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Wall Street has now truly jumped the shark—the one jockeyed by Jeff Bezos.

Last night Amazon reported a whopping 41% 暴跌 in free cash flow for the March 2018 LTM period compared to prior year. Yet it was promptly rewarded by a \50 亿美元 surge in market cap—-with \10 亿美元 of that going to the guy riding topside on the Great White Shark of Bubble Finance.

That’s right. Amazon’s relatively meager operating free cash flow for the March 2017 LTM period had printed at \$9.0十亿, but in the most recent 12 months the number has slithered all the way down to just \5.3 亿美元.

这才是真正的精神错乱开始的地方。 一年前,亚马逊的市值飙升至 \425 亿美元—meaning that it was being valued at a downright frisky 47X 自由现金流。 但是快进一年,我们得到了 \780 亿美元 在今天上午的市值栏中 146X 自由现金流倍数。

民间,一家从青春之泉出售蒸馏水的公司,不值得 146X 自由现金流,但不要在华尔街告诉那些狂躁的疯子,因为他们显然才刚刚起步。

黎明时分,SunTrust 的目标价为 1900 美元,这意味着隐含市值为 \970 亿美元180X 自由现金流的倍数。

当然,在这一点上,您可以说是谁在计数并完成它。 但实际上,情况更糟了,对亚马逊和美国经济而言。

这是因为亚马逊既是华尔街有史以来最奇妙的泡沫的领先者,又是泡沫金融在大街上重塑增长,就业,收入和经济活力的方式的榜样。

此外,崩溃的华尔街泡沫将很快使已经严重受损的主要街道经济崩溃。 因此,亚马逊是一个双重破坏者。

 
• 类别: 经济学 •标签: 华尔街 
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  1. I more or less agree with everything in the article but I think that the phenomenon described is a manifestation or symptom of a larger phenomenon that I describe as The Great Liability Kiting Bubble (copied below).
    _________

    Bankers are not equity-lenders – they are legal-debt insurance underwriters and liability-kiters who almost never actually pay anyone but only ever agree that they owe them by issuing deposit credits that do not cost them anything of substance to produce – or what the Canadian judiciary refers to as “substitutes for currency”. The appeal Court, below, directly addresses the system employed by the chartered banks and the Alberta Treasury Branches, but which applies equally in theory and practice to all members of the Canadian Payments Association (CPA):

    The chartered banks in Canada issue obligations, namely, deposit liabilities, which are generally accepted as means of payment in Canada although they do not have the status of legal tender. In like manner the treasury branches create deposit liabilities. These deposit liabilities are a form of book debt owing by the bank to the customer and in most cases, including the treasury branches, are subject to transfer by cheque. These payments by cheque provide the means of settlement of a large percentage of the transactions of Canada. Likewise, the treasury branches’ deposit liabilities furnish their customers with a similar means of making settlement of transactions by orders drawn on the treasury branches because the treasury branches have been able to persuade the public to regard their deposit liabilities or promises to pay as the equivalent of legal tender by undertaking to convert them into legal tender on demand. These deposit liabilities are used by the customers of the bank or treasury branch which created them as a substitute for currency. (Breckinridge Speedway v. R [The Crown] (1967) 63 W.W.R. 257).

    [1. Note that the said deposit liabilities function-in-fact as evidence-of-indebtedness, and not as promises-to-pay. To be precise the Court ought to have written: “…to regard their deposit liabilities or evidence of their own indebtedness…”. that is, a bank’s “deposit liability” is an assumption of liability and not a promise to pay. That and the assignability (by cheque) of the banker’s liability is what allows them to function as substitutes for currency.]

    The banks/bankers globally endlessly kite their liabilities while re-setting our financial perception calibration by a factor of 1,000 roughly every ten years to accommodate the massive ballooning of their aggregate liabilities. In the 1960’s we were accustomed to dealing with substantial (richest-family-based) wealth in the hundreds of millions. Then in the early seventies we were introduced to the words billion and billionaire. In the 1980’s we were introduced to the words trillion and trillionaire. Then toward the end of the 1990’s and early 2000’s we were introduced to the word quadrillion. In just my adult lifetime we have gone from a measurement standard calibrated in millions to one that is calibrated in million-billions (a quadrillion is a million billion). If a million is one inch, then a quadrillion is15,700 miles.

