powerful, highly cohesive nation. For many anti-Semites, most notably the anti-Semitic 沃尔基舍 intellectuals, such as Paul de LaGarde, negative attitudes toward Jews were intimately intertwined with a loathing of liberalism and unrestrained, irresponsible capitalism, combined with a strong desire for a powerful sense of community (Stern 1961, 64, 66).[150]Interestingly, when de LaGarde visited England in the 1850s, he was very favorably impressed by the unity of the people, the popularity of the monarchy, and the responsible behavior of the aristocracy (Stern 1961, 54). Whether or not he was correct in his judgment, it may well be the case that the muted forms of individualism that have characterized several proto-typical Western societies depend for their success on high levels of social consensus and on social or legal constraints on the individualistic behavior of elites. Indeed, late-19th-century Zionists commonly believed that an important source of opposition to liberalism among gentiles stemmed from the perception that liberalism benefited Jews in competition with gentiles; thus Theodor Herzl believed that “emancipation had placed an intolerably heavy strain on Austrian liberals, who had to defend an economic system that eased the way for recent outsiders into positions of prominence” (Kornberg 1993, 180).

The hypothesis that individualism is incompatible with group-based conflict is also consistent with Américo Castro’s (1954, 497; see also Castro 1971) perspective that the Enlightenment could not develop in a Spain fraught with competition between ethnic groups: “From such premises it was impossible that there should be derived any kind of modern state, the sequel, after all, of the Middle Ages’ hierarchic harmony.” Similarly, Grayzel (1933, 83) comments that the exclusion of Jews from Christian society, which was the focus of ecclesiastical policy in the 13th century, might have occurred even in the absence of the Church’s actions; another factor besides religious difference that he argues might have led to exclusion was racial: “The Jews persistently refused to mingle their blood with that of their gentile neighbors at a time when racial intermingling was laying the foundations of the modern national state.”

The implication is that the Western tradition of muted individualism and its concomitant democratic and republican political institutions are unlikely to survive the escalation of intrasocietal group-based competition for resources that is such a prominent theme of contemporary American society. I have previously quoted Pulzer’s (1964, 327) comment, “The Jew could flourish only in the sort of classical Liberal society that existed in Western Europe and that the late nineteenth century had introduced to Central Europe.” While Judaism flourishes in a classical liberal, individualist society, ultimately Judaism is incompatible with such a society, since it unleashes powerful group-based competition for resources within the society, which in turn lead to highly collectivist gentile movements incompatible with individualism. It is also noteworthy that the 19th-century liberal critics of Judaism typically assumed that it would disappear as a result of complete cultural and genetic assimilation—a sort of tacit understanding that a liberal society required a fairly high degree of cultural uniformity.

My view, which I elaborate in 批判文化, is thatWestern societies have a tendency to seek an equilibrium state of hierarchic harmony among the social classes in which there are powerful controls on extreme individualism among the elite classes. This tendency toward hierarchic harmony—a paradigmatic feature of the Christian Middle Ages—combined with assimilationism and individualism has been a powerful force in breaking down barriers within society. The difficulty for a group strategy like Judaism is that, if assimilation fails, the Western tendencies toward universalism and individualism are abandoned. From this perspective, it is no accident that the National Socialist theorist Alfred Rosenberg regarded the Western concepts of universalism and individualism as anathema: Both concepts were incompatible with National Socialism as a closed ethnic group strategy. It is in this sense that the individualist, universalist strands of Western culture are indeed incompatible with Judaism.

Finally, given the Western tendency toward “muted individualism” and hierarchic harmony, there is the suggestion that in the absence of a hated and feared outgroup such as the Jews, there would be a tendency toward decomposition of collectivist, authoritarian social structures in the West. From this perspective, the apparently primitive Western tendency toward a significant degree of individualism, possibly deriving ultimately from a unique ancestral environment (see 创伤后应激障碍, Ch. 8), results in an inertial tendency toward assimilatory, reproductively egalitarian, and moderately individualistic societies. However, these tendencies may be altered in the direction of authoritarian collectivism under conditions of perceived intrasocietal group-based competition, as discussed throughout this and the previous two chapters.

It has been noted that National Socialism was characterized by a significant degree of within-group egalitarianism. This tendency toward within-group egalitarianism can also be seen in the conscious attempt to portray Hitler as an idealistic, ascetic hero who tirelessly pursued group interests rather than his own interests. This portrayal of Hitler had some basis in reality well before he came to power, and it later became a prominent feature of National Socialist propaganda (Bracher 1970, 66). Clearly, a fundamental feature of National Socialism was the belief that within the group there would be significant reciprocity, cooperation, even altruism, and that differences in rank would not be closely tied to variation in the markers of reproductive success.

From an evolutionary perspective under conditions of exogamy, the appeal of a group strategy is likely to be increased by the belief that other members of the group, and especially the leaders, are personally ascetic. In a despotic situation, lower-status males are more likely to perceive themselves as exploited by upper-status males and as benefiting little from cooperation or altruism. Self-sacrifice and voluntary cooperation in such a situation are expected to be minimal because the benefits of such behavior are more likely to accrue to the despot while the costs are borne by the lower-status males. At the extreme, if the lower-status male is a slave, cooperation and self-sacrifice are expected to only occur as the result of coercion (see also 创伤后应激障碍，Ch。 1）。

The appeal of asceticism among leaders would be expected to increase dramatically in a situation where the group as a whole has relatively little genetic cohesiveness. I propose that because of the low degree of genetic relatedness within the society, cohesive and anti-individualistic Western group strategies tend to be characterized by leaders who accept asceticism, celibacy, or in general do not have relatively high reproductive success compared to the others in the movement. As indicated in 创伤后应激障碍 (Chs. 6, 8), the high levels of endogamy and consanguinity of Jewish groups are an important aspect of Judaism as a group evolutionary strategy, because they result in individual fitness being correlated with group success. Individual Jews are therefore expected to be much more tolerant of large differences in resources and reproductive success within the Jewish community and more tolerant of the authoritarian political structure of the traditional Jewish community; this is the case not only because they benefit from Jewish charity, but also because they benefit genetically to a considerable extent when other Jews succeed.

However, in an exogamous, assimilative Western society, lower-status individuals benefit less from the success of upper status individuals. A significant degree of personal asceticism in leaders may therefore be necessary in order to obtain the allegiance of the lower orders. The suggestion, then, is that ultimately exogamy and genetic assimilationism are the reasons that reproductive egalitarianism tends to be characteristic of Western collectivist movements. As reviewed in MacDonald (1995b), there has indeed been a strong trend toward reproductive leveling in Western societies beginning in the Middle Ages. The Franciscan and Dominican friars who spearheaded the anti-Semitism and collectivist tendencies of the medieval period also led ascetic lives despite their origins in the middle and upper-middle classes. Their activities appear to have been critical to the development of the intense religious fervor and commitment characteristic of all levels of medieval society—an integral component of the societas Christiana. For example, Lawrence (1994, 126) notes that “the voluntary poverty and self-imposed destitution that identified the early Mendicants with the humblest and most deprived sections of the population, in loud contrast to the careerism and ostentation of the secular clergy and the corporate wealth and exclusiveness of the monasteries, moved the conscience and touched the generosity of commercial communities.”

St. Francis and St. Dominic . . . gave to the Church a new form of religious life, which had an immense and permanent appeal, and one which both attracted a new type of recruit and in its turn inspired an apostalate to the laity, to the heretic and to the heathen. Not only did the appearance of the friars rescue the western church from its drift toward heresy and schism, but the new warmth of devotional life, the preaching, the confessing and the daily counsel of the friars gave a new strength to the lower level of Christian society and indirectly acted as a powerful agent of spiritual growth and social union, thus inevitably compensating for the growing power of legalism and political motives at the higher levels of church life. (Knowles & Obolensky 1968, 345)

Moreover, while Western medieval reproductive altruism occurred as an aspect of commitment to a collectivist group, reproductive leveling continued after the collapse of the medieval church (MacDonald 1995b) and continues in contemporary individualistic and democratic Western societies. Thus the sex lives of the presidents of the United States are closely scrutinized for suggestions that they have not been monogamous. And even if public figures engage in non-monogamous sex, they do it clandestinely, since it would be political suicide to publicize the fact and take pride in it.

As in the case of Judaism, therefore, but for somewhat different reasons, the group must be viewed as an important level of adaptation in conceptualizing historical Western societies.

The foregoing suggests a theoretical association between exogamy and egalitarianism that transcends the individualism/collectivism dichotomy which has been central to my treatment. Political coalition building in exogamous societies tends to result in attempts at egalitarian social controls on the leadership, because lower-status males have a powerful interest in controlling the reproductive behavior of the elite. Such attempts may not succeed, so that a despotism is always a possibility. Nevertheless, exogamy implies that lower-status individuals do not benefit from the reproductive success of the elite, and as a result popular support of either individualist or collectivist political entities is facilitated by reproductive egalitarianism.

Phenotypic Resemblance: Crypsis

We decree that Jews who have become Christians in appearance only, but secretly keep the Sabbath and observe other Jewish customs, shall not be permitted to join in communion or prayer or even to enter the church, but let them openly be Hebrews according to their religion. Their children shall not be baptized nor shall they purchase or possess a slave. (Canon 8 of the Council of Nicaea II [a.d. 787]; in Gilchrist 1969, 157)

And what will it profit our lord and king to pour holy water on the Jews, calling them by our names, Pedro or Pablo, while they keep their faith like Akiba or Tarfon? . . . Know, Sire, that Judaism is one of the incurable diseases. (Comments of a fictional Spanish-Jewish refugee after being forcibly baptized in Portugal in 1497, from Solomon Ibn Verga Sefer Shevet Yehudah, in Yerushalmi 1991, 32)

The data summarized in 创伤后应激障碍 (Ch. 4) indicate that there has been a powerful trend for Jews in traditional societies to maximize phenotypic differences between themselves and host populations, by a variety of segregative practices. Nevertheless, there are many instances in which Jews themselves have minimized these differences.

A particularly interesting example is crypsis. When threatened by severe sanctions, Jews have “converted” to other religions, practicing Judaism in secret and ultimately becoming overtly Jewish again when the threat had passed. Crypsis is “as old as the Jew himself” (Prinz 1973, 1). Indeed, there is a long tradition within Judaism that highly prizes the tradition of crypto-Judaism. In his preface to the 1932 edition of his work History of the Marranos, Sir Cecil Roth (1974, xxiii–xxiv) wrote of the “incredible romance” of the history of the Marranos, “the submerged life which blossomed out at intervals into such exotic flowers; the unique devotion which could transmit the ancestral ideals unsullied, from generation to generation, despite the Inquisition and its horrors.”

Indeed, there is some indication that the ideological basis of crypto-Judaism can be found in standard interpretations of the Book of Esther, in which Esther marries King Ahasuerus but secretly retains her Jewish identity and ultimately saves her people.[152]Pakter (1992, 719) notes that there is a tradition of oblique criticism of the Book of Esther because of the marriage of Esther to Ahasuerus. Even a marriage to a foreigner that resulted in Jewish deliverance was viewed negatively. The phrase, “Esther had not made known her people nor her kindred” (Est. 2:10) was especially valued by the crypto-Jews during the period of the Inquisition (Beinart 1971b, 472). The tradition of crypto-Judaism also sometimes appears as part of contemporary Jewish education, as described by Freedland (1978): Jewish schoolchildren reenact the experience of practicing Jewish rituals in secret (admitted to this exercise only after providing a password), saying prayers under their breath.

The first instance given by Roth (1974) occurred during the 5th-century b.c. Zoroastrian persecution in Persia, and the phenomenon occurred as recently as World War II (Begley 1991). Jewish crypsis occurred under Byzantine rule (Avi-Yonah 1984, 254–255) and in medieval Germany, England, and France (Chazan 1987, 101; Roth 1978, 83; Baron 1973, 111). Crypto-Jews have existed for centuries in several areas of the Muslim world (e.g., the Daggatun of the Sahara, the Donmeh of Salonica, and the Jedidim of Persia). In at least one instance, the government simply gave up the effort at forcible assimilation. Lewis (1984, 152) describes cryptic Jews in Muslim Persia during the 18th century following a forced conversion. These individuals were eventually allowed to return to Judaism. In the words of a French traveler, “They [the Muslim authorities] found that what external professions so ever they made of Mahometanism, they still practised Judaism; so that there was a necessity of suffering them to be again bad Jews, since they could not make good Muslims out of them.”

Jews have also adopted crypsis in order to take advantage of economic opportunities. There are many examples of temporary deception, such as Jewish traders posing as gentiles in order to avoid taxes levied on Jews in Arab countries (Stillman 1979), Poland (Weinryb 1972; Hundert 1986), and the Roman Empire (Grant 1973, 225). Reflecting these practices, in the early 5th century the Theodosian Code (CTh 16.8.23) prohibited conversions of convenience by Jews attempting to avoid prosecution for crimes and for avoiding compulsory public services, and in 787 the Council of Nicaea II prohibited such individuals from owning Christian slaves (in Gilchrist 1969, 157). Marrano traders posed as Christians when in Christian countries but revealed their Judaism when in the Ottoman Empire (Pullan 1983, 193). Individuals from the same extended family would represent themselves as sincere New Christians in Portugal, as Christian Portuguese in France, and as Jews in Holland, Italy, and the Ottoman Empire (Yerushalmi 1971, 17). There have also been examples of lifelong deception, in which an individual, typically a powerful person, “converts” but continues to associate with Jews and furthers their causes. Fischel (1937) gives the example of Ya’qub ben Killis in the medieval Islamic period who underwent a conversion of convenience, continued to associate with Jews, and appointed Jews to responsible posts in his administration.

In Europe prior to emancipation, “conversion” to Christianity was often perceived, in Heinrich Heine’s words, as the “entrance ticket to European civilization,” the baptized person becoming in effect a crypto-Jew. “Most Jews who now converted to Christianity did so simply as a mode of qualifying for social and professional positions in society, with little interest in Christianity 本身 and, as often as not, without really relinquishing their family and social ties with the Jewish community” (Carlebach 1978, 32). Meyer (1989, 36) notes that Jews who converted to Christianity “often associated almost exclusively with fellow converts. In Germany they were referred to as Taufjuden, baptized Jews. They had not really become Christians but had taken on a borderline identity in which they still feared the verdict of the Gentile.” Ruppin (1934, 331) also notes a similarly motivated pattern in which Jewish parents would baptize their children in infancy while retaining their own religious status.

The conversions of several famous people were apparently conversions of convenience. For example, Heinrich Heine’s baptism does not seem to have been accompanied by any religious feelings, and a year later he complained that he regretted it, because it had not held any benefits for him. Within a few years his writing exhibited very negative attitudes toward Christianity. Christianity was “a gloomy, sanguinary religion for criminals” (in Sammons 1979, 148), a religion that repressed the healthy sensuality of antiquity. Heine developed a strong Jewish consciousness toward the end of his life, as indicated by his late work 罗马零 and his statement that “I make no secret of my Judaism, to which I have not returned, because I have not left it” (in Rose 1990, 167). As a rule, Jewish identification has typically been most intense during periods of anti-Semitism, and, “whenever Jews were threatened—whether in Hamburg during the Hep-Hep riots [of 1819] or in Damascus at the time of the ritual murder accusation [1840]—Heine at once felt solidarity with his people” (Prawer 1983, 762). In his later years Heine referred to himself as a Jew and developed a biological conception of Judaism (See Chapter 5).

Such individuals often retained a “residual solidarity, if not with the community of origin, at any rate with fellow ‘marranos’ ” (Mosse 1989, 335). Lichten (1986) describes the case of an individual who converted at age fifteen and benefited from the lack of economic restrictions on Christians but remained an advocate of Jewish causes and stated in his will that “I was my whole life a Jew, and I die as a Jew” (p. 113). Mosse notes that baptized Jews maintained informal social and business networks that resulted in marriages with other baptized Jews and Jewish families who had not changed their surface religion. While baptized Jews of the 高级资产阶级 被犹太人视为可接受的婚姻伴侣 高级资产阶级, 外邦人 高级资产阶级 were not. Thus genetic ancestry rather than social class or surface religion made a difference in marriage decisions. Indeed, Mosse states his impression that the “earlier sharp distinctions between unbaptized and baptized Jews appear with time to have become somewhat blurred” (p. 133), suggesting that the baptized individuals were eventually re-absorbed into the Jewish community rather than into the gentile community. Carlebach notes that these “converts” were subjected to a great deal of ridicule and contempt by gentiles, presumably because they were perceived as deceivers. The suggestion is that this type of conversion increased anti-Semitism.

However, the most important historical examples of Jewish crypsis come from Spain and Portugal (Beinart 1971a,b, 1981; Contraras 1991, 1992; Lea 1906–1907; Roth 1937, 1974). Crypsis occurred under the Christian Visigoths in the 7th century, under the Muslim Almohades during 12th and 13th centuries, and reached its greatest heights after the forced conversions of 1391 in Christian Spain. In both of the cases involving Christian authorities, crypto-Judaism occurred after a period of mass forced conversion, a rapid ascendancy of crypto-Jews to the highest ranks of society (see 创伤后应激障碍, Ch. 5), and, as a direct consequence, the development of political institutions intended to expose crypto-Judaism when gentiles realized that attempts to assimilate the Jews forcibly had not succeeded.

The Inquisition, established in 1481, was “the result of conditions which arose in Spain following the forced conversion movement. . . . All the methods that had been employed in the 15th century to prise the converts away from their Jewish education and surroundings—whether by ousting the Jews from the mixed [Jewish-New Christian] neighborhoods or by their expulsion from the country—had failed. The Conversos were, and remained, Jews at heart, and their Judaism was expressed in their way of life and their outlook” (Beinart 1981, 23). The New Christians were “Jews in all but name, and Christians in nothing but form” (Roth 1937, 27; see also Baron 1969, 3ff; 1973, 161ff; Johnson 1988, 225–228).

Beinart (1981; see also Hordes 1991; Lazar 1991b; Roth 1995, 70) provides evidence for elaborate deceptions used by the New Christians in order to continue to observe many of the 613 commandments that constituted the 米茨沃特 during this period, including circumcision, observance of the Sabbath, marriage customs (including having Jews witness the marriage), and burial rites. Children were told of their special status around the age of puberty, and intermarriage with other New Christians was practiced. For its part, the Inquisition developed a long list of practices by which crypto-Jews could be recognized, including the performance of Jewish Mitzvot and perfunctory participation in Christian rites. Baron (1973, 162) shows that Jews from Holland and France traveled surreptitiously to Spain and Portugal during the late 17th century to instruct the New Christians in Jewish ritual and encourage them to emigrate to safer regions.[153]Other interesting tidbits: Roth (1995, 235) describes examples of monks born of Converso parents who made up fantastic stories to explain why they appeared to have been circumcised. The Converso historian Palencia states that prior to the anti-Converso riots of 1473 in Cordova, the Conversos, believing that they were protected by a large army, openly disparaged Christianity and performed Jewish rituals (Netanyahu 1995, 800). When Byzantium fell to the Turks in 1453, many Conversos believed that the Messiah had come and that they could soon resume their overt identities as Jews (Baer 1961, II, 292). During this period, the Conversos openly acknowledged their ancestry and commonly asserted that it was superior to that of gentiles (Contraras 1991, 134). Converso writers living outside the Peninsula developed apologia for crypto-Judaism; the Converso Bachelor Alfonso de la Torre (d. 1485) wrote a book containing instructions for Jewish practice, camouflaged as a Christian catechism (Faur 1992, 30). When the book was republished in Amsterdam in 1623 the Christian material was omitted.

