博客浏览菲利普·吉拉迪(Philip Giraldi)档案
约翰·布伦南(John Brennan)知道,智能不只是无人机。



书签 全部切换总目录添加到图书馆从图书馆中删除 • B
回复同意/不同意/等等 更多... This Commenter This Thread Hide Thread Display All Comments
这些按钮可将您的公开协议,异议,感谢,LOL或巨魔与所选注释一起注册。 仅对最近使用“记住我的信息”复选框保存姓名和电子邮件的频繁评论者可用,并且在任何八个小时的时间内也只能使用三次。
忽略评论者 关注评论者
搜寻文字 区分大小写  确切的词  包括评论
列表 书签

We have lately witnessed two cabinet-level confirmation hearings by the Senate in which little or nothing was asked that actually might enlighten us as to how the State and Defense Departments might be transformed over the next four years. John Kerry was tossed softballs, while Chuck Hagel was hammered over his reported detachment from Israel and its interests. America’s important relationships with China, Russia, and the European Union were largely ignored, and potential threats posed by Iran and al-Qaeda were grossly exaggerated

Part of the reason for this is that no one expects transformational changes at either the State Department or Pentagon even if sequestration or other budget cuts occur. But it will be different at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Obama’s nominee for director, John Brennan, was predictably 攻击 by senators concerned about the expanding drone program, which he supervised; about CIA torture, which he had little to do with; for the kill lists that he helped manage; and regarding the pervasive government secrecy, which he surely condoned to cover up the questionable nature of the assassination lists and the drones. Not surprisingly, he was forced to defend the policies of an administration that he has served as top counterterrorism adviser.

But he also cited his basic disagreement with CIA interrogation policies and expressed surprise at learning that enhanced interrogation—which he refused to label torture because he is “no lawyer”—had not provided any unique or actionable information. He had only “raised serious questions” in his own mind on the issue after reading the 300-page summary of the recent 6,000-page report prepared by the Senate Intelligence Committee, a document that detailed the failure of the Agency program. Brennan’s reaction suggested at a minimum that he had read material produced by CIA that had inflated the value of the intelligence produced.

Surprisingly, the subject of rendition—which Brennan must surely have been involved with while at CIA—hardly surfaced, though two other interesting 片段 emerged from the questioning. One was confirmation that the government has its own secret list of innocent civilians killed by drones, even as it maintains that such fatalities do not occur. And more relevant to Brennan himself, Sen. John D. Rockefeller provided insight into the still-classified Senate report on CIA torture, mentioning that the enhanced interrogation program was both “managed incompetently” and “corrupted by personnel with pecuniary conflicts of interest.” One would certainly like to learn more about the contractors (presumably) who profited corruptly from waterboarding, and to know if they were in any way punished—especially as Brennan several times spoke about the need for accountability.

布伦南根本没有被问及该委员会提出的利益冲突或道德问题。 旋转门 that he benefited from when he left CIA as deputy executive director in 2005 and joined a British-owned company, The Analysis Corporation (TAC), where he was named CEO. He almost certainly made millions when CIA and other federal agencies awarded TAC contracts to develop biometrics and set up systems to manage the government’s various watch lists. Brennan also reportedly knew how to return a favor, giving his former boss at CIA, George Tenet, a compensated advisory position with his company and hosting in 2007 a book signing for Tenet’s 在风暴中心. The invitation-only event included 600 current and former intelligence officers, some of whom waited for hours to have Tenet sign copies of the book, which were provided by TAC.

The Senate’s lack of curiosity extended to questions relating to what Brennan might do to make CIA relevant in the coming post-“Global War on Terrorism” environment. If one thing is certain after the misadventures in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is that the United States will not launch a ground war to combat terrorism unless there is another attack along the lines of 9/11 initiated by some state player. The Senate’s deep unease about the drone program, which has swallowed up Agency resources and become the ugly face of CIA, was also evident. Drones have become the driver for both budgets and the training of new officers at Langley.

Even CIA’s friends on the Senate panel implied that in their view the Agency has become a paramilitarized killing machine in which traditional skills in espionage and analysis have been abandoned. The White House apparently intends to change that, which will force a realignment of what CIA does. President Obama has spoken of his goal of demilitarizing both 反恐 和美国 外交, allowing the State Department, aided by the law-enforcement and intelligence communities, to step up its efforts as the Pentagon’s role in those areas declines. This is overdue: there are simply fewer terrorists to go around, and those that remain are far less capable than their predecessors. The “with us or against us” mentality of the Bush years only succeeded in making enemies for the United States worldwide. To be sure, drones are here to stay. But the CIA will have to take the lead in counterterrorism in the old fashioned way by spying, running agents, and working cooperatively with local intelligence and security services overseas. Back in Washington, focused intelligence estimates rather than analysis to identify drone targets will be crucial in anticipating developing threats in such a way as to maximize dwindling resources.