    The Great Kited-Liability Bubble

    风筝 means to keep (financial) paper in the air.

    [更多]

    The aggregate existing global credit/charge-card business (about 50% controlled by visa and mastercard banks), especially, is a delivery mechanism / gateway for a massive ever-expanding liability bubble or ponzi scheme or what the Criminal Code (of Canada for example) calls a money increment scheme. Although to be more cognitively accurate it is a kited-liability-scheme.

    Assume that I am your payment agent and that you spend \$60,000 from your salary (\$5,000 per month) over the course of a year at various merchant establishments via a card that I give you for that purpose. Over the course of the year you also repay or reimburse me in cash / equity from your earned-income or monthly paycheques for that \$5,000 per month or \$60,000 total that I have paid out to merchants on your behalf.

    Now assume that you discover that I have not in fact paid any of the said merchants, but have only agreed that I owe them, such that I have also retained or pocketed your \$60,000 of cash (equity) reimbursement.

    这有什么区别吗?

    It makes all the difference in the world.

    In terms of procedure, approximately one billion card-users globally went to work an average of 25 days per month last year to earn at least an aggregate of \$7 trillion (USD-equivalent) cash money / equity that they then paid to aggregate credit/charge-card companies (visa and mastercard banks alone) as what they believed to be reimbursement, while the said companies / banks have merely increased or kited their aggregate liabilities to the same merchants (and their assigns) by nearly \$7 trillion while pocketing the \$7 trillion of cash / equity.

    It works out to about 10% of global GDP (i.e., just through the visa / mc credit/charge-card systems alone).

    Do you think that that has some substantial effect on human socioeconomic relationships as opposed to a world where the aggregate card-issuers are required to actually pay the merchants instead of merely kiting / ever-inflating their liabilities?

    I was a high-school junior / freshman in the early 1970’s when Howard Hughes purportedly became the world’s first billionaire. And although undoubtedly a great entrepreneur in his own right, his greater fortune had been given an immense head-start by, among other things, his inheritance of the Hughes Tool Company from his father.

    So at that time we basically first needed the number “one billion” or 1,000,000,000 to account for the inter-generationally-accumulated fortune of the world’s purportedly richest man.

    And also at that time I would estimate in good faith that the majority of my classmates and the public generally would have had some trouble even identifying the precise concept of a trillion. We had only just been introduced to only very occasional references to a billion and the word trillion would normally have been used merely as a general or generic reference to an astronomically large number.

    Then as I lived my life through the 1980’s and 1990’s the term billion and multiple billions came into increasingly common use, especially in reference to the major financial fortunes won on the world’s stock markets.

    Then the word was increasingly needed to describe the aggregate fortunes of relatively small groupings of what were called dot-com billionaires. Notwithstanding that a billion is a thousand millions and a trillion is a thousand billions or a million millions.

    Then as we passed into the first decade of the 21st century we were introduced to the term 万亿 (1,000,000,000,000,000) or one thousand trillions or one million billions to describe the nominal exposure of what is called the derivative markets (and which only exists to account for the money / liability itself).

    So for all of human history to about the middle of the 20th century the concepts of million and multiple millions were sufficient to account for the inter-generationally-accumulated fortunes of the world’s richest man / men / families. But once then introduced and educated to appreciate what a billion is, at least we could have reasonably expected not to have to make the same adjustment again in our lifetimes or even our great-grandchildren’s lifetimes.

    I also recall the major breakthrough of the late 1970’s when we achieved the great pre-tax \$5 per hour for wages on entry-level jobs. Forty years later \$10 per hour is about the minimum wage in practice. So based on that criteria we ought to be now speaking in terms of about two billion to describe the same top-of-the-pile that we needed one billion to describe in the 1970’s. And certainly no more than about ten billion.

    But after the last fifty years of the global credit/charge-card system, if we pause and look back, we see that globally we have collectively earned the USD-equivalent of at least \$100 trillion or \$100,000,000,000,000, and that we have paid that amount to the aggregate banks as cash / equity reimbursement for the same amount that the banks have ostensibly paid to broadly-defined merchants on our behalf over the same 50-year period. (Less about \$3 trillion in concealed interest / credit charges called “merchant discounts” – but that is a different fraud).