Moreover, many wealthy New Christians and their descendants openly practiced Judaism after leaving the Peninsula (e.g., Boyajian 1983; Yerushalmi 1971). Groups of New Christians immediately established openly Jewish communities in Amsterdam, Hamburg, Bordeaux, Italy, and many other areas after leaving the Peninsula, and New Christians in Brazil immediately emerged as Jews after the Dutch conquest. These families had extensive kinship and mercantile ties with Sephardic mercantile families around the world, and some had preserved their Jewish names after many generations and re-adopted them after they left.

In addition, some of those who escaped the Inquisition lived as crypto-Jews in France beginning in the 15th century, and also in Germany, the Netherlands, and England in the 16th century at a time when Judaism was officially proscribed. Some crypto-Jews remained in France even after the edict of expulsion of 1615; Portuguese Marranos living in France changed their pose of Christianity only at the turn of the 18th century, although in the 17th century there had been complaints that Jews were trading among the French “with no distinguishing marks” (in Baron 1973, 110). Some returned to England in the latter part of the 16th century posing as Calvinist refugees. The crypto-Jews, who were said by a contemporary to be attending mass and receiving the Eucharist (Baron 1973, 139), were expelled from England in 1609 after an internal quarrel alerted the authorities to their existence, but they gradually returned, this time posing as Catholics, removing their disguise only after official negotiations under Cromwell. Crypto-Jews who were refugees from the Iberian Peninsula were also targets of inquisitions in Italy if they failed to adopt a Jewish identity on arriving (Pullan 1983).

The New Christians were perceived by the Iberians not as an atomistic set of individuals but as a cohesive national/ethnic group; Yerushalmi (1971, 21), after emphasizing the ethnic character of the Jewish nation living in exile in the Peninsula, notes that the fundamental difficulty addressed by the Inquisition was “the continuing existence in the Peninsula of a metamorphosed Jewish “国家’which was basic to the very possibility of a 变质 “犹太教,’ in whatever form that might assume” (italics in text).

The “groupness” of the New Christians was obvious to all:

Yet while the convert abandoned his people, his peoplehood did not abandon him. It was reflected in many of his characteristics, the product of numerous factors—ethnic, social, environmental and educational—that had influenced Jewish life for centuries. These were essentially 犹太 characteristics; and although assimilation had somewhat dimmed them, they could still be discerned in the Jewish convert even decades after his conversion. . . . [W]hen masses of Jews were converted at the same time, each of them saw himself within his people and by no means as one who had forsaken it. In Spain, where these converts or their great majority lived for many years in boroughs of their own, this feeling of communion was kept alive as long as the process of assimilation had not destroyed, or seriously affected, the collective fabric. Also many characteristics of the Jew and his life-style, which even isolated converts retained for many years, were guarded for much larger periods in the converso communities. As a result, the converso could still be recognized—even several generations after his ancestors’ conversion—by his Jewish appearance, his habits and mannerisms, his attitudes and reactions, as well as his views on a variety of issues. In consequence, in the middle of the 15th century (and no doubt in many cases even later) the great majority of the New Christians in Spain had not yet shaken off the shadow of their past; and the result of this fact was the consciousness of their “otherness” that determined the attitude of their neighbors. (Netanyahu 1995, 993–994; italics in text)

There was undoubtedly a wide variation among the New Christians in their religious beliefs and the extent to which they retained Jewish religious observances—a fact that has resulted in continuing controversy and a large mass of both contemporary and modern apologetic literature (see Chapter 7). Nevertheless, the central fact about the Inquisition is that the New Christians continued to exist as visible groups within Iberian society. They were organized as a set of endogamous, interlocking family clans characterized by high levels of within-group cooperation and patronage in pursuit of economic and political goals (Contraras 1991, 1992; Hordes 1991; Yerushalmi 1971, 18). Indeed, as has been common throughout Jewish history, especially in traditional societies (see also 创伤后应激障碍, Chs. 5 and 6), the spectacular economic success of the New Christians was conditioned ultimately on the “organic solidity of the kinship ties” (Contraras 1991, 140) and (at least prior to the onset of the Inquisition) on their being patronized by a gentile ruling elite, who utilized them as an intermediary between themselves and a subject population (see Chapter 2).

In Spain, the Inquisition ultimately had the intended effect. The New Christians were persecuted, and the unconverted Jews were expelled in 1492. Nevertheless, even at the beginning of the 17th century, well over a century after the beginning of the Inquisition, Jews and gentile Spaniards were still fighting for supremacy: “The remnants of the Jewish caste were attacked by the Inquisition through the New Christians of Jewish ancestry, while the real Spanish Jews helped to worsen the international situation of Christian Spain from Turkey, Holland, and, later, from England” (Castro 1971, 244; see also Contraras 1991, 132). Indeed, persecutions for Judaizing actually increased in the first decades of the 18th century; in the period from 1721 to 1727 there were sixty-four autos de fé involving 820 individuals accused of Judaizing (Haliczer 1990, 233). Vestiges of crypto-Judaism can still be found in the Iberian Peninsula (Haliczer 1987), and crypto-Jews never disappeared entirely from Spanish America (Baron 1973, 372).[154]The Portuguese New Christians were also very tenacious. The great majority of them descended from Spanish Jews who had been expelled from Spain after refusing to become New Christians at the time of the expulsion of 1492, suggesting that many in this group were very resolute in their commitment to Judaism (Yerushalmi 1971, 5). Although the Portuguese Inquisition was largely successful in suppressing crypto-Judaism both in the Peninsula and the New World (Lea 1906–1907; Roth 1974), the last regular synagogue was discovered in 1706 in Lisbon, and crypto-Jews were discovered periodically in the 18th century. Several communities of crypto-Jews came to light in Portugal in the 20th century; Hordes (1991, 213) describes a group of “Hispanic Catholics” in contemporary New Mexico who continue to marry among themselves and preserve several remnants of Jewish religious practices.

A less extreme form of crypsis de-emphasizes or discontinues traditional phenotypic traits that provoke hostility while at the same time retaining the essential genetic and cultural separatism central to traditional Judaism. In 创伤后应激障碍 (Ch. 4) it was noted that a powerful trend since the Enlightenment has been to minimize phenotypic features such as special Jewish languages, modes of dress, styles of hair, and ways of gesturing that have sharply distinguished Jews from gentiles in traditional societies. There is a “dynamic—albeit contradictory—process in modern Jewish life between efforts to decrease visibility in order to reduce hostility to the group and the need for public perpetuation and legitimization of the Jewish religion and community. . . . Much of the content of American Jewish culture can be seen as an outcome of different strategies of image management” (Zenner 1991, 141).

I propose that this attempt to maintain separatism while nevertheless making the barriers less visible is the crux of the problem for post-Enlightenment Judaism. A good example is the Reform Judaism movement. While never abandoning the ideology of genetic separatism, the Reform movement, beginning in the 19th century, has de-emphasized the appearance of differences between Judaism and other religions in order to alter negative images of Jews held by gentiles (Endelman 1991, 195).

Reform Judaism in contemporary societies may thus be viewed as a “semi-cryptic” Jewish strategy, which like other religious forms of Judaism acts as a “protective coloring” (Elazar 1980, 9) adopted because “it is a legitimate way to maintain differences when organic ways [i.e., assertions of ethnic peoplehood] are suspect” (Elazar 1980, 23). As Katz (1986, 32) notes, “The definition of the Jewish community as a purely religious unit was, of course, a sham from the time of its conception.” While Judaism in other parts of the world was and remains openly ethnic, Reform Judaism in the West developed a religious veneer because of its usefulness in facilitating perceptions of surface similarity with other, non-ethnic religions, while in Israel the Reform movement is virtually non-existent because the need for protective coloring is not present.

Reform Jews hoped to retain traditional genetic and cultural separatism but “as to outward appearances, [they would] differ from any Christian church to no greater degree than did the various Christian denominations among themselves” (Patai 1971, 37–38).[155]Although many Jews in post-emancipation Germany attempted to suppress Jewish expressions and patterns of intonation, they were not entirely successful. One component of anti-Semitic writings, particularly those of Wagner, was the charge that Jews could not speak any European language without betraying their group identity. Katz (1985, 98) states the charge of continued linguistic peculiarity “had some basis in reality,” and he also suggests that Jews made attempts to suppress their linguistic peculiarities much more when talking to gentiles, while continuing to retain Jewish overtones to their speech in the company of other Jews. Such a situation suggests deception, since the suppression of linguistic peculiarity would appear to be in the service of de-emphasizing Jewish identification in the presence of gentiles, while within-group linguistic peculiarity continued its age-old function as a badge of group membership. As the Reform Rabbi Isaac M. Wise (1819–1900) stated, “Whatever makes us ridiculous before the world as it now is, may safely be and should be abolished” (in Patai 1971, 38).[156]These trends are not restricted to recent times. Rabinowitz (1938, 243) notes that the Jews of medieval France abandoned several traditional practices out of concern not to appear ridiculous to Christians. Religious services and weddings became more solemn and dignified in order to make them more similar to many Christian services (Meyer 1988, 35–36, 169–170). One disaffected French Jew complained that “what his co-religionists desired above all was for Gentile visitors at their service to exclaim with satisfaction: ‘Why it’s like our own!’ ” (in Meyer 1988, 171).[157]Other examples: Physical rituals were minimized, especially ones that were raucous and “primitive” (such as flagellation on the day before Yom Kippur). The traditional goal of resuming animal sacrifices in the restored Temple was abandoned. Vernacular languages were increasingly used, and the organ was widely introduced to religious services in imitation of the Christian practice. The effort to blend in sometimes coincided with continued expressions of separatism. For example, the synagogues built in Germany during the period of liturgical reform from 1850 to 1880 tended toward Moorish style, “in effect declaring that political and cultural integration did not require abdication of origins; the synagogue did not have to resemble the Church” (Meyer 1988, 183).

Jews have sometimes avowed religious belief in order to escape the charges of Jewish nationalism—another example of the role of religion as a “protective coloring” for Jewish ethnic/national interests. In the World War I era in Germany, “liberal laymen . . . were in the mass irreversibly secularized Jews, who called themselves religious principally to escape suspicion that their Judaism might be national” (Meyer 1988, 212). Similarly, during the negotiations on the peace treaty ending World War I, the anti-Zionist Henry Morgenthau pressed President Wilson on wording of the treaty: “Any clause in the peace treaty which denoted or connoted the Jews as anything other than a religious sect was anathema to him” (Frommer 1978, 157). This conflicted with the views of the American Jewish Congress (AJCongress) and Eastern European Jews, who favored granting Jews political and cultural autonomy as a separate nation within Eastern European societies. As one Eastern European delegate said, “Jews are a nation, not a religious sect and we wish the world to know it” (in Frommer 1978, 147).[158]Similarly, in 1920 Jewish leaders attempting to oppose restrictions on Jewish immigration argued that Jews should be classified not as a race but as a religion. This ideology of Judaism was designed to make Jewish immigration more appealing to gentiles, but in making this assertion they had to contend with the fact that many Jews at the time, especially Zionists, viewed Judaism as a racial group (Panitz 1969, 56).

A more extreme form of this tendency is to deny the reality of the Jewish group entirely. For example, a highly influential essay written in 1893, at the height of an outbreak of anti-Semitism in Germany, not only emphasized the exclusively religious nature of Judaism but portrayed Jewish group ties as completely analogous to those among Catholics and Protestants. Jews were portrayed as engaging in political action solely as individuals and as subject to moral judgment only as individuals (see Schorsch 1972, 108; see also Chapter 8).

Interestingly, the attempt to emphasize phenotypic similarity in the context of continued separatism was not always successful, presumably because it was perceived as little more than deception. The proto-Zionist Moses Hess wrote in 1840 that “it is not the old-type of pious Jew that is most despised but the modern Jew . . . who denies his nationality while the hand of fate presses heavily on his own people. The beautiful phrases about humanity and enlightenment which he employs as a cloak for his treason . . . will ultimately not protect him from public opinion (in Frankel 1981, 12). Writing of the upsurge in anti-Semitism in Germany in the late 19th century, Meyer (1988, 202) notes that anti-Semites focused their hatred most on the non-Orthodox Jews, “since they were the least conspicuously Jewish, yet persisted in maintaining a purposeful religious differentiation.” Indeed, there is some indication that the German public ceased thinking of Jews in religious terms at all in the latter part of the 19th century (Mosse 1989, 224).

A particularly interesting example of the flexibility of Jewish identity is the shift by the Jewish leadership away from the traditional ideology of Judaism as a nation in exile, to an ideology that Judaism is nothing more than a community of religious faith as a common response to the Enlightenment, then to a resurgence of an ideology of Judaism as an ethnic group and advocacy of cultural pluralism in the period following World War II in America and other Western societies. Harup (1972) notes that the return to an ideology of ethnic peoplehood was at least partly a result of declining anti-Semitism, and this makes excellent theoretical sense. We have seen that a common Jewish strategy during periods of anti-Semitism is to adopt varying forms of crypsis, but the converse is also true. During periods of minimal anti-Semitism, Jews benefit from an ideology that Judaism constitutes an ethnic group, because such an ideology is ideal for rationalizing and openly advocating an interest in Jewish group commitment and genetic non-assimilation. Indeed, I would suppose that in the absence of anti-Semitism there would be a resurgence of traditional Judaism, complete with separate languages, different types of clothing, etc., which would very clearly mark off the Jewish ingroup from the surrounding society. Such a strategy would be ideal for maintaining group cohesion and solidarity, but it would also render Judaism thoroughly visible to gentiles and thus tend to increase anti-Semitism. The best strategy for Judaism is to maximize the ethnic, particularistic aspects of Judaism within the limits necessary to prevent these aspects from resulting in anti-Semitism. But at least in Western societies, such a strategy involves walking a very fine line and being very flexibly responsive to changes in external contingencies (see Chapter 9).

In a statement that would apply to Jewish responses to anti-Semitism throughout history, Lindemann (1991, 279) portrays Jews “individually and collectively, as active agents, as modern, responsible, and flawed human beings, not merely as passive martyrs or as uncomprehending objects of impersonal forces.” In general, Jews have been flexible strategizers in the political arena. The effectiveness of Jewish strategizing has been facilitated by the fact that Judaism is a high-investment group evolutionary strategy, and particularly by the fact that the IQ of Ashkenazi Jews is at least one standard deviation above the Caucasian mean (创伤后应激障碍, Ch. 7). For example, Jewish influence on United States immigration policy was facilitated by Jewish wealth, education, and social status (Neuringer 1971, 87). The main Jewish activist organization influencing immigration policy, the AJCommittee, was characterized by “strong leadership, internal cohesion, well-funded programs, sophisticated lobbying techniques, well-chosen non-Jewish allies, and good timing” (Goldstein 1990, 333). In all historical eras, Jews as a group have been highly organized, highly intelligent, and politically astute, and they have been able to command a high level of financial, political, and intellectual resources in pursuing their group goals.

A very wide array of political strategies have been pursued with varying success. Jews in traditional Poland responded to anti-Semitism with such strategies as physical defense, attempts to fill indispensable functions for the king, cultivation of friendly personal relationships with the powerful, and payment of bribes and protection money. This led to the perception among Polish writers that Jews controlled the nobility and the political process (Goldberg 1986, 49–51; Weinryb 1972).[159]Similarly, Jews pursued an array of strategies to avoid or mitigate the Spanish and Portuguese Inquisitions, including armed resistance, assassinations, personal relationships with the powerful, political efforts (particularly the effort to obtain Portuguese independence from Spain), bribes and gifts, and manipulating the attitudes of the powerful (“propaganda”) (Roth 1974, 69; see also Beinart 1981; Lea 1906–1907).

Jews engaged in a very wide range of activities to combat anti-Semitism in Germany in the period from 1870 to 1914, including the formation of self-defense committees (e.g., the Zentralverein deutscher Staatsbürger jüdischen Glaubens whose name—Central Association of German Citizens of Jewish Faith—was meant to suggest that Jews constitute a community of religious faith), lobbying the government, utilizing and influencing the legal system (e.g., taking advantage of libel and slander laws to force anti-Jewish organizations into bankruptcy), writing apologias and tracts for distribution to the masses of gentile Germans, and funding organizations opposed to anti-Semitism that were not overtly Jewish (Ragins 1980, 23ff).

A major consequence of these activities was to make anti-Semitism a disreputable, unsavory enterprise. The Zentralverein successfully pursued legal actions against every major anti-Jewish leader, with the result that not only were there severe financial repercussions for the anti-Semitic movement, but, more importantly, because of the high prestige of the legal system among Wilhelminian Germans, convicted individuals lost their status among large segments of the public and even within the anti-Semitic movement itself (Levy 1975, 158–159). Similarly the Zentralverein commissioned writings in opposition to “scientific anti-Semitism,” as exemplified by academically respectable publications that portrayed Judaism in negative terms. The Zentralverein monitored academic works for such material and sometimes succeeded in banning offending books and getting publishers to alter offensive passages. The result was to render such ideas academically and intellectually disreputable.

Similar examples are provided in Chapter 2 where it was mentioned that a theme of anti-Semitism has been that Jewish organizations have used their power to make the discussion of Jewish interests off limits, and that individuals who had made remarks critical of Jews were forced to make public apologies and suffered professional difficulties as a result. In recent cases illustrating this theme, the ADL successfully pressured St. Martin’s Press to rescind publication of David Irving’s biography of Goebbels (“华盛顿邮报”, April 4, 1996) after an article by editorial columnist Frank Rich condemning the book appeared in the “纽约时报” （四月3，1996）。[160]Jewish academics were also successful in getting the American Historical Association (AHA) to condemn the idea that the Holocaust never happened or has been greatly exaggerated, and recently the AHA rejected the thesis that Jews were disproportionately involved in the Atlantic slave trade or as exploiters of slaves, as maintained by the book 黑人与犹太人之间的秘密关系, published by the Nation of Islam (洛杉矶时报, B12, February 18, 1995). The ADL also pressured the American Psychological Association to defer presenting a lifetime achievement award to Dr. Raymond B. Cattell because of Cattell’s alleged “commitment to racial supremacy theories” (“纽约时报”，15年1997月XNUMX日）。[161]Noam Chomsky, the famous MIT linguist, describes his experience with the ADL:

In the United States a rather effective system of intimidation has been developed to silence critique. . . . Take the Anti-Defamation League. . . . It’s actually an organization devoted to trying to defame and intimidate and silence people who criticize current Israeli policies, whatever they may be. For example, I myself, through a leak in the new England office of the Anti-Defamation League, was able to obtain a copy of my file there. It’s 150 pages, just like an FBI file, [consisting of] interoffice memos warning that I’m going to show up here and there, surveillance of talks that I give, comments and alleged transcripts of talks . . . [T]his material has been circulated [and] . . . would be sent to some local group which would use it to extract defamatory material which would then be circulated, usually in unsigned pamphlets outside the place where I’d be speaking. . . . If there’s any comment in the press which they regard as insufficiently subservient to the party line, there’ll be a flood of letters, delegations, protests, threats to withdraw advertising, etc. The politicians of course are directly subjected to this, and they are also subjected to substantial financial penalties if they don’t go along. . . . This totally one-sided pressure and this, by now, very effective system of vilification, lying, defamation, and judicious use of funds in the political system . . . has created a highly biased approach to the whole matter. (Chomsky 1988, 642–3)

The AJCommittee has also engaged in a wide range of activities to minimize anti-Semitism and pursue Jewish interests, including writing and distributing articles on the situation in czarist Russia, the fraudulent nature of the 锡安长老的礼节, and the benefits of immigration. Position papers were prepared on Jewish life in Eastern Europe prior to requesting intervention by the American government. Scholarly treatises were prepared in an effort to emphasize Jewish contributions to civilization and rebut the anti-Semitism of such intellectuals as Houston Stewart Chamberlain (Cohen 1972, 34).

