我已拥有术语 Occupocalypse ©、香港 Occupocalypse © 和 Occupocalypse Now 的版权！ © 如你所见。 请联系我获取T恤和雨伞许可等。

不过实话说…

有趣的是，美国、英国和联合国秘书长都对香港事态发展表示关切，呼吁克制。

换言之，我们看到的是香港问题正在逐渐国际化。 考虑到迄今为止这件事的相对较小和地方性，至少，它让人停顿一下。

毕竟，在一些对抗性的街头抗议之后，香港目前的伤亡人数是几十人，一些催泪瓦斯被发射了，现在每个人都坐在那里等待占领香港的最新举措。

既然美国无数次通过军用绞肉机向中东重新喂食，乌克兰东部发现了被屠杀的平民的万人坑，而美国可以难道不谴责以色列在加沙采取不成比例的军事行动，造成 2000 人死亡，其中包括 500 名儿童？

不想这么说，但美国认为在香港制造有利可图的恶作剧的推论是不可避免的。

我相信占领香港是一个合法的本地运动，有合法的本地不满，而且几乎是一种本地现象。

我还相信，它的领导层花了几个月的时间来规划当前的竞选活动，该活动的一部分涉及让美国了解情况并进行协调 罗莎 与美国利用动乱向中国施加压力。

阿拉巴马州之月的伯恩哈德 出土 2012 年 NDI 的一项引人入胜的预算项目（而且，我必须拥有，谴责我将香港演示视为本土的天真）：

国家民主国际事务研究所 – 460,000 美元 提高人们对香港政治体制和宪政改革进程的认识，并 发展能力 公民—— 特别是大学生 – 为了更有效地参与关于政治改革的公开辩论，NDI 将与民间社会组织合作进行议会监督、调查和互联网门户的开发，让学生和公民 探索导致普选的可能改革.[伯恩哈德的粗体]

正如我当时发推文所说，“必须承认，我没想到香港成熟的公民社会会在这个问题上需要美国的支持。 他们用那 460 万美元做了什么，挖出卡迪·斯坦顿的尸体 [卡迪·斯坦顿是一位早期的参政女英雄]，然后把它运到香港？”

管间也排出了 图片 的香港民主化身陈方安生和李柱铭在前往华盛顿参加 NED 会议的路上与美国副总统乔拜登面对面。 拜登可能被委托分享他对民主的见解，但他也是奥巴马政府全球政权管理过渡时期的首选目标。

西方威望媒体没有报道，这并不奇怪，因为据我所知（中国事务媒体预算排除了对付费和配额报道的无限制点击和阅读，并过度依赖解析 journos 的自我祝贺推文）西方报道，没有点名，已经尴尬到令人畏缩的地步。

好吧，我不会指名道姓或媒体，但有一家知名报纸储存了大量在中国被驱逐或以其他方式不受欢迎的记者，其管理层显然已决定投资于他们的卓越报道（未发酵，毫无疑问，任何意义上的个人不满）都应该兑现，它考虑了一年/也许十年/也许世纪的故事。 （而且，随着香港骚乱的发展，我想知道中华人民共和国是否会通过大肆宣传某位中华人民共和国新闻负责人在北京面临死刑的谩骂指控来回击折磨其媒体的人，因为他泄露了某篇论文声称其独立的、迄今为止在中国报道中取得的最高成就的故事。）

回香港。

据我所知，流行的媒体模因是亲爱的，亲爱的示威者； 天安门Redux； 和习近平完全被骗了！

先说最后一个，据我所知，对中共最高领导人习近平与香港有关的思维方式的痴迷，与香港的记者非常适合报道的一个故事的相当轻薄的报道形成鲜明对比，凭借位置、同情和接触，这就是占港运动的策略。

为了教育我的读者，我的策略是整个运动都经过精心策划和深思熟虑：从学生示威者开始； 期望/激起警方过度反应； 呼吁行政长官辞职（我们现在所处的位置）； 更大的示威； Benny Tai博士代表的成人领导层出现； 更复杂的要求，也许是通过一些涉及立法会的法律程序让行政长官辞职，也许随后是正式的民主公投； ??.