    [2. For one billion card-users \$100 trillion works out to an average of \$100,000 per card-user over 50 years or \$2,000 per year.]

    But then we look a little more closely to discover that the banks / bankers collectively still owe the world’s merchants (and their assigns) the same \$100 trillion and that they have never paid them at all, but instead endlessly kite their liabilities while taking our cash / equity to wager in the financial markets, to buy up most everything else, and to pay themselves ever larger dividends, salaries and bonuses.

    Here again, the Big Five private banks in Canada had about \$32 billion of total assets balanced by \$32 billion of liabilities (i.e., they owed about \$1,600 per Canadian times 20 million Canadians) in 1968 when the visa credit card system was introduced into Canada. Almost fifty years later the same five banks have over \$4 trillion of assets balanced / off-set by \$4 trillion of liabilities (they owe about \$120,000 per Canadian times 35 million Canadians).

    The near \$4 trillion or \$4,000 billion difference is a function of endlessly-kited liabilities. We keep feeding them our cash earnings from labour and other forms of production, and they keep pocketing the cash and kiting their liabilities to anyone and everyone.

    The bank(s) merely agree that they owe the merchants by issuing them deposit account credits (“substitutes for currency”) that do not cost the banks anything material to produce. The merchant then writes cheques to its employees, suppliers and other service providers. Now the bank(s) agree that they owe the entities to whom the cheques have been written instead of the original merchant(s). But except in about 2% of cases the banks never actually 任何人。

    [3. And even then they are only discharging in favour of the Crown as lead underwriter/debtor. Legal tender is by definition evidence of Crown debt.]

    Economists are trained to say that banks may create credit for free, but also that the same credit is destroyed when it is repaid, so it is not really as bad as it appears. But that is only half the equation and they essentially deal with the other half by ignoring it.

    The bank’s credit asset is indeed destroyed when it is repaid in cash / equity, but the bank continues to hold and own the cash repayment as a much more valuable replacement for it. By process the loan asset was used to support the mirror-image creation of an off-setting liability to the vendor or merchant, and that liability persists long after the credit asset has been re-paid or converted to the debtor’s former equity (mostly from labour). In fact it persists 永远 or until the scheme collapses.

    Taking today (the current 24 hours) as a snap-shot-in-time, the banks globally (through visa and mastercard alone) will collectively kite another \$20 billion or \$20,000,000,000 in new liabilities to merchants. Seven trillion dollars per year in gross throughput works out to about \$20 billion per day and that is the current expansion rate of the gross credit/charge-card liability-kiting bubble.

    As at late 2017 there have been a number of articles in the media about who from the current crop of mega-billionaires will become the world’s first genuine 万亿富翁. So we see that over the past 50 years the measurement standard for the world’s single richest human has increased by an approaching 1,000-fold (from \$1 billion to \$1 trillion), while the minimum wage in practice for 小矮人 has increased about 5-fold (from about \$2 per hour to \$10 per hour). In practice it would appear that the vaunted 公平的竞争环境 has an actual slope of about 500-to-1 in favour of the entrenched money power.

    bleeping moron could rule the world with the benefit of rules like that. Bankers are not financial geniuses. The only reason they own and / or control everything is because their great-grandfathers accidentally discovered the great stupid-ray that keeps the rest of us believing whatever they tell us regardless of how obviously and profoundly stupid.

    We only need to keep in mind one thing to grasp / comprehend the fraud and scam that is banking, and that is that the global banking 系统 essentially still owes to 有人 every last dollar that it has ever allegedly loaned / advanced to 任何人. At the very end the nominal bankers (credit-insurers-in-fact) will both own everything and owe everything.