In recent times Jewish strategy has often included attempts to mold personal beliefs via the mass media. The Dreyfus Affair in 去世界 France “saw the emergence, for the first time, of a distinct class of intellectuals . . . as a major power in European society and among whom emancipated Jews were an important, sometimes a dominant, element. A new issue was raised, not just for France: Who controls our culture?” (Johnson 1988, 387). “The young Jewish intellectuals, and their growing band of radical allies, began by asking for justice and ended by seeking total victory and revenge. In doing so, they gave their enemies an awesome demonstration of Jewish and philosemitic intellectual power” (Johnson 1988, 388). While at the beginning of the affair the media was controlled by the anti-Semites, by the end of it, fully 90 percent of the literature on the subject was pro-Dreyfus. This campaign involved newspapers, photography, and cinema, and gradually it tilted public opinion in favor of Dreyfus.[162]In the 1890s Julius Langbehn’s work on Rembrandt became enormously popular and received many positive reviews in the media. However, later editions offended Jews and liberals, and the tone of the reviews changed. Langbehn stated that “the mendacity of the . . . reviewers in the daily press is clearly demonstrated by the fact that they praised the author of the Rembrandt book to the skies until he uttered one word against the Jews; from that day on, he was continually maligned” (in Stern 1961, 156n).

Sachar (1992) provides several examples of the use of the mass media to promote Jewish causes, some of which were originally perceived as being opposed to majority interests. In the campaign against czarist Jewish policy in the 1890s, Oscar Straus and Jacob Schiff were able to secure highly sympathetic treatments in the “纽约时报”, owned by their friend Adolph Ochs, also a Jew. The AJCommittee’s Louis Marshall also persuaded Ochs to provide press coverage favorable to Leo Frank (Ivers 1995, 41). (Frank, the manager of a pencil factory, was convicted in the murder of a 14-year-old female employee in 1913). This attempt backfired; Southerners reacted negatively to attempts by a northern, Jewish-owned newspaper to influence events in the South. (It is also interesting that Marshall insisted that Ochs not mention that Frank was Jewish or that anti-Semitism was involved in the prosecutionanother instance in which Jewish interests were perceived as best served by crypsis.)

Another example of media manipulation was the effort expended to abrogate the Russian trade agreement of 1832. Over a period of three years (1908–1911), the AJCommittee overcame complete apathy among the public and also widespread official concern about American commercial and foreign policy interests to achieve a complete victory (Cohen 1972, 54ff). Although the purpose of the campaign was to change Russian policy toward its Jews, the pretext was Russia’s denial of visas to four American Jews and the inability of twenty-eight American Jews living in Russia to travel freely. Thousands of copies of speeches by the Jewish activist Louis Marshall (who never mentioned the plight of Russian Jewry) and Herbert Parsons (a non-Jewish congressman from New York) were distributed to national and state politicians, newspapers, magazines, judges and lawyers, clergy, educators, and fraternal organizations. The AJCommittee provided material for articles in the popular media and distributed rebuttals when opposing positions appeared in the media. Political bodies ranging from Congress to state legislatures were intensely lobbied to pass pro-abrogation resolutions. Rallies with prominent gentile speakers were held, including one in New York whose participants included Governor Woodrow Wilson of New Jersey (who later, as president, endorsed the Balfour Declaration supporting a Jewish homeland in Palestine) and Speaker Champ Clark of the U. S. House of Representatives (who also served Jewish interests in the Congressional immigration battles of the period [Neuringer 1971]).

The results were successful: “Leading newspapers throughout the United States editorialized against the treaty. Magazine articles inveighed against it. Clergymen and Rotary Club, Lion, and other service organizations added their own resolutions of condemnation” (Sachar 1992, 233). By the time of passage by a 301–1 vote, “most members [of Congress] could not wait to express their horror of Russian barbaric practices, their eulogies of the Jewish people and of American Jews in particular, and their insistence upon the inviolability of the rights of American citizens” (Cohen 1972, 77).[163]The results did not live up to Jewish expectations:

[The pact had resulted in] a bitter unfriendly Russia, a decline in trade, anti-Semitic and anti-American reprisals in Russia. Foreign countries did not follow America’s action but sought rather to reap the benefits of her rift with Russia. In the United States abrogation brought adverse reaction for American Jews in some quarters [including widespread negative attitudes in the State Department]. A year after abrogation Taft laughed privately at the joke on the Jews; from their pulpits rabbis were declaiming that the United States had scored a victory against bigotry and intolerance, but America and the Jews, not Russia, had lost out. (Cohen 1972, 78–79) Later, during World War I, the AJCommittee attempted to prevent Americans from being sympathetic to the Russian war effort at a time when American officials viewed an alliance with Russia as an important aspect of American foreign policy (Goldstein 1975).

More important was the successful Zionist public relations campaign to change American public opinion on the advisability of a Jewish homeland. Although other factors were involved, Sachar (1992, 595) gives partial credit to the Zionist public relations campaign for the ultimate success of the thirty-year effort on behalf of a Jewish homeland. In the final stages, the pressure on President Harry Truman was intense. After Truman reluctantly agreed to vote for the United Nations Special Commission on Palestine measure supporting the creation of a Jewish state, he was strongly urged to exert pressure on other countries to approve the measure. “Again, the White House was inundated by mail, besieged by Democratic congressmen and party officials. As Truman himself said, ‘I do not think I ever had so much pressure and propaganda aimed at the White House as I had in this instance,’ ” (in Sachar 1992, 599–600).[164]Another Jewish media strategy has been to encourage a “dynamic silence” on certain topics. The AJCommittee persuaded the media to withhold coverage of the activities of anti-Semite Gerald L. K. Smith (Cohen 1972, 375; Ginsberg 1993, 124), and most Jewish writers in England chose to ignore Chamberlain’s Foundations (Field 1981, 465). Perhaps it is significant that review copies of 创伤后应激障碍 were sent to over forty Jewish publications but, to my knowledge, the book was not reviewed in any of them.

Another Jewish media interest has been to promote positive portrayals of Jews and combat negative images. Gabler (1988, 300ff) describes a traditional concern among Jewish organizations regarding the portrayal of Jews by the Jewish-controlled Hollywood studios. Major Jewish organizations, such as the AJCommittee, the ADL, and the AJCongress, developed a formal liaison with the studios by which depictions of Jews would be subjected to censorship. One such group stated in 1947 that “Jewish organizations have a clear and rightful interest in making sure that Hollywood films do not present Jews in such a way as to arouse prejudice. . . . In some cases, such pictures should be taken out of production entirely. In other cases, scripts should be edited carefully to eliminate questionable passages. Everything should be done to eliminate unfortunate stereotypes of the Jews” (p. 303). Gabler describes several instances where scripts were altered to provide more positive portrayals of Jews. The activities of this group were not publicized, out of fear that it could result in “the charge that [a] Jewish group is trying to censor the industry,” which, as Gabler notes, “was exactly what it was trying to do” (p. 304).[165]On the other hand, the idea that Hollywood portrays other ethnic groups negatively has been a component of remarks deemed anti-Semitic. See Chapter 2, note 40. The period following World War II marked the beginning of anti-anti-Semitic movies such as 绅士协议, which won an Oscar for Best Picture (Gabler 1988, 349ff).[166]A recent media tactic has been to label as anti-Semitic any negatively toned difference between Jews and gentiles. Hertzberg (1993a, 52) cites widely publicized ADL data from 1992 indicating that approximately half of Americans believe that “Jews stick together more than other Americans,” and that “Jewish employers go out of their way to hire other Jews.” While the ADL labels such views anti-Semitic, Hertzberg (1993a, 52) questions whether these attitudes are prejudicial, suggesting that they simply reflect reality: “One of the main tasks of the organized Jewish community is to maintain Jewish identity in the American melting pot; and members of Jewish organizations take special pride in the claim that Jews value continuity more highly than other ethnic groups do. Among Jews, moreover, it is clearly a virtue to feel closer to other Jews than to anyone else. Why is it an index of anti-Semitism if other Americans are aware that many Jews feel this way?” Indeed, during the 1950s the AJCommittee, while advocating exclusively Jewish associations related to “specific religious or ethnic purposes,” had deplored the fact that Jews preferred to associate and socialize exclusively with exclusively or predominantly Jewish groups (Cohen 1972, 411–412).) Weiss (1996) finds it ironic that the AJCommittee views a statement like “Jews stick together” as anti-Semitic while at the same time it classifies a Jew only half of whose friends are Jewish as lacking in Jewish identification. One might also note that negative gentile attitudes regarding intermarriage with Jews continue to be viewed as expressions of anti-Semitism by Jewish organizations (see, e.g., Smith 1994), while at the same time the organized Jewish community continues to aggressively combat intermarriage between Jews and gentiles (see Ch. 9).

Jews attempting to appeal to gentiles have often framed their interests in universalist terms or recruited prominent gentiles to back the cause publicly. From an evolutionary perspective the intent is to make the Jewish cause appear to be in the interests of others as well. When goals are cast in ethnic or national terms, they are not likely to appeal to those outside the group. Indeed, such obviously self-interested goals would be likely to alert outsiders to conflicts of interest between ingroup and outgroup. On the other hand, a standard finding in social psychology is that people are more likely to respond positively when goals are advocated by similar others, or when the goal is cast as being in the interests of all rather than in the interests of an outgroup, as predicted by social identity theory and genetic similarity theory (see Chapter 1).

The attempt to cast particularistic interests in universalist terms has appeared periodically in Jewish intellectual history and has had a very central role in Judaism since the Enlightenment. Thus a major aspect of Reform ideology, especially during the 19th century, was to recast the traditional messianic hope of Judaism into universalist terms and to de-emphasize the ethnic/national character of Judaism while nevertheless maintaining traditional Jewish cultural separatism. The traditional hopes for the restoration of Jewish political power were replaced by the hope of a world of peace and justice for all of humanity.

Moreover, a major theme of 批判文化 is that Jewish intellectual movements have advocated universalist ideologies for the entire society (e.g., Marxism) in which the importance of the Jew/gentile social category is reduced in salience and is of no theoretical importance. A consistent finding in research on intergroup contact is that making the social categories which define groups less salient would lessen intergroup differentiation and facilitate positive social interactions between members from different groups (Brewer & Miller 1984; Doise & Sinclair 1973; Miller et al. 1985). At the extreme, the acceptance of a universalist ideology by gentiles would result in their not perceiving Jews as in a different social category at all, while nevertheless Jews would be able to maintain a strong personal identity as Jews.

Jewish organizations have often included statements that explicitly advocate universalist aims for human rights and de-emphasize the ethnic character of Judaism:

While it is clear that [the plea for universal human rights] of these . . . organizations is merely subsidiary or supplementary, its inclusion in the general statement of aims serves the important purpose of precluding the reproach of Jewish clannishness or ethnocentrism: one way of striving for the betterment of the Jewish position in America is to demonstrate, on an organizational level, the Jewish interest in the general American welfare. (Patai 1971, 53)

Jewish organizations in Germany in the period 1870–1914 argued that anti-Semitism was a threat to all of Germany because it was fundamentally “un-German”: “It followed that those Jews who now banded together to oppose anti-Semitism did so out of concern for their nation and in order to make a contribution to the welfare of their fatherland. In their dedication to defense, Jewish citizens gave proof of their patriotism and deep devotion to the national interests of Germany” (Ragins 1980, 55). The strategy may have sometimes backfired:

Jewish interests were firmly entrenched on the side of the Manchester school of laissez-faire. As a group the Jews had nothing to gain from state interference in private enterprise and they stood to lose a good deal by the fall of liberals from political power. So they fought back mainly through the press [1848–1874]. Their power was not exactly measurable but recognizable. What made their power appear sinister to their enemies was the fact that the Jews were anxious to hide it for fear of arousing yet greater hostility. Thereby they increased the impression of all sharing in a conspiracy particularly as they defended their interests in the name of lofty principles not as Jews but as Germans. (Schmidt 1959, 46)

Another use of universalism has been to recruit gentile leaders to endorse Jewish causes. Theoretically, this technique takes advantage of the importance of similarity and ingroup membership for inducing positive attitudes (see Ch. 1). People are more likely to agree with, and have positive attitudes toward, similar others and fellow ingroup members than dissimilar others or outgroup members.

This type of activity can involve deception, as occurred in the ancient world, where an entire apologetic literature was written by Jews masquerading as gentiles (Schürer 1986, 617ff). By adopting a gentile pseudonym the author hoped to make gentiles more sympathetic to Jewish ideas, particularly the superiority of Jewish religious beliefs (e.g., ethics and monotheism), as well as to defend Jewish honor against gentile criticisms. For example, the famous Letter of Aristeas defends the Jewish law of purity and “tends to glorify the Jewish people with its excellent institutions and its sumptuous prosperity” (Schürer 1986, 678). In Chapter 4 I also suggested that in the late Roman Empire prominent gentile Judaizers were courted by the Jewish community in order to lessen anti-Semitism.

The first cases I am aware of where gentiles were recruited to support Jewish causes occurred during the New Christian turmoil in 15th-century Spain. Lope de Barrientos, an Old Christian and the Bishop of Cuenca, was recruited by the prominent New Christian Fernán Díaz to write a tract supporting the orthodoxy of most New Christians and condemning their enemies (Netanyahu 1995, 612). (The tract was a revision of Díaz’s apologetic tract 相关说明, and Díaz even suggested that the entire tract be published in the bishop’s name.) Another Old Christian apologist for the New Christians, the jurist Alonso Díaz de Montalvo, was also closely associated with Fernán Díaz and discussed his apologetic tract with Díaz and another prominent New Christian apologist, Alonso de Cartagena, prior to publication.

Jewish organizations opposed to anti-Semitism had an active role in establishing and maintaining gentile-dominated organizations opposed to anti-Semitism in Germany in the period from 1870 to 1933 (Niewyk 1980, 88; Ragins 1980, 53–54; Schorsch 1972, 79ff), leading to accusations among anti-Semites that such organizations were “no more than a front for ‘moneyed Jewry’ ” (Levy 1975, 147). Much earlier, Moses Mendelsohn had obtained the services of Christian Wilhelm von Dohm, a prominent gentile historian and diplomat, to argue the cause of emancipation of the Alsatian Jews (Schorsch 1972, 79).

One reason why gentiles were attractive spokesmen for Judaism was that for Jews to openly fight against anti-Semitism was in effect “a repudiation of concealment as the price for equality” (Schorsch 1972, 12)—a comment that shows the importance of adopting a semi-cryptic profile during this period, in which emancipation was viewed as a quid pro for assimilation. A desire not to appear Jewish was present in the 1840s when proto-Zionist Moses Hess, editor of a journal “determined to subject German attitudes and institutions, political and religious, to an unrelenting barrage of radical criticism,” refused to admit his Jewish friend Ludwig Braunfels to the editorial board out of concern that the paper would be perceived as dominated by Jews (Frankel 1981, 14).

In England during the 1930s Jewish organizations developed a technique “used periodically ever since” of supplying materials to be used by groups that advocate Jewish causes, such as supporting anti-fascist candidates, without referring in any way to the Jewish origins of the materials (Alderman 1983, 122). The result was a gap between the actions of the official Jewish community and its public proclamations during a period when Jews were being advised by these same organizations to adopt a low profile to avoid fanning the flames of anti-Semitism: “Publicly, therefore the Board denied the existence of a Jewish vote, but surreptitiously it did its best to foster an anti-fascist vote” (Alderman 1983, 122). Indeed, the Board of Deputies did its best during the period simultaneously to “tighten its hold” (p. 123) on the behavior of British Jews while at the same time promulgating the fictions that Jews were merely a religious community (despite a strong strand of Zionism within the community) and that Jews tended not to vote in any particular way (despite their antipathy to Conservative candidates, at least partly because of the Conservative Party’s opposition to Zionism).

This type of strategy appears also to have been common in 20th-century America. In 1903 during an attempt to influence czarist policy toward Jews, a fund-raising and protest committee formed by Jewish activist Jacob Schiff and his colleagues was headed by a gentile and included former president Grover Cleveland and prominent Christian clergymen as speakers. In 1911 the attempt to abrogate the Russian trade agreement included the formation of “the first of a series of non-Jewish ‘front’ committees at which Jews would prove exceptionally adept in future years” (Sachar 1992, 233), including, as we have seen, the participation of Woodrow Wilson and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Jewish spokesmen favored formulations in which the problem was couched as an 美国人 problem rather than as a problem for American Jews (even though the difficulties for American Jews were only a pretext for a campaign that was actually directed at changing the status of Russian Jews). It was in this form that the measure passed Congress (Cohen 1972, 72). In comments to AJCommittee officials, President W. H. Taft was quite aware of the deceptive nature of the AJCommittee rhetoric, stating that he viewed “the AJC’s anti-Russian campaign as an attempt to destroy the Pale [of Settlement]—thinly disguised by the AJC’s public rhetoric that spoke only of treaty obligations and religious equality in the United States” (Goldstein 1990, 150). In the period following World War II, Jews were active in funding gentile-dominated organizations opposed to anti-Semitism: “Jews offered to provide the professional staffs and most of the financing if prominent Gentiles would grace the organizational letterheads” (Dinnerstein 1994, 147).

Beginning in the late 19th century, Jews were far more unanimous in their support of liberal immigration policies than any other American ethnic group, and their arguments were typically couched in terms of universalist humanitarian ideals rather than narrow ethnic interests. Jewish organizations, such as the AJCommittee, organized, funded, and performed most of the work of a variety of umbrella organizations aimed at combating restrictions on immigration (e.g., the National Liberal Immigration League; the Citizens Committee for Displaced Persons; the National Commission on Immigration and Citizenship; the American Immigration Conference; see 批判文化, Ch. 7). Most of the members of these groups were from other ethnic or religious groups.

This type of strategy is also apparent in Jewish attempts to secularize American culture. Ginsberg (1993, 101) notes that the New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU) insisted that the plaintiffs and the lead lawyer be gentiles in a case challenging the constitutionality of a non-denominational prayer in the New York public schools. This meant that the only gentile lawyer on the NYCLU staff was chosen to argue the case.[167]In Chapter 2 it was noted that Jews controlled all of the major motion picture companies and that this has been a recurrent aspect of anti-Semitism in the United States. It is interesting that the industry has often used gentiles as spokespersons in its dealings with investigative bodies, which themselves have often had anti-Semitic overtones. Two gentiles, Will H. Hays and Joseph I Breen, were appointed in 1922 and 1934 respectively to head movie industry bodies intended to prevent censorship campaigns directed at Hollywood movies (Ceplair & Englund 1980, 304n), and more recently Jack Valenti has filled this role. Wendell Wilkie, a Republican internationalist and former presidential candidate was recruited as spokesman for the Hollywood studies during investigations of its role in promoting intervention in World War II. During the anticommunist hearings of 1940, the studios recruited a gentile from Georgia, Y. Frank Freeman, to represent it before HUAC (Gabler 1988, 346, 354). During the HUAC Hollywood hearings of 1953 there was an attempt to develop a “kosher HUAC” that would coordinate policies related to screening employees, etc. “All of the names that were floated (from [Judge Learned] Hand to [former president Harry] Truman) had only one thing in common—not one of them was Jewish. They had difficulty coming up with an acceptable sponsor, perhaps because their criteria of selection—an establishment organization with impeccable credentials—precluded their finding any acceptable takers” (Navasky 1980, 127).