So that is Brennan’s task—to make things as they once were. But no one asked how he will do it, and his job will be all the harder because basic espionage and analytical skills that have been lost at CIA over the past 12 years. Brennan, however, is “old school.” He has worked as a CIA analyst and as an operations officer, is reportedly fluent in Arabic, and has served as chief of station in Saudi Arabia. He knows what has to be done, and he appreciates the value of good liaison relationships, which used to be the backbone of the Agency’s overseas operations. Training must be tweaked to emphasize the once more required old skills, and the entire system of rewards has to be revamped so that recruiting a useful source who will provide a steady stream of information for ten years will be more career-enhancing than directing a drone to kill a suspected terrorist. And no, it won’t happen overnight: kill lists and drones will continue. But a return to the “normal” security environment that prevailed prior to 9/11 is no longer unimaginable.

菲利普·吉拉尔迪(Philip Giraldi),前中情局官员,是国家利益委员会执行董事。

(从重新发布 美国保守党 经作者或代表的许可)
• 类别: 对外政策 •标签: 中央情报局, 恐怖主义 
忽略评论者...跟随Endorsed Only
  1. The “Bay of Pigs” paramilitary role is too entrenched and with the propensity of Presidents to use a private army unaccountable to the other branches of government, I cannot imagine this role ever being seriously downgraded. If traditional intelligence skills have been degraded, the most likely scenario is for a competent restoration of them, without relinquishing the role running off-the-books “secret” wars. History shows us, right from its origins after World War II, that attempts to reign this behavior in are fitful and ultimately unsuccessful. The CIA offers Presidents a corrupting kind of absolute power, too tempting to resist.

  2. Wes 说:

    “the United States will not launch a ground war to combat terrorism unless there is another attack along the lines of 9/11 initiated by some state player.”

    Does this mean that no non-state actor is capable anymore of launching a terrorist attack of the intensity of 9/11 as states have a lot more resources and capabilites or does this mean that the United States would never launch another ground war in retaliation for a 9/11-style terrorist attack by Al-Qaeda or another non-state actor? If it is the latter, I don’t know why a terrorist attack launched by a state should be seen as having greater urgency than one launched by a non-state actor.

    Anyway, I would think that terrorist groups with some kind of state support are more threatening. Al-Qaeda was protected by the Taliban in Afghanistan and we don’t know what other direct or indirect support Al-Qaeda may have received from other countries. Hezbollah, which has launched terrorist attacks around the world and has a huge weapons cache, receives a lot of support from Iran and Syria. And Hamas also receives support from Iran and some from other countries too.

  3. It’s OK for Dept. Of Defense to become a political football (Hagel nomination) because the military is being retired in favor of the CIA (the presidents private army). That way Imperial aggression can be carried out in total secret. Obama is perfecting Dick Cheney’s vision of President as Napoleon.

    The country and especially the world will be a much much better place when the CIA is no more.

  4. Great piece. And we should bear in mind George Tenet’s role in helping the neocon warmongers dupe the occupant of the White House, to bring on the idiotic invasion of Iraq.

  5. Wes – – Hezbollah would prefer to focus its attention on improving the lives of the Shia community in Lebanon.

    Has Israel caused many of its problems with Hamas, by continuing its insane and illegal colonisation programme in the West Bank?

  6. Thos. 说:

    I am heartened by this piece. A new-new normal is long overdue, and maybe Brennan will advance that at CIA.

    But the real rat’s nest is policy-making. That’s where the American voter must step up, dumping special interest and lobby-bought politicians who pushed the policies that caused such grave damage to the country.

  7. Anonymous • 免责声明 说:

    Given the Obama administration’s first-term record on secret warfare and drones, the evidence points to a continuation of existing policy. Mr. Brennan’s career since 9/11 hardly indicates that he is interested in leading a change in CIA strategies and activities. I’d like to believe what this article claims, but it needs to provide more evidence to be credible.

  8. DrJ 说:

    Al-Qaeda and groups like them, like the Taliban and other i.e. Sunni/Salafi/Wahabi extremist terror groups in countries like Pakistan, Syria, Iraq, Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, get their support from Saudi Arabia, Qatar and UAE. We do know where al-Qaeda gets it support, (don’t let the poster ‘Wes’ mislead you); we just don’t really talk about it, because al-Qaeda gets it support from American allies.

    Funny how people who are always quick to blame Iran for supporting Hezbollah, always seem to neglect how America’s Arab allies are always supporting terrorists and will continue to do so, because America says it’s okay.


发表评论 -

 记得 我的信息为什么?
提交的评论已被许可给 Unz评论 并可以由后者自行决定在其他地方重新发布
通过RSS订阅此评论主题 通过RSS订阅所有Philip Giraldi的评论
Personal 古典文学