    In 2007 the High Court of (the Province of) Gujurat in India made the following decision in a dispute involving two banking companies where one had sold / assigned its nominal portfolio of bad debts to the other: (Assignment of Debts (Appeal no. 156 of 2007) in KOTAK MAHINDRA BANK LTD. versus O.L. of M/S APS STAR IND LTD. (emphasis added):

    24. In fact the concept of trading in debts is, by its very nature, abhorrent to the concept of banking in any form, either the form of primary business of banking or the additional activities…

    48. (n). [T]he entire [sale or assignment] transaction is based on a speculative form of activity which can never be a permissible mode of activities as part of, or in addition to, or incidental to or conducive to the promotion for advancement of the business of a banking company;
    So why would the judges of the Court say that? What is it that these judges know that the global public generally do not?

    There are a number of independent reasons or routes by which the Court / judges would arrive at the same conclusion, but the short answer here is that equity dominates law (in this case the law of the contract) and the original merchants and / or their assigns have a superior equity title to the assets of the defaulting debtor(s) (who are the financial creditors-in-fact but that is another issue).

    The merchandise provided by the original merchants is what created the legal-debts and the merchant(s) have still not been 支付 (i.e., the debts have been 出院 (passed on or assigned to someone else) but not paid). The original bank has still not paid the merchants but only agreed that it owes them (and / or their 分配), and so that bank has an inferior claim to the money owing by the defaulting card-users. The nominal selling bank cannot sell the debts to another party because that original bank has itself still not paid for them. Is that clear?

    This decision may well turn out to be one of the first 裂缝 in the global system of control by the 根深蒂固的金钱力量. If you think that the financial system is crooked at the front-end, it is breathtakingly and scandalously criminal at the back-end. Global nominal debt-collection and deemed-debtor-management practices would make Al Capone or even Attilla the Hun blush.

    From a different perspective, the kiting of liabilities is also how and why Bernie Madoff, for example, was able to run a flagrant ponzi scheme in broad daylight for 25-plus years. It is all one massive on-going ponzi scheme and Mr. Madoff wasn’t doing anything that would cause anyone to point and say “Hey he shouldn’t be doing that!”. He wasn’t running a ponzi scheme on the back of an honest system – he was running a ponzi scheme nested and disguised within a larger ponzi scheme.

    The larger system / arrangement is contrary to every rule of law and equity and is in fact utterly ridiculous but the bankers and the entrenched-money-power generally have employed the power of language to fraudulently induce the rest of us to believe that that is the way things ought to be.

    It now becomes clear regardless as to the real purpose of the massive global movement to nominally eliminate cash. It is not the cash that the private bankers want to eliminate so much as cash convertibility of their liabilities.

    Eliminating cash convertibility is functionally indistinguishable from printing a global aggregate of the USD-equivalent of about \$200 trillion (or \$200,000 billion) and making a gift of it to the private banking (credit-insurance) system. Over the past 50 years they have collectively kited \$200 trillion of liabilities and now they are going to effectively / constructively cancel (default on) their debts for the 共同的好.

    But in both law and equity the nominal anti-cash movement defines the private global banking system as an absconding debtor whose goal is to avoid and evade their lawful and legal debts.

    另一个 错误的前提systemized delusion here is that the socioeconomic damages created by pyramid / ponzi / kiting schemes occur when they 崩溃. The truly massive socioeconomic damages (misdirection and misuse of resources) occur while the schemes 正在 and not when they collapse.

    And they could have gotten away with it 永远 – if they would not have become so greedy and flat-out-stupid.

    The bankers and their solicitors have effectively committed the ultimate folly of believing their own legal-fiction-based word-games. The only thing holding their system together was the bare pretence of the legality of it and that is now gone. Again, not just in Canada but throughout most of the world.

    In both equity and in law (in fact and in law) the entrenched-money-power – the so-called “1%” – are the greatest debtors in world history. The only thing preventing justice (equity) is 政策 – the policy of the former bank lawyers running the Courts (English Crown) that criminal offences committed by the entrenched-money-power-parasites-in-fact are criminal but not fundamentally illegal because the criminal law only provides that offenders will be severely punished but does not expressly state 不要做.

    [The reference above is to the 1989/90 decisions of the Canadian appellate courts that criminal acts committed by creditors and their solicitors are “not fundamentally illegal” (Thomson, (William E.) Associates Inc. v. Carpenter [1989] 34 O.A.C. 365).]