Jews dominated the Socialist Party of America but “they tended to avoid the very top leadership positions, however, lest attempts to develop a broader base be weakened. Their role in the American Communist Party [CPUSA] would soon follow the same pattern” (Rothman & Lichter 1982, 99). CPUSA leaders were greatly concerned that the party image was too Jewish, with the result that Jewish members were encouraged to adopt non-Jewish-sounding names, and there were active (largely unsuccessful) efforts to recruit gentile members (Klehr 1978, 41; Liebman 1979, 501). This attempt at Jewish invisibility often coincided with a strong sense of Jewish ethnic identification (see 批判文化). As a result of these efforts, gentiles were able to rise in the party at a substantially faster rate than Jews; despite often representing around 40 percent of the Central Committee in the period from 1921–1961, only one Jew ever held the top position in the CPUSA (Klehr 1978, 47, 52).[168]The attempt to defuse perceptions of Jewishness was also behind efforts of the German-Jewish economic elite in the early 20th century to appoint a significant number of gentiles to boards of directors of their companies (Mosse 1987, 294). Whereas the gentile board members of these companies tended to be isolated and heterogeneous, the Jewish board members formed a highly compact, interlocking elite group with a strong presence throughout the “Jewish sector” of the economy. Similarly in Germany, Jews avoided the top positions in the German Social Democratic Party despite “a large Jewish presence in leadership positions of the second rank” (Lindemann 1997, 172).

Jews have often taken actions within their own community designed to limit anti-Semitism. Such measures are theoretically important, because a successful group strategy must be protected from invasion by deceivers, freeloaders, and those who endanger the community. The data reported in this section offer corroboration for the social identity theory presented in Chapter 1 as the basis of gentile anti-Semitism: The negative behavior of a few outgroup members tends to be generalized uncritically to all of the outgroup. As a result, a strategizing group, especially a minority group surrounded by a potentially hostile majority, is well advised to have mechanisms that control the behavior of individual Jews.

One of the most important roles of the old 凯希拉 organization among the Jews was to regulate the personal behavior of Jews so as not to offend gentile sensibilities (see also 创伤后应激障碍, Ch. 4). In 15th-century Spain there were laws that prohibited extravagant dress and entertainment, the purpose of which was partly “to prevent householders . . . from arousing Christian envy and hatred ‘on account of which new edicts are enacted against us’ ” (Baer 1961, II, 269). During this period there were attempts to control the behavior of the wealthy Jewish courtier class, because their activities, such as moneylending and tax farming, were potent sources of anti-Semitism (Baer 1961, I, 257ff). Similarly, a regulation of the Synod of Frankfort of 1603 stated that “no member of our community whether young or old, shall be permitted to lie to Gentiles or deceive them, whether in regard to what Jews buy from them or in regard to what the Jews sell them. Those who deceive Gentiles profane the name of the Lord among the Gentiles” (from Finkelstein 1924, 280). Resolutions also prohibited large groups of Jews from congregating in public. “In general, any action that might arouse the notice, the envy, or the anger of the Gentile population was deprecated” (Finkelstein 1924, 88).

Despite the decline of the Kehilla system, there have been continuing attempts to restrain other Jews in the interests of lowering anti-Semitism. In the period from 1870 to 1914, liberal German Jews actively dissociated themselves from Jews, especially Orthodox Jews, who refused to adopt the outward appearances of assimilation and thus justified the charge that Jews were foreigners (Ragins 1980, 49). Attempts were made to get other Jews to abandon typically Jewish gestures and social behavior because it was offensive to Germans: “One was required to be ever watchful and take great care to avoid all provocative behavior” (Ragins 1980, 88). Indeed, “as late as 1890 [Jews] were still consciously suppressing every conspicuous and distinctive Jewish trait” (Schorsch 1972, 66).[169]Nevertheless, Jewish behavior continued to draw comment from Jews. Walther Rathenau, a prominent Jewish industrialist and political figure who strongly advocated assimilation, described the Jews as “a separated alien tribe in the midst of German life, effervescent and vulgarly decorated, with hot-blooded, animated gesticulations. An Asiatic horde on Brandenburg sand. . . . In narrow cohesion among themselves, in strict seclusion outwards: thus they live in a semi-voluntary, invisible ghetto; not a living member of the 沃尔克, but rather an alien organism in its body” (in Ragins 1980, 77). Similarly, in the United States as late as 1931, the ADL contained a Bureau of Jewish Deportment that “taught Jews to avoid offensive behavior that might arouse anti-Semitism” (Goldberg 1996, 129), including advice not to wear furs in Florida during the summer.[170]Concerns about the potential for anti-Semitism resulting from perceptions of foreignness were also behind the attempts by the more established German-American Jews to decrease immigration of their Eastern European coreligionists. Thus in the 1880s a Jewish spokesman tried to prevent European Jewish philanthropies from sending Eastern European Jews to America, by noting that “the Jewish position in America was not yet secure. . . . American Jews could not ‘afford to incur the ill will of their compatriots’ ” (Sachar 1992, 124; see also Neuringer 1971, 15ff). A Jewish publication warned about the “uncouth Asiatics” from Russia, and there were concerns that the new immigrants would ultimately lower the social class of the established Jewish community. These concerns regarding the outlandish behavior of new immigrants continue regarding recent Jewish immigrants into America. Sachar (1992) describes the extreme separatism of the Hasidic Jews who immigrated to the United States after World War II. The Hasidic Jews are so separatist that they are given to viewing rabbis of other sects as “heterodox,” a trend Sachar perceives as ominous: “Even in tolerant America, hairshirt tribalism was a provocative stance for a community ranked among the smallest, and still among the most suspect and vulnerable, of the nation’s ethno-religious minorities” (p. 700).

Attempts have also been made at defusing gentile perceptions of Jewish racial exclusivity. One of the questions submitted by Napoleon to the Jewish community in 1807 was on Jewish attitudes regarding intermarriage. The response of the Jewish Sanhedrin was that intermarriage could not be religiously sanctioned although the marriage was civilly valid—a response interpreted by Levenson (1989, 322) as an attempt to deceive Napoleon into thinking that their response was a qualified “yes” to intermarriage when in fact it was a qualified “no.” Leopold Auerbach, an influential 19th-century Jewish apologist, argued that Jews should actively seek converts and relax requirements for conversion to counter the perception among Germans that Jews were racially exclusive (Schorsch 1972, 110). Isolated Jewish spokesmen repeatedly advocated intermarriage with or without conversion of the Christian partner, but even liberal Jewish organizations such as the Zentralverein developed very aggressive campaigns against apostasy and condemned the government for encouraging Jewish conversion to Christianity (Schorsch 1972, 110, 141).[171]Similar activities are apparent in the contemporary world. Children of the group of Falasha Jews who were evacuated from Ethiopia to Israel have made tours of schools in the United States with the avowed purpose of demonstrating that not all Jews are white (洛杉矶时报, February 16, 1995). These activities may well be directed at opposing the logic of the United Nations resolution (since repealed) equating Zionism with racism and at ameliorating African-American anti-Semitism.

There have also been many attempts to alter Jewish economic behavior vis-à-vis gentiles. In the 19th century, the Verein zur Abwehr des Antisemitismus (League to Combat Anti-Semitism), a gentile organization opposing anti-Semitism, made efforts to supervise the practices of Jewish clothing peddlers and cattle traders that provoked gentile hostility (Schorsch 1972, 84). These activities won the support of Jewish leaders, many of whom perceived their coreligionists as “vocationally and morally defective.” For example, Ludwig Stern, responding to Wilhelm Marr’s anti-Semitic writings, blamed anti-Semitism on the activities of a few rich Jews and accepted Jewish involvement in stock market frauds as an important cause of anti-Semitism rooted in actual Jewish behavior (Zimmerman 1986, 80). Stern urged Jews to abandon moneylending and not to flaunt their wealth, because it aroused jealousy. Later the Zentralverein attempted to reduce the “objective” causes of anti-Semitism by apologizing for the “maturing” nature of the Jewish community and especially for the large number of “alien and uncultured Semites living in Germany” (Schorsch 1972, 136).[172]Similarly, in the Weimar period, the National League of Frontline Veterans emphasized Jewish “self-discipline” as a means of defusing anti-Semitism: “Out of the inns of gluttony! Away from the mad pursuit of pleasure! Down with vain baubles! Back to simplicity and serious living!” (in Niewyk 1980, 92; italics in text). During this period the Zentralverein was also active in urging Jewish businessmen to treat customers and employees fairly, in response to the complaints of anti-Semites.

In the 1930s in England, Neville Laski, President of the Board of Deputies (the major organization of British Jews), set up a subcommittee to “to deal with such social conditions as sweatshops, bad employers, landlords and price-cutting in the East End.” The committee attempted to raise the public image of Jews by making Jews more aware of the effect their “individual malpractices” had on fomenting anti-Semitism and pressuring them to change their behavior.

I submit that the time has passed for us . . . to ignore the fact that not a day goes by without anti-Semitism being created by Jews themselves . . . a new generation of unethical Jewish traders are by bankruptcy, due to complete irresponsibility and lack of principle, causing hardship over a wide field and manufacturing anti-Semitism at high pressure. (M. G. Liverman, Chairman of the Defence Committee of the Board of Deputies, November 1938, in Alderman 1992, 294)

During the 19th century there were attempts to end the economic and social class disparities between Jews and Germans because of the clear effect these disparities had in exacerbating anti-Semitism (Ragins 1980, 68, 71). Although largely unsuccessful, these programs were motivated by the fact that a consistent theme of anti-Semitism of the period was the lack of Jewish participation in primary production and their concentration in high-prestige, high-income occupations. This Jewish response was therefore an attempt to alter the perception that Jews as a group engage in resource competition and economic exploitation of gentiles, a common theme of anti-Semitic writings (see Chapter 2). Thus an advocate of the program stated that

if the Jews do not post a contingent in 所有 types of occupations, if there are not soon more waiters and letter-carriers, miners and factory workers in the lower classes, court clerks and minor officials of every sort in the middle classes and artisans and farmers in greater numbers among the German Jews, then we cannot complain about the hostile reproach that we constitute a 沃尔克 字幕可视电话用于 沃尔克 and do not assimilate ourselves sufficiently. (In Ragins 1980, 68; italics in text).

Jewish organizations have also attempted to control Jewish criminal behavior. The “extraordinarily large representation of Jews among traffickers and their victims” (Niewyk 1980, 118) in international prostitution from 1870 to 1939 was a major source of negative stereotypes by gentiles (see Bristow 1983), and in early 20th-century America Jews were active in attempts to eradicate Jewish prostitution, control of prostitution, street crime, and gangster activities (see Sachar 1992). In New York in 1912, the Bureau of Social Morals was established by Jewish philanthropists to provide information to the district attorney regarding Jewish criminal activities.

Jews also made active attempts to control the behavior of other Jews likely to lead to charges of disloyalty.[173]The official Jewish community also cooperated with the British government’s lack of aggressive concern about European Jews during World War II out of concerns that

the loyalty of British Jews to their co-religionists in other lands was greater than their loyalty to their fellow citizens in Britain. . . . The spectre of the cosmopolitan Jew, loyal to international Jewry but to nothing else, haunted Jewish communal leaders (and many of those whom they led) as much as it haunted purveyors of anti-Jewish prejudice, of whom there was a growing number in the 1930s. (Alderman 1992, 281) Meyer (1988, 339) notes that a major goal of the Reform movement in post–World War I Germany was to suppress Zionism because of its perceived effect on fanning the flames of anti-Semitism due to charges of Jewish disloyalty.[174]Walter Rathenau (see note 19) was a prominent critic of Jewish behavior during this period. Rathenau stated that the charge of internationalism would continue to be made against Jews so long as they were related by marriage to “all the foreign Cohns and Levys” (in Ragins 1980, 77), a comment which illustrates the saliency of the ethnic nature of Judaism for anti-Semitic attitudes of the period. Rathenau also criticized Jews for remaining foreigners and failing to win the trust of Germans (Niewyk 1980, 96–97). Reflecting this concern, a major goal of the National League of Jewish Frontline Veterans was to rebut charges that Jews had been underrepresented as frontline soldiers in World War I and had suffered disproportionately few casualties (see Niewyk 1980, 90). Two prominent German reform rabbis in the early 20th century declared that a Zionist newspaper was a “calamity” to German Jews: “As long as the Zionists wrote in Hebrew, they were not dangerous, now that they write in German it is necessary to oppose them” (in Meyer 1988, 209). In other words, a low-profile Zionism was harmless, but there was danger if gentiles became aware of strident assertions of Jewish nationalism. In 1913 the Zentralverein accused the Zionist movement of being dominated by people who denied any allegiance to Germany (Schorsch 1972, 200), and it voted to expel any Zionist “who denies any feeling of German nationality, who feels himself a guest among a host people and nationally only a Jew” (in Schorsch 1972, 181; see also Magill 1979, 211–212). (In 1914 at the outbreak of World War I, the German Zionist Federation [the main German Zionist organization] resolved that Jews had no roots whatever in Germany.) To an organization intent on depicting Jews as loyal to Germany, there was clearly a concern that Germans would over-attribute the lack of loyalty of these Zionists to all Jews—another example of the tendency to assume the worst about outgroups as an important contributor to historical anti-Semitism (see discussion of Type II errors in Chapter 1).

On the other hand, Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, a prominent Zionist and leader of the AJCongress, characterized Western European Jews as engaging in deception by pretending to be patriotic citizens while really being Jewish nationalists: “They wore the mask of the ruling nationality as of old in Spain—the mask of the ruling religion” (in Frommer 1978, 118). Wise had a well-developed sense of dual loyalty, stating on one occasion “I am not an American citizen of Jewish faith. I am a Jew. I am an American. I have been an American 63/64ths of my life, but I have been a Jew for 4000 years” (in Lilienthal 1953, 165). Similar conflicts between Zionists and anti-Zionists, framed in much the same way, occurred in America (Frommer 1978)[175]There was a conflict between the established German-American Jews represented by the AJCommittee and the Eastern European Jews who founded the AJCongress (Frommer 1978). The latter were far more likely to be Zionists (as well as political radicals) with a well-developed view of Jewry as a nation and as a race with strong ties to foreign Jews. The following are quotations from 美国希伯来语, a periodical that reflected the views of the older Jewish establishment represented by the AJCommittee:

[The vast majority of American Jews] feel that they cannot participate in an undertaking predicated on what, in effect, would be an acknowledgment that they are a people apart from the rest of the population of the countries of which they are citizens and to which they owe their allegiance. (美国希伯来语，15 年 1923 月 93 日，第。 XNUMX)

Reports from the Zionist Convention at Baltimore indicate at this writing that the Organization continues heedless of the fact that its nationalist policy is the chief stumbling block in the way of the speedy upbuilding of Palestine. It was, indeed, with great assurance that the convention “keynote” orator declared that the Jew is the alien par excellence; that even “assimilationists,” i.e., anti-nationalist Jews, are now again conscious that the flag which they thought theirs during the war is not their flag, that those who fought for their nation fought, in effect, not for their nation but in the Foreign Legion. Can folly go further? . . . [O]ne who knows himself to be an American in nationality will not alienate himself from the land of his birth or adoption, however cordially he may desire the upbuilding of Palestine. (美国希伯来语，22 年 1923 月 113 日，第。 XNUMX) and England (Alderman 1983).[176]In England there were conflicts between recent immigrants from Eastern European and the established Jewish community represented by the Board of Deputies and the Anglo-Jewish Association. In 1916 an establishment leader stated that cooperation with the Zionists could not take place “on an overt or official assumption of the existence of a Jewish nationality for the Jews all over the world” (in Alderman 1983, 100).

Fears of charges of disloyalty also emerged when the World Jewish Congress was established as an outgrowth of the AJCongress in the 1930s. Cyrus Adler, president of the AJCommittee, described the attempt to create such an international body as “a sensational blunder,” warning that “the enemies of Jews in every country and especially in Germany would seize upon the Congress as an alleged justification of their charges. The question is not whether such a result should occur, but whether it is likely to occur. The Jews of Europe, and especially of Germany, want no such Congress” (in Frommer 1978, 467).[177]Although the leaders of the AJCongress were largely Zionist and conceptualized Jews as a nation rather than a religion, they recruited “outstanding American clergymen individually to endorse our movement” (in Frommer 1978, 488)—another example of the usefulness of conceptualizing Judaism as a religion rather than an ethnic group, and presumably involving some deception or self-deception. The official statement of the function of the World Jewish Congress was framed in terms of peoplehood: “To symbolize and make a reality of the common resolution of the Jewish people to unite in defence of its rights; and to secure the cooperation of the various branches of this dispersed people in all matters of common interest” (in Frommer 1978, 492). United States Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, though an ardent Zionist, also strongly disapproved of a World Jewish Congress because it would “lend color to the arguments based on the 操作流程概述 [锡安长老]” (in Frommer 1978, 484).[178]Attempts to control Jewish behavior related to Zionism continued after the establishment of Israel. Early on, David Ben-Gurion was prevailed upon to resign his office as chairman of a Zionist organization because it “might instantly lead to charges of dual loyalty” (Sachar 1992, 717). Concerns about accusations of dual loyalty have figured prominently in the wake of the Jonathan Pollard spying case. American Jews “pressed urgently for assurances that the Israeli government never again would expose them to this discomfiture. How would their own government ever entrust Jews to positions of security and responsibility?” (Sachar 1992, 896). American Jews were extensively investigated when applying for positions related to national security after this incident (Ginsberg 1993, 217–218). Nevertheless, the Israeli intelligence service has often recruited diaspora Jews to assist in intelligence operations (Ostrovsky & Hoy 1990).

Also related to charges of disloyalty, there was great concern within the Jewish community from the 1920s through the Cold War period, that the very large overrepresentation of ethnic Jews within the American Communist Party (CPUSA) would lead to anti-Semitism; “The fight against the stereotype of Communist-Jew became a virtual obsession with Jewish leaders and opinion makers throughout America” (Liebman 1979, 515),[179]In the 1920s, the fact that Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe were viewed as “infected with Bolshevism . . . unpatriotic, alien, unassimilable,” contributed to restrictive immigration legislation (Neuringer 1971, 165). Jewish publications warned that the leftism of Jewish immigrants would lead to anti-Semitism. The official Jewish community engaged in “a near-desperation . . . effort to portray the Jew as one hundred per cent American” by organizing highly visible patriotic pageants on national holidays and urging the immigrants to learn English (Neuringer 1971, 167). Nevertheless, Jewish radicalism continued to be a problem. In 1937 the AJCommittee commissioned a report from a sympathetic gentile, Alvin Johnson, who recommended that Jews develop programs aimed at countering political radicalism and Zionism among Jewish youth and that Jews become less conspicuous (Cohen 1972, 203). and indeed, the association of Jews with the CPUSA was a focus of anti-Semitic literature at this time (e.g., Beaty 1951). As a result, the AJCommittee engaged in intensive efforts to change opinion within the Jewish community by showing that Jewish interests were more compatible with advocating American democracy than Soviet communism (e.g., emphasizing Soviet anti-Semitism and support of nations opposed to Israel in the period after World War II) (Cohen 1972, 347ff).[180]Similarly in England in 1887 the Federation of Minor Synagogues was created by established British Jews to moderate the radicalism of newly arrived immigrants from Eastern Europe. This organization also engaged in deception, by deliberately distorting the extent to which the immigrants had radical political attitudes (Alderman 1983, 60).