至于中共的反应，似乎也出自其标准剧本：本地人（香港行政长官梁振英）有机会遏制危机，可想而知他妈的，危机组合交给了中共精英团队在幕后进行细致、专注的管理，本地人担任前台人员/替补角色。

昨天，顺便说一句，第一个正式的要求（经过几天的游行/演示/对抗）终于从占领方面出现了。 通过 Twitter 的魔力，从 Rappler 的标题作者的经典反转片开始（我注意到最广泛采用的诽谤/虚假陈述格式是在具有误导性和煽动性的标题下打印相当准确的文章和/或描述性的蛞蝓。我想知道这种方法是否已被证明在欺骗公众方面是有效的，这可能只是略过头条新闻而无法阅读支持文本）：

香港领导人要求“立即”结束抗议活动 通过 @拉普勒网络

中国之手（我）权衡（几条推文串在一起并被引用）：

梁实际上说的是“我要求他们兑现承诺”。 本篇 更像是来自OHK的要求：“如果梁宣布辞职，这个职业至少会在短时间内暂时停止，我们将决定下一步行动。” 不知道中共会不会觉得这一系列的让步和威胁，对可梁来说，有吸引力。 “甩掉梁，我们宣布胜利，回家休息，下周再来”听起来不是一个不可抗拒的提议。 这是深度游戏的迹象……还是没有游戏？

在我个人看来，我不认为中共打算在一个十七岁的学生领导的一群学生这样说的情况下解雇梁振英（被示威者辱骂为北京无能的走狗），因为示威者人数众多在街上出现了几天。

And I don’t think the demonstrators expect this either. The main objective is to trumpet Leung’s intransigence (with, it seems, a little reality-massaging help from outlets like The Rappler) to justify bigger demonstrations, more outrage and, I expect, if and when the demonstrations gain significant traction and Hong Kong is polarizing to Occupy’s advantage then the Occupy elders will emerge to make their demands on the Hong Kong government from a position of optimal strength.

And I strongly suspect the CCP knows the Occupy game plan, not just because of the reality on the ground but because Occupy is probably chockablock with moles feeding info to Hong Kong and PRC security forces (and Occupy I expect is running a few countermoles; I also take Benny Tai’s rather preposterous occasions of handwringing over “Occupy is fading” or “Occupy is outta control” over the last few weeks as disinfo meant to sandbag public opinion and manage its expectations, if not the PRC’s).

Won’t find much of this kind of ruminating over the Occupy strategy or the day-to-day mindset of its leadership in the Western press. In fact, one senior editor disgorged a tweet today that the Occupy movement was leaderless, a misrepresentation that I, in my current frame of mind, found more sinister than ridiculous.

Instead, there’s been a spate of articles purporting to get inside the faraway and unfamiliar territory of Xi Jinping’s head—as I put it in twitter terms “brilliant Western journos lecture Commie dictator on how to run his f*cked up country” pieces. The pieces pontificate on Xi’s lack of options, his rigidity, his lack of moral clarity, how he’s boxed himself into a corner on Hong Kong etc. with a declaration that he brought the crisis on himself by the PRC government’s issuing the inflammatory White Paper on Hong Kong governance.

(I think history will judge, once it gets around to the issue, that the Occupy activists seized on the White Paper—which primarily stated that the PRC ultimately runs the show in Hong Kong, an observation that I think was no surprise to anybody—as a pretext for kicking off the current movement. If it wasn’t the White Paper, it would have been something else.)

I also think, especially if Hong Kong doesn’t blow up in Occupocalypse (c) ! In the next few weeks, that a lot of journos should be pretty embarrassed about what they wrote and tweeted. But I kind of doubt it.

The key journalistic framing/expectation is that Hong Kong is Tiananmen Redux. As I discussed in a previous post, Hong Kong is a big and dangerous problem, but it is no Tiananmen. As a reminder, the CCP was shaken to its core in 1989 by a major economic and political crisis, a split leadership, hundreds of thousands of demonstrators camped out in the nation’s capital and demonstrations, violence, and factionalism in virtually all of China’s major urban centers while, on top of everything else, the Soviet Union—which was generally considered at the time the PRC’s military, economic, and organizational superior—collapsed in chaos.

Hong Kong 2014 not so much.