  2. Miro23 说:

    Another false premise in the systemized delusion here is that the socioeconomic damages created by pyramid / Ponzi / kiting schemes occur when they collapse. The truly massive socioeconomic damages (misdirection and misuse of resources) occur while the schemes are working and not when they collapse.

    This is what Stockman is saying about the misdirection and misuse of resources:

    这是因为亚马逊既是华尔街有史以来最奇妙的泡沫的领先者,又是泡沫金融在大街上重塑增长,就业,收入和经济活力的方式的榜样。

    And, this is before anything collapses. We are still in the pump phase of the Pump & Dump cycle.

    The Wall St./FED alliance pump up Amazon with newly issued QE liquidity, drawing in the public with stellar stock price increases and loads of media hype. When Amazon finally shows the crazy valuations referred to by Stockman, and when the public has no more money to invest or borrow on margin, then the FED & Friends decide to withdraw liquidity and raise rates (like now) initiating the Dump cycle.

    Pump & Dump works because the criminal boiler shop operators (Wall St. and their FED enablers) are the first to drive up the price (with borrowed money) and the first to exit, in fact initiating the collapse with their own selling (i.e. they get to keep their “profits” while everyone else is wiped out).

    That’s not to say that all credit is bad. There are good investments and bad investments.

    If a project that is brought into reality with a loan provides a good enough profit to repay the capital borrowed and interest, then the loan is legitimate (like the first \$ 1 million loan to Google), but billions of \$ invested to share in hyped future fantasy profits (current Amazon), just destroy capital and enrich the Pump & Dump operators.

    • 回复: @TimothyPMadden
  3. you can precisely measure

    the degree of Jewification of an economy

    by the extent to which financial products

    have replaced physical products.

  4. @Miro23

    Hi: Thanks for that and I certainly appreciate the insight. I think that one of the most significant aspects is a systemic problem of the markets – being that all shares in a given company or listing are deemed to have an exchange value equal to that of the last (most recent) trade.

    同样,至关重要的是,始终要在贷款和信贷预付款之间进行区分,信贷预付款实质上是保险交易而不是放债交易。 以下是我正在研究的另一篇文章。 它仍在进行中,但希望能找到基本的区别。

    ____

    关于这个词的含义 报答

    欺骗过程中的附带手段是 反义报答。 如果一个 贷款人 做一个 贷款,然后这个词 报答 手段 偿还。 但是当一个 债权人 做一个 信用预付款 (即仅提供信用保险服务), 报答 认知上 翻转 表示或容纳 再次付款.

    贷方与债权人; 贷款与预付款

    贷款人 使 贷款,他们 支付 方式:

    1.贷方已经获得并拥有的先前存在的货币/权益,
    2.承担风险,以及
    3.行政管理费用。

    债权人 预付款(保险) 信用,他们 支付 方式:

    1.承担风险,以及
    2.行政管理费用。

    借贷至少XNUMX亿美元需要花费XNUMX亿美元,而放款人则放弃交易XNUMX亿美元 就立即购买力而言,因为现在借款人拥有它,而贷方则没有。 贷方通过贷出将其现有货币资产净耗竭。

    它的成本 至少没有 借贷十亿美元,而债权人则放弃了十亿美元的交易 更富有 比之前的时刻要多,因为现在他们拥有债务人的担保,加上债务人欠他们的债权人甚至还没有以前时刻拥有的十亿美元。 债权人获得 净增长 通过提供(担保)信贷垫款在其货币资产中。

    立即获得十亿美元贷款 成本 贷方XNUMX亿美元。
    十亿美元 推进 即刻 进步 or 收益 债权人十亿美元。

    Yet not one man or woman in 10,000 even appreciates that there is a difference; that a loan is vastly more expensive to one of the parties, than an advance of credit, because of the added cost of the money itself. Yet legal documents, securities, mortgages, credit-card contracts, newspapers, TV and radio media, court judgements, all of it – all use the word-pairs 贷方和债权人; 贷款和垫款,可以互换地进行,这是客观上要在地球上做出的最大区分。 我自己做了很多年都没有意识到这一点(有时还是这样做-需要持续的心理训练才能避免它)。

    “Mr. Banker, that \$1 billion 交易 that you just completed – did it cost you \$1 billion? Or did it gain you \$1 billion?”