Particularly worrisome to American Jewish leaders was the arrest and conviction of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg for spying. Leftist supporters of the Rosenbergs, many of whom were Jewish, attempted to portray the event as an instance of anti-Semitism and actively sought to enlist mainstream Jewish opinion on the side of this interpretation (Dawidowicz 1952). However, in doing so they made the Jewish identities of these individuals and the connection between Judaism and communism even more salient; the official Jewish community went to great lengths to alter the public stereotype of Jewish subversion and disloyalty. The AJCommittee obtained a prominent role for Jews in the prosecution of the Rosenbergs and was active in promoting public support for the guilty verdicts (Ginsberg 1993, 121; Navasky 1980, 114ff).

Communists were also hounded out of mainstream Jewish organizations where they had previously been welcome. Particularly salient was the 50,000-member Jewish Peoples Fraternal Order, an affiliate of the AJCongress listed as a subversive organization by the U. S. Attorney General. The JPFO was the financial and organizational “bulwark” of the CPUSA after World War II and also funded the 日工 和 清晨 （Svonkin 1997，166）。 尽管AJCongress切断了与JPFO的联系，并指出共产主义是一种威胁，但在犹太人努力树立公众对反共主义形象的努力中，它“充其量只是勉强而又不热心的参与者”（Svonkin 1997，132）。反映了第二代和第三代东欧移民成员中许多人的同情。

Finally, the right of Jews to dissent from Israeli policy has sometimes been a lively issue within the Jewish community. During the mid-1970s, American Jewish leaders were recruited by Israel to condemn the activities of Breira, a group that aimed to influence American Jewish attitudes toward Israeli policy. American members of Breira received “tongue-lashings” by ranking Israeli diplomats, and American Jewish intellectuals who had signed advertisements opposing settlements in the occupied territories were, in the words of Irving Howe recounting his own experience, “subjected to unseemly pressures in their communities and organizations”—what Howe termed “heimishe [homelike] witch hunting” (Goldberg 1996, 206).

Obviously such a form of revision would involve a flagrant distortion of the truth. But historical truth was less important in their eyes than the consequences it entailed for the welfare of their group. (Netanyahu [1995, 660] describing the activities of the 15th-century New Christian chroniclers in falsifying history to serve group interests)

Politics [is] not merely a fierce physical struggle to control the present, and so the future, but an intellectual battle to control the record of the past. (Johnson [1988, 481], describing the philosophy of history of Walter Benjamin [1892–1940])[187]Benjamin was a member of the Frankfurt School of Social Research, discussed extensively in 批判文化. Regarding Benjamin’s strong Jewish identity, see Lilla (1995) and Scholem (1965).

Before Emancipation, Diaspora Jewry explained its Exile . . . as a punishment from God for its sins. After Emancipation, this 神学，现在变成了新的外邦人身份受众群体， 思想, emphasizing Gentile persecution as the root cause of Jewish “degradation.” This ideology . . . was shared in one form or another, by all the ideologists of nineteenth-century Jewry: Reform Jews and Zionists, assimilationists and socialists, Bundists and Communists—all became virtuosos of ethnic suffering. . . . The point is that these Diaspora groups were uninterested in actual history; they were apologists, ideologists, prefabricating a past in order to answer embarrassing questions, to outfit a new identity, and to ground a claim to equal treatment in the modern world. (Cuddihy 1974, 177)

Living so long in exile and so often in danger, we have cultivated a defensive and apologetic account, a censored story, of Jewish religion and culture. (Walzer 1994, 6)

Interpretations of history have played a central role in the ideology of Judaism as a group evolutionary strategy. We have seen that the Tanakh itself is vitally concerned with the interpretation of history, and, building on the Hellenistic-Jewish apologetic literature described above, self-serving interpretations of history continued in the Christian period: “History, not in its realistic record but in its mutually accepted homiletical and hermeneutic elaboration, became for centuries the main battleground between the rivaling Jewish and Christian denominations” (Baron 1952, II, 136).

Jewish historiography, written almost exclusively by Jews, has been characterized by a great deal of self-conscious case-making and defense of perspectives that portray Jewish behavior in a positive light. This phenomenon is by no means restricted to Jews. Although he does not mention Jewish historiography, Schlesinger (1993, 45ff) describes numerous examples where historical reconstructions have been used to advance political agendas by exculpating the expropriation of power or by compensating for failures by exaggerating the virtues and accomplishments of the oppressed.

While not characteristic of all Jewish historians, examples are commonplace. Indeed, the examples provided in this section cannot do justice to the many subtleties of nuance and style that, apart from the arguments themselves, indicate that the historian has an intense emotional commitment to the subject. Lindemann (1997, ix–x) mentions the impassioned, moralistic rhetoric and simplistic analyses in Robert Wistrich’s 反犹太主义：最长的仇恨 and in the work of Holocaust historians Lucy Dawidowicz and Daniel J. Goldhagen. Perera (1995, 172) refers to the “almost mystical jeremiads against the Inquisitors” in Benzion Netanyahu’s (1995) recent book on the Spanish Inquisition. Moralism by itself is, I suppose, scientifically harmless, although one might reasonably assume that such moralism may well result in conscious or unconscious biases in seeking out information and in interpreting historical events. From the standpoint of social identity theory, a strong sense of ingroup identity is expected to bias perceptions of events related to ingroup/outgroup conflict.

Strong personal statements reflecting deep emotional attachment to Judaism are frequently found in the historiography of Judaism written by Jews. Books often begin with emotionally charged dedications to victims of anti-Semitism, especially the Holocaust. For example, Gertrude Himmelfarb (1991) notes that David Abraham dedicates his controversial book 魏玛共和国的崩溃 “For my parents—who at Auschwitz and elsewhere suffered the worst consequences of what I can merely write about.” The point of such dedications is to show that the author stands in a morally privileged relationship with the subject matter. Abraham’s dedication becomes “part of a deep quarrel among the living, between a survivor’s son and elderly German businessmen or their heirs” (Himmelfarb 1991, 48; see also Novick 1988).[188]Novick (1988, 341) attributes the negative view of American populism held by some American Jewish historians (Hofstadter, Bell, Lipset) to the fact that “they were one generation removed from the Eastern European shtetl [犹太小镇]，在那里叛乱的外邦农民意味着大屠杀。” Abraham has been accused of deceiving his readers in his use (and fabrication) of sources in an effort to show that elite gentile businessmen had a decisive role in undermining the Weimar Republic and facilitating the rise of National Socialism.

While German businessmen have been unfairly condemned, Mosse (1987, 8, 16–17, 219) describes a tendency among some historians to minimize Jewish involvement in the German economy (especially banking) or to propose that Jewish economic enterprises had become largely assimilated to gentile enterprises by the time of Weimar Republic. The apologetic purpose of these analyses is to falsify anti-Semitic charges related to Jewish economic behavior and, more broadly, portray Jewish behavior as irrelevant to anti-Semitism. Mosse’s data show that Jews were overrepresented in the German economy by a factor of approximately twenty, that there was no decline in Jewish economic importance, and that the Jewish economy was not assimilated to the German economy.

The 15th-century New Christian chroniclers of events leading up to the Inquisition fashioned a historiography that served their group interests. Thus the New Christian author of the Crónica de Juan II was “a staunch supporter of the conversos . . . [as] indicated by his endeavor to conceal any opinion, action, or relationship that could cast any aspersion upon the conversos.” Also, the New Christian author of the Cuarta Crónica General adopted a policy of concealment of charges of religious heresy and racial antagonism in order to control “what should, and should not, be presented for public discussion” (Netanyahu 1995, 645, 657). Similarly, the New Christian author of the 缩写 went to great lengths to remove explicit references to tax collectors as “infidels and heretics,” because readers would identify them as New Christians (Netanyahu 1995, 635). For all of these historians, “the issues of Marrano heresy (Judaism) and converso racial inferiority, which formed one of the stormiest controversies that ever swept the kingdoms of Spain, were thus systematically forced into obscurity as if they had never been debated” (Netanyahu 1995, 658).

Modern historians of Judaism have also been accused of exhibiting ingroup biases. Much of this case-making is on issues central to an evolutionary approach—an extraordinary vindication of the fundamental accuracy of the evolutionary perspective. For example, there has been a great deal of polemical writing on the question of whether Judaism is properly viewed as a universal religion. This issue is of considerable importance for an evolutionary view and is discussed extensively in 创伤后应激障碍 （第 4 章）。

McKnight (1991, 11) states that “perhaps at no point has Christian and Jewish propaganda been more visible in biblical scholarship than in the discussion of Jewish missionary activity.” Christian polemics “were met in kind with counter-apologetics that attempted to prove that Judaism was not misanthropic in nature but was instead a universalistic and missionary religion.” Gager (1983) notes that a great deal of the debate on Christian-Jewish relations in antiquity as well as the general phenomenon of anti-Semitism has been guided by an awareness of the Holocaust and by a conscious attempt to show that Christianity was the primary source of anti-Semitism in the West (see review in Gager 1983, 13–23).[189]“Even a cursory reading of works in this area, whether popular or academic, reveals great depths of passion and personal involvement” (Sevenster 1975, 9). Regarding the work of J. Isaac (Genèse de l’Antisémitisme 1956) Sevenster notes that “sometimes Isaac gives the impression of representing that ancient pagan anti-Semitism is as unimportant as possible, so that he can let the blame for the later anti-Semitism fall with full force on the Christian Church” (p. 7; see also Simon 1986, 398). The review of Hertzberg (1993a,b) indicates that attempts to portray anti-Semitism as a consequence of a uniquely pathological Christianity or Western culture continue to be common among Jewish apologists.

During the 19th century, Christian and Jewish theologians developed self-serving views of historical events (Heschel 1994). On the Jewish side, Abraham Geiger presented a very positive account of Pharisaic Judaism and depicted Jesus as a Pharisee. Gieger’s account was vigorously challenged by Christian theologians like Julius Wellhausan, Emil Schürer, and Wilhelm Bousset. The Christian theologians portrayed early Judaism as a precursor to Christianity, as overly legalistic, and as a religion of “national particularism and soulless piety” (Schorsch 1972, 170). The result was that “the scientific study of the Jewish past was again summoned to defend Judaism and reassert the worthiness of Jewry” (p. 172). The result was a series of scholarly works intended to absolve Judaism of these charges, but “the underlying apologetic intention was beyond dispute” (p. 174). Thus a work of Leo Baeck is described as having “only an occasionally overt polemical aside,” but “the sum and substance of his reconstruction was determined by a deep aversion to Lutheran Christianity” (p. 174). These works were funded by the Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaft des Judentums (Society for the Advancement of the Science of Judaism), which was itself associated with the Verband der Deutschen Juden, an association founded to combat anti-Semitism. During this period, the Verband developed an archive for material to be used in anti-Christian polemics, including areas in which Christianity was alleged to be inferior to Judaism.

Katz (1986b, 83) notes that the 犹太法学博物馆 movement of the 19th century, although beginning as a movement dedicated to the scientific study of Judaism, developed into one that “would serve to foster greater spiritual identification with the totality of Jewish culture, thought, and experience.” The work of the premier Jewish historian of the 19th century, Heinrich Graetz, displays “a very strong national bias” (Katz 1986b, 96). (The 19th-century German historian Theodor Mommsen dismissed Graetz’s work by comparing it to history written by Catholic defenders of the faith and their “historical falsifications” [in Lindemann 1997, 140]). In the contemporary world, Katz finds that academic departments of Jewish studies are often linked to Jewish nationalism: “The inhibitions of traditionalism, on the one hand, and a tendency toward apologetics, on the other, can function as deterrents to scholarly objectivity” (p. 84). The work of Jewish historians exhibits “a defensiveness that continues to haunt so much of contemporary Jewish activity” (1986b, 85).

A central theme of Katz’s analysis—massively corroborated by Albert Lindemann’s (1997) recent work—is that historians of Judaism have often falsely portrayed the beliefs of gentiles as irrational fantasies while portraying the behavior of Jews as irrelevant to anti-Semitism. For example, Endelman (1982, 11) states that “it can be argued that the history of modern anti-Semitism belongs more properly to the realm of American and European historiography than Jewish. Anti-Semitism, after all, reflects stresses and strains in the larger societies in which Jews live and mirrors actual Jewish behavior only in a limited, distorted way.” Katz comments that a principal motivation for such distortions is to preempt any possibility of endorsing the arguments of anti-Semites who, as we have seen, have consistently stressed particular features of Jewish behavior.

As a concrete example of this tendency, Katz discusses the work of Eleanore Sterling on the “Hep! Hep!” riots of 1819 in Germany. Katz pointedly notes Sterling’s associations with the Frankfurt School of predominantly Jewish intellectuals. I discuss this school as a highly politicized Jewish intellectual movement in 批判文化, but it is noteworthy here that Katz (1983, 40) states that “the Frankfurt School, with its Marxist perspective, had not been notable for the accuracy of its evaluation of the Jewish situation either before the advent of Nazism or afterward.” Sterling accepts a theory of anti-Semitism as displaced aggression proposed by Frankfurt School leaders Max Horkheimer and T. W. Adorno. As Katz notes, the theory completely ignores evidence that the rioters were “responding . . . to incitements by the burgher class, which felt threatened by the entry of the Jews into its occupations during the Napoleonic period and wanted to return them to their previous ghetto status. The riots originated in cities like Würzburg, Frankfurt, and Hamburg where the problem of Jewish civil status was being passionately debated at the time.” A contemporary also complained about Jews “who are living among us and who are increasing like locusts” (in Dawidowicz 1975, 30), suggesting that reproductive competition as well as resource competition were important.

This lack of objectivity has often been the focus of comments by scholars. Lindemann (1997, 308) describes Howard Morley Sachar’s chapter on Romanian anti-Semitism as “a tirade, without the slightest effort at balance.” Kieniewicz (1986) emphasizes that Jewish history in Poland has almost exclusively been written by Jewish historians and that they have focused on “the importance of the Jewish contribution to both the Polish culture and economy, and the reprehensible discrimination against Jews by Christians” (p. 70). Lichten (1986) describes Heller’s (1977) influential study of Jews in Poland as arriving “at conclusions not always based on facts; not as they really occurred but as she would like to see them” (p. 107; see also Mendelsohn 1986).

Mendelsohn (1986) notes a tendency for Jewish scholars to emphasize the virulence of anti-Semitism in pre-World War II Poland and the economic decline of Polish Jews. “The impression sometimes gained from reading the works of these authors is that Jewish life in Poland was a nightmare of almost daily pogroms, degradation and growing misery” (p. 130). Mendelsohn (1986, 132) favorably reviews the work of several historians (Bartoszewski 1986; Davies 1981; Marcus 1983; Tomaszewski 1982) who claim that “the Jews have tended to paint far too lurid a picture of their grievances.” Gutman (1986) reviews a debate between Jewish and Polish historians on Polish-Jewish relations in World War II, noting the “hypersensitivity” of some Jewish historians.

This type of apologetic conflict also relates to earlier Polish-Jewish relations. Several Jewish historians, including Yitzhak Schipper (see Litman 1984 for a review) have attempted to show that Ashkenazi Jews derive for the most part from the remnants of the Khazar empire, which converted to Judaism in the 8th century. Independent of the scholarly value of this hypothesis, Litman (1984, 105) notes that Schipper’s theories were “not merely an academic exercise in historical speculations. That they were also meant to serve nationalist Jewish causes of his time is evident.” Schipper’s theory of the early origins of Polish Jews implied that Jews had lived in Poland as long as the Poles, and further that they had had a civilizing influence on Poland. His theory of a powerful, independent Jewish state was also meant to be a model for a future Zionist state. His emphasis on the agricultural prowess of the Khazars implied that Jews engaged in farming unless prevented by others—a claim that was meant to counter the anti-Semitic charge that Jews avoided farming and were disloyal, alien economic parasites. Litman notes that this proposal outraged many Polish historians, including A. Marylski, who viewed it as an attempt “to put pre-historic Poland under Jewish feet” (in Litman 1984, 105). The Khazar hypothesis was also used by Samuel Weissenberg, a 19th-century Jewish racial scientist and political/cultural activist, in his attempt to prove that Jews were “an integral element on Russian soil” (Efron 1994, 106).

The theory of the Khazar origins of Polish Jews is highly speculative and has been rejected by many historians aware of the apologetic nature of the hypothesis (e.g., Dunlop 1967, 261–262; Weinryb 1972, 19–22, 27–29). A crucial difficulty is that Ashkenazi groups speak a German-based language (Yiddish) rather than a Turkish-based language. Moreover, it is very unlikely that the highly literate Ashkenazim would preserve no trace at all of their Turkish origins. The genetic data summarized in 创伤后应激障碍 (Ch. 2) also weigh strongly against such a view.

Nevertheless, the Khazars have become a sort of all-purpose device for those intent on making apologetic claims. Weiseltier (1976; see also Ankori 1979) documents the apologetic interests at work in Arthur Koestler’s (1976) revival of the hypothesis.[190]Koestler (1971) also wrote 助产士蟾蜍的案例 defending Paul Kammerer who committed suicide in 1926 after some of his specimens purportedly confirming Lamarckian inheritance were shown to have been faked. As discussed in 批判文化, many Jewish intellectuals accepted Lamarckian inheritance during this period, quite probably as an aspect of their ethnic agenda. Koestler uses the Khazar conjecture to argue against the idea that the Jews are a single people. This in turn stems from his interest in defusing racial anti-Semitism (which on this view is misdirected, since the Ashkenazi Jews are not Semites), and as part of his attempt to make diaspora Jews more willing to assimilate, because they would abandon the belief that they have a common origin with other Jews.

Albert Lindemann’s (1991, 1997) work shows a keen awareness of the role of Jewish interests in the construction of Jewish history. Writing of the Dreyfus Affair in 去世界 France, Lindemann notes that “Jewish historians, especially those who wrote at the time of the Affair, have perceived a more central role for anti-Semitism and Gentile villainy, whereas non-Jewish students of the affair have tended to question such perceptions, although on both sides a wide range of opinion is to be found” (1991, 94–95).