Nevertheless—and despite the fact that the CCP’s main job description is dealing every year with the literally thousands of admittedly less dire “mass incidents” prompted by the cruelties and inefficiencies of its rule without military force–the breathless prediction is that Xi can’t make concessions; so he’s gonna send in the tanks!

I find this scenario pretty unlikely. Could happen (throw in the necessary ass-covering hedge) but Hong Kong is still a special case, with the crisis largely limited to Hong Kong, with the PRC regime prosperous and united and with resources of money and influence that would dwarf anything that Li Peng could have imagined in 1989. And whatever combination of soldiers and People’s Armed Police the PRC decides to throw at Hong Kong if the local cops are overwhelmed and insurrection rears its head, they will probably perform their jobs more neatly and professionally than the disoriented blunderers of the 38^th Field Army in 1989.

Hong Kong also has limited resonance inside China because the segment of the Hong Kong population alienated from the PRC and out on the streets is also the segment that has alienated the mainlander population with its abrasive and condescending chauvinism, an awkward fact apparently skated over in fawning Western coverage of the adorable demonstrators.

Though generations of journos, activists, and scholars would disagree, I find the Tiananmen analogy way past its sell-by date and a barrier to understanding what the PRC can and will do. I suspect the West clings to it because it provides that instantaneous good guy/bad guy framing so important to public diplomacy. Also, on a deeper level, the Tiananmen meme hearkens back to a happier, sunnier time when the US was the omnipotent and benevolent lawgiver in a unipolar world, and not a peer competitor in relative decline, increasingly perceived as an incompetent and resented mangler of nations.

Finally, of course, the prospect of a bloody crackdown, even if it currently exists primarily in the expectations of the foreign media, allows the West to claim humanitarian and/or security skin in the game. Call it R2P, call it solicitude for the immense importance of Hong Kong as a linchpin of the global financial system (forgetting the fact that Hong Kong’s jittery tycoons are still firmly lined up on Beijing’s side), and the West can inject itself into what is still a messy but manageable political crisis in Hong Kong.

And, if you’re going to hype a potential massacre, you’d better hype the innocent adorableness of the demonstrators. I agree, the demonstrators are adorable, but the extent to which Western and Hong Kong journos swoon over their umbrella-brandishing, trash-collecting, and banana-offering ways is ludicrous and misleading. The general intent appears to be to present the demonstrations as a spontaneous outpouring of indignation by innocents, thereby depriving them of agency (to trot out a sociological term) and make the other side responsible for anything that happens to them.

This is, of course, an important framing because, in addition to being personally adorable, the demonstrators will be engaging in actions that might be considered obnoxious: tying up roads, storming government buildings, etc. Heartfelt emotional expressions of unconditional student-love might be needed to paper over a few excesses.

All in all, I predict predictable if not coordinated synergies in escalating unrest, escalating BS in the media, and escalating handwringing by foreign governments.

As to where it all ends, my guess is that, thanks to the growing alienation of the Hong Kong population and its encouragement and celebration by foreign governments and media, the Hong Kong governance problem will never go away. The priority of the CCP will be to try to keep a lid on it, manage it, and try to divide and weaken the pro-democracy movement to the point that the Hong Kong populace becomes disillusioned and the city can return to business as usual.

The key question for me is, if the CCP keeps its cool, avoids the ultimate polarizing crisis, and settles in for protracted, slow-burn war, will the interests and strategies of the United States and the Occupy movement diverge?

The U.S. willingness to see the PRC hoisted on its anti-democratic petard—and encourage the process—should be apparent to anyone who follows these issues. And it’s Hong Kong today, Taiwan tomorrow, as strategists are well aware.

Best case, for the US anyway, is the PRC commits some immense, irretrievable blunder in its handling of the Hong Kong crises, with major, debilitating knock-on effects in Taiwan, Xinjiang, Tibet, and maybe the Han heartland.

But that’s not necessarily the best-case situation for Hong Kong.

There is no conceivable scenario in which the US can project meaningful support for the movement inside Hong Kong. The best it can promise if things turn to sh*t is escape, asylum, and sinecures for the leaders.

Wonder if that will be enough for the leadership…or the people on the streets.