    银行家:“成本,收益; 有什么不同? 您只需要恢复工作,而将复杂的哲学问题留给我们。 作为无烟煤信托公司/垄断公司的总裁,乔治·F·贝尔先生在1902年恰当地指出:

    “劳役者的利益将得到维护,而不是由劳动鼓动者维护,而是由上帝已控制该国财产权的基督教徒[阅读:继承的财富俱乐部]维护。”

    定义广泛的英国法律的基本要素仍然占据着地球的大部分地区(包括美国),其中包括民事/货币法院法官所称谓的概念。 站在生活中。 根据这样的学说,如果你天生贫穷,那是因为 上帝要你贫穷,因此法律积极协助您逃脱被视为道德上的不法行为 神的旨意. The English language – including and especially 法文 金融语言 – has concurrently developed so as to mould our perception of reality consistent with that principle.

    密切相关的附带或相反原则或学说是 避免不当得利 因此,法律将其本身视为对人类的不正当和有害行为(除非通过继承/上帝的旨意)。 这也是最初禁止金融彩票的理由,穷人将其描绘成企图逃避上帝关于穷人的旨意的企图。

    但是,创建了一个基础性例外/先例,并在1830年得到上议院的批准(永久人寿保险办公室友好协会诉Bolland等人[1830] 4 Bligh NS 194),律师对此进行了辩护。对于金融机构并经法院法官接受的是,即使该公司必须实施侵权行为,公司也应尽其应尽的义务追究和获取非劳动/不正当的致富(一种可采取行动的不法行为) )和/或违反其合同来执行此操作。 同样, 上议院 同意。

    建立之后 分裂 在我们的整体和(或)集体的思想中,商法体系已经慢慢按摩并塑造了我们对现实的看法,以接受人类不必要的丰富化是一种邪恶的不法行为(除非他们已经很富有),同时又接受了同样的未经接受的丰富化公司(以及公司的管理者和所有者)作为美德的缩影。

    • 回复: @JoeFour
    , @Miro23
  5. JoeFour 说:
    @TimothyPMadden

    蒂莫西,您在哪里发布文章?

    我想阅读更多您对我们都生活在这个疯狂的金融世界中的想法和观察……您在此处发布的内容令人着迷……而且非常具有挑战性! 谢谢!

    • 回复: @TimothyPMadden
  6. Miro23 说:
    @TimothyPMadden

    1) A billion dollar loan instantly costs a lender a billion dollars.
    2) A billion dollar advance instantly advances or gains a creditor a billion dollars.

    This is true, but in the real world the whole banking system runs on 2).

    Then the question is; If the bank already has a few billion dollars and it creates a new billion dollar loan (out of thin air) and awards it to a borrower, what could go wrong? It’s gained an extra billion dollars.

    That’s good, but the evidence is that it can go wrong. For example the Sub-Prime boom created vast amounts of new money (credit) that ended up in construction and speculation. If this speculative pyramid collapses, why shoud it concern the banks? – After all, it was new money conjured out of thin air – so if it disappears what does it matter to the bank?

    The point seems to be, that you can liken type 2 credit loans to cows “created” by a farmer. He has a collection of them , that he one day has to “un-create”, but in the meanwhile he cares for them (and sells the milk) to cover his costs and make a profit (hopefully).

    If he gets “Sub-Primed” he’s created a lot of sick cows that a) don’t give any milk b) die while he’s still got the liability to support them = a bad situation. He has to dip into his small savings to cover his costs which he knows he can’t.

    In the Sub-Prime debacle, the farmers knew that the cows were sick, but they all wanted big farms, and word got round that that a company called AEG would give cheap insurance that covered their loses if the animals didn`t turn out to be prime milkers. AEG did very well until they were asked to pay up – and when they didn’t – the government paid, and the farmers still got their bonuses.

    Moral that dairy farmers/bankers need a good connection to government.