Lindemann (1991, 131) finds similar biases in the historiography on Russian Jews written by Jews, who tended to view the situation as simply an example of irrational czarist brutality rather than spontaneous uprisings. (Judge [1992] shows that the Kishinev pogrom of 1903 was a spontaneous response to Jewish economic domination, and he shows that the Russian government viewed such pogroms very negatively because they were perceived as a sign of revolutionary activity.) Lindemann notes that these historians also fail to present the problems and dilemmas facing the czarist authorities attempting to deal with the problems presented by Jews during this period. A crucial issue for the Czarist authorities was their belief that the Russian peasants would not be able to compete with the Jews in open economic competition, a belief that is certainly justified by the extraordinary upward mobility of Jewish populations in post-emancipation Europe. Indeed, Jewish economic domination of Russian peasants was apparent even to Jewish socialist radicals of the period (e.g., Zhitlowsky 1972, 129; see Chapter 2). Lindemann (p. 154ff) also notes that Jewish historians of events in late-19th- and early-20th-century Russia tended to exaggerate Jewish losses as well as unfairly depict the pogroms as the result of conspiracies by the authorities rather than as having any popular roots or economic causes related to competition and the Jewish population explosion.[191]Exaggerations of Jewish losses during the Russian pogroms of 1881 and the extent to which the Russian government was responsible were apparent to contemporaries during the 19th century. Historian Goldwin Smith (1894) noted that a publication distributed by the Jewish community in England in a successful attempt to gain British sympathies contained claims of many atrocities for which there was no evidence. These alleged crimes included roasting infants alive and mass rapes, including some in which Christian women held down Jewesses being raped by Christian men. Regarding property losses (including claims that entire streets had been razed and entire Jewish quarters put to the torch), Smith states that based on reports of British consuls in the area, “though the riots were deplorable and criminal, the Jewish account was in most cases exaggerated, and in some to an extravagant extent. The damage to Jewish property at Odessa, rated in the Jewish account at 1,137,381 roubles, or according to their higher estimates, 3,000,000 roubles, was rated, Consul-General Stanley tells us, by a respectable Jew on the spot at 50,000 roubles, while the Consul-General himself rates it at 20,000” (p. 243). Finally, Lindemann notes that Jewish historiography of the Leo Frank Affair (see p. 191) has virtually assumed anti-Semitic conspiracies: “People then and later have in some sense wanted to find anti-Semitism. They have not been entirely disappointed in their search, but they have also been inclined to dramatize inappropriately or exaggerate what they found of it” (p. 236).

The most blatant example of ethnocentric bias among Jewish historians I have been able to find is José Faur’s book on the Iberian inquisitions. Faur (1992), whose book was published by the State University of New York Press, begins by terming his work “autobiographic,” since its origins lie in his grandfather telling him of “the glory of 塞帕拉德 ” (p. ix; italics in text). He proceeds to show his deep commitment to Judaism and attachment to the Jewish culture of his childhood, and concludes by writing that “this book is written from the perspective of the ‘other.’ The story of the 转换 . . . concerns the attempt of the oppressed to break the silence imposed on them by the persecuting society, and transmit the perspective of the persecuted to future generations” (p. 8; italics in text).

This is ethnocentric historiography with a vengeance. Faur completely rejects “objective,” “scientific” history, whose function “is to suppress alternative perspectives, particularly the perspective of the victim” (p. 183). “There will be no ‘Jewish history’ without Jewish historians establishing a specific Jewish perspective. Therefore, the rise of a Jewish historical consciousness is indispensable for a particular Jewish history. . . . Without a historical consciousness the destiny of the Jewish people will remain unfulfilled” (p. 184). History, he asserts, is at its basis subjective, and “the most awesome responsibility of the Jewish historian is to validate the authority of Jewish memory” (p. 210). Jewish history, as the history of the persecuted, is viewed as “Sacred History,” while the history of the gentiles is “Profane History”—the “primitive beastly fantasies written by brutes of an alien race” (p. 213). Faur rejects the Greek scientific perspective in favor of a perspective in which historical truth is pluralistic. Within this pluralistic framework, an essential function of Sacred History is to justify the moral and intellectual superiority of Judaism and the Jewish historical record.[192]While Jewish culture is viewed as morally and intellectually superior, Faur exhibits extreme hostility to Western culture, seen as fundamentally racist and as intolerant of diversity. An important agenda is to reinforce the sense of Jewish intellectual superiority by attempting to show that Western intellectual movements can be traced to Jewish sources. However, Faur asserts that these intellectual structures then collapse under the criticism emanating from Jewish sources as a result of the persecution of the Jews. In a remarkable example of self-deception, the moral superiority of Judaism is said to result from the greater individual freedom and lack of group identity said to be characteristic of Judaism, in contrast to the corporate character of medieval Christianity. Faur depicts Christianity as fundamentally intolerant, but he develops an elaborate casuistry to justify instances of intolerance among Jews. Faur also provides a highly apologetic attempt to vindicate the morality of Jewish moneylending. Faur is not alone in his apologetic tendencies regarding Jewish moneylending; Stein (1955) refers to a modern Jewish apologetic literature by historians in the area of moneylending to Christians. Faur’s work is replete with instances in which any morally questionable behavior associated with Judaism, such as intolerance of dissent within the community or discrimination against outgroups, is considered so obviously traceable to evil Christian influences that the author deems no further comment necessary.[193]Similarly, Neuman (1969, II, 120) writes that when Solomon of Montpellier “anathemized the writings of Maimonides, interdicted the sciences and pronounced the sentence of excommunication against those who engaged in the study of profane literature or who treated the Bible allegorically and dealt too freely with the aggadic portions of the Talmud . . . one can see in it the unfortunate Christian influence on Judaism.” Regarding the genesis of anti-Semitism, Faur cites with approval the views of a 17th-century Jewish writer who “validated Jewish memory” by attributing anti-Semitism to the beauty and preeminence of the Jewish people. “As with the falconers, it is the beauty of the bird—and nothing else—that prompts them to hunt and destroy it” (p. 210).

History as apologia is also seen in the work of S. D. Goitein (1974) on Jews in Arab lands. There is a clear agenda to indict Western culture and vindicate Arab culture and especially Judaism. Goitein finds that “in contrast to the neighboring early medieval civilizations of Byzantium and Sassanid Persia, Israel and the Arabs present the type of a society which is characterized by the absence of privileged castes and classes, by the absence of enforced obedience to strong authority, by undefined but nonetheless very powerful agencies for the formation and expression of public opinion, by freedom of speech, and by a high respect for human life, dignity and freedom” (p. 27). Such an opinion flies in the face of excellent evidence that Muslim societies (as well as Israelite society as portrayed in the Tanakh; see 创伤后应激障碍, Ch. 8) conform very well to the typical Eastern pattern of a collectivist, authoritarian social structure in which there are pronounced social status differences and in which wealthy males have large numbers of wives and concubines (Weisfeld 1990). Indeed, Goitein’s view would appear to be a rather thoroughgoing inversion of the contrasts between Eastern and Western societies discussed in 创伤后应激障碍 （第 8 章）。

Goitein’s apologetic stance can also be seen in his views that Jewish marriage in Muslim lands was monogamous, in contrast to the surrounding societies. Monogamy, which has been characteristic of Western societies throughout their history, is undoubtedly associated with a higher position for women and is essentially an egalitarian mating system for men (MacDonald 1983, 1990, 1995b; see 创伤后应激障碍, Ch. 8). Goitein’s view is thus an attempt to place Jewish marriage customs in a favorable moral light and is at variance with clear indications that polygyny is primitive among the Jews and that Jews practiced polygyny wherever it was legal (创伤后应激障碍, Chs. 3, 8). Indeed, Friedman (1989, 39) notes that in fact polygyny and concubinage with female slaves was “far from rare” among medieval Jews in Muslim lands, as indicated in the Geniza documents, and there were many discussions and legal rulings related to polygyny among them. Friedman also notes that Goitein and others have declared other practices common in the Jewish community on the basis of far less documentation than that related to polygyny; yet polygyny was said to be rare.

Goitein himself notes that Jewish scholars of the 19th century, such as Graetz (who described Muslim lands as an “interfaith utopia” [Cohen 1994, 5]), tended to portray the situation of the Jews in Arab countries in benign terms in order to contrast the situation with perceived European oppression of the Jews, thereby condemning European culture. Goitein takes a middle view, but there remains a strong desire to condemn the West: “Modern Western civilization, like the ancient civilization of the Greeks, is essentially at variance with the religious culture of the Jewish people. Islam, however, is from the very flesh and bone of Judaism.” Anti-Semitism, including extreme “ritual degradation” of Jews, was a prominent characteristic of Muslim societies throughout their history, the exceptions tending to occur when Jews occupied the role of an intermediary group between a foreign conqueror and a subject Muslim population (see p. 30).

Finally, Raphael and Jennifer Patai (1989) in their book 犹太种族的神话, combine historical interpretation with genetic analysis in an attempt to show that Jews have eagerly attempted and succeeded in converting other peoples to their religion and intermarrying with them. The stated agenda of the book is to counter the idea that Zionism is racism, as stated by the UN resolution of 1974, and the implication that Judaism itself is racist. Although the book is replete with inaccuracies and distortions of Jewish religious writings and the historical record, I note here only that researchers in the field of Jewish population genetics have gone out of their way to reject their conclusions (e.g., Bonné-Tamir et al. 1979, 71; Szeinberg 1979, 77).[194]Despite a nod in the direction of possible genetic and eugenic causes of higher Jewish intelligence, Patai and Patai argue that such causes are “not necessary” (1989, 156), since environmental explanations are available. They take the indefensible view that if environmental influences are possible or are demonstrably of some influence, there is sufficient reason to reject genetic mechanisms completely. When they discuss the eugenic hypothesis of Jewish intelligence, no mention is made of the central position these practices have had in Jewish religious writings. Eugenic practices are simply noted rather than discussed as a highly conscious effort sustained over many centuries. Thus they hope the reader will conclude that (1) if there are genetic influences, they are either due to gentile evil—the Gentile Selection Hypothesis reviewed in 创伤后应激障碍 (Ch. 7), or to a sort of adventitious cultural practice (the eugenic hypothesis); (2) however, since there may be environmental causes of these findings, one can safely ignore genetic hypotheses.

While Patai and Patai attempted to combat anti-Semitism by portraying Judaism as a universalist religion with no ethnic implications, earlier Jewish scientist/activists were intent on combating anti-Semitism and developing a positive conceptualization of Judaism within the context of 去世界 race science. While having somewhat different political agendas, all of the Jewish race scientists profiled by Efron (1994) (i.e., Joseph Jacobs, Samuel Weissenberg, Elias Auerbach, Aron Sandler, Ignaz Zollschan) were strongly identified Jews and were activists on behalf of Jewish causes. They were vitally concerned that Jews would continue to maintain their racial purity, and they combated anti-Semitism by emphasizing the cultural assimilability of Jews and stressing positive Jewish traits and accomplishments. Their work attempted “to engage the dominant discourse about race and the so-called Jewish question as well as to mount a sustained campaign of self-defense, self-assertion, and ethnic identity building. . . . Before scientific racism had run its course . . . Jewish scientists had risen on behalf of their embattled people, polemicizing the problem of Jewish ‘Otherness’ by using the contemporary methodologies of race science to either confirm or disprove claims of racial difference” (Efron 1994, 3, 5).

For example, Ignaz Zollschan’s writings were intended to appeal to various audiences, but the ultimate goal was to advance his perception of Jewish group interests. He emphasized Jewish contributions to culture in order to rebut the claims of anti-Semites. On the other hand, his message for Jews was that they were a unitary racial type and that cultural assimilation would not change the fact of Jewish racial distinctiveness. Only Zionism would solve the Jewish racial question, by allowing Jews to continue as a racial entity (see Efron 1994, 156).

Both Jewish and gentile racial scientists stressed the genetic purity of the Jewish gene pool and the close genetic relatedness of far-flung Jewish groups. However, Jewish racial scientists emphasized the moral superiority of Jews and also their intelligence, as indicated by a large cranial capacity. Unlike their gentile counterparts, however, Jewish racial scientists argued for the importance of the environment in shaping individuals, and their speculations in this regard fit well their general ideological agenda: Jews were a pure race, but their features, including their large cranial capacity and intelligence, were molded by the environment. Negatively perceived traits thought to be characteristic of Jews, such as weak physical constitutions and a tendency to neurasthenia, were ascribed to being forced to live in a ghetto environment or subjected to anti-Semitism. On the other hand, the strengths of the Jews, such as their longevity and low levels of infant mortality, were ascribed to “the structure of Jewish life as created for and by Jews” (Efron 1994, 177).

Besides the race scientists, other 去世界 Jewish social scientists dedicated themselves to improving the image and lot of Jews by gathering statistics on them. “The gathering of Jewish statistics and the writing of a Jewish sociology or anthropology based on those statistics were impelled by political considerations. Although they were Zionist, they were also liberal and even assimilationist. These three post-emancipatory Jewish ideologies expressed widely divergent philosophies. Yet statistics gathering provided them with a common denominator in that the figures were always used to defend Jews against their detractors and to work for the improvement of Jewish conditions on the basis of those data” (Efron 1994, 169). These social scientists gathered data intended to refute the empirical claims of anti-Semites, for example, that Jews dominated certain sectors of the economy or were prominent in certain types of criminal enterprises. 批判文化 will discuss several historically important examples where Jewish social scientists have developed theories, collected data, and created intellectual movements in the interest of promoting Jewish group interests.

We have seen that racialist rhetoric was used by Jewish racial scientists and Zionists to advance group goals. The situation in America is particularly interesting in this regard. Beginning in the late 19th century, the rhetoric of race served to clearly demarcate group boundaries for a community deeply concerned about defections resulting from intermarriage, especially of women (Goldstein 1997). Jews—both traditional and Reform (see discussion of Kaufman Kohler above)—developed a view of themselves as a race with characteristics—intellectuality and high morality—that made them uniquely qualified to live up to American ideals; indeed, they traced the ethical foundations of Western civilization to Jewish influences. Their ideas were explicitly tied to 去世界 racial science; in the words of Reform intellectual leader Emil G. Hirsch in response to a critic who viewed Judaism as a purely spiritual force, “let him sneer at physiological Judaism! This demurrer and sneer prove only one thing, that he cannot have grasped the import of the most recent investigations in anthropology” (in Goldstein 1997, 52).

However, while racialist rhetoric was highly functional in cementing group ties, preventing intermarriage, and developing positive self-images of the ingroup, this rhetoric was abandoned when it was perceived to conflict with Jewish group goals, particularly with regard to Jewish immigration (Goldstein 1997). Whereas in the 19th century Jews saw themselves as members of the dominant white race in distinction to African Americans and Native Americans, Jews came to be perceived by some, such as Madison Grant in his influential Passing of the Great Race, as non-Nordics and hence as less desirable immigrants. At this point, the Jewish strategy shifted and Jews became leaders in the movement to delete the concept of race from science entirely. The prominent anthropologist Maurice Fishberg was recruited by Jewish leaders to cast doubt on the idea that Jews were a race, and Franz Boas developed the intensely politicized cultural determinism school of anthropology which came to dominate American anthropology from the mid-1920s to the present. The efforts of Boas and his followers are a major topic of 批判文化. Here they serve as a reminder of the flexibility of Jewish strategizing in the intellectual arena as well as the ability of Jewish intellectuals to bend the language of the current Zeitgeist—in this case the language of science—to serve group interests.

Although there is no question regarding the existence of crypto-Judaism on the Iberian Peninsula, there remains controversy surrounding the precise status of many of the New Christian descendants of forced conversions in Spain and Portugal. The standard interpretation is that indeed the vast majority of the New Christians were crypto-Jews (e.g., Cohen 1967; Freund & Ruiz 1994, 178), and there is no question that this was the popular perception of the time (e.g., Kamen 1965; Roth 1937). Consider, for example, the following statement by the 15th-century historian Andrés Bernáldez. Bernáldez charges the Conversos with religious heresy, continued peoplehood (note the appellation of “tribe”), as well as continuing to treat Old Christians as an exploitable and hated outgroup.

Those people who can avoid baptizing their children, do so, and those who have them baptized wash them off as soon as they return home. . . . [T]hey are gluttons and feeders, who never lose the Judaical habit of eating delicacies of onion and garlic fried in oil, and they cook their meat in oil, using it in place of lard or fat, to avoid pork; and so their houses and doorways smell most offensively from those tit-bits; and hence they have the odor of the Jews, as a result of their food and their not being baptized. . . . [T]hey eat meat in Lent and on the vigils of feasts and on ember days; they keep the Passover and the Sabbath as best they can. They send oil to the synagogues for the lamps. They have Jews who preach to them secretly in their houses, especially to the women very secretly; and they have Jewish rabbis whose occupation is to slaughter their beasts and fowls for them. They eat unleavened bread during the Jewish holidays, and meat chopped up. They follow all the Judaical ceremonies secretly so far as they can.

The men as well as the women always avoid receiving the sacraments of Holy Church voluntarily. When they confess, they never tell the truth; and it happened that one confessor asked a person of this tribe to cut off a piece of his garment for him, saying, “Since you have never sinned, I should like to have a bit of your garment for a relic to heal the sick.” There was a time in Seville when it was commanded that no meat be weighed on Saturday, because all the 转换 ate it Saturday night, and they ordered it weighed Sunday morning.

Not without reason did Our Redeemer call them a wicked and adulterous generation. They do not believe that God rewards virginity and chastity. All their endeavor is to increase and multiply. And in the time when this heretical iniquity flourished, many monasteries were violated by their wealthy men and merchants, and many professed nuns were ravished and mocked, some through gifts and some through the lures of panderers, they not believing in or fearing excommunications; but they did it to injure Jesus Christ and the Church. And usually, for the most part, they were usurious people, of many wiles and deceits, for they all live by easy occupations and offices, and in buying and selling they have no conscience where Christians are concerned. Never would they undertake the occupations of tilling the soil or digging or cattle-raising, nor would they teach their children any except holding public offices, and sitting down to earn enough to eat with little labor. Many of them in these realms in a short time acquired very great fortunes and estates, since they had no conscience in their profits and usuries, saying that they only gained at the expense of their enemies, according to the command of God in the departure of the people of Israel to rob the Egyptians. (In Walsh 1930, 202–203)

Nevertheless, several historians (Henry Kamen [1985], Ellis Rivkin [n. d.], Norman Roth [1995],[195]Roth’s work, published by the University of Wisconsin press, is patently apologetic and has been devastatingly reviewed (see Meyerson 1997). His main strategy is simply to aggressively deny the truth of the accusations of the Inquisition. For example, in recounting a charge based on very detailed statements describing Conversos at a Yom Kippur service, Roth states that “these details, and the fact that the witnesses testified that they did not understand all the prayers, which were in Hebrew, and that they described the prostration which is part of the Yom Kippur service, the wearing of white robes, washing of hands, etc., 可能 appear to prove the ‘accuracy’ of the charges. In fact, of course, all of these charges are patently false and simply derive, again, from Inquisition manuals and general knowledge of the most important of Jewish holidays.” Roth repeatedly uses the phrase “of course” and “patently false” to make assertions that are at least open to considerable doubt, as if his views are so obviously true that no one could dispute them. An often-repeated argument is that a certain sameness to the charges made against the Conversos is evidence that the charges are illusory (e.g., p. 248). Roth also states that the testimony of the Converso Pulgar, who asserted that some Conversos secretly observed Jewish rites or practiced a melange of Jewish and Christian rites, is “believable” but then provides no evidence for his assertion that the situation described by Pulgar was unique to Toledo and should not be extrapolated to the rest of Spain (p. 241). Roth also notes without comment that some members of the prominent Coronel family converted to Judaism when they left the Peninsula (p. 130). The suggestion is that while in Spain they were true Christians who just happened to convert to Judaism when they left Spain, and that moreover those members of the family remaining in Spain were true Christians—suggestions that I find difficult to believe.

Roth concludes, “There is no doubt whatever, therefore, that the 绝大多数, nearly all, of these accusations are totally false. Only the extreme bigot, or the most zealous apologist for the conversos, can possibly continue to maintain otherwise” (p. 268). Presumably people who view the Inquisition as at least partially understandable as a medieval response to religious heresy or as resource competition between the Old Christians and New Christians are in the “extreme bigot” category, while historians who accept the reality of crypto-Judaism but view the phenomenon in positive terms would be in the latter category.

Roth almost completely de-emphasizes the continued “groupness” of the Conversos and implies several times that there is no ethnic basis to Judaism or to the Conversos (e.g., p. 272) despite the evidence he provides that they were very concerned to marry each other (p. 70). In this regard, therefore, his work is even more one-sided than Netanyahu’s. To Roth, the Jews were a completely religious, non-ethnic entity; they had no group ties that influenced their marriage decisions or economic and political cooperation; and almost all of the Conversos were true Christians. Cecil Roth [1974],[196]Roth’s 1932 book took a highly romanticized view of the Iberian crypto-Jews (see above). However, in the third edition, Roth (1974) argues that the New Christians were sincere in their religious beliefs but emigrated to Protestant lands for economic rather than religious reasons; they then adopted Judaism in their new surroundings for economic reasons. He then proposes (without evidence) that by becoming Jews they avoided isolation in their new surroundings and avoided alienating their new Protestant neighbors because, as Jews, they could not join guilds; or they adopted Judaism purely for intellectual reasons (fulfilling the messianic promise of the Old Testament). This rather incredible view is also found in the introduction to this same book by Salomon (1974). and most notably, Benzion Netanyahu [1966, 1995]) have claimed that the New Christians were not really crypto-Jews, in order to avoid the charge that there is a certain “legitimacy” to Christian suspicions of these individuals with the consequence that the Inquisition itself would be given some legitimacy.

From the theoretical perspective adopted here, there are two points to keep in mind, either of which, if true, would render the Inquisition comprehensible within the present theoretical framework. First, the social identity theory of anti-Semitism implies that the major determinant of anti-Converso actions would be whether the Conversos continued to constitute an identifiable group within Iberian society, not whether their religious beliefs were sincere. In the case of the New Christians, there is a great deal of evidence that they retained a strong sense of group cohesion whatever their religious beliefs (see Chapter 6, pp. 184–86). Even if all of the New Christians developed sincere Christian beliefs but continued to form an endogamous, cooperative, and highly successful group within Iberian society, it is expected that the outgroup would develop negative beliefs about them, including perhaps the belief that they were not sincere. After all, to be a true Christian might reasonably be viewed by the Old Christians as implying complete social intercourse and the breaking down of group boundaries within the society, to form a homogeneous Christian state. The view that society should be a corporate, seamless, and homogeneous entity was central to conceptions of the medieval state.

Second, from the perspective of social identity theory, an important contributor to anti-Semitism is the prevention of Type II errors (see p. 13). This would result in hypotheses about Judaism as a whole being accepted on the basis of even a few instances of negatively evaluated behavior. Thus if even a few New Christians were known to be crypto-Jews, it is expected that Old Christians would err on the side of over-inclusion in this negative category, because this would have a very low cost to the Old Christians and would result in very large benefits in their competition with the New Christians. That there were at least some crypto-Jews is acknowledged by all scholars, even Netanyahu: “That there were some Jewish pockets among the Marranos in the sixties [i.e., 1460s], and probably in the seventies too, may be taken for granted” (1995, 931).

It is also known that New Christians and Old Christians were engaged in resource competition throughout the period leading up to the Inquisition (创伤后应激障碍, Ch. 5). Given this state of affairs, an evolutionist could scarcely be surprised to find that Old Christians overattributed religious heresy to the Conversos in order to achieve their evolutionary goals. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that this is the whole story. Recently several historians have emphasized the heterogeneity of Converso religious beliefs, and this perspective, if true, not only validates the rationality of the Inquisition as an instrument of ethnic warfare but also provides it with a certain moral legitimacy. After all, heresy was indeed a crime worthy of official punishment in the eyes of virtually everyone during this period. (Netanyahu [1995, 660] terms heresy an “execrable crime.”) As a result, no matter how odious such sentiments appear to the modern observer, the Inquisition was certainly acting within the moral and theological premises of the age.

Haliczer (1990, 212ff) notes that there were a variety of religious beliefs among the New Christians in Valencia, including a deep commitment to Judaism, a belief in both Judaism and Catholicism, and fervent Catholicism. At the onset of the Inquisition in the 1480s, the Converso community of Valencia is described as “close knit” and with a high level of affluence and political influence. In the early 1500s the Inquisition discovered a network of “dozens of interlocking families” (p. 225) of New Christians. In the 1720s there remained a “a tight-knit group of New Christian families who married among themselves or with other families of known Judaic sympathies” (p. 234). Haliczer recounts the example of a New Christian woman who was severely beaten by her father for secretly marrying an Old Christian. The woman then married a New Christian, but her behavior caused the New Christian families to ostracize her. Clearly, whatever these individuals believed, the woman’s exogamous behavior was a very grave offense against New Christian ethics.

Consistent with the present emphasis on behavior rather than beliefs, Haliczer notes that the best evidence for being a true Christian was not what one said one believed, but one’s actual behavior, such as associating with Old Christians, eating pork, and giving alms to Christian poor. “In an age when popular religion consisted of little more than a collection of rituals and social customs, there was no other way to judge, and it was the conversos’ failure to conform to the behavioral patterns expected of a Catholic rather than any deeply held religious views that made him an object of suspicion and denunciation for his Old Christian neighbors, servants, and associates” (Haliczer 1990, 219). The continued association of New Christians with each other (and, until 1492, with Jews), including continued endogamy, provided a rational basis for the Inquisition.

Indeed, one might note that New Christians who maintained group separatism while sincerely accepting Christianity were really engaging in a very interesting evolutionary strategy—a true case of crypsis entirely analogous to crypsis in the natural world. Such people would be even more invisible to the surrounding society than crypto-Jews, because they would attend church regularly, not circumcise themselves, eat pork, etc., and have no psychological qualms about doing so. As Trivers (1985, 1991) emphasizes, the best deceivers are self-deceivers because they do not show any psychological tensions or feelings of ambivalence. Psychological acceptance of Christianity may have been the best possible means of continuing Judaism as a group evolutionary strategy during the period of the Inquisition. While the rest of society would be led to believe that these individuals had completely assimilated and would be impressed with their devout practice of religion, the New Christians would be aware of a sort of subterranean group boundary which delimited mate choice and partners for economic cooperation and charity.

There is indeed a suggestion that at least some of the New Christians had altered their religious ideology while continuing to engage in genetic separatism. For example, Ortiz (1965, 76) mentions the philosopher Juan Luis Vives, who had four Jewish grandparents and was married to a Conversa, but nevertheless was apparently a sincere Christian. In Chapter 4 evidence was reviewed indicating that there were high levels of endogamy among at least some groups of New Christians for centuries after the onset of Inquisition. Reflecting the genetic purity of this group, Israel (1985, 203; see also Baron 1969, 100, 124–125, 149–150) notes that Jewish authorities assumed that marriage in the Iberian Peninsula had been entirely endogamous. The interesting point is that when these New Christians went abroad in search of a Jewish marriage, Jewish religious authorities made active attempts to convert them back to Judaism (Israel 1985, 203). The suggestion is that surface beliefs had indeed ceased to be a reliable cue for endogamy, and that at least a subset of the New Christians were sincere in their Christian beliefs but had managed to retain their ethnic purity for generations.

A critical point in evaluating apologia such as that of Netanyahu (1995) is that he does not attach any moral importance to the central fact of the situation—that the New Christians constituted an endogamous, highly successful, and even dominating group within Spanish society, with high levels of within-group cooperation and patronage.[197]Netanyahu’s book has received devastating reviews. Kagan (1995, 16), interprets Netanyahu’s passions as a reaction to the Holocaust—an interpretation that is problematic given the apologetic tendencies in Jewish historiography going back to the ancient world but that nevertheless emphasizes the political nature of his writing: “Mr. Netanyahu’s expansive, highly personal and emotive style carries us back to another era, to a mode of polemical discourse rarely practiced among professional historians today. More poignantly, this book illustrates the lasting intellectual repercussions of the Holocaust on historical scholarship about the Jews.” Another reviewer, Berger (1995, 56) describes the work as “devoid of nuance” in its unitary portrayal of the New Christians, and as reconstructing “motives and intentions through a series of inferences based on slim evidence.” It is interesting that in discussing the attitude of the 15th-century apologist Fernán Díaz regarding intermarriage, Netanyahu (1995, 420) states that the New Christians had an ideology that intermarriage was “the ultimate solution” of the problem, but he comments that this ideology coexisted with a powerful sense of group affinity and group pride.

Nor, despite the official ideology of New Christian apologists, did it lead to much actual intermarriage, apart from providing dowries to restore the fortunes of the gentile nobility—a practice that resulted in a one-way flow of genes from the New Christian to the Old Christian population (see Chapter 4). That the New Christians remained a definable, endogamous group is independent of whether they secretly believed and behaved as Jews. It is also independent of the opinions of Jewish religious authorities living abroad regarding their orthodoxy or whether they were still Jews.[198]Although the opinions of the rabbis cannot decide this crucial question, they are of interest in their own right, since they show considerable concern with the extent to which the New Christians intermarried with the Iberians. Rabbi Simon Duran argued that since the admixture with the gentiles was “insignificant,” all those who repent should be considered of Jewish origin” (Netanyahu 1966, 65). Clearly, Duran, writing almost a century after the forced conversions of 1391, did not believe that intermarriage had been extensive. In fact, Netanyahu notes that Duran emphasized the fact that the New Christians kept meticulous records in order to retain family purity by shunning mixed marriages. “The insignificant minority that intermarried with the gentiles is considered by them as an abomination” (in Netanyahu 1966, 65).

Further, the 15th-century rabbis Solomon Duran (Rashbash) and his son Zemah Duran emphasized that an individual with Jewish ancestry (descent from a Jewish mother) was a member of the Jewish people even if that person did not follow religious observance. Later, Rabbi Ibn Danan stated that they should be considered “wicked Israelites,” and not gentiles “so long as they are separated from the gentiles and are recognized as the seed of Israel” (Netanyahu 1966, 61). Lineal descent therefore became crucial in the absence of religious observance; while gentile converts could not become priests, New Christians who had repented could do so.

On the other hand, rabbis who rejected the New Christians as Jews emphasized that intermarriage had been significant: Jacob Barav regarded the New Christians as gentiles partly because “intermarriage with gentile women had assumed sufficient proportions among them as to place in doubt the ethnic purity of every single Marrano” (Netanyahu 1966, 70). Significantly, New Christians who had not intermarried were also considered gentiles “except with regard to relations between the sexes” (p. 70).

Thus there was disagreement among the rabbis as to the racial purity of the New Christians. However, racial purity was of supreme importance for all involved in deciding the question. Indeed, Shaw (1991, 47) emphasizes that while the Jewish status of returning New Christians was highly controversial among rabbis in the Ottoman Empire, the criterion adopted by most rabbis was whether both parents had been Jewish. Thus the offspring born to a Jew and a gentile slave were never accepted as Jews, and these individuals formed “a highly disputatious and divisive group demanding their rights and inspiring heated argument in consequence.”

Further attesting to the concern for ethnic purity among the New Christians, Baron (1973, 364) notes that the “the disproportionate share of women among the New Christian martyrs [in the Inquisition in Goa during the 16th century] may have been owing to the anxiety of many Marranos to avoid exogamy, a concern which caused them to travel in family groups, or to have their wives follow them in larger numbers than was the case among their Old Christian compatriots.”

Interestingly, a 17th-century responsum describes a Converso who was encouraged by other Conversos to flee the Peninsula but who refused because he wanted to stay with his Christian wife and children (Yerushalmi 1971, 30). For this individual, the choice of an open Jewish identity in a foreign land meant abandoning his gentile family, since the latter would not have been admitted to the Jewish community. Another 17th-century responsum referred to the practice of ostracizing New Christians who married Old Christians (Yerushalmi 1971, 20n.29). As Cohen (1967, 181; see also Contraras 1991, 129–130) notes, “no matter how Christianized the Marrano way of life may have become, and was giving evidence of becoming further, they need not—and apparently, did not—cease to be a Jewish group historically, sociologically or even religiously.” As Netanyahu (1995, 996) himself notes, the New Christians were perceived by all concerned as a separate group in Spanish society (see Chapter 6, pp. 185–186). Indeed, a remarkable fact about all of the apologias for the New Christians that emerged in the 15th century is that they took for granted that the New Christians constituted a “nation” with a particular genetic lineage—that is, that New Christians were a different race. Thus the famous 相关说明 is written “a favor de la nación Hebrea,” and its New Christian author speaks of “our race.” The 指令 is directed at absolving Jews as a race whether or not they have converted to Christianity (Netanyahu 1995, 406). Not surprisingly, the anti-Conversos, such as Alonso de Espina, also viewed them as members of the “Jewish race” (Netanyahu 1995, 847).

Besides his emphasis on the “groupness” of the Conversos, Netanyahu (p. 1044) also agrees with the dominant view among scholars that social, economic, and political conflict between New and Old Christians was basic to the Inquisition, and these views fit well with the present perspective.

Netanyahu’s own analysis therefore is quite compatible with the following overall scenario: The Conversos remained as a separate unassimilated racial/national group in Spanish society well into the 15th century and indeed up through the period of the establishment of the Inquisition and at least the following 250 years. This group, freed from the economic and social constraints placed on Jews, rose quickly to a position of dominance (or near dominance) and was correctly perceived by the Old Christians as a competitor for resources and as an outgroup—precisely the general condition that has led to anti-Semitism repeatedly throughout the history of the Jews. Because they were unable to use racial/national group membership as a category of social discrimination, in some cases the Old Christians exaggerated the extent of the Conversos’ religious heterodoxy to attain their social and political aims.

Netanyahu’s interest in asserting the non-culpability of Judaism for the events surrounding the Inquisition is also apparent in an article he wrote opposing the views of Américo Castro on the origins of the concern with purity of blood in Spain (see Netanyahu 1979–1980). As described in Chapter 4, Castro (1954, 1971) proposed that the Spanish concern with purity of blood was a reaction to previously existing concern with purity of blood among Jews. This is a critical issue in my proposal that major Western anti-Semitic movements develop as a reaction to Judaism and mimic key aspects of Judaism as a group evolutionary strategy (see Chapters 3–5).[199]Contraras (1991, 133) notes that despite criticisms of Castro’s thesis, “yet today, when many historians, whether they are Jewish or not, investigate these themes, they arrive at hypotheses quite similar to those formulated earlier by Américo Castro.”

The first part of Netanyahu’s rebuttal focuses on the interpretation of the biblical evidence. Netanyahu criticizes Castro for relying on Deuteronomy 7:6 which refers to the chosenness of Israel, to support his proposal that the Israelites were concerned with purity of blood. Netanyahu neglects to discuss the context of Deuteronomy 7:6; this context, although not quoted by Castro, clearly supports of the connections between the chosenness of Israel and fear of exogamy. The preceding passage (Deut. 7:2–5) contains God’s instructions to the Israelites to completely destroy the seven nations to be found in the promised land in order to avoid intermarriage.

And when the Lord thy God shall deliver them up before thee, and thou shalt smite them; then thou shalt utterly destroy them; thou shalt make no covenant with them, nor show mercy unto them; neither shalt thou make marriages with them: thy daughter thou shalt not give unto his son, nor his daughter shalt thou take unto thy son. For he will turn away thy son from following Me, that they may serve other gods; so will the anger of the Lord be kindled against you, and He will destroy thee quickly. But thus shall ye deal with them: ye shall break down their altars, and dash in pieces their pillars, and hew down their Asherim, and burn their graven images with fire. For thou art a holy people unto the Lord thy God: the Lord thy God hath chosen thee to be His own treasure, out of all peoples that are upon the face of the earth. (Deut. 7:2–6)

Passages like this give rather obvious support for the general associations among the idea of chosenness, the fear of exogamy, and the Israelite god as representing the interests of the ethnic group emphasized in 创伤后应激障碍 (Ch. 3). However, Netanyahu claims that the text resists any possible interpretation of a concern for purity of blood. In the passage referred to by Netanyahu (Castro 1971, 67ff), Castro goes on to cite Ezra’s condemnation of intermarriage and his pronouncements about the “Holy Seed,” and he discusses the elaborate sections on establishing descent from Aaron required by priestly families, and the genealogies of all of the tribes of Israel in 1 Chronicles 1–9. (Indeed, 1 Chronicles 1–9 is a remarkable document, purporting to be a complete genealogy of Israel up to the Babylonian captivity.) Netanyahu completely ignores the very clear concern for genealogy in these writings and expresses amazement that anyone could interpret the Tanakh as concerned with racial purity.

As part of his argument, Castro cites a passage from a letter of the Converso Hernando del Pulgar (late 15th century) that “这些人 [犹太人] are now paying for the prohibitions that Moses made to his people, that they should not marry gentiles” (Castro 1954, 531; italics in text). The passage indicates a perception about the Jews at the time as being concerned to avoid intermarriage with gentiles, and this is how Castro interprets it: “We must now try, insofar as possible, to see things as he saw them; With a free spirit he told the cardinal, a great aristocrat far removed from any sort of plebeian suspicion, that the exclusiveness of his contemporaries, their concern over purity of blood, was a reply to that other hermeticism of Pulgar’s own ancestors” (Castro 1971, 80).

The thrust of Netanyahu’s rebuttal, however, focuses on the truth of Pulgar’s statement, a point that is clearly irrelevant to the importance of 15th-century Spanish perceptions of Judaism whether or not they are true. The indications are that Pulgar viewed Jews as concerned to avoid intermarriage, and the material summarized throughout this volume and 创伤后应激障碍 indicates that, despite Netanyahu’s objections, there is substantial truth to Pulgar’s belief.

Further, Netanyahu states that the biblical strictures on ethnic intermixture

are religious, moral, historical, or cultural; but they have a common denominator in that they are not racial. . . . Like Pulgar, however, Castro ignored this ideology as if it were of no significance, assuming perhaps that it merely served as cover for a distasteful racial policy. Even so, it is obvious that this ideology of the Bible is vital for determining the issue at hand. For what we seek to establish is a 中世纪 attitude, and the impact of the Bible on its formation, and it is clear that the Bible’s justification of its laws—a justification which was taken at its face value in the Middle Ages—was far more influential in shaping views and attitudes than any contradictory fact it may have hidden. (1979–1980, 404; italics in text)

An evolutionary perspective certainly agrees that biblical rhetoric is racialism in religious disguise. To claim that this rhetoric is somehow moral because it is phrased in religious terms is clearly an attempt to avoid a negative moral judgment upon his religion. But the point here is that Pulgar’s views on this matter are indeed critical, whether or not they are true. Netanyahu in no way casts doubt on the idea that Pulgar and others viewed the 15th-century Jews as highly concerned with racial purity and that they believed that this Jewish concern was clearly articulated in Jewish religious writings.

Castro (1971, 71) then quotes the 15th-century gentile chronicler Andrés Bernáldez as saying that the New Christians “had the presumption of arrogance; [they thought] that in all the world there were no people who were better, or more prudent, or shrewder, or more distinguished than they because they were of the lineage and condition of Israel.” Netanyahu does not mention Bernáldez, but Castro is correct in using him as evidence that the Old Christians had the view that Jewish ancestry mattered a great deal to the Jews themselves.

Netanyahu then asserts (pp. 405–406) as an obvious fact that the Jews in the ancient world had an intense interest in proselytism from Hasmonean times (2nd century b.c.) onward and were very successful in their efforts. Some of the flavor of the battle between Jewish and Christian scholars over this issue has been provided in this chapter, and the evidence is discussed at length in 创伤后应激障碍 (Ch. 4). The evidence indicates that such a view is highly problematic. (Indeed, Netanyahu’s invocation of this interpretation is another indication of the theoretical usefulness to Jewish apologists of the belief that Judaism was highly successful in attracting converts in the ancient world.) Interestingly, Netanyahu is not able to point to any substantial number of converts during the medieval period in Spain, or to any evidence that Jews were intensely interested in proselytism during this period. Yet it is surely this period, during which the 睡衣 (Jewish communities) were hermetically sealed from the gentile community, which would have given rise to Spanish perceptions of Jewish attitudes toward intermarriage. Instead, Netanyahu points to the possibility of conversion in Talmudic law. As indicated in 创伤后应激障碍 (Chapter 4), the writings of the Talmud hardly show unanimous enthusiasm for converts, and, in any case, even though the Talmud does indeed make allowances for conversion, there is no evidence for Jewish proselytism or for a substantial numbers of converts at any period of Jewish history in traditional societies.

Netanyahu then criticizes Castro’s assertion that Cardinal Siliceo “purged the Cathedral of Toledo of impure priests [i.e., New Christians] on the model of Ezra and Nehemiah” (Castro 1971, 69). Netanyahu replies that Castro

was well aware of the fact that from time immemorial it was established in Israel, and in the Law of Israel, that no one could be a member of the priesthood unless descended from a priestly family; and thus it was quite natural for Ezra and Nehemiah—in that period of transmigration and resettlement—to check the records of all those who claimed to be priests. But of what interest could such a procedure be to a Catholic archbishop? Christianity did away with the hereditary principle as far as the Church hierarchy was concerned. . . . What led him [Cardinal Siliceo], then, to apply hereditary considerations to Christians of Jewish origin? There is a question here, of course, but it cannot be answered by Ezra and Nehemiah. (Netanyahu 1979–1980, 408)

If Castro is suggesting that Cardinal Siliceo’s motives in checking the ethnic ancestry of priests were explicitly inspired by Ezra and Nehemiah (although this is not at all clear), he does indeed go beyond the evidence. I interpret Castro as pointing to a formal similarity between these two activities—a formal similarity that is entirely compatible with Castro’s view that Spanish behavior was fundamentally a reaction to and a mirror image of previously existing Jewish practices. However, it is hardly irrelevant that the New Christians had retained a strong sense of group identity, that they constituted a distinct faction within the Church, and that many of them were reasonably suspected of being crypto-Jews. The analogy with the behavior of Ezra and Nehemiah, whether consciously perceived by the cardinal, is quite apparent: in both cases there was a conscious attempt to rid one’s own group of an alien group by looking for genealogical cues. The cardinal’s racialism, whatever his personal ideology, is thus reasonably construed as a rational response to the continuation of a group strategy by the New Christians, at least some of whom were known to be crypto-Jews. As indicated in Chapter 4, the obvious phenotypic cue for recognizing crypto-Jews was simply their Jewish ancestry; there were often no other clues available. Even if not all of the New Christian ecclesiastics were really crypto-Jews or did not continue to identity with the New Christians as a separate group within Spanish society, it was still reasonable to avoid the possibility that at least some of them were indeed continuing to engage in a group strategy that was antithetical to the interests of the gentile Christians.

Further, Netanyahu seems to be quite content to view the hereditary nature of the priesthood among the Israelites as simply a very ancient practice which has no theoretical interest whatever. Netanyahu views the concern of Ezra and Nehemiah for genealogy as “quite natural” given this practice, and there is the implication that these practices are a sort of harmless and arbitrary superstition—perhaps on analogy with wearing a certain style of clothing or driving on the right as opposed to the left side of the street.

From the present perspective, however, and in defense of Castro, the concern with genealogy is indeed quite natural, but only if one is concerned about racial purity. Otherwise, it makes no sense at all. Indeed, modern evidence indicates that indeed the priestly families of Judaism (i.e., the 科哈尼姆) have the same Y-chromosome and are indeed the lineal descendants of Aaron (Skorecki et al. 1997). Netanyahu fails to grasp the deep significance of these practices for conceptualizing Judaism or for how gentiles have reacted to Judaism.

Although it is not a central part of Castro’s argument, he refers in a footnote to a biblical commentary by the 15th-century Jewish scholar Rabbi Moses Arragel, who interprets Ezra as admonishing the Israelites as follows: “The uses of this chapter [of the Book of Ezra] are to make us understand that he who takes a wife of an alien nation gives great sorrow and anger to God; it notes of Solomon that he took wives of alien nations, and that caused all the woe of Israel, and the falling into captivity. . . . And [Ezra] said that this sin of sleeping with women of other nations was alone sufficient that no one should remain in Israel” (in Castro 1971, 69n). Castro comments that “it is clear that long before Christian literature talks of “purity of blood,” the concern over maintaining that purity was consubstantial with the very existence of the Hebrews.”

After questioning Arragel’s competence as a scholar, Netanyahu asserts that Arragel’s concern is not with purity of blood but with purity of religion, since converted Christians could marry Jews. First, we do not really know Arragel’s thoughts. Netanyahu would have us believe that Arragel interpreted Ezra in this manner while at the same time having very positive views about conversion and subsequent intermarriage with converts, views which he suppressed only out of fear of Christian antagonism to conversion to Judaism. There is no evidence for this, and in light of the generally negative views on conversion characteristic of Judaism throughout its history, it is extremely unlikely that this is the case.

Rabbi Arragel goes beyond a concern with marriage to a concern with even “sleeping” with gentiles and begetting “alien” offspring upon them. In this regard, Netanyahu correctly notes that Arragel’s interpretation goes beyond the literal meaning of the Book of Ezra, and I agree with Netanyahu that Arragel has an agenda of preventing all sexual contact with gentiles. Netanyahu also notes that the offspring of a gentile woman and a Jewish man would not be accepted as Jews according to Jewish law. As reviewed in 创伤后应激障碍 (Ch. 4), this concern with preventing any sexual contact with gentiles was a prominent feature of the 睡衣, and evidence reviewed there indicates that indeed Arragel was far from alone in having these concerns. For example, some 睡衣 even developed Jewish prostitution in order to prevent sexual contact between the groups. The evidence indicates that the motivations for the periodic upsurges in concern about sexual relationships with gentile women had nothing to do with fears of Christian antagonism, but rather with internal concerns that the Jews were straying from their religious law. Netanyahu acknowledges as much but maintains that this religious rationale frees Arragel of the charge of being concerned with race. Moreover, Netanyahu argues that since the offspring of a Jewish woman by a gentile man were considered to be Jews, the rejection of the offspring of a Jewish man and a gentile woman could not have been based on race, and indeed Maimonides clearly viewed such behavior as a religious crime, not a racial transgression.

Again, however, as emphasized throughout this volume, the historical instantiation of Judaism was co-extensive with ethnic differences between Jews and the surrounding society. However Arragel conceptualized the matter, his pronouncements clearly advocated a continued separation between ethnic groups. Given these practices, it would not be in the least surprising that gentiles would conceptualize Jews as greatly concerned with preventing sexual contact between the groups and developing the idea that the Jews themselves were concerned with purity of blood. This is the crucial point. Whatever the religious ideology, Castro is simply saying that Christians were aware that a major impetus for preventing sexual contacts between Jews and gentiles came from the Jewish community. That this impetus was cloaked in religious ideology is irrelevant.

Moreover, the fact that the offspring of a gentile and a Jewish woman were considered to be Jews while the offspring of a Jewish man and a gentile woman were not is hardly evidence that ethnic purity was not a motivation for this aspect of Jewish religious law (see p. 144).Normatively, the most common situation in which a Jewish woman in a traditional society would have sexual contact with a gentile was via marriage into the upper levels of gentile society combined with dowry payments, with the resulting children lost to the Jewish gene pool. As indicated below, a Jewish woman who had an affair with a gentile in this period was sentenced by two rabbis to having her nose cut off, a punishment far more severe than the punishments given to Jewish males who consorted with gentile women (see 创伤后应激障碍, Ch. 4). Indeed, the latter practice appears to have been quite common and subject to very weak, informal sanctions, since there were periodic efforts, emanating from fundamentalist factions within the Jewish community, to prevent it, while there is no evidence for analogous behavior as common among Jewish females.[200]A common mechanism for Jews begetting “alien offspring” would have been via gentile slaves. It is interesting that while there is no prohibition against having intercourse with a female slave, Maimonides disapproves of having intercourse with a slave because “it causes a man’s son to depart from following after the Lord, since that bondwoman’s son is likewise a slave, and is not of Israel; the man thus causes the holy seed to become profaned and reduced to slavery” (p. 83). It is interesting that Jews have been greatly concerned to prevent other Jews being enslaved by gentiles. Great efforts were expended to redeem Jews who had been enslaved or captured (see 创伤后应激障碍, Ch. 6); it was a religious obligation to redeem a slave “so that he may not become intermingled with the heathens” (Code of Maimonides, 第十二册 , The Book of Acquisition, Slaves, 247). Moreover, priests were obliged to divorce their wives if their wives had been enslaved or taken captive, because of the possibility that they had had sexual relationships with their masters. The law of slavery as presented in Maimonides is an excellent example of ingroup morality as discussed in 创伤后应激障碍 (Ch. 5): there are completely separate laws for heathen and Israelite slaves, much to the detriment of the former. For example, the 15th-century Kabbalistic author of Sefer Ha-Kanah Sefer 和 Ha-Peliah decried a Jewish courtier who “was a lover of gentile concubines” (Cutler & Cutler 1986, 285). The contemporary Rabbi Solomon Ibn Verga attributed the expulsion of the Jews in 1492 to, among other things, the Jewish “jealously” of gentile women (Roth 1995, 291). These comments indicate that Jewish males were often consorting with gentile females and they indicate a concern within the Jewish community that this involvement was a source of gentile hostility.

Netanyahu (1979–1980, 434) then makes much of Castro’s (1971, 73) claim that Arragel believed that lineage was the greatest advantage of the Spanish Jews. Netanyahu may be correct in supposing that Arragel did not think lineage was the 最先进的 important advantage, but Netanyahu does not deny that lineage is one of the virtues of Spanish Jews according to Arragel. The only question is where it ranked on the list of virtues; wherever it ranked, it was clearly viewed by Arragel as of considerable importance. As we have seen, it was not at all uncommon for the 15th-century New Christians to show great pride in their Jewish lineage. I have already noted (see Ch. 4) that the Converso Bishop of Burgos wrote, “Do not think you can insult me by calling my forefathers Jews. They are, to be sure, and I am glad that it is so; for if great age is nobility, who can go back so far?” Netanyahu’s claim (p. 437) that Arragel had a non-genetic concept of lineage seems incredible, but in any case it would be very difficult to argue this in the case of such New Christians as Burgos. (Recall that during the 15th century the New Christians openly acknowledged their ancestry and commonly believed that their ancestry was superior to that of gentile society.)

Netanyahu (p. 437) then notes that a concern with lineage was common also to gentiles of the period and indeed among the nobility everywhere. I would agree that there was a similar concern with lineage (but not racial purity) among the gentile nobility.[201]In the case of the European nobility there was no similar concern for marriage within the ethnic group. Because of the Church’s rules on consanguineous marriage, the European nobility in the medieval period was forced to search far and wide for permissible partners (MacDonald 1995b; 创伤后应激障碍，Ch。 8）。 Castro’s point still stands: purity of blood and a concern with racial contamination on the part of the Old Christians became a concern only in the 15th century, when the New Christians continued their group behavior and their endogamous practices while outwardly at least behaving as Christians. Prior to this phenomenon, Jewish marriage into the Spanish nobility was uncontroversial. Castro’s proposal that the New Christian concern with their lineage was linked to the continuation of New Christian endogamy is eminently reasonable. Indeed, even if one dismissed all of Castro’s claims on the long history of Jewish concern with purity of blood prior to the 15th century, the events of that century by themselves would result in a heightened consciousness of race on the part of the Old Christians. Since there is substantial agreement among historians that the New Christians remained as an endogamous, cooperating group within the society whatever their beliefs, the Old Christians of necessity utilized the only cue available to them in combating this cryptic continuation of an oppositional group strategy: Jewish genetic ancestry. Thus their concern with race.

Netanyahu then mentions the famous early 14th-century case, discussed in 创伤后应激障碍 (Ch. 4), in which the rabbinical courts ruled that a Jewish woman who bore children to a gentile man should have her nose cut off. Netanyahu argues that the Jewish courts were merely imitating Christian courts of the period. Moreover, for the Jewish courts to be lenient would be to “arouse contempt, since their own penalties for such offenses were extremely severe” (p. 439).

Such an attribution of Christian contempt appears rather gratuitous. One might equally suppose that the Jewish courts should show their leniency in this matter, and thus give a signal that interethnic sexual relationships with Jewish women (apart from marriage via dowry) were tolerated by the Jews. Interestingly, Netanyahu shows that there were severe laws enacted by Christian communities against Jewish males having sexual relationships with gentile women, but he cites no laws restricting gentile men from having relationships with Jewish women. This suggests that Christians would not have viewed these latter relationships as particularly threatening, and an evolutionist would expect exactly such a pattern. As also occurred toward the end of antiquity in the Roman Empire (see Chapter 3), the Christian community was concerned that Jewish males would exploit Christian females, and an exacerbating situation may well have been that the Jewish community was quite wealthy compared to the vast majority of Christians. There would be no reason for Christians to enact similar penalties preventing Christian men from seducing Jewish woman, since this would result in a genetic benefit to the Christian community. Similarly, Bosworth (1982, 49) notes that in Muslim societies a Muslim could marry a 迪米 wife (e.g., a Jew or Christian) but not vice versa “for this would put a believing woman into the power of an unbeliever,” and he goes on to comment that the same logic applied to the lack of symmetry in laws regarding slavery: Muslims could enslave Jews but Jews could not enslave Muslims. The rabbis who sentenced the woman to have her nose removed for this transgression were, on the face of it, similarly concerned that a Christian man might have power over a Jewish woman. Jewish men who casually consorted with Christian women were never punished so severely by the Jewish community.

Moreover, whatever the relative severity of the penalties and whatever the beliefs of those involved, two important points are that during this entire period the Spanish Jews in fact constituted an impermeable ethnic group, and that both Christians and Jews looked upon intergroup sexual relationships with hostility, especially when they involved the women from their own group. We have seen that more or less complete group impermeability has been a feature of Judaism throughout its history in traditional societies, and that one response of gentile societies during periods of heightened between-group competition has been to erect similar barriers to prevent contact with Jews (Chapters 3–5). These tendencies are entirely comprehensible from the perspective of an evolutionary interpretation of social identity theory as discussed in Chapter 1.

However, historians such as Netanyahu then attribute any exclusivism on the part of the Jews as an imitation of gentile practices or as resulting from a fear of gentile reprisals; any failure to attempt to convert gentiles is the result of fears of gentile aggression, etc. These hypotheses serve to exonerate Judaism for any blame because it is always difficult to determine the exact dating of exclusivist practices, or to determine whether Jews or gentiles originated the practices or which side was more vigilant in prosecuting offenders.

However, while doubts that are difficult to resolve may be raised in particular instances, as Netanyahu does here, it stretches credulity to suppose that the uniform pattern of Jewish sexual exclusivism and cultural separatism apparent in so many societies and over so long a period always resulted from gentile sources, especially when we have seen, in 创伤后应激障碍 (Chs. 3, 4), that these practices have a firm foundation in Jewish religious law and that both Christian and Muslim governments have often attempted forcibly to convert Jews or have exerted other forms of pressure on them to convert. Indeed, as noted in Chapters 3–5, a common sequence has been for societies to attempt to convert Jews or forcibly convert them, but then resort to violence, deportation, or exclusionary policies when this inevitably fails.

There is no need to deny that indeed gentile behavior may result in Jewish responses that exacerbate the problem by intensifying Jewish behavior which provokes anti-Semitism—resulting in a “feed-forward” process in which anti-Semitism spirals out of control. A good example in the case of the Inquisition is that the 清洁的 laws may well have made many New Christians intensely conscious of their Jewish ancestry and feel that they had little choice but to retain their Jewish identities (Yerushalmi 1971, 40). Nevertheless, the cohesive community of New Christians existed long before the concern with 清洁的 became enshrined in a powerful set of legal disabilities. As Yerushalmi (1971, 41) points out, the claim that the Inquisition preserved crypto-Judaism is a version of the old theory that anti-Semitism is responsible for the persistence of the Jewish people. He notes that despite the same level of external pressures applied by the Inquisition in Spain and Portugal, crypto-Judaism was more persistent in Portugal, indicating that factors internal to the Jewish community must have been important (p. 41n.62). I have also noted (Ch. 6, p. 180) that the recent decline of anti-Semitism has resulted in intensive efforts within the Jewish community to heighten Jewish identification and prevent intermarriage.

Netanyahu often invokes Jewish religious law as justifying Jewish exclusivism, as if that law itself were obviously beyond rational discussion: “The hermeticism of the Jews on the issue of intermarriage was not 种族 但是 宗教, precisely as was the hermeticism of the Christians with respect to the same issue” (Netanyahu 1979–1980, 452). To repeat the point made in 创伤后应激障碍 (Ch. 4), one must then examine why a religion continued this separatism even though failure to erase genetic and cultural segregation resulted repeatedly in resource and reproductive competition, accompanied by a great deal of intrasocietal violence and social division between genetically segregated groups.

Netanyahu discusses another famous case from the late 13th and early 14th century, mentioned also in 创伤后应激障碍 (Ch. 4), in which a family went to great lengths to show that its genealogy had not been contaminated with the blood of a slave. Netanyahu points out that freed slaves could become Jews by conversion, so that the taint of slavery in one’s background, whatever its purpose, was not intended to prevent genetic admixture. Netanyahu’s implication is that the finding of the rabbis that there had been “no admixture of impure blood” would have been compatible with finding that the progenitor was a freed slave who converted to Judaism before the conception occurred. The references to “impure blood” in this responsum, however, would, on the face of it, appear to indicate that it was the doubt about genetic relationships that resulted in the intense emotions raised by this case. Moreover, as noted in 创伤后应激障碍 (Ch. 4), offspring of female slaves received “grudging social recognition and tolerance,” the master freeing the slave, converting her to Judaism, and then engaging in a “semi-marriage” (Neuman 1969, I, 11), presumably similar to concubinage. This strongly suggests that being the descendent of a slave would have been a taint on one’s ancestry even if the slave had been freed and converted.

In conclusion, I agree with Castro: the Spanish were indeed racialists, but the Spanish racialist mirror-image response was a response to a Jewish racialism that long pre-dated the events of the 15th century and thereafter.