  7. @JoeFour

    Hi: thank you for your kind words. My writings are not as yet posted anywhere. I am a researcher and writer whose home is on Vancouver Island but I have been in South Africa for the past two years researching a book on the history of English law and equity (and policy) over the past 400 years. (Sorry for the delay in responding – 9 hour time difference from the west coast of Canada).

    Basically, things in the financial world are made to appear vastly more complicated than they really are. Above all, modern banking (since 1913) is not money-lending. It is credit-insurance and reinsurance. Banks do not advance credit to nominal debtors – they obtain credit from them in the form of the nominal debtor’s underwriting or acceptance of the liability to the bank (via the promissory note). The banker then merely insures or reinsures the credit that it has obtained from the nominal debtor, in favour of the vendor of the property being acquired with the credit. The nominal debtor is the lead-underwriter and creditor-in-fact who creates the credit by underwriting/accepting the liability.

    But even that is going too far in a sense, in terms of complexity. Start with the basics. The following is from an essay that I call “My Top 7 Reasons why ‘All of this is unreal’” (Reason #2):

    存款功能

    [更多]

    Assume, for the sake of argument, that some force, divine or otherwise, makes me the winner of \$1 billion in cash in a super-multi-state 强力球型 lottery. That \$1 billion in cash would bestow upon me some quantifiable and very substantial socioeconomic power.

    By whatever means, fate will have selected me for such power, and of course about 100 million people would have each paid an average of at least \$10 in cash buying tickets to make it happen.

    Also further assume, just to keep track of it, that the typical/average lottery-ticket-buyer earns \$14 per hour, and nets \$10 after nominal taxes, such that the \$1 billion jackpot represents the product of an aggregate 140 million hours of labour already performed (plus whatever percentage the government keeps from total ticket sales).

    但是无论如何,这笔现金都是我的,我实际上(拥有)和法律上都拥有它。

    但是,如果第二天,当我将现金存入私人银行时,此后现金实际上并在法律上属于该银行,并且我(此后)对我拥有的银行可以与之交易的无抵押负债或通过支票(支票)分配给他人,但不会使银行付出任何实质性的生产成本。

    现在,私人银行还拥有 \1 亿美元的新社会经济权力,这是我决定支持它的一种系统性礼物,它是已经完成的 140 亿小时劳动的股权和金融产品的系统性礼物。

    现在将相同的过程应用于(比如说)美国经济中每年从新的广义劳动力服务中获得的超过 5 万亿美元的收入。

    假设您工作一年以赚取 100,000 美元的现金,以换取您的劳动和其他人认为有用的其他技能和才能。 你也将获得一定的社会经济权力。

    But the instant you deposit the money into a bank account, it is no longer your legal or actual money, and you have unwittingly made the private bank an equal partner in the product of your year’s labour. Same with cheques/checks (and anything that is deposited) – the bank literally and legally owns your paycheque the instant you deposit it.

    The same goes for all the illegal-drug-money globally. Even if the drug dealers could obtain every last coin and banknote on Earth, there is still only about the USD-equivalent of \$1 trillion, or about a one-year supply for the world’s broadly-defined substance-abuse industries. So if it has been going on for 40 years-in-fact, then you know with certainty that virtually every last dollar of such drug money is being laundered-in-fact (converted to deposit balances) through private banks. It can’t go anywhere else. They are partners-in-theory and they are partners-in-fact.

    然后,如果以及当您参与金融市场时,您会发现您的本地银行(包括所有个体银行和集体银行)不仅是一家 记分员,但积极参与经济和金融活动 运动场。 因此,即使您击败了它,您也可以在存入资金时将收益返还给它。 当您的对手得分时,它得分。 当您获得一个分数时,您的分数将被您的对手放弃,但是您得到的另一种分数就是安慰,所以这还不错。

    至少自从我曾曾曾曾曾祖父时代以来,我们的全球经济分析师队伍就拥有了更多 军队 拿破仑和惠灵顿的总和 滑铁卢不能弄清楚,通过存款以及私人银行家的习惯和实践,在货币本身中来之不易,不公正的财产权利转移本身就是一项价值几千亿美元的年业务,也是我们整个系统的定义性现实。 从来没有人想到这可能很重要吗?

    Just as the words “application fee” or “loan fee” or “commitment fee” excite a different area of your brain, than do the words “True-principal-amount and real-interest-rate obfuscation and concealment fee” or “GAAP-fraud concealment fee”, so too does the word “deposit” evoke a very different reality than the more conceptually accurate “gratuitous wealth transfer”. As in: “Hi Bob, I just got my paycheque, and I am on my way to gratuitously assign the right of property in my earnings to the bank. I’ll meet you later for pizza.”

    自成立私人银行英格兰银行以来,就此而言; 323年以来,我们的国际军队 猎犬 经济学家未能掌握这一无所不包和定义游戏的意义 排除.

    现在,让我们看看为什么 经济学家 concern themselves with something as arcane as rights of property in money itself, in a global system that processes \$98 of financial/money transactions for every \$2 of actual GDP? You witness \$3 quadrillion of financial transactions annually to support global GDP of \$60 trillion (2%) and you 爱因斯坦 can’t think of a single reason why rights of property in the \$3 quadrillion might have some effect on human socioeconomic relationships?

    假设全球大约有7,000个实质性私人存款机构,那么将有一个这样的机构。 特殊玩家 每百万人类玩家(劳动单位)。 还假设每个特殊玩家基本上都由一个既得的寡头家族单位拥有和/或实益拥有和/或控制,而最高级(也是迄今为止最大的)单位已经存在了300多年。

    在此游戏中,所有90亿人类玩家每天都为劳动而工作,其中XNUMX%(按金额) 存款 这些工资存入(免费财富转移)在7,000个特殊参与者/家庭单位之一中,此时工资成为特殊参与者/家庭的法律和实际财产。 特殊球员称其特殊优势为 公平的竞争环境 这是私人银行家长期以来的习惯和做法所固有的权利。

    在323年的时间里,我们的代际全球经济学家大军无法弄清楚“这个游戏怎么了?”

    _____

    希望对您有所帮助。 蒂姆

    • 回复: @JoeFour
    , @JoeFour
  8. m___ 说:

    On all of the above, comments, column. The systemic error at the root: no concise terminology. That is what theoretical economics, and for the ones that have salesman blood, especially financial capitalism, is about. Add to that that numbers(whether to include them or not), can lie as much as terminology, the conceit is endless. Add to that a layer of serious mathematics within confined contexts to give it credibility. To be countered by amazing ignorance to bait the performance(one looses face to acknowledge not understanding the terms of the variables), the circle is complete.

    Drunkenness, stupor, and when somewhere someone wakes up, (China!), the make believe drains into the sleeping deplorables. Military capitalism holds up what is the US prestige, and badly, financial hocus pocus is so passe.

    Looking forward with great delight to see how the first global “crises” is going to play out.

  9. JoeFour 说:
    @TimothyPMadden

    蒂姆,我欠您一个很晚但真诚的谢谢(!),您对我以前错过的询问的答复……今天晚上我在搜索这篇文章时,现在就看到了,尤其是您对此发表的第一条评论发送给感兴趣的朋友。 您的书怎么样了?您在任何地方发表了其他财务评论吗?

  10. JoeFour 说:
    @TimothyPMadden

    蒂姆(Tim),鉴于您对英国法律的历史感兴趣,我认为我会向您推荐以下参考书(尽管您可能已经很熟悉):

    埃文·惠顿(Evan Whitton)的《我们腐败的法律制度》

    http://netk.net.au/whitton/ocls.pdf

  11. 嗨乔! 感谢那! 实际上,我以前从未听说过作者,但在阅读目录后,它似乎很迷人。

    我仍在多伦多,但希望在接下来的几天内回到乔堡。

    它仍处于预发行阶段(尚有一些错别字),但我可以向您发送我的新电子书“ Nominal my butt”的发行版。

    也是您最感兴趣的“法治我的屁股”的pdf版本。

    但是我不知道如何发送附件,因为我没有您的电子邮件地址。 我可以在这里将其上传到评论中吗?

    我只是想在返回之前在多伦多完成所有工作,但是肯定会阅读有关腐败的法律制度的pdf书籍。 实际上,我可能会在回程中阅读它。

    再次感谢。 我期待您对材料有任何反应。

    蒂姆